Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java by Ricklefs, M.C.
University of Hawai‘i Press
Honolulu, Hawai‘i 96822
www.uhpress.hawaii.edu
N U S  P R E S S
S I N G A P O R E
9 789971 696313 N U S  P R E S S
S I N G A P O R E
The Javanese — one of the largest ethnic groups in the Islamic world — were once 
mostly ‘nominal Muslims’, with a minority of pious believers and the majority 
seemingly resistant to Islam’s call for greater piety. Over the tumultuous period 
analyzed here — from colonial rule through Japanese occupation and Revolution 
to the chaotic democracy of the Sukarno period, the Soeharto regime’s aspirant 
totalitarianism and the democratic period since — that society has changed 
profoundly to become an extraordinary example of the rising religiosity that marks 
the modern age.
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Islamic and Other Visions (c. 1830–1930) (NUS Press, 2007) and Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of 
Islamisation from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries (EastBridge, 2006).
Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java 
draws on a formidable body of sources, 
including interviews, archival documents 
and a vast range of published material, to 
situate the Javanese religious experience 
from the 1930s to the present day in its 
local political, social, cultural and religious 
settings. The concluding part of the 
author’s monumental three-volume series 
assessing more than six centuries of the 
ongoing Islamisation of the Javanese, the 
study has considerable relevance for much 
wider contexts. Beliefs, or disbeliefs, about 
the supernatural are important in all societies; and the nal section of the book, 
which considers the signicance of Java’s religious history in global contexts, 
shows how this history exemplies a profound contest of values in the universal 
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Dedicated to
those who, over the centuries, have lost their livelihoods, 
their homes, their friends, their loved ones, their dignity,
their dreams, their health, their freedom and their lives,
because of conflicts over what people believe
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Preface
This is the final volume in a series concerning the history of the Islamisation 
of the Javanese people. Beliefs — or disbeliefs — about the supernatural are 
important in any society, so this series seeks to address questions that are 
not about the Javanese alone. The first of these books was Mystic synthesis in 
Java: A history of Islamisation from the fourteenth to the early nineteenth centuries 
(2006) and the second Polarising Javanese society: Islamic and other visions c. 
1830–1930 (2007); both of these are summarised briefly in the first chapter 
here. These two and the present book focus in large part on the connection 
between what people believe and what they do. Much is about religion and 
politics, about the relationship between two forms of authority, knowledge 
and power and those who wield them. Pursuing the broader issues, I have 
drawn comparisons with other societies and times in these books, and the 
final chapter in this volume considers some broad, I think universal, topics.
There is something of a writing tradition that regards the Javanese 
as mystically exotic, as somehow not quite like anybody else. Colonial-era 
literature is full of such mythologising and stereotyping. In those days, the 
Dutch sometimes called the Javanese ‘the gentlest people of the earth’ and 
some modern writers have succumbed to a similar temptation to romanticise 
them, to see Javanese as the people of an ageless land of ‘magic and mystics’ 
(the title of a 1974 book by the traveller Nina Epton). The Javanese have 
just seemed so ‘Eastern’. An absurd consequence of this was the title of a 
film released in 1969 about the eruption of Mount Krakatau in 1883, called 
‘Krakatoa: East of Java’. Krakatau is actually west of Java, but evidently only 
‘east’ was exotic enough.
I recognise that it is still possible to romanticise Java. One evening in 
2006 I was talking with the idiosyncratic kyai Mbah Lim at his religious 
school near Klaten. With the sun going down and rain gathering, a breeze 
blew up across the rice fields and came through the open front area of the 
house where we were sitting, with frog and other evening noises rising — a 
reminder of how beguiling the Javanese countryside can be at the end of a 
hot day.
xviii
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Preface xix
But this is not a book about romance or exoticism, and the Javanese 
experience is no less a part of the universal human experience than anybody 
else’s. As one of Salman Rushdie’s characters puts it, ‘The curse of the 
human race is not that we are so different from one another, but that we 
are so alike’.1
It may be worth briefly reminding ourselves of the scale of significance 
of this Javanese story. The ethnic Javanese total about 100 million people 
— about 40 per cent of Indonesia’s total population approaching 250 
million.2 Indonesia is the fourth largest nation in the world, the world’s 
largest Muslim-majority nation and its third largest democracy. The island 
of Java hosts not only the national capital Jakarta and the vast conurbation 
that surrounds it — with all of the political, cultural, social and economic 
significance that brings3 — but also several other important cities of 
Indonesia. In the Javanese-speaking heartland of Central and East Java 
are found Surabaya, Semarang, Malang and the venerable cultural centres 
of Surakarta and Yogyakarta. Outside those cities, from the coasts to the 
mountain ranges, are found small towns and smaller villages where millions 
of Javanese seek to improve their lives and those of their neighbours, 
loved ones and descendants. The political, social, cultural and religious 
transformations that we are about to chart are no small-scale matters.
I hope that by the time you have reached the end of this rather large 
book, you will be persuaded that the history presented here tells us some 
important things about how human societies change, in particular about the 
interaction between religion and politics and the links between what people 
believe and what, as a consequence, they do.
M.C. Ricklefs
Singapore, 2012
1 Salman Rushdie, The enchantress of Florence: A novel (London: Vintage Books, 
2009), p. 392.
2 Based on estimates in the online CIA World Factbook, at https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html.
3 Jakarta and West Java are the subject of a forthcoming study by my colleague 
Chaider Saleh Bamualim, tentatively entitled Islamisation and resistance in West Java: 
A study of religion, politics and social change since c. 1965.
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Transcription and orthography
In the period covered in this book, the writing of Javanese in its own script 
died out and was almost completely replaced by a romanised form which 
does not distinguish between different sounds for e (as Javanese script 
did). Because of this and in order to be consistent throughout this book, 
the scholarly transcription system normally used for Javanese has not been 
used, so no distinctions are drawn among the pronunciations /ə/, /é/ or 
/è/. In Javanese, vowels are pronounced as in English except for a, which is 
pronounced rather like English o when it is found in penultimate and final 
syllables without final consonants. In Indonesian, vowels are pronounced 
as in English. In both Javanese and Indonesian, consonants are generally 
(ignoring some subtleties) pronounced as they are in English (with g as 
a hard consonant), with the following exceptions. In both languages, c is 
pronounced like English ch as in ‘chair’. In Indonesian, sy is pronounced like 
English sh. Stress in both Indonesian and Javanese words is generally on 
the penultimate syllable. Plurals of Indonesian or Javanese words have been 
formed here by adding the English form s or es.
For place names, contemporary Indonesian usage is employed. For 
example, Kediri is found rather than the correctly Javanese form Kedhiri 
(Kědhiri) and Ponorogo rather than Panaraga (or the older form Pranaraga).
Consistency in transliterating Javanese personal names became a 
problem after they came to be written in the Western alphabet. Javanese 
individuals often varied in their own choice of transcriptions. I have 
attempted to follow personal preferences where they are known. Colonial-
era spellings are sometimes used, particularly for personal names, including 
in post-colonial times. For example, President Soeharto’s name was usually 
spelled in this old-fashioned way. In such cases, dj is pronounced like English 
j, tj is pronounced like English ch, j is pronounced like English y, and oe is 
pronounced like English u. Thus, one finds here Tjokroaminoto rather than 
the ‘correct’ transcription Cakraaminata. Soeharto’s name is pronounced 
‘Suharto’ (which, were we to use the scholarly transcription system for 
Javanese script, would be spelled Suharta). One can have some sympathy, if 
xx
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little professional respect, for the hapless Australian television correspondent 
in Jakarta who insisted on reporting about ‘President So-é-harto’.
Arabic is transcribed with a simplified version of the system found 
in the third edition of Encyclopaedia of Islam. Diacritics are used as little as 
possible. The ‘ayn is indicated by ‘ (being one of the most difficult sounds for 
non-native speakers to pronounce: a sort of a sound made in the pharynx), 
while the hamza glottal stop is indicated with ’. Words in Old Javanese and 
Sanskrit follow currently accepted systems of transliteration. In Sanskrit 
words, ś is pronounced like English sh.
Transcription and Orthography xxi
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PART I
THE TROUBLED PATH TO 
DEEPER ISLAMISATION, TO c. 1998
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Islamisation in Java to c. 1930 3
c h a p te r  1
Islamisation in Java to c. 19301
The Javanese developed a sophisticated literary and religious culture and were 
governed by sophisticated elites long before Islam made its first recorded 
appearance in Javanese society in the 14th century. This earlier civilisation 
was inspired by Hindu and Buddhist ideas and left behind legacies of art, 
architecture, literature and thought that continued to impress both Javanese 
and outsiders. There may well have been Muslims travelling in Java before 
the 14th century and there may have been Javanese converts to Islam, but 
all we can know is that the first evidence of Javanese Muslims is a series 
of gravestones beginning in 1368–9. These appear to record the deaths of 
Javanese of the aristocratic (perhaps royal) elite at the court of the Hindu-
Buddhist kingdom of Majapahit in East Java, at the very height of its 
glory, who were Muslims. One theme that recurs throughout the history 
of Javanese Islam is the role played by elites. Only rarely is this a history of 
bottom-up religious change.
Creating the Mystic Synthesis
The early development of Islam in Java is poorly documented, but 16th-
century manuscripts suggest both that Islam was accommodating itself to 
the Javanese cultural environment and that it was not. On the one hand is 
3
 1 This chapter summarises briefly my books Mystic synthesis in Java: A history of 
Islamisation from the fourteenth to the early nineteenth centuries (Norwalk: EastBridge, 
2006) and Polarising Javanese society: Islamic and other visions c. 1830–1930 (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press; Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press; Leiden: KITLV 
Press, 2007). Details may be sought in those volumes. Only direct quotations will be 
footnoted in this chapter.
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4 Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java
evidence of a hybrid culture in which being Javanese and being Muslim at the 
same time was seen as unproblematic, a culture in which older local terms for 
God, prayer, heaven and soul prevailed over their Arabic equivalents. On the 
other is evidence that people were expected to choose between being Muslim 
and being Javanese. All that this tells us is that Islamisation was a contested 
and complicated matter in this early period. Two processes seem to have gone 
on at the same time: foreign Muslims settled locally and became Javanese, 
while local Javanese embraced Islam and became Muslims. Legends about 
this period tell of nine saints (the wali sanga) who were the first to bring 
Islam to Java. Their graves became places of pilgrimage and through their 
legends they remain today symbols of how some people think Islamisation 
should take place, by a process of accommodation with local culture. But there 
is no reliable historical evidence at all about these men or their doings.
The court in the interior was still Hindu-Buddhist when the Portu-
guese apothecary Tomé Pires visited the north coast of Java in 1513. He 
was much impressed by the grandeur of the court (which he knew through 
its reputation): ‘They use krises, swords, and lances of many kinds, all inlaid 
with gold’ and had ‘stirrups all inlaid with gold, inlaid saddles, such as 
are not to be found anywhere else in the world’, he wrote.2 A Javanese 
Illustration 1 Kyai Wali, a Javanese kris with its scabbard; reputedly a 
15th- or 16th-century blade made by the wali Sunan Giri, 
with a 19th-century Surakarta hilt
2 Armando Cortesão (ed. and transl.), The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires and the book of 
Francisco Rodrigues (2 vols; London: The Hakluyt Society, 1944), vol. 1, pp. 174–5.
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Islamisation in Java to c. 1930 5
nobleman from the court whom he saw in person had ‘three handsomely 
caparisoned jennets with stirrups all inlaid, with cloths all adorned with 
richly worked gold, with beautiful caparisons’.3 This court fell to an alliance 
of local Muslim lords c. 1527, but its reputation and styles continued to be 
influential thereafter.
By the early 17th century, the ruling dynasty was that of Mataram 
(the area of present-day Yogyakarta). There the greatest king of post-
Majapahit Java, Sultan Agung (r. 1613–46), acted to reconcile kraton and 
Islamic traditions. He continued his royal liaison with the most powerful of 
Central Java’s indigenous (and definitely not Islamic) deities, the Goddess 
of the Southern Ocean (Ratu Kidul), but he also took decisive steps to make 
his court a more Islamic one. In 1633 he made a pilgrimage to Tembayat, 
where is found the holy grave of Sunan Bayat, regarded as the wali who 
introduced Islam to the Mataram area and whose grave-site had been the 
centre for resistance to Agung’s rule, which he crushed. Agung is said to 
have communed with the saint’s spirit, which taught him secret mystical 
sciences; thus were Bayat’s powers attached to the monarchy. Agung also 
abandoned the Old Javanese Indian-style Śaka calendar for a hybrid 
Javanese dating system using Islamic lunar months, an act which no doubt 
was also supernaturally potent. He reconciled with the princely family of 
Surabaya which had been his main opponent while he was building his 
empire by marrying one of his sisters to the senior surviving Surabaya 
prince, whose ancestry reached back to one of the most senior of the walis. 
With this prince’s assistance, Agung introduced major works of Islamically 
inspired literature into the court canon that were themselves thought to 
have magical potency. One of these works, Kitab Usulbiyah, claimed that 
reading or writing it was equivalent to fulfilling two of Islam’s five pillars 
— undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca and giving alms — and also to 
going on Holy War. In this work, the Prophet Muhammad is depicted as 
wearing the golden crown of Majapahit, thus bringing together two powerful 
Islamic and Javanese symbols.
Agung’s reconciliation of Islamic identity with Javanese royal traditions 
was not pursued with similar enthusiasm by his successors. For several 
decades, rebellions against the dynasty largely justified themselves in the 
name of Islam. From the 1670s, Madurese, Makasarese and other non-
Javanese became involved in the wars in Java. The beleaguered dynasty turned 
to the Dutch East India Company for military support. The Company’s 
 3 Ibid., pp. 191–2.
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intervention enabled the dynasty to survive, but it also enhanced the religious 
aspect of rebellions — for now the dynasty’s enemies could see it supported 
by kafirs — and played a major role in the Company’s own bankruptcy at 
the end of the 18th century.
After decades of destructive civil wars in which religious identity played 
a major role, a second reconciliation of the kraton and Islamic sensibilities 
took place in the reign of Pakubuwana II (r. 1726–49). The prime mover 
here was the young king’s aged, blind and pious Sufi grandmother Ratu 
Pakubuwana (b. c. 1657, d. 1732). Inspired by the example of Sultan 
Agung, she had new versions of the magically powerful works of his reign 
recomposed in the court. She made it clear in the introductions to those 
versions that she herself was particularly blessed by God and that these 
books deployed supernatural power which would both bring her own life to 
perfection and make perfect the reign of her grandson, making of him the 
ideal Sufi king. There were indeed kraton-led efforts to make the society more 
devoutly Islamic. The people were commanded to be diligent in attending the 
mosque on Fridays, gambling was outlawed at the court (with an exception 
for cock-fighting) and there is some evidence of the hands of thieves being 
amputated. Pre-Islamic doctrines, works of literature and other practices 
were, however, preserved within the court, but they were understood as being 
properly Islamic. This Islamisation project was idiosyncratic in other ways as 
well. Opium was banned (in theory) but the court’s taste for European wine, 
liquor and beer was evidently unabated. 
Pakubuwana II, however, was no ideal king. He was young, inconstant, 
foolish and probably rather stupid. His court disintegrated into deadly 
cliques that he could not manage. When war began between the Dutch East 
India Company and locally domiciled Chinese with their Javanese allies in 
1740, the king first sided against the Company. He attacked, besieged and 
eventually compelled the surrender of the Company fortress at his court 
city of Kartasura, forcing the surviving Europeans to convert to Islam. He 
was now the conquering Sufi king of Holy War, bringing low the Christian 
kafirs. But changing military circumstances then made him think that this 
had been a mistake, and that it would have been wiser to side with the 
Company after all. Tentative steps towards reconciliation produced disaster, 
since neither the Company nor the rebels could now trust him. He found 
that his own court became the target of the rebels; in 1742 the kraton fell to 
them and Pakubuwana II took flight. Now the Company was prepared to 
deal with him, since he was prepared to offer whatever the Company might 
ask to restore him to his throne. Eventually the Company and its Madurese 
and Javanese allies prevailed and Pakubuwana II was restored to his battered 
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court, which he soon abandoned. He seems also to have abandoned any 
enthusiasm he had for further Islamising efforts or demonstrations of 
muscular piety. He moved to his new court of Surakarta in 1746.
The following years spawned more conflict, notably the rebellion of 
Png. Mangkubumi, who fought the forces of Pakubuwana III (r. 1749–88) 
and the declining Company to a standstill. Mangkubumi was proclaimed 
as a king in his own right, took the title of Sultan Hamengkubuwana I (r. 
1749–92) and established his new court of Yogyakarta in 1755–6. Surakarta’s 
domains were further subdivided in 1757 when the flamboyant Png. 
Mangkunagara I (r. 1757–95) was given a sizeable territory. Yogyakarta’s 
lands were divided further in 1812, when a substantial portion was hived 
off by the British interim administration and given to Png. Pakualam I (r. 
1812–29). The once-great kingdom of Mataram thus came to consist of 
two senior courts — those of the Sultan of Yogyakarta and the Susuhunan 
of Surakarta — and the two subsidiary but substantial principalities of the 
Pakualaman and the Mangkunagaran. Together these were what the Dutch 
called the Vorstenlanden (principalities).
During these years of tumultuous politics, the reconciliation of Javanese 
and Islamic identities, beliefs and styles produced what I have termed a 
‘Mystic Synthesis’. Within the capacious boundaries of Sufism, this synthesis 
rested on three main pillars:
• a strong sense of Islamic identity: to be Javanese was to be 
Muslim;
• observation of the five pillars of Islamic ritual: the confession of 
faith (Shahada), five daily prayers in the direction of Mecca (salat), 
giving alms (zakat), fasting during the month of Ramadan (puasa 
or pasa) and the pilgrimage to Mecca (the hajj) for those who were 
able to undertake it; and,
• despite the potential contradiction with the first two, acceptance 
of the reality of local Javanese spiritual forces such as Ratu Kidul 
(the Goddess of the Southern Ocean), Sunan Lawu (the spirit 
of Mount Lawu, essentially a wind-god) and a host of lesser 
supernatural beings.
This synthesis is illustrated in one of the important Sufi works of the time, 
the ‘Gift addressed to the Spirit of the Prophet’ (al-Tuhfa al-mursala ila 
ruh al-Nabi), which was written in the court of Yogyakarta and derived 
ultimately from the work of the Gujarati scholar Muhammad ibn Fadli’llah 
al-Burhanpuri (d. 1620). The Javanese-language text departs from the Arabic 
original in ways consistent with the Mystic Synthesis: having encountered 
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Illustration 2 Depiction of the wayang character Bima (Werkudara) 
(from Pigeaud, Javaanse volksvertoningen, 1938, pl. 102)
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difficulty in setting out the Sufi doctrine of seven stages of emanation, the 
writer resorted to the Hindu-Javanese metaphor of the relationship between 
Vishnu and Krishna. Older-style arts such as the wayang shadow play, with 
its stories taken mainly from the Hindu-Javanese epics, also continued to 
be patronised. Yet all of this was within a context in which the sense of 
being Muslim was evidently powerfully felt across Javanese society. Similar 
compromises of faith and practice could be found across the Islamic world 
in the period before the reform movements of the 18th and particularly 
19th centuries.
There is very limited evidence from this period for the religious life 
of Javanese outside kraton circles, but what we do have mostly confirms 
widespread observation of Islam’s five pillars. One account is a description 
of Gresik in East Java in 1822 by A.D. Cornets de Groot, who was Dutch 
Resident there. He wrote, 
The main points of the Islamic faith, which are carried out by many, 
are the Shahada [Confession of faith], the sembayang [daily prayer], the 
puasa (fast), the zakat [alms], fitrah [contribution at the end of the fast] 
and hajj [pilgrimage]. … The puasa (fast) is carried out by most Javanese 
of all classes.4 
Further support for this view comes from J.W. Winter, who had worked in 
Surakarta as a translator since the late 18th century and wrote a report in 
1824. His observations of Javanese Islam combine insights with ignorance 
and are not always to be taken at face value. Nevertheless, it is of interest 
that in a section entitled ‘Superstitions’, he wrote, ‘I’m not saying that the 
Javanese don’t practice well their religion of the faith of Muhammad, which 
is professed by them across the whole of Java. Its adherents are devoted to it 
as strongly as possible.’5
Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles was Lieutenant Governor of Java during 
the interim British administration of 1811–6 and wrote a famous History of 
Java. ‘Pilgrimages to Mecca are common’, he noted, and ‘every village has its 
priest, and … in every village of importance there is a mosque or building 
set apart adapted to religious worship’. He also reported the practice of 
circumcision of both boys and girls, the latter said to ‘suffer a slight operation, 
 4 A.D. Cornets de Groot, ‘Bijdrage tot de kennis van de zeden en gewoonten der 
Javanen’, TNI vol. 14, pt. 2 (1852), pp. 271–2.
 5 J.W. Winter, ‘Beknopte beschrijving van het hof Soerakarta in 1824’, BKI vol. 54 
(1902), p. 82.
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intended to be analogous’.6 A rather dissenting picture was presented by John 
Crawfurd, who was also in Java during this time. He was a shrewd observer 
but also a sternly judgmental Scottish Protestant, who condemned the 
Javanese as ‘semibarbarians’.7 He said further, 
Of all Mahomedans the Javanese are the most lax in their principles and 
practice. … Neither the prayers nor the fastings of the Indian islanders, 
commonly speaking, are very rigid. The lower orders know little, and 
care less, about these matters. … The pilgrimage to Mecca is frequently 
undertaken by the Javanese, and all the other Mahomedan tribes, less 
on account of piety, than on account of the distinctions and immunities 
which the reputation of the pilgrimage confers among a simple and 
untaught people.8
Taking all of the Javanese and foreign evidence together, it seems 
to me clear that the depiction of the Mystic Synthesis here captures the 
essence of Javanese Islam as of, say, 1800–30. It also seems likely that 
— despite some conflict of evidence on this aspect — many Javanese of all 
classes adhered to it.
The culminating symbolic expressions of the Mystic Synthesis were a 
great book and a great man. The former is the monumental Serat Centhini, 
written in the court of Surakarta in the second decade of the 19th century at 
the behest of the Crown Prince (later Susuhunan Pakubuwana V, r. 1820–3). 
This work — containing something over 200,000 lines of verse — is full 
of variety and subject to real problems of analysis, but certainly depicts a 
Javanese society in which Islam (as understood locally) was central. One of 
the characters in the text declares,
Already embracing this holy religion [Islam]
is every blade of grass in the land of Java,
following the Prophet who was Chosen.9
 6 Thomas Stamford Raffles, The history of Java (2 vols; 2nd ed; London: John Murray, 
1830), vol. II, pp. 3–4.
 7 John Crawfurd, History of the Indian Archipelago, containing an account of the manners, 
arts, languages, religions, institutions, and commerce of its inhabitants (3 vols; Edinburgh: 
Archibald Constable and Co., 1820), vol. I, p. 47 and elsewhere.
 8 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 260–71.
 9 [Pakubuwana V] Sêrat Cênthini (Suluk Tambangraras): Yasandalêm Kangjêng Gusti 
Pangeran Adipati Anom Amêngkunagara III (Ingkang Sinuhun Paku Buwana V) ing 
Surakarta (ed. and transl. Kamajaya; 12 vols; Yogyakarta: Yayasan Centhini, 1986–92), 
stanza 66:3.
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The great man was Png. Dipanagara of Yogyakarta, a son of the later 
Sultan Hamengkubuwana III (r. 1810–1, 1812–4).10 He spent much of 
his earlier years away from the kraton, which he saw as an environment 
deeply corrupted by, among other things, the European presence and 
general irreligiosity. He withdrew from this atmosphere and spent time 
at the estate of his pious great-grandmother the Ratu Ageng (the widow 
of Sultan Mangkubumi). There he studied works of Islamic inspiration as 
well as literature from the pre-Islamic Old Javanese heritage, a range of 
inspirations consistent with the Mystic Synthesis. He formed relationships 
with pious Islamic communities in the countryside. Around 1805–8 he had 
an inspirational experience in which he met several major spirits — local 
deities, the wali Sunan Kalijaga and Ratu Kidul — which convinced him 
that he had been selected to be the purifying leader of an age of devastation 
in Java, which would usher in the messianic time of the Ratu Adil, the 
Just King. Over the following years, the situation at the court and in the 
countryside deteriorated, while further visions came to Dipanagara. In one 
such, according to his autobiographical account, Dipanagara met the Ratu 
Adil himself, who said that the prince was tasked to conquer Java and that 
his mandate was the Qur’an. His final visions occurred during the fasting 
month of Ramadan in April–May 1825, when he was told that God had 
bestowed certain titles upon him, including Erucakra, the title which Javanese 
messianic traditions ascribe to the Ratu Adil.
In 1825 a final break occurred between him and the kraton with 
its Dutch allies, and the devastating Java War (1825–30) began. With 
widespread support amongst both aristocratic and commoner Javanese, 
Dipanagara initially did serious damage to the ill-prepared Europeans. 
Eventually, however, the latter gained the upper hand. This was no minor 
conflict. In the course of the fighting, the government side lost about 8,000 
European soldiers and 7,000 Indonesian, and at least 200,000 Javanese died. 
But it became clear that Dipanagara could not prevail. In 1830 he agreed to 
meet the Dutch side for negotiations: it is unclear what he really expected 
to happen, but in any case he was arrested and sent into exile, where he died 
25 years later.
The Java War was the last major resistance to Dutch dominance in 
Java. In its wake, the truly colonial period of Javanese history began, and 
10 Since the publication of my Mystic synthesis book, an outstanding and authoritative 
study of Dipanagara has at last been published: Peter Carey, The power of prophecy: 
Prince Dipanagara and the end of an old order in Java, 1785–1855 (VKI vol. 249; 
Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008).
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with that came dramatic political, social, religious and cultural change. By 
the 1850s, the three pillars of the Mystic Synthesis — the identification of 
being Javanese with being Muslim, the widespread observation of Islam’s 
five pillars and the acceptance of the reality of local spirit forces — were all 
coming under challenge.
Polarising Javanese society
By the time that Dipanagara was sent into exile, reform movements were 
already arising in the Islamic Middle East and having an influence in 
Sumatra, but not yet among the Javanese. The Wahhabi movement began 
in Arabia in the 18th century, bringing a fierce martial puritanism to the 
task of restoring Islam to its original perfection. From the 1780s a reform 
movement began to spread in Minangkabau (West Sumatra); in 1803–4 it 
became more violent under the leadership of people known as the Padris. 
They were inspired in large part by the Wahhabis, whose movement they 
knew from their experience of the hajj to Mecca, which the Wahhabis 
conquered in 1803. A civil war followed in Minangkabau which by 1815 
resulted in near-total victory for the Padri side. The Dutch were invited to 
intervene by defeated Minangkabau aristocrats, however, and they did so in 
1821, precipitating the drawn-out Padri War which only came to an end in 
1838 with final Dutch conquest and the imposition of colonial rule.
In Java, the end of the Java War in 1830 allowed the Dutch at last 
— after over two centuries of involvement there — to impose a true 
colonial regime. They implemented what is called the Cultivation System 
(cultuurstelsel), a means to wring profit from Java’s peasantry through 
various compulsory mechanisms for growing export crops. The Javanese 
administrative-aristocratic elite (priyayi) were engaged in administering this 
‘system’ (really a wide variety of local arrangements) and rewarded for their 
contribution. The cultuurstelsel also fostered a nascent Javanese middle class, 
for there were many tasks that were needed but which were not government 
monopolies. Tasks such as pottery- and gunny sack-making, smithing, brick-
laying, textile production, entertainment, agricultural processing, fishing and 
fish-farming, land transport, shipbuilding and similar trades, even some sugar 
cane harvesting, were sectors in which local entrepreneurship could develop.
At the same time, Javanese population began to grow remarkably. Al-
ready since the ending of Java’s civil wars in the mid-18th century population 
had been growing. This was probably at a rate in excess of 1 per cent per 
annum, and perhaps even substantially in excess of that rate, already in the 
third quarter of the 18th century (or so it seems, recognising the inadequacies 
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of the statistical records for that period).11 In the 19th century the population 
took off, rising from something like 3–5 million at the start of the century 
and approaching 24 million by 1890. These figures cover the whole of Java, 
encompassing areas that were majority Sundanese in West Java and majority 
Javanese in Central and East Java, with substantial Madurese population in 
the last area particularly. In the 1870s the ethnic Javanese were estimated 
(there had not yet been a census) to total about 11.5 million. These colonial 
and demographic revolutions produced considerable social dislocation.
Not only such political and social change, but also religious change 
came to the Javanese in the 19th century. For the first time Christian 
missions had some success after the end of the Java War. There were only a 
few missionaries from Europe and they had a limited effect, but there were 
several pious lay Christians of Indo-European background — competent 
in Javanese and sympathetic to Javanese culture — who began to produce 
significant numbers of converts. The first and most flamboyant was the 
Russian-Javanese Conrad Laurens Coolen, who became in effect the first 
Javanese Christian kyai. Both his teachings and his personal life scandalised 
pious Europeans, but he was more effective than they in producing a 
community of Javanese Christians. Even more effective were indigenous 
Javanese Christians who, after embracing this new faith, also presented it 
in ways that were explicable within Javanese cultural contexts. The most 
colourful was Ky. Ibrahim Tunggul Wulung — the Christian kyai with long 
flowing hair, wispy beard and supernatural powers who conversed in riddles 
and had been converted by magical phenomena. A distinction was observed 
between Kristen Jawa ( Javanese Christians) who were followers of these 
indigenous figures and Kristen Londo (Dutch Christians) who had been 
converted by the Europeans. The most influential of all was Ky. Sadrach, 
who produced the largest Christian communities in Central Java before 
his death in his late 80s in 1924. Some Javanese Muslims objected to the 
spread of Christianity. Between 1882 and 1884, almost all the churches built 
by Sadrach’s followers were burned down, but such incidents diminished 
thereafter. By 1900 there may have been some 20,000 Christians in Central 
and East Java. The Christians thus represented less than 0.1 per cent of the 
Javanese population, but they had established that being Javanese did not 
necessarily mean being Muslim.
11 This complicated issue is not discussed in my Polarising Javanese society. For a full 
discussion, see my paper ‘Some statistical evidence on Javanese social, economic and 
demographic history in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’, Modern Asian 
Studies vol. 20 (1986), no. 1, esp. pp. 28–30.
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Social change among the Javanese, particularly the emergence of a 
nascent middle class, encouraged the spread of Islamic reform movements. 
The increasing financial resources of this group enabled more of them to go 
on the hajj. While 19th-century colonial statistics are not to be taken too 
seriously, it is worth noting that in 1850, so far as the Dutch knew, only 48 
people went on the hajj from Javanese-speaking residencies but by 1858 that 
number was 2,283. In the later years of the century and into the early 20th, 
it was normal for between 1,500 and around 4,000 to go on the pilgrimage 
each year, with 7,600 going from Javanese-speaking residencies and Madura 
in 1911. The Javanese middle class in towns and cities also often had business 
and other links with local Arab communities, which constituted another 
channel for disseminating ideas about Islamic purification.
Reform movements were not universally welcomed and the Mystic 
Synthesis continued to have a large following. There are multiple works from 
the 19th century reflecting this synthesis and not a few that criticise the 
more reformist ideas then spreading. In his famous poem Serat Wedhatama 
(‘Superior wisdom’), the modernising prince and poet Mangkunagara IV (r. 
1853–81) admonished his sons,
If you insist on imitating
the example of the Prophet,
O, my boys, you overreach yourself.
As a rule you will not hold out long:
seeing that you are Javanese,
just a little is enough.12
Mangkunagara IV also criticised those ‘young people who boast of their 
theological knowledge’ and should be ‘reckoned as frauds’: ‘Oddly enough 
they deny their Javaneseness / and at all costs bend their steps to Mecca in 
search of knowledge’.13
Religious boarding schools (pesantren) — key institutions, as we will 
see throughout this book — became a significant feature of Javanese life 
in the 19th century. There have been various suggestions (none of them 
supported by reliable evidence) that the pesantren was an ancient feature of 
the Javanese countryside. In fact none are known of before the 18th century 
and it is only in the 19th century that they became a major phenomenon. In 
12 [Mangkunagara IV,] The Wedhatama: An English translation (ed. and transl. Stuart 
Robson; KITLV working papers 4; Leiden: KITLV Press, 1990), pp. 30–1, with 
minor departures from Robson’s translation.
13 Ibid., pp. 36–7.
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1863 the colonial government recorded nearly 65,000 professional religious 
(mosque functionaries, teachers at religious schools, etc.) and 94,000 students 
at religious schools. By 1872, those numbers were 90,000 and over 162,000 
respectively. In 1893 there were reckoned to be some 10,800 religious schools 
in Java and Madura with over 272,000 pupils. Many of these schools merely 
taught Qur’anic recitation by rote and elementary Islam, and in many the 
Mystic Synthesis version of Islam remained. But some taught more advanced 
topics and more reformed, more orthodox and shari‘a-oriented Islam, and 
many played a role in the deeper Islamisation of the Javanese — at least of 
those Javanese who were receptive to the message.
Sufi brotherhoods (tarekats) also underwent reform in the 19th 
century. The Naqshabandiyya (of the Khalidiyya branch) was particularly 
significant; it seems to have been introduced in Javanese areas around the 
1850s–60s. The Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya (combining the practices of 
those two orders) was also new around that time. Both of these gave greater 
emphasis to the need for adepts to adhere to the five pillars of Islamic ritual, 
countering the antinomian inclinations of some other Sufis. They were 
also more anti-Christian and played a role in leading some anti-colonial 
uprisings, all of which were crushed. The Shattariyya and other orders also 
had followers among Javanese. So also did various messianic movements, 
especially in the 1880s.
Some of Java’s Islamic reformers were conspicuous in their denunciation 
of older Javanese ideas. The most extreme example was Ky. H. Ahmad Rifa‘i 
(or Rifangi), the founder of a movement known as Rifa‘iyah or Budiah. 
He returned from the hajj to Java in the 1840s and established a pesantren 
at Kalisalak south of Tegal on the pasisir (north coast). In his numerous 
writings he sought to cleanse local Islam from what he regarded as unlawful 
innovations. He denounced wayang and other Javanese entertainments as un-
Islamic. He did not, however, reject Sufism as some other contemporary and 
many later reformers did, but insisted on Sufi practices being reformed of 
deviant ideas and local innovations. He objected strongly to Javanese officials 
who were prepared to work for the kafir Dutch rulers and did not recognise 
as valid a marriage conducted by a pangulu (mosque head) appointed by the 
colonial government. He and his followers withdrew from the corrupted (in 
their eyes) society around them and built their own mosques. Rifa‘i did not 
call for physical resistance against the colonial regime, but he was regarded as 
a threat by both the regime and the priyayi elite who worked for it. So he was 
exiled to Ambon in 1859, where he died in 1876. His movement continued 
after his exile and even in contemporary times is said to have some 7 million 
followers, particularly on the pasisir.
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Pious and devout Javanese Muslims called themselves putihan (the 
‘white ones’), but there were a good many Javanese who were not prepared 
to accept these new and more demanding versions of Islam; they were 
dubbed the abangan, ‘the red (or brown) ones’.14 This originated as a term 
of contempt used by the pious putihan in the mid-19th century — it is 
not documented before that time — but the abangan came to wear it 
comfortably. The first references known to me of the use of this term are in 
Dutch missionary reports from the 1850s.
The term abangan seems to have become more regular in its meaning 
of nominal, non-observing Muslims as the years passed, and to have spread 
across the Javanese-speaking heartland. As it did so, abangan lifestyle seems 
to have evolved away from the widespread observance of Islam’s five ritual 
pillars that had marked the Mystic Synthesis. The Dutch missionary Carel 
Poensen, who spent some 30 years in Kediri, described a dynamic Javanese 
society in the 1880s, with more reformed Islam influencing putihan life while 
the abangan were withdrawing from previous religious practices:
The influence of Islam is active in ever greater degree, at the cost of the 
previous religious life. … The truth is that, indeed, very many people are 
ever more penetrated by Arabic or Islamic concepts in a more or less 
unrecognised way. But among the great majority there flows another 
current15 which, under the influence of present circumstances, causes the 
14 I repeat here points I made in Polarising Javanese society (p. 84 n1) and elsewhere 
about the etymology of this term. A folk etymology claims that abangan (a ngoko or 
‘low Javanese’ term) derived from the name of one of the walis of Javanese Islam, Seh 
Lemah Abang, who was martyred for disclosing secret doctrines to the uninitiated, 
but there is no evidence for this. However unorthodox his methods, as a saint of 
Islam, Lemah Abang would certainly have been regarded as one of the putihan. The 
irrelevance of this etymology is confirmed by noting that in krama (‘high Javanese’) 
Lemah Abang’s name is given as Seh Siti Jenar, yet the abangan were never called 
jenaran in krama, but rather abritan (krama for ‘the red ones’). More recently, an 
Islamised etymology has also been suggested. This posits that abangan derives from 
aba‘an, from the Arabic verb aba (to reject, refuse). This is unacceptable on 3 grounds: 
(1) it is grammatically unsound; (2) at the time the term emerged, contemporary 
sources describe it as meaning ‘red’, not ‘rejectors, refusers’; and (3) again, in krama 
Javanese the term is abritan, whereas if it were from the Arabic, we would expect the 
Arabic word to be used in both ngoko and krama.
 15 Poensen’s Dutch term is stroom, which in modern Indonesian would be translated 
as aliran, the term that, as we will see, was indeed used for such political-social-
religious categories in the 20th century.
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previous — in many ways naïve — religion more and more to be lost 
to the people. Basically, people are beginning to become less religious 
and pious.16
The differences between putihan and abangan became profound, as 
differences in religious style were mirrored in broader social differences. In 
general (repeating my own summary from Polarising Javanese society),17 the 
putihan were wealthier, active in business, better dressed, had better homes, 
seemed more refined in manners, avoided opium and gambling, observed 
the pillars of Islam, gave their children more education and disciplined 
them more. The abangan were poorer, were not involved in trade and did not 
provide their children with education. Abangan still observed some religious 
activities, but did so in the name of village solidarity. Whereas the putihan 
read Arabic works and discussed the Islamic world’s affairs, the abangan 
watched wayang performances and other entertainments in which indigenous 
spiritual forces were at work. The two groups mixed with the like-minded. 
These were worlds far apart from one another and becoming more so. They 
were distinguished by religious style, social class, income, occupation, dress, 
education, manners, cultural life and the mode of raising children. Because 
many of Java’s money-lenders were from the putihan and many of their 
debtors were abangan, their interactions carried the seeds of conflicting 
interests. In the early 20th century, this mix would be made more volatile by 
the addition of political competition.
Yet another important development within the priyayi elite contributed 
to this breaking-up of Javanese society into contending groups. In some 
ways, what we observe in 19th-century Java is a competition between two 
forms of globalisation and modernisation: on the one hand, international 
Islamic purification movements and, on the other, European colonialism 
and its attendant baggage of scientific and technological advances. As the 
priyayi elite became more familiar with their Dutch overlords, more literate 
(because of limited but expanding educational opportunities for the elite), 
more familiar with the outside world of Asia, Europe and North America 
and more clear about what sorts of conduct would most promote their 
careers in the colonial context, most opted for European-style modernity 
over Islamic reform. For many this meant continuing their adherence to 
 16 C. Poensen, ‘Iets over den Javaan als mensch’, Kediri, July 1884, in Archief Raad 
voor de Zending (het Utrechts Archief ) 261; also in Mededeelingen van wege het 
Nederlandsche Zendelinggenootschap, vol. 29 (1885), p. 49.
 17 P. 102.
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the Mystic Synthesis style of Islam. It was extremely rare for priyayi to 
convert to Christianity: that was something that happened mainly among 
commoners. Around 1870, a Bupati put his continuing commitment to 
remaining a Muslim in notably more instrumentalist than spiritual terms. He 
had expressed enthusiasm for all things Dutch. His European interlocutor 
therefore asked whether this meant that he would convert to Christianity. He 
replied, ‘Ah, … to tell the truth, I would rather have four wives and a single 
God, than one wife and three Gods’.18 There were, it seems, some things 
upon which the Europeans could not improve.
In Java’s larger towns and cities, a rather hybrid society grew up, 
consisting of priyayi Javanese, Europeans and wealthier Chinese, all self-
consciously modern, with Javanese (or sometimes Malay but never Dutch) 
as their common language. Their dress, their houses and their entertainments 
reflected this hybridity: Javanese priyayi wearing military jackets or formal 
European cutaway tuxedo jackets (without tails), with Dutch decorations 
on the chest if they had them, and fine batik wraps below. They read about 
the new discoveries of science and about events outside Java. They hung 
family photographs on their walls and chandeliers from their ceilings, and 
joined Europeans and elite Chinese at thé dansant and book-reading clubs. 
Their distance from both pious Muslim Javanese and the heavily burdened 
abangan peasantry grew. They were fascinated by the discoveries of European 
archaeology and philology, which tended to depict pre-Islamic Java as a 
‘classical’ age (implying an analogy with views of European history).
Among some of these priyayi there even grew a specifically anti-Islamic 
idea — that the conversion to Islam had been a civilisational mistake and 
that the key to true modernity was to combine modern knowledge à la 
Europe with a restoration of Hindu-Javanese culture. Islam was seen as 
the cause of the fall of the greatest expression of that culture, the kingdom 
of Majapahit. In the 1870s, writers in Kediri encapsulated these ideas in 
three remarkable works of literature, Babad Kedhiri, Suluk Gatholoco and 
Serat Dermagandhul, which denounced and ridiculed Islam. The last of these 
prophesied that rejection of Islam would happen four centuries after the 
fall of Majapahit — this perhaps having been written to commemorate the 
establishment of a government school for the elite at Probolinggo in 1878, 
400 years after the traditional date for the fall of Majapahit — and even that 
the Javanese would then become Christians.
18 Quoted in [C.E. van Keesteren] v.K, ‘De Koran en de driekleur’, Stemmen uit Indie 
no. 1 (1870), p. 46.
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In the early 20th century the Islamic reform movement was strength-
ened by Modernism, which added another layer to the polarised devout 
community. Modernism denied that the four Sunni Schools of Law were 
authoritative guides to understanding Islam, seeing them more as sources 
of medieval obscurantism, and sought to return directly to the Qur’an and 
Hadith to understand God’s revelation, mobilising human reason in this 
task. Modernism was thus open to modern social styles and, above all, to 
modern forms of education. The hajj numbers by now were considerable, 
with the number of pilgrims from Javanese-speaking areas and Madura at 
the level of 8,000–15,000 per annum in most years from 1912 to 1930. The 
pilgrimage and a range of publications together constituted major vehicles 
for the spreading of Modernist ideas. Modernism was almost entirely an 
urban phenomenon. In 1912 Muhammadiyah was founded in Yogyakarta. It 
grew to become the foremost Modernist Islamic organisation in Indonesia, 
with schools and welfare organisations across the archipelago. It was 
active in advocating its reforming views and resisting Christian missions 
(whose methods it often copied). We will see much of Muhammadiyah 
in this book. Muhammadiyah eschewed political involvement, but many 
Modernist individuals did not. The Traditionalist kyais of the countryside 
wanted little or nothing to do with Modernism. In 1926 they founded 
their own organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), to defend the interests of 
Traditionalism, another organisation about which we will have much to say 
in this volume.
Now the categories within this increasingly polarised society became 
politicised, and thus deeper and more socially dangerous. From 1901 the 
Dutch adopted the so-called Ethical Policy, which was meant to put the 
interests of Indonesians higher on the colonial agenda. This meant inter alia 
more education and even encouragement for local organisations to develop 
— if, of course, they were not a threat to the colonial regime. Priyayi who 
doubted that Islamisation had been a good idea took the lead in creating the 
first modern political organisation, Budi Utomo, in 1908. It was soon eclipsed 
by more active, less conservative organisations. Sarekat Islam was founded 
in 1912. Its evocation of Islam in its name was really little more than a 
notification that its members were Indonesians (and thus Muslims) while 
the colonial authority was not, but over time it came to be dominated more 
by Modernist politicians. Its followers were often more motivated by their 
animosity towards the priyayi elite and Chinese than by any other issues.
A radical organisation initially led mainly by Europeans developed 
into an Indonesian- (in fact mainly Javanese-)led Communist organisation 
in 1920; in 1924 it adopted the name Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, 
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the Indonesian Communist Party). Its constituency was found among the 
abangan, both among the growing proletariat in Java’s cities and among 
the peasantry. The Communists were very aware of the Javanese heritage 
which they wanted to attach themselves to. On the walls at PKI’s Semarang 
congress in 1921 hung portraits of Dipanagara and of his lieutenants 
Kyai Maja and Sentot, alongside those of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky and Rosa 
Luxemburg. PKI was, however, an organisation with inadequate coherence 
and internal discipline and was subject to government surveillance and 
infiltration. In 1926–7 it stumbled into an uprising against the colonial 
regime that was an utter failure and led to the party being crushed — the 
first of three such devastating episodes in its history (we will later see those 
of 1948 and 1965–6).
In the wake of PKI’s destruction, a young charismatic leader named 
Sukarno — later to become the first president of independent Indonesia 
— founded a new nationalist party in 1927, which in 1928 became the 
Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). Its constituency, too, was mainly 
abangan. But the failed PKI uprising rattled the Europeans. The colonial 
government stepped back from the degree of liberality previously displayed 
under the Ethical Policy. Political organisations were closely watched 
and shut down at will. Sukarno and others were in and out of jail and 
internal exile. The government — with the support of most of the priyayi 
administrators — did all they could to prevent anti-colonial agitators gaining 
access to the masses in the cities or countryside. Meanwhile internecine 
squabbles amongst the tiny anti-colonial elite remained frequent and bitter.
This was Javanese society polarised as it entered the hard years of the 
Great Depression.
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c h a p te r  2
Under colonial rule: Javanese 
society and Islam in the 1930s
It is rare for significant redirections in history to be associated with a 
particular year, not just as a convenient metaphor of historians, but as 
something that was actually visible in events. It is even more unusual for 
two such turning-point years to occur neatly one hundred years apart. Yet so 
it was for the Javanese. I observed in the preceding book in this series that, 
‘In Java, 1830 was one of those remarkable years that truly mark a historical 
watershed.’1 The changes which followed 1830 are the subject matter of that 
book and their consequences are captured in its title, Polarising Javanese 
society. A century later, 1930 also stands as a watershed time, for it saw 
the sudden and dramatic commencement of the hard years of the Great 
Depression, the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian Revolution, which 
would together convulse Javanese society for 20 years.
Social parameters: The census of 1930
We have a reasonably comprehensive statistical picture of the Javanese in 
1930 because the Dutch colonial authorities carried out a census in that 
year, their first — and last — census covering all of what was to become 
Indonesia. The data is not entirely reliable but it nevertheless captures 
important information about Javanese society after a century of intrusive 
colonial rule, dramatic population growth, intensifying Islamisation and the 
reactions — not always welcoming — to that Islamisation. Unfortunately 
for the theme of this book, however, the census data does not include 
21
1 Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese society, p. 12.
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information about the social division between the devout sector of Javanese 
society — the putihan or, as they are more commonly called now, the santri 
— and the abangan, for whom Islam was little more, and sometimes even 
less, than a nominal commitment.
The population of Central and East Java, including the royal Prin-
cipalities (Vorstenlanden) of Central Java, totaled 30.4 million in 1930, of 
whom about 30 million were indigenous people. The vast majority of these 
lived in rural areas. The percentage of the indigenous population living in 
towns and cities was only 6.4 per cent in East Java, 7.4 per cent in Central 
Java, 9.1 per cent in the Principality of Yogyakarta and 7.2 per cent in the 
Principality of Surakarta. Very few of these lived in cities of any real size: 
less than 3 per cent of Central Javanese lived in Semarang, Yogyakarta or 
Surakarta, the only cities with populations over 100,000 there. Less than 2 
per cent of the indigenous people of East Java lived in Surabaya, the only 
city there with a population over 100,000.2 
Central and East Java were already heavily populated by 1930, the 
result of rapid population growth that had begun in the 18th century and 
was still continuing. The census commented on ‘the enormous population 
density of Java’.3 The overall density of Central Java was 395.6 persons/km², 
while that of East Java was 314.2. In some regencies very high figures were 
reached: 860.5 persons/km² in Yogyakarta, 900.2 in Kota Gede, 749.2 in 
Surabaya, 1051.6 in Tegal outside the town. In some other areas, particularly 
mountainous regions, the figures were significantly lower. For comparison, 
in the same period, the population density of the Netherlands was 232.2 
persons/km², while in British India, that of Bengal was 223 and Madras 
114.4 By later standards, the Java figures may seem tolerable, for by the time 
of the 2000 census, the population density of Central Java was 904 persons/
km² and that of East Java was 726 persons/km². Some areas had by then 
reached a density of 2,000 persons/km² or even higher.5 But already in 1930 
2 Departement van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel & Departement van 
Economische Zaken, Volkstelling 1930 / Census of 1930 in Netherlands India (8 vols; 
Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1933–6), vol. 2, pp. 4–5; vol. 3, pp. 2–4. Surabaya was then 
the second-largest city in the Netherlands East Indies, with a population around 
342,000, the largest being Batavia/Jakarta with 533,000; H. W. Dick, Surabaya, city 
of work: A socioeconomic history, 1900–2000 (Athens: Ohio University Center for 
International Studies Research in International Studies Southeast Asia Series No. 
106, Ohio University Press, 2002), p. 121.
3 Volkstelling 1930, vol. 2, p. 9.
4 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 7–10; vol. 3, p. 5
5 Information provided by Prof. Gavin Jones, based on the 2000 Indonesia census.
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these were seriously heavy population densities, with population growth rates 
remaining at a high level. Over 1920–30, population grew at an annual rate 
of 1.81 per cent in East Java, 1.16 per cent in Central Java, 2.25 per cent in 
the Principality of Surakarta and 1.93 per cent in that of Yogyakarta. The 
rate for all of Java and Madura was 1.73 per cent.6 Such rates of growth — if 
they were maintained — would double the population in about 40 years.
Central and East Java were populated largely by ethnic Javanese. There 
were significant European and Chinese communities in some of the larger 
towns and cities, but even there the indigenous population constituted the 
vast majority, in Surakarta and Yogyakarta for example exceeding 96 per 
cent of the total.7 These indigenous residents were overwhelmingly ethnic 
Javanese, who formed 98.2 per cent of the indigenous population across 
Central Java and nearly 100 per cent in Surakarta and Yogyakarta.8
In East Java, however, the ethnic picture was different as other ethnic 
groups, particularly Madurese, moved into previously sparsely settled areas. 
Overall, Javanese constituted 69.4 per cent of the population of East Java 
while the Madurese amounted to 29 per cent. Some areas — such as 
Bojonegoro, Madiun and Kediri — remained almost entirely Javanese in 
ethnic composition. Elsewhere there was significant immigration, particularly 
into the easterly regencies of Banyuwangi, Jember, Lumajang, Malang and 
Blitar. By 1930, Bondowoso, Panarukan and Kraksaan had become almost 
totally Madurese regencies. In Banyuwangi, Probolinggo and Jember, ethnic 
Javanese had become a minority.9
This ethnic diversity in East Java highlights the significant degree of 
mobility among the population. There were population movements across 
Java, and particularly from rural areas into towns and cities. The 1930 census 
recorded that people who lived in major urban areas but were not born 
there amounted to 40.8 per cent of the population of Semarang, 35.5 per 
cent of Surakarta, 33 per cent of Yogyakarta and 51.4 per cent of Surabaya, 
in the last case being similar to the levels reached in the major West Java 
metropolises of Batavia (51.2 per cent) and Bandung (55.1 per cent).10
By 1930 the Javanese had been undergoing a process of Islamisation 
for over five hundred years, but polygamy (polygyny) was at a low level. Its 
practice was largely confined to aristocratic circles, which were, in general, 
6 Volkstelling 1930, vol. 2, p. 12; vol. 3, p. 11.
7 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 136–7, 142–3.
8 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 17–8.
9 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 12–3, 15–6.
10 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 23; vol. 3, p. 29.
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among the least piously Muslim in style. In Central Java, the Principalities 
and East Java, the proportion of men with more than one wife varied from 
1.6 per cent to 2.4 per cent. In some regencies figures were slightly higher, 
but nowhere did the percentage exceed 3.4. The vast majority (about 95 per 
cent) of polygynous marriages involved only two wives. We should note 
that the lowest figures (below 1 per cent) for polygynous marriages in East 
Java were found in the regencies of Tuban, Lamongan, Gresik, Surabaya 
and Sidoarjo, while figures just over 1 per cent were found in Nganjuk and 
Jombang. These areas with low levels of polygyny are usually thought of as 
quite santri in religious and cultural style, suggesting that even a strong sense 
of Islamic identity in Java did not involve significant levels of polygyny. Only 
0.01 per cent of marriages in East Java involved four wives, the maximum 
allowed by Islamic law.11
One of the most striking features of Javanese society in 1930 — which 
would prevail well into the period of Indonesian independence — was 
a low level of literacy. In such a society, prejudices, stereotypes, symbols, 
slogans and rumours can be more powerful than more modern kinds of 
mass communication and persuasion. The overall figures clearly reflect how 
little had been achieved by the Dutch colonial government’s commitment 
to education in its post-1901 Ethical Policy. The overall literacy rate (in 
any language or script) in Central Java was 5.9 per cent, in the Principality 
of Yogyakarta 4.4 per cent, in that of Surakarta 3.6 per cent and in East 
Java 4.4 per cent. At regency level in the Principalities of Central Java, 
the Pakualaman regency had a literacy rate of 22.2 per cent, but from 
that isolated high figure literacy dropped to 7.5 per cent in Yogyakarta 
regency, 6.9 per cent in Semarang and so on down to very low levels in the 
mountainous regencies Gunung Kidul (1.6 per cent) and Wonogiri (1.5 
per cent), ‘where the need for education is low or difficult to fulfill’. In the 
Principalities, the literacy figures were generated largely by the capital cities 
and their immediate environs; outside such areas, figures never exceeded 5 
per cent. Similar patterns were found around the towns and cities throughout 
Central and East Java. The highest literacy rate at regency level in East Java 
was in Trenggalek with 8.4 per cent (and 16.5 per cent in the town), whence 
it dropped to 7.8 per cent in Surabaya (but 12.2 per cent in the city), down 
to 4 per cent in Malang (15.5 per cent in the town) and thence to a mere 
2.4 per cent in overwhelmingly Madurese Kraksaan. It is noteworthy that 
these overall figures conceal great gender disparity. For example, in the 
11 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 49; vol. 3, pp. 50–1.
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regency of Surakarta, the overall level of literacy was 9.2 per cent, but for 
men it was 17.1 per cent while for women it was only 2.4 per cent. In the 
Mangkunagaran principality, it was 11.4 per cent for men but 1.5 per cent 
for women. In Trenggalek regency it was 17.3 per cent for men but only 1.1 
per cent for women. In other words, in many parts of Java it would have been 
nearly impossible to find a literate woman.12
Literacy was increasing, but from very low levels, and the coming 
Great Depression would put a halt to the expansion of government schools 
in Java. A significant element within the small proportion of the population 
who were literate, however — varying from about one-sixth to one-quarter 
in different regions — gained their reading and writing skills outside of any 
school.13 Anticipating the dramatic social changes which will emerge in 
the course of this book, we may note here that after 1949 the independent 
Republic of Indonesia would give high priority to increasing literacy and, 
particularly from the 1970s, had the resources to make a major impact. By 
the mid-1990s, literacy rates for the population over the age of ten were 84.5 
per cent in Central Java and 79.4 per cent in East Java, with the rate for the 
whole of Indonesia standing at 87.4 per cent.14
Turning from literacy to occupation data, we can observe that Java 
in the 1930s was still a largely agrarian society, but that some areas of 
indigenous industry were well developed. It is noteworthy that, if few women 
were gaining literacy skills, many were nevertheless active in employment. 
In Central Java 24.9 per cent of all women were classified as exercising an 
occupation (beroepsbeoefenaars), in Surakarta 42.1 per cent, in Yogyakarta 45.9 
per cent, in East Java 23.7 per cent. Women particularly played a role in the 
batik industry, notably in the towns of Banyumas, Sukaraja, Purbalingga, 
Pemalang, Kedungwuni, Lasem, Blora, Wates, Surakarta and the municipality 
of Pekalongan. In the industrial town of Kota Gede — still famous today 
as a source of fine silver handicrafts — there were many women involved 
in trade. Nevertheless, among occupied persons agriculture was still a 
major area of activity. In Central Java 56.5 per cent of all occupied persons 
were agriculturalists, in Yogyakarta 41.8 per cent, in Surakarta 54.4 per 
cent. Plantation agriculture — especially tobacco, coffee, rubber and sugar 
— absorbed significant mounts of labour, particularly in East Java, and day 
12 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 67–74 (quotation from p. 68); vol. 3, pp. 68–75.
13 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 75.
14 Information provided by Prof. Gavin Jones. See also M.C. Ricklefs, A History 
of modern Indonesia since c. 1200 (4th ed. Basingstoke, Hants: Palgrave Macmillan; 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 348. 
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labourers represented a major employment category (up to 22.6 per cent of 
employed persons) in some East Javanese regencies.15
The 1930 census provides an interesting snapshot of indigenous 
employment in the city of Surabaya in 1930:
Table 1 Indigenous employment in Surabaya city, 193016
Occupation  % of all  Males  Females  Total
 employed employed employed employed
Agriculture 1.9 1,949 223 2,172
Industry 21.0 19,696 4,111 23,807 
Transportation 10.5 11,656 177 11,830
Trade 11.7 9,114 4,109 13,223
Liberal professions17 1.8 1,673 334 2,007
Public administration 10.8 11,998 169 12,167
Domestic service 24.0 7,888  19,259 27,143
Others18 15.8 15,208 2,608 17,816
Total 97.5 79,182 30,990 110,165
At this time, Surabaya was one of the leading cities of the archipelago, 
with a population of 342,000, the second largest city after Jakarta/Batavia. 
It was a hub of trade and industry with a total indigenous population of 
271,275, of whom 40.6 per cent were occupied as set out in the table above. 
Of those Indonesians, 84 per cent were reckoned to be ethnic Javanese 
and 13 per cent ethnic Madurese.19 Table 1 shows a significant level of 
indigenous male employment in industry, transportation, trade and public 
administration and the large, more feminised work force in domestic 
service. The ‘other’ category showed substantial numbers — a majority male 
— employed largely as day labourers in various industries, as dock workers 
15 Volkstelling 1930, vol. 2, pp. 84–98; vol. 3, pp. 86–91.
16 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 90. There is a minor discrepancy of seven persons visible among the 
various totals, which I have not attempted to correct.
17 For example, religion, medicine, law, journalism, i.e., the educated professionals.
18 In the census listed as ‘inadequately described’, meaning mainly miscellaneous 
day-labourers (kuli rupa-rupa); Volkstelling 1930, vol. 3, p. 91.
19 Of the roughly 20 per cent of the population that was not reckoned as Indonesian, 
7.6 per cent were classified as Europeans (a classification which by then included 
Japanese), 11.4 per cent as Chinese and 1.6 per cent as other Asians; Dick, Surabaya, 
pp. 121, 125.
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and so on. Here was an urban proletariat in the making. All of these sectors 
would be hard hit when the Great Depression came. That episode, combined 
with the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian Revolutionary war that 
followed, would so damage Surabaya that it would not recover its former 
dynamism until the 1970s and 1980s.20
The impact of the Great Depression
The Depression had a major impact upon the people living in Central and 
East Java, but its effects varied significantly from group to group and place to 
place.21 In general, as industrial production collapsed in developed countries 
— where the majority of Indonesian exports went — so that international 
markets shriveled up, trade went into decline, protectionism spread and the 
world prices for tropical produce fell, many Javanese saw their incomes, 
standards of living and future prospects decline precipitously. Although 
before 1930 there had been some signs that the expansion of Java’s economy 
was reaching its limits, it was the Great Depression that propelled Java and 
its citizens dramatically into crisis. This was a crisis from which the Dutch 
colonial state never fully recovered, for it was to be overtaken by the Second 
World War and Indonesian Revolution before it could do so.
The colonial budget was cut back dramatically in order to contain 
ballooning deficits.22 Colonial civil servants and school teachers — whether 
European or indigenous — found their prospects either reduced or indeed at 
an end. Private enterprise was in no position to offer alternative employment 
to such people. New graduates coming out of schools and (in extraordinarily 
tiny numbers) from the few university-level institutions in Indonesia had 
hardly any prospects of employment. As O’Malley observes, ‘The increased 
clamor for more education that had been so determinedly stirred up was to 
go largely unheard, and the effort that had already been put into education 
was to go largely unrewarded, throughout the 1930s.’23
20 On Surabaya’s 20th-century history, see Dick, Surabaya, e.g., pp. 464–5.
21 A brief overview of the impact of the Depression on Indonesia may be found in 
Ricklefs, History of modern Indonesia, pp. 222–4.
22 William J. O’Malley, ‘Indonesia in the Great Depression: A study of East Sumatra 
and Jogjakarta in the 1930’s’ (PhD thesis, Cornell University; Ann Arbor: University 
Microfilms, 1977), p. 73.
23 O’Malley, ‘Indonesia in the Depression’, pp. 80–1. In 1930–1, there were only 178 
Indonesians in university-level education in the entire Netherlands East Indies. For 
a general survey of education policy in this period, see Ricklefs, History of modern 
Indonesia, pp. 189–93.
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Rural living standards fell. As plantation agriculture was cut back, 
more land again became available for rice agriculture. Nevertheless, with 
the population continuing to grow, per capita consumption of rice fell. 
People compensated for this with lower-quality foodstuffs such as cassava, 
corn (maize) and sweet potatoes.24 Such hardship was also common 
in towns and cities among the vast majority of Indonesians who were 
poorly educated and worked as coolies, small-time traders and industrial 
labourers. The government’s response to hardship was to attempt to save 
money by cutting back such welfare services as existed. The government 
tried to create employment by expanding labour-intensive public works 
programmes, encouraging the use of what little uncultivated land remained, 
and supporting emigration (dubbed ‘transmigration’) from Java to the outer 
islands,25 but such measures only had a marginal impact on the hardship 
suffered by most of the Javanese population. I have pointed out elsewhere 
how futile the transmigration programme was: between its inception in 1905 
and 1930, several thousand Javanese moved out of Java, the total population 
of such transmigrants being about 36,000 in 1930. At the same time, far 
larger numbers left Java to work as coolie labourers on plantations, mainly 
in Sumatra; these totaled over 306,000 in 1930. Meanwhile, between 1905 
and 1930 the population of Java grew by some 11 million.26 As outer island 
plantations cut back production and employment in the Depression, Javanese 
plantation coolies indeed began to flow back to Java, where there was no 
work for them.27
In many places in Java, the great employer had been the sugar industry. 
Java had exported some 3 million tonnes of sugar before the Depression but 
by 1936 was exporting a mere 1 million. East Java’s area planted to sugar was 
cut by 81 per cent over three years. Sugar had so dominated the economy of 
Surabaya that that city was particularly hard hit.28 Payments to Indonesians 
from the sugar industry for wages, rents and compensation fell from D.fl. 
129.6 million in 1929 to a low of 10.9 million in 1936, a reduction of over 
90 per cent. In Yogyakarta, in a normal pre-Depression year the sugar 
industry planted about 17,600 hectares. In 1931 that fell to 13,697, in 1932 
24 P. Boomgaard, ‘The welfare services in Indonesia, 1900–1942’, Itinerario vol. 10 
(1986), no. 1, p. 70.
25 John Ingleson, ‘Urban Java during the Depression’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 
vol. 19, no. 2 (Sept. 1988), p. 302.
26 Ricklefs, History of modern Indonesia, p. 188.
27 Ingleson, ‘Urban Java during the Depression’, p. 305.
28 Dick, Surabaya, p. 65.
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to 6,449 and in 1933 to only 1,110, by which time there were only two sugar 
plantations still operating in Yogyakarta. Before the Depression, people in the 
sugar areas of Yogyakarta normally earned a total of about D.fl. 8.3 million 
in wages, rent and compensation from the sugar industry. In 1933 the figure 
was barely 2.3 million. Of course there was more land available for rice 
cultivation as sugar cultivation was cut back, but this was of no assistance to 
the cash income of farmers because the prices of crops tumbled.29 The money 
supply contracted sharply, with serious consequences for trade and welfare 
across Javanese society.30
It was not only agriculturalists who suffered in places like Yogyakarta. 
The silver artisans of Kota Gede survived and even expanded their trade 
in the later 1930s, but elsewhere the picture was gloomy. Batik production 
— a major form of local industry — was cut to a third of its former capacity 
by 1935. Some small cottage industries such as hand-rolling of cigars and 
cigarettes and local production of textiles and soaps did, however, find that 
opportunities were created by the cutting back of foreign imports and the 
fall in money incomes.31
In Surakarta, the story in the batik industry was somewhat different. 
Among the most famous batik entrepreneurs of Java are those of Laweyan, 
Surakarta. Contrary to some interpretations of entrepreneurship in Java, 
these manufacturers (as opposed to many of the batik traders in the town) 
were mostly not from the pious santri community but were rather abangan 
nominal Muslims. Nor did they have much interest in local Javanese 
arts and traditions: they were interested in making money. They did, 
however, engage in various Javanese mystical and ascetic practices in the 
hope that they would bring good fortune. Women played a leading role 
as organisers of the Laweyan batik industry. Not surprisingly, there was 
therefore strong opposition in Laweyan to the polygyny commonly seen 
in Surakarta aristocratic circles. These abangan entrepreneurs modernised 
batik production from the early years of the 20th century and turned it into 
a mass-marketing industry by adopting print (cap) rather than hand-crafted 
techniques. Their markets were reduced during the Depression years but 
they survived reasonably well and by 1936 were as wealthy and technically 
proficient, and had marketing networks that were as good, as their Chinese 
29 O’Malley, ‘Indonesia in the Depression’, pp. 82, 98 n56, 188, 190, 216 n107.
30 Petrus Bakker, Eenige beschouwingen over het geldverkeer in de inheemsche 
samenleving van Nederlandsch-Indië (Groningen and Batavia: J.B. Wolters’ Uitgevers-
Maatschappij, 1936), pp. 121, 133.
31 Ibid., pp. 191–2
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and Arab (and very few European) competitors. In that year these Javanese 
entrepreneurs organised themselves into the Persatuan Perusahaan Batik 
Bumiputra Surakarta (Union of Indigenous Batik Enterprises of Surakarta), 
‘strengthening their position as the Javanese middle class’ as Soedarmono 
puts it. But this organisation was opposed by the Chinese entrepreneurs 
and the Dutch regime would not give it sole authority to manage the batik 
industry, so it collapsed.32
Most indigenous wage-earners in urban Java — people who, for 
example, worked as clerks and typists in public administration and private 
businesses — found their work opportunities shrinking or disappearing 
altogether. They sought various remedies, taking lower-standard employment 
or having their wives set up small trading warungs.33 For some, however, 
there were new opportunities. European, Eurasian and Chinese employees, 
who were paid higher salaries, were often the first to be fired. Sometimes this 
meant that lower-paid Indonesians were able to move into those positions.34 
Urban labourers were hard hit. When the British American Tobacco 
Company shut its factory in Surabaya in 1932, for example, two thousand 
Indonesians were dismissed with a single week’s pay.35
Newly qualified school teachers found few opportunities for employ-
ment. In Yogyakarta, however, there was actually an expansion of educational 
institutions during the 1930s. Both Taman Siswa and Muhammadiyah had 
their headquarters there and continued to be major providers of education. 
The government and Christian mission schools also continued. In 1929 a 
trade school taught in Dutch, the Princess Juliana School, opened there. It 
was followed by a new Dutch-medium high school in 1932, a normal school 
in 1934 and a Higher Middle-Class School (HBS: Hoogere Burgerschool) 
in 1937, all taught in Dutch.36 In this time of crisis, the foundations were 
thus laid for Yogyakarta’s prominence as a centre of education, which it 
retains today.
32 Soedarmono, Mbok Mase: Pengusaha batik di Laweyan Solo awal abad 20 ( Jakarta: 
Yayasan Warna Warni Indonesia, 2006), esp. pp. 32, 37, 39, 45, 58, 71, 90–1, 123–5. 
For a valuable study of santri batik entrepreneurs of Central and East Java, see 
Christine Dobbin, ‘Accounting for the failure of the Muslim Javanese business class: 
Examples from Ponorogo and Tulungagung (c. 1880–1940)’, Archipel no. 48 (1994), 
pp. 87–101.
33 Ingleson, ‘Urban Java during the Depression’, p. 297.
34 Ibid., p. 296.
35 Ibid., p. 300.
36 O’Malley, ‘Indonesia in the Depression’, pp. 194–5.
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Since prices and hence the cost of living were rapidly falling, those 
urban Indonesians who managed to retain their jobs probably in fact gained 
in living standard simply because their salaries were falling less rapidly.37 That 
drop in the cost of living was dramatic, as set out in Table 2.













Thus, for most people of East and Central Java, the 1930s were a time 
of hardship from which certainly social and probably cultural consequences 
flowed. From the cities many had to return to rural areas to look for work, 
food and shelter. So the process of quite rapid urbanisation and proletari-
anisation that was suggested by the 1930 census data was slowed and for a 
time perhaps even reversed. For Surabaya, Howard Dick estimates that from 
1930 to c. 1935 there was probably a net outflow of population from the city, 
a trend reversed again in the second half of the 1930s. By 1940 Surabaya had 
grown to an estimated 403,000 people from the figure of 342,000 a decade 
before, a much slower rate than for the decade 1920–30.39 
The Islamic reform movements and Islamically inspired political organ-
isations associated with those movements were still largely urban-based. The 
malaise of the Great Depression was felt profoundly in those urban areas at 
the same time as the colonial government was cracking down on urban-based 
anti-colonial movements and political leaders in the wake of the failed PKI 
37 Ingleson, ‘Urban Java during the Depression’, p. 306–9.
38 Ibid., p. 307.
39 Dick, Surabaya, p. 120.
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uprising of 1926–7.40 So there was little prospect of new streams of political, 
cultural or religious ideas spreading widely in Java in the 1930s. Older ideas 
and styles still dominated much of Javanese life, whether of the aristocrats 
and elites in the Vorstenlanden court (kraton) precincts or of villagers in the 
countryside. While modern political elites contemplated how to liberate 
Indonesia from colonial rule — a contemplation not infrequently under-
taken while in jail or exile on a remote island — and modern Islamic leaders 
considered how to make Javanese religious life conform more closely to their 
ideals, the vast majority of Javanese remained beyond their influence.
Javanese life and culture in kraton and countryside
In these hard times, Javanese villagers maintained a rich variety of popular 
performances, arts and entertainments. In most cases, these reflected a 
sense of supernatural powers that was only marginally influenced by Islamic 
orthodoxy. This richness and variety was captured in the monumental study 
of ‘Javanese popular performances’ by Th. G. Th. Pigeaud, published in 
1938.41 Pigeaud emphasised that he was not intending to cover all such 
performances. His book of over 500 folio-sized pages described masked 
dances, masquerades, horse-dances (using model horses of woven bamboo), 
youth dance performances, male group dances and religious performances in 
their bewildering variety of styles and names from place to place across Java. 
He wrote that he would give little or no attention to 
the performances of dancing women and female singers or of story-
tellers, to combat-play (fencing, etc., various kinds of combat sports 
and sparring matches), cock-fights and other animal fights, trance 
performances … and folk-theatre. Next to these we should mention 
all sorts of puppet theatre (wayang) and all sorts of music, as well as 
artistic dances by men and women, artistic expressions which are or 
have been the most influenced by courtly arts or which arose entirely 
from and developed at the courts. Completely beyond consideration 
remain the games and entertainments which cannot be regarded as 
performances or productions, such as children’s games (of boys and girls) 
and gambling.42 
40 A brief survey of the politics of the 1927–42 period may be found in Ricklefs, 
History of modern Indonesia, Chapter 16.
41 Th. Pigeaud, Javaanse volksvertoningen: Bijdrage tot de beschrijving van land en volk 
(Batavia: Volkslectuur, 1938).
42 Ibid., p. 5.
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Illustration 4 Horse-dance (jaranan) from Ponorogo (note the female dancer on 
the right) (from Pigeaud, Javaanse volksvertoningen, 1938, pl. 90)
Illustration 3 Depiction of a Yogyakarta horse-dance (jaranan) 
(from Pigeaud, Javaanse volksvertoningen, 1938, pl. 89)
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Many of these entertainments not described in Pigeaud’s study were 
discussed in other major works of scholarship of that age, such as Kunst’s 
study of Javanese music, Kats’s of the wayang and van Lelyveld’s of Javanese 
dance.43 In these art forms, pre-Islamic inspirations, styles and librettos 
remained dominant.
Nevertheless, Pigeaud covered a very great deal. Some of these forms 
of performance we will encounter again in this book, such as the dances 
of Kediri (now commonly called jaranan) involving woven model horses 
and spirit possession, the female dancers and singers of the gandrung of 
Banyuwangi and the burlesque ludruk of Surabaya.44 Pigeaud was aware that 
he was recording a changing scene, for older supernatural understandings 
seemed to be fading. ‘The feeling for a (or several) religious significance(s) 
has not yet entirely disappeared from these performances’, he wrote.45 
Indeed, if one were to begin with Pigeaud and write a full history of popular 
Javanese folk arts down to the present, it would largely be a story of decline 
and loss of traditions, as will be suggested by the discussions in this book. 
This was partly to do with religious reform, but also with modernisation and 
globalisation: perhaps at least as much a product of education, electrification, 
televisionisation and Nintendoisation as of Islamisation.
Pigeaud noted performances which were associated with Islamic 
piety. Foremost among these was slawatan, known widely among ‘the 
old-fashioned Islamic religious community’, by which he meant the 
Traditionalist santri followers of NU. He commented that ‘In some districts 
more than others, however, [slawatan performances] seem also to be held 
in high regard by the common people [by which he meant the abangan 
majority] and by the priyayis.’46 In these performances, narratives of the 
life of the Prophet were sung by men either in Arabic or in Javanese to the 
sole accompaniment of terbangs (tambourines) but in Javanese musical style. 
Offerings (sajen) were prepared just as on other sacral occasions in Java and 
the performance usually went from around 9pm to about 3am, finishing in 
time for the pre-dawn prayer. Slawatan was performed particularly on the 
43 J. Kunst, Music in Java: Its history, its theory and its techniques (3rd enlarged ed.; 
ed. E.L. Heins; 2 vols; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973; first published in 
Dutch in 1934); J. Kats, Het Javaansche tooneel, vol. 1: Wayang poerwa (Weltevreden: 
Volkslectuur, 1923); Th. B. van Lelyveld, De Javaansche danskunst (Amsterdam: Van 
Holkema & Warendorf ’s Uitgevers-Mij, 1931).
44 Pigeaud, Volksvertoningen, pp. 194–5, 238, 322–3, 327–9.
45 Ibid., p. 6.
46 Ibid., pp. 282–3.
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occasion of marriages, circumcisions, the seventh month of pregnancy, the 
falling off of the umbilical cord and redeeming of a promise. Remarkably it 
was sometimes also performed at the annual village cleansing (bersih desa) 
ceremony, which was more commonly the occasion for wayang performances 
and observations little associated with Islamic spirituality. Sometimes also 
slawatan was performed a few days after a performance of tayuban — 
dancing women who were also commonly prostitutes. It seems that on such 
occasions slawatan was a way to expiate the sins acquired at the preceding 
tayuban party.47
Most of the performances recorded by Pigeaud, however, were shaped 
more by concepts older than Islam in Java. Masked dance, like puppet 
(wayang) theatre more generally, performed stories that most commonly 
derived from the Hindu-Buddhist period classics Bratayuda and Rama or 
from the romantic adventures of the pre-Islamic hero Panji. The spiritual 
Illustration 5 Depiction of a Yogyakarta slawatan performance in observation of 
the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (Muludan, Maulid Nabi) 
(from Pigeaud, Javaanse volksvertoningen, 1938, pl. 97)
47 Ibid., pp. 282–6.
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forces at play in performances were mostly those that Islamic reformers 
regarded as anathema: the Goddess of the Southern Ocean (Ratu Kidul), 
the founder and protector spirits of villages, the spectral denizens of caves, 
forests and other haunted places. Transvestite performances and dancing 
women who also worked as prostitutes were hardly art forms thought 
proper by the devout. The popular folk dramas of kethoprak and ludruk often 
mocked the values of elites, including relatively prosperous middle-class 
santri.
Most Central Javanese villagers still seem to have accepted the kraton 
elite’s claims to cultural, religious and social leadership. This despite that 
elite’s obligatory — if often grudging — collaboration with the colonial 
authorities. In fact the Javanese aristocracy had only limited room for 
political manoeuvre in the colonial context, but some of them used that room 
as far as they could. For many others, however, a louche life of womanising 
and opium, or of pious retreat into mysticism, offered greater attraction. The 
values of the knightly aristocrat, the satriya, were more often reflected in 
poses than in day-to-day conduct.
In Yogyakarta, Pangeran (prince) Surjodiningrat was one of those who 
found room for manoeuvre. He established an organisation called Pakem-
palan Kawula Ngajogjakarta (Association of the Subjects of Yogyakarta) in 
Illustration 6 Topeng (masked 
dance) performance, 1929, depicting 
Prabu Klana from the Panji stories 
(from Pigeaud, Javaanse volksver-
toningen, 1938, pl. 1)
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1930.48 This sought to represent the demands of ordinary Javanese villagers 
in the midst of the Depression. The Association became virtually a shadow 
administration in Yogyakarta’s countryside and Surjodiningrat himself was 
taken by many villagers to be the messianic Just King (Ratu Adil) promised 
by Javanese eschatologies. By 1931 Pakempalan Kawula Ngajogjakarta 
claimed over 100,000 members in Yogyakarta and by 1941 over 260,000. 
Such figures made it the largest political organisation in Indonesia (then, 
of course, still the Netherlands East Indies) in its day. The Pakempalan 
promoted cooperatives, attempted to spread literacy, supported peasant 
objections to taxation, and such like. It had been founded with the support 
of the Yogyakarta Sultan Hamengkubuwana VIII (r. 1921–39), who was the 
elder half-brother of Surjodiningrat, but as the Association’s influence spread 
in the countryside it aroused the concern of the Sultan and the colonial 
authorities. In 1933 one local leader of the organisation publicly announced 
that Surjodiningrat was the king (ratu) of all Muslims, thereby directly 
threatening the standing of the Sultan. Nor was the Association welcomed by 
the urban-based nationalist elite, for it bypassed and threatened to undermine 
nationalist figures like Sukarno who aspired to be the leaders of ordinary 
Indonesians but were unable to do that in conditions of colonial repression. 
The Sultan even contemplated asking the Dutch to exile Surjodiningrat. 
He escaped that fate, but from 1934 Surjodiningrat was pressured by the 
colonial and local authorities into limiting the Pakempalan’s activities to 
less disturbing social and economic initiatives, notably the promotion of 
cooperatives. The presence of such an organisation, which gave broader social 
relevance in hard times to princely leadership, may explain in part why in 
subsequent decades the Yogyakarta Sultanate survived — indeed prospered 
politically — in the tumult of war and revolution. Such was not to be the 
fate of the parallel Vorstenlanden in Surakarta.
Seemingly analogous organisations were founded in Surakarta, but they 
were less about building links between the kraton elite and ordinary villagers 
and more about internecine squabbles between the two royal houses there: 
those of Susuhunan Pakubuwana X (r. 1893–1939) and of the junior princely 
house of Mangkunagara VII (r. 1916–44).49 The Susuhunan’s kraton still felt 
48 The following account is based upon William J. O’Malley, ‘The Pakĕmpalan 
Kawulo Ngajogjakarta: An official report on the Jogjakarta People’s Party of the 
1930s’, Indonesia no. 26 (Oct. 1978), pp. 111–58; George D. Larson, Prelude to 
revolution: Palaces and politics in Surakarta, 1912–1942 (VKI vol. 124; Dordrecht and 
Providence: Foris Publications, 1987), pp. 155–8.
49 The account here rests upon Larson, Prelude to revolution, pp. 158–67, 168–70.
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aggrieved about the 1790s arrangements that had made the Mangkunagaran 
principality permanent.50 So the kraton elite now sought to reabsorb the 
Mangkunagaran. In 1932 the Surakarta politician Singgih, an activist for 
the Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia (Union of the Indonesian Race, PBI) 
headed by Dr Soetomo of Surabaya, led the establishment of a Pakempalan 
Kawula Surakarta (Association of the Subjects of Surakarta), ostensibly to 
build links with common villagers for the PBI. But it soon became evident 
that the main purpose of the organisation was to insinuate Surakarta kraton 
influence into Mangkunagaran domains. This organisation spread quite 
widely and Singgih — like Surjodiningrat in Yogyakarta — was regarded by 
some as the Ratu Adil. In 1933 Mangkunagara VII responded by establishing 
a Pakempalan Kawula Mangkunagaran (Association of the Subjects of the 
Mangkunagaran), but this failed to prosper. It seems that the popular prestige 
of the Mangkunagaran line was waning, while the Susuhunan still wielded 
considerable influence. But the main actor here was Singgih.
There were predictions that the Mangkunagaran would be reabsorbed 
under the Surakarta court and that Singgih would ascend the throne as 
Ratu Adil. He and other leading figures of his Pakempalan were known to 
be gathering spiritual powers through fasting and meditation. In 1935 they 
formed a group to engage in ilmu kebatinan (the inner mystical sciences). 
Office walls of the Association’s administration had images depicting Singgih 
as the Hindu god Wisnu (Vishnu), who in Javanese tradition was regarded 
as the first ruler of Java and the saviour of the world in times of trouble 
and, in his avatar as Kresna (Krishna), was particularly associated with the 
warrior class. Pakempalan Kawula Surakarta obviously had the support 
of the Susuhunan and its propaganda became increasingly radical and 
sometimes even explicitly anti-colonial. In August 1934 the Dutch Resident 
of Surakarta warned Singgih to tone down his organisation’s activities, 
which he did. Thereafter administrative problems and financial irregularities 
contributed to a falling-off of popular support. The organisation had probably 
never had a following of more than 20,000–50,000 at its peak and fell to 
4,000–5,000 by the end of 1936.
In the later 1930s, the Pakempalan Kawula Surakarta revived somewhat 
but the dominant leitmotiv remained hostility between the Susuhunan’s court 
and that of the Mangkunagaran. The organisation’s membership may have 
climbed again to around 25,000, with its leadership very much in kraton 
hands. The more significant development, however, was a closer linking of the 
50 A brief overview of these events is in Ricklefs, History of modern Indonesia, 
Chapter 10.
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anti-colonial leanings of the court elite with the more modern nationalism 
of Dr Soetomo and his Surabaya-based PBI. In 1935 at a congress held 
in Surakarta this party was fused with the older Budi Utomo — founded 
in 1908 by leaders among whom several regarded the Islamisation of the 
Javanese as having been a mistake51 — to form a new Partai Indonesia 
Raya (Greater Indonesia Party), led by Dr Soetomo until his death in 
1938. This party rested on an alliance of Surakarta aristocratic politicians 
and the Surabaya activists. Partai Indonesia Raya — usually abbreviated 
Parindra — was impressed by the warrior culture of Japan, which had many 
resonances with the aristocratic warrior values of the Javanese elite, values 
that underpinned the social styles of that elite in just about everything except 
real battles, given the prevailing pax neerlandica.
That the goings-on in Surakarta were more about intra-elite conflicts 
than about truly building links between the Vorstenlanden aristocracy and 
ordinary villagers may go some way to explaining why — as will be seen 
later in this book — the princely rulers of Surakarta would become enemies 
of the Indonesian Revolution rather than forming part of its leadership, as 
occurred in Yogyakarta. In 1939 a crucial transition occurred in Surakarta 
that probably guaranteed this outcome. As Pakubuwana X neared the end 
of his days, there was discussion in Dutch colonial circles about who should 
be allowed to succeed him. One leading candidate was Pakubuwana X’s son 
Png. Kusumayuda. He had serious marks against him from the Dutch point 
of view, however, mainly that he was both genuinely able and a member of 
Parindra. So the choice fell instead upon another prince, Png. Hangabehi, 
whom the Dutch picked to succeed as Susuhunan Pakubuwana XI (r. 
1939–44). He was assessed by the Dutch as a person who would be loyal, but 
‘not excelling in firmness of purpose and from whom no great deeds may be 
expected’ — which was to say, a safe and malleable choice. A new contract 
was imposed on this new king which reduced the already circumscribed 
powers of the Susuhunan and cut his kraton budget, changes which produced 
much critical comment from Indonesian observers. These developments 
further diminished the prospects of the Surakarta kraton standing at the 
head of any sort of popular movement — prospects that were not great in 
1939 in any case.
The Susuhunan’s kraton elite continued to favour Parindra, with its 
sympathies for Japanese-style fascism. In late December 1941, as the Japanese 
advanced on Indonesia, some Parindra activists may even have plotted a 
51 See Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese society, pp. 217–9.
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revolt against the Dutch, which was nipped in the bud. The Mangkunagaran, 
by contrast, began to lend its support to the leftist, anti-fascist Gerakan 
Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People’s Movement), founded in 1937. The 
Mangkunagaran Legion was the only serious military force raised in the 
Vorstenlanden. It had a military tradition going back to 1808 that rested on 
service to the colonial regime and this, too, inclined the Mangkunagaran 
side to an anti-Japanese, therefore pro-Dutch, position. Thus, developments 
in both the kraton and the Mangkunagaran positioned them poorly to be 
leaders of the mass mobilisation that was to follow.52
The magico-mystical powers that commoners ascribed to Javanese 
royalty were still, however, widely believed in the 1930s. This was illustrated 
by the response to epidemic diseases that swept through the old town of 
Kota Gede, south of Yogyakarta. Here were the graves of the founders of 
the Mataram dynasty Senapati Ingalaga (d. c. 1601) and Seda ing Krapyak 
(d. 1613). It was a warren of houses and narrow streets where gold-, silver- 
and coppersmiths, leather workers, tortoise-shell artisans and diamond 
traders worked. In 1931 there was so much disease in this town that the 
more well-to-do abandoned their homes to live elsewhere, while the less 
favoured stayed awake at nights for fear of being overcome by death in their 
beds. Holy weapons regarded as supernaturally powerful heirlooms (pusaka) 
were paraded in the streets to ward off illness. Eventually the Sultan of 
Yogyakarta Hamengkubuwana VIII was asked to allow one of the most 
holy of all the royal pusakas, the banner Kangjeng Kyai Tunggul Wulung, 
to be paraded. This was said to be made from the cloth that hung around 
the grave of the Prophet himself. On its tip was a pusaka spearhead called 
Kangjeng Kyai Slamet.
The Sultan agreed to the request, but in fact Ky. Tunggul Wulung 
and Ky. Slamet were paraded only around the city of Yogyakarta itself, 
not around Kota Gede. The last time this had been done was during the 
influenza epidemic of 1918 and the popular belief was that the epidemic 
had indeed ended as a consequence. Before that Ky. Tunggul Wulung had 
been paraded in 1892 and 1876, also at times of widespread illness.53 It was 
decreed that this time the pusakas would be paraded on the night of 21–22 
January 1932, when the Javanese seven- and five-day week combination was 
Friday-Kliwon, the best combination from a supernatural point of view for 
Ky. Tunggul Wulung.
52 Larson, Prelude to revolution, pp. 181–5.
53 On the 1876 episode, see Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese society, p. 137.
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After appropriate ritual preparations and offerings, a hundred religious 
officials (pamethakan) prepared to escort the pusakas out from the court. The 
call to prayer was jointly sung, followed by prayers. Then a large procession 
formed up and went out from the kraton bearing the holy banners, to be met 
by a throng of thousands of Javanese. Lest one think this procedure was in 
some way purely Islamic, however, it should be noted that the next step was 
to place offerings at the waringin kurung, the fenced banyan trees on the 
great square to the north of the Sultan’s kraton which were (indeed, often still 
are) believed to have supernatural powers. The offerings were a female albino 
water buffalo, tortoises with various kinds of shells, and so on. The entourage 
— court religious, soldiers, aristocrats, led by the pangulu (the head of the 
kraton religious hierarchy) on horseback — and thousands of local Javanese 
then made a circumambulation of the city of Yogyakarta, stopping at nine 
prescribed places to pray. At 5 AM the pusakas returned to the court, where 
the Sultan had remained awake throughout the night. The pangulu then 
oversaw the slaughtering of the animal sacrifices on the northern square.
But 1930s Yogyakarta was not 1830s Yogyakarta. Now this city hosted 
the headquarters of Muhammadiyah and such a parading of a holy pusaka 
provoked controversy. Soedjana Tirtakoesoema reported that ‘a group of 
orthodox [here meaning Modernist] religious types is of the opinion that 
one must break with this old practice and rely entirely upon medical science 
in combating illnesses, adhering to the Islamic faith’. Others objected that 
gathering thousands of people together in this way in fact enhanced the risk 
of infections spreading. ‘A liberal thinking man’, however, ‘belonging to the 
older religious [meaning the Traditionalists], was of the opinion that the 
parading nevertheless in some sense had a religious character. After all, a 
pious Sultan (he mentioned Sultan Agung) had got this banner from Mecca 
and at various places the call to prayer was sung and prayers were said.’54 
In this contrast of opinions we may note the ongoing tensions between 
followers of Traditionalist Islam and the older Mystic Synthesis of Java on 
the one hand and those of the new Modernist Islam on the other.
However uncomfortable religious purists may have felt about some 
older Javanese traditions, courtly ritual life continued both to preserve 
traditions that conveyed the Javanese Mystic Synthesis and to inspire mass 
interest and awe. The courts still presented labuhan (offerings) to the spirits 
54 Soedjana Tirtakoesoema. ‘De ommegang met den Kangdjeng Kjahi Toenggoel 
Woeloeng te Jogjakarta, Donderdag-Vrijdag 21/22 Januari 1932 (Djoemoeah-Kliwon 
13 Påså, Djé 1862)’, Djåwå vol. 12 (1932), pp. 41–9.
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of Mount Merapi, Mount Lawu and the Southern Ocean, and still do. In 
Surakarta, offerings were — and still are — made to a site sacred to the pre-
Islamic goddess Durga in the forest of Krendawahana north of Surakarta.55 
In both Surakarta and Yogyakarta, the sacred bedhaya dance was performed 
(as it still is today), invoking the presence of the Goddess of the Southern 
Ocean.
Yet it is also true that in this overwhelmingly illiterate and poor 
society, at village level there were many Javanese who genuinely cared about 
adhering to what they understood the correct Islam to be. Even abangan 
villagers would turn to their more pious fellows for ritual leadership at 
major rites of passage. Ky. H. Saifuddin Zuhri, a leader of NU who was 
eventually to become Indonesian Minister of Religion (1962–7), later 
recalled his own youth in the period before the Second World War. He was 
sent to a small pesantren in Karangsari (Banyumas) run by one Ky. Dimiati, 
to whom he was related. There Saifuddin Zuhri observed the simple life of 
the local peasantry. They were poor in possessions, he recalled, but rich in 
character and morals. Although they were illiterate in the roman script, they 
could read and in some cases write in the Arabic script. They made time 
Illustration 7 Sacred bedhaya dance in the Yogyakarta kraton, 1969
55 On the Krendawahana ritual, see Stephen C. Headley, Durga’s mosque: Cosmology, 
conversion and community in Central Javanese Islam (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2004), esp. pp. 227–30.
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to read the Qur’an and were strict in observing what was allowed (halal) 
or forbidden (haram). At the Friday sermon and at Ky. Dimiati’s Qur’anic 
recitations (pengajian) they listened attentively, taking pride in the fact that 
there was a kyai living in their village to give them guidance. Such was the 
recollection of Saifuddin Zuhri.56
Saifuddin Zuhri’s memoirs remind us that villagers in 1930s Java did 
sometimes have connections to more highly educated leaders. But these 
were rarely connections to nationalist political organisations. The Dutch 
regime and its repressive structures saw to that. There were links with kraton 
culture and sometimes with kraton elites, but this only applied in certain 
circumstances within the Vorstenlanden. More generally, it was the extensive 
informal networks and large organisations associated with Islam that built 
such bridges. It is therefore to such networks and organisations that we 
now turn.
Islam in Java: Reform, local traditions and mysticism
To a large extent, Muhammadiyah held the initiative in Islamic circles in 
1930s Java. It was Muhammadiyah that looked at contemporary Javanese 
religious practice and judged much of it to be in need of reform. But 
we would be wrong to think of this as mainly a reformist assault on the 
religious practices and superstitions of the abangan. Muhammadiyah’s targets 
were more often the understandings of Islam to be found in the santri 
community of pious Muslims. Muhammadiyah was — to borrow a phrase 
used by Azyumardi Azra57 — ‘guarding the faith of the ummah’, and it was 
as if many abangan were so far beyond the pale that, by Muhammadiyah’s 
standards, they were hardly members of the ummah at all.
Muhammadiyah was regarded by G.F. Pijper (1893–1988), one of the 
leading Dutch experts on Islam who served as Advisor for Native Affairs to 
56 Saifuddin Zuhri, Berangkat dari pesantren ( Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1987), pp. 
40, 42. For biographies of Saifuddin Zuhri and Indonesia’s other Ministers of 
Religion, see Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam (eds), Menteri-menteri Agama RI: 
Biografi sosial-politik (Seri Khusus INIS Biografi Sosial-Politik 1. Jakarta: Indonesia-
Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies [INIS], Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan 
Masyarakat [PPIM], Badan Litbang Agama Departemen Agama RI, 1998); 
Saifuddin’s biography is to be found on pp. 201–41.
57 Azyumardi Azra, ‘Guarding the faith of the ummah: Religio-intellectual journey 
of Mohammad Rasjidi’, SI vol. 1 (1994), no. 2, pp. 87–119. We will discuss Rasjidi 
shortly.
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the colonial government, as a ‘backlash against the Christianisation efforts 
of the Protestant and Catholic missions’.58 That was certainly a major 
inspiration for the organisation, but its activities were also directed at local 
religious practices that it regarded as bid‘a, unlawful innovations in Islam. By 
the 1930s the national leadership of Muhammadiyah was more in the hands 
of Minangkabau from Sumatra than Javanese leaders. These Minangkabau 
tended to be more intolerant of idiosyncratic practices that were regarded 
locally as being pious Islam.59 But there were also Javanese Muhammadiyah 
leaders who took a firm line against local practices not sanctioned by Islam. 
One of the foremost of these was Muhammad Rasjidi (1915–2001).
Rasjidi’s life story exemplifies the cultural and religious transitions 
experienced by many Javanese in the 20th century.60 He was born into an 
abangan family in Kota Gede but his father cared sufficiently about Islam to 
have his children taught to read the Qur’an. As Rasjidi’s father grew older, 
he became more pious and began to pray. Upon his death he left money for 
someone else to undertake the pilgrimage on his behalf. Rasjidi’s youthful 
cultural milieu remained in some ways more characteristic of Javanese 
traditions than of pious Islam. He could read Javanese script and sing 
Javanese poetry and was married in Javanese traditional attire. Yet his father 
sent him to a Muhammadiyah primary school and there Rasjidi’s transition 
to a leader of Modernist Islam began. He went on to a Muhammadiyah 
teacher-training school. When he learned that a new religious school had 
been founded in Lawang (East Java) by Ahmad Surkati (1872–1943), the 
Sudanese leader of the Arab Modernist organisation Al-Irsyad (est. 1915), 
Rasjidi applied and was accepted as a student there. In 1931 he set off to 
study in Cairo. Rather than studying at the great university of Al-Azhar, 
which he found too traditional, Rasjidi went to the University of Cairo. He 
also met and took private lessons from Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), who was to 
become one of the most prominent of radical Islamic thinkers and leader of 
the Muslim Brotherhood until his execution by the government of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser.61
58 G.F. Pijper, ‘Lailat al-Niṣf min Sha‘bān op Java’, TBG vol. 73 (1933), p. 424.
59 Ahmad Najib Burhani, ‘The Muhammadiyah’s attitude to Javanese culture in 
1912–30: Appreciation and tension’ (MA thesis, Leiden University, 2004).
60 The following account rests upon Azra, ‘Guarding the faith’, pp. 89–96.
61 For one among the many accounts of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, see 
John O. Voll, ‘Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab world: Egypt and the Sudan’, in 
Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appelby (eds), Fundamentalisms observed (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 360–74.
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Although Rasjidi may have displayed some degree of tolerance towards 
abangan — as also did some other Muhammadiyah leaders of Javanese 
background, notably the founder of Muhammadiyah himself, Ky. H. Ahmad 
Dahlan — he could be quite intolerant of what he regarded as backward 
and ignorant practices found among Javanese santri. In his 1956 doctoral 
thesis, defended at the Sorbonne, he held up for ridicule fatwas issue by 
Nahdlatul Ulama in the 1930s, such as the declaration that the production 
of photographs was haram. An NU fatwa also declared a purchase made 
while wearing spectacles invalid in Islamic law, on the grounds that spectacles 
distorted vision.62 For Rasjidi this was just backwardness.
Yet NU, too, was pressing for what we might think of as more modern 
ways in some respects. Like Muhammadiyah, NU approved giving the 
Friday sermon in the vernacular rather than in Arabic.63 NU was particularly 
concerned about the roles of government-appointed pangulus. These men 
were at the same time government bureaucrats and religious leaders, a 
difficult balancing act. It was certainly not the case that they were all highly 
regarded for their religious knowledge.64 In this respect, the kyais of NU 
were in competition with them for influence and leadership within Javanese 
society. NU pressed throughout the 1930s for a government-run system 
of examinations for pangulus, but without success.65 Similarly, in 1935 the 
NU Congress resolved that if the government did not create an institution 
to train Islamic judges adequately — a role exercised by pangulus — then 
NU would feel obliged to do so itself.66 This contest was not to be resolved 
until the Japanese occupation and the subsequent victory of the Indonesian 
Revolution cemented the kyais’ dominance of Traditionalist Islam and 
removed the kafir colonial government which supported, and thereby made 
illegitimate in the eyes of many, the authority of pangulus.
Just as the Modernists objected to the parading of royal pusakas to 
ward off epidemic disease, as noted above, they also attacked the widespread 
62 The thesis was not published until 20 years later: H.M. Rasjidi, Documents pour 
servir à l ’histoire de l ’Islam à Java (Paris: Ecole Français d’Extrême-Orient, 1977), 
pp. 195, 199.
63 Muhamad Hisyam, Caught between three fires: The Javanese pangulu under the Dutch 
colonial administration 1882–1942 ( Jakarta: INIS, 2001), pp. 177–80.
64 On the pangulus in general from the later nineteenth century to 1942, see ibid.
65 G.F. Pijper, Studiën over de geschiedenis van de Islam in Indonesia, 1900–1950 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977), p. 89.
66 Rasjidi, Documents, p. 192. On the more general leadership competition between 
pangulus and kyais in the 1930s, see Hisyam, Caught between three fires, pp. 182–9.
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observance of the middle of the month Saban (in Java often named 
Ruwah).67 There were a variety of beliefs which connected this time with 
fate, death and the dead. So it was a time to fear wandering spirits, to pray 
and to seek supernatural protection through communal observances. This 
night was (and is) observed widely in the Islamic world,68 including Mecca, 
by then under Wahhabi rule. Al-Irsyad’s leader Surkati declared, however, 
that all of the Prophetic traditions (Hadith) supporting the observance were 
weak. The Modernist, Muhammadiyah-led, Yogyakarta newspaper Bintang 
Islam (Star of Islam) also denounced these traditions thoroughly in 1930. 
What Pijper called ‘enlightened orthodox circles’, represented above all by 
Muhammadiyah, sought to stigmatise all the traditions about the middle of 
Saban as heterodoxy.
Yet these practices were deeply rooted. In Cirebon the pious would read 
the Qur’an in the middle of the night of 15 Saban. It was believed that then 
the dead were summoned from their graves so that from that night, through 
the fasting month that followed and until the first of the subsequent month 
of Sawal, there was no need to visit graves to talk to one’s ancestors, for they 
were empty. Rather, one took the occasion to clean the graves in preparation 
for the returning spirits. In south Banyumas ‘the religious and the irreligious’ 
(i.e., the santri and abangan) alike observed the occasion. While the santri 
gathered in mosques to pray for divine grace, forgiveness and protection 
from misfortunes, the abangan understood this as a time when God fulfills 
all of one’s wishes, so it was a time for jollity. There were various ideas about 
water connected with this, so public bathing at several (usually seven) specific 
places was often part of the celebrations. Warungs and pasars did a roaring 
trade from the passing observants.
In Kediri and Bojonegoro, by contrast, Pijper reported that the abangan 
cared nothing at all for this business. Only the ‘religiously developed’ honoured 
the night. Wherever abangan took part in the observances, not only did pre-
Islamic ideas get mixed up in them, ‘but also here and there the celebration 
67 This account of the controversy rests upon Pijper, ‘Lailat’, pp. 405, 417–25.
68 See the article on Sha‘ban by A.J. Wensinck in P. Bearman et al. (eds), Encyclo-
paedia of Islam (2nd ed.; 13 vols; Leiden: E.J. Brill; London: Luzac & Co., 1960–
2008), vol. 9, p. 154. Wensinck writes, inter alia, that ‘according to popular belief, in 
the night preceding the 15th, the tree of life on whose leaves are written the names of 
the living is shaken. The names written on the leaves which fall down, indicate those 
who are to die in the coming year. … It is said that in this night God descends to 
the lowest heaven; from there he calls the mortals in order to grant them forgiveness 
of sins.’
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attains a worldly character, indeed takes on the features of a popular festival.’ 
In Semarang, Kedu and the Vorstenlanden, the pious sometimes kept watch 
in the night and fasted. In Surakarta there was a strong commitment to 
what was there called separo (half, i.e., half-way through Saban) among ‘old-
fashioned orthodox circles’, i.e., Traditionalist santri who followed NU-style 
devotions rather than Modernist Muhammadiyah versions. The Manba‘ al-
‘Ulum school in Surakarta, set up on the orders of Pakubuwana X in 1905 
and the first modern Islamic school in Java,69 was closed on 15 Saban. The 
Muhammadiyah schools, not surprisingly, remained open. In Yogyakarta, 
the aristocracy’s sense of decorum prevented them from joining in the 
celebrations at public bathing places so instead they sent servants to collect 
water from the seven wells traditionally identified for these observances. In 
the farthest Eastern Salient of Java, where was found ‘a simple, pious folk’, 
Pijper reported that ‘Islam in this district is not old and the knowledge of 
the faith is often still scanty’, but Javanese, Madurese and ‘Osingers’ (local 
indigenous Javanese) mostly regarded the night of 15 Saban as holy.
So the Modernist Islamic reformers faced formidable challenges in 
reforming Javanese society. Given low levels of literacy, widespread hardship, 
and the ongoing beliefs in all sorts of spiritual powers — usually connected 
with indigenous occult forces and agricultural cycles but sometimes of more 
clearly Islamic inspiration — it is hardly surprising that the influence of 
Muhammadiyah and like-minded groups remained almost exclusively limited 
to urban areas.
Nor did the Islamic reformers have a monopoly of influence in urban 
areas, for there they were challenged by other ideas and organisations, such 
as the Taman Siswa schools. These sought to produce a modern educational 
and intellectual style that was specifically rooted in Javanese culture, and 
particularly in ‘high’ Javanese culture: the world of wayang, gamelan and 
classical dance. In 1935, Taman Siswa’s founder, Ki Hadjar Dewantara 
(1889–1959), spoke about national education and the role of Taman Siswa. 
He made it clear that the central cultural or national question for him was 
about Javanese identity on the one hand and Dutch on the other. He ignored 
Islam and Islamic elites: they did not apparently offer a third alternative. 
Dewantara criticised those members of the aristocratic elite (priyayi) who 
were attracted to Dutch styles of doing things.
Dissatisfaction has … befallen us, and worse: slowly but surely we have 
become alienated from our own people and our own environment. 
69 See Hisyam, Caught between three fires, pp. 141–6.
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…Because of the great inferiority complex which we derived from 
our particular governmental experience, we were easily satisfied with 
anything that made us look a bit Dutch. …70
In 1941 Dewantara gave another speech that was directed specifically 
towards Islam and, particularly given its venue, bluntly dismissive of narrow 
understandings of that faith. He was speaking to a gathering of the Lahore 
branch of the Ahmadiyya movement held in Yogyakarta. Ahmadiyya is an 
idiosyncratic development of Islam rather like Mormonism in Christianity 
since its founder, the Punjabi Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1839–1908), claimed 
to have experienced divine revelations.71 Half a century later, Ahmadiyya 
would be declared deviant by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian 
Islamic Scholars’ Council), a government-appointed body of Islamic scholars. 
But in the 1930s, Ahmadiyya was still fairly new in Indonesia and was not 
yet the subject of such objections. In Java as elsewhere, Ahmadis were noted 
for their commitment to education and intellectualism.72
At the 1941 Ahmadi meeting in Yogyakarta, Ki Hadjar Dewantara 
spoke directly of ‘Islam and culture’. His comments would have been 
quite unwelcome to many of Islam’s leaders in Java at that time. Speaking 
Indonesian and tossing in Dutch words both to explain concepts and to 
confirm his intellectual standing, Dewantara observed, 
Although in principle all religions are the same, because there is a stelsel 
[system] or specific forms, therefore over time inner faith (religi) becomes 
a regularised religion (godsdienst). And because of that, over time special 
regulations arise that differentiate religions one from another. … Indeed, 
even within a single religion there are differences of understanding, so 
that sekten [sects] or variants arise. …
70 Ki Hadjar Dewantara, ‘Some aspects of national education and the Taman Siswa 
Institute at Jogjakarta’, Indonesia no. 4 (Oct. 1967), pp. 150–68. Discussed further in 
Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese society, pp. 224–5.
71 The Lahore branch regards Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a renewer of Islam rather 
than a new prophet. Ahmadiyya’s other branch — the Qadian — sees him as a new 
prophet, an idea that is clearly heretical in conventional Islamic terms. See Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith, ‘Aḥmadiyya’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed.), vol. 1, p. 301. The 
further story of Ahmadiyya in Java is considered below in this book (consult the 
index for relevant passages). The history of this movement in Indonesia is the subject 
of Iskandar Zulkarnain, Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2005).
72 Ahmadiyya had only arrived in Java in the mid-1920s and did not establish its 
first mosque until the late 1930s. As a part of its intellectual activities, it produced 
translations of the Qur’an in both Dutch and Indonesian.
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 Thus it is that Islam is not pure, but is mixed with Arab, Indian, 
Persian, Sumatran, Javanese, and suchlike cultures. And don’t forget as 
well that the influence from society is very strong, as is also true of the 
circumstances of the time, so that the nature of Islam in a country in 
previous times is genuinely different from its nature nowadays. …
 This means:
(a) That Islamic culture always had the character of ‘people’s culture’, 
not ‘kraton culture’ like Javanese culture down to the present, for 
example. In the present age, ‘kraton culture’ in Java is beginning to 
develop so as to become ‘people’s culture’.
(b) That Islamic culture in general is always about the religious life, 
social life and state life. Thus, art, for instance, is insufficiently or not 
at all considered.
 Because Islam came to our country via Persia and India, therefore the 
nature of Islam in Java naturally is a mix of various religious and social 
influences from those places. …73 
Thus, here was a relativistic view that looked upon religion generally 
and Islam specifically as culturally and historically contingent. This was 
an idea that would have resonated in those circles still committed to the 
Javanese Mystic Synthesis and among those who were uncomfortable 
with fundamentalism in any faith. But to the more puritanical of Islamic 
reformers it would have been anathema. It is doubtful that Ahmad Surkati, 
many Muhammadiyah leaders or the activists of Persatuan Islam74 would 
have been at all happy with such views. The published version of this 
talk does not, however, give any indication of what the Ahmadis thought 
about it.
73 Originally published in Pusara, May 1941. Reprinted in Ki Hadjar Dewantara, 
Karya, vol. 2: Kebudayaan (Yogyakarta: Majelis Luhur Persatuan Tamansiswa, 1994), 
pp. 40–3.
74 Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union) was founded in Bandung in 1923 and was one 
of the most puritan of Modernist organisations. Its foremost leader in this period 
was A. Hassan (b. 1887), a Singapore-born Tamil with a Javanese mother. The 
organisation’s name was conventionally shortened to ‘Persis’, a pun on the Dutch 
word precies (precise, punctilious). Hassan established a pesantren in Bandung in 1936 
but transferred it to Bangil in East Java when he moved there in 1940. See Howard 
M. Federspiel, Islam and ideology in the emerging Indonesian state: The Persatuan Islam 
(PERSIS), 1923 to 1957 (Leiden, etc.: Brill, 2001); Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim 
movement in Indonesia, 1900–1942 (Singapore, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1973), 
pp. 85–92.
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Islam in Java was still much influenced by mysticism and in this realm, 
too, there were controversies in the 1930s. In Java, the Traditionalist kyais 
who were adherents of the Shafi‘i school of law and were involved in NU 
were also supporters and leaders of Islamic mysticism. The various Sufi 
tarekats (orders; from Arabic tariqa, literally ‘way’ or ‘path’) were inherently 
in at least some degree of competition with one another for followers and to 
assert the superiority of their own understandings and devotional practices 
(wirid, Arabic wird). The principal tarekats in Java in this period were still 
the Naqshabandiyya (of the Khalidiyya branch), the Qadiriyya, the composite 
Indonesian order Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya, the Khalwatiyya, the 
Shadhiliyya and the Shattariyya.75 The main controversy in Java in the 1930s, 
however, concerned a newly arrived order, the Tijaniyya, which provoked 
conflict within NU circles.
Tijaniyya was controversial for several reasons.76 All Sufi tarekats 
should have a spiritual genealogy (salsilah; Arabic silsila, literally ‘chain’) 
which connects the current head of the order in a direct line back to 
the tarekat’s founder and thence to the Prophet, thereby confirming the 
authenticity of the teachings and devotions. Tijaniyya, however, lacked 
such a conventional genealogy. Its founder was the Algerian Ahmad bin 
Muhammad al-Tijani (1738–1815), who said that while in a fully awakened 
condition he met the Prophet Muhammad, first in 1782 and subsequently 
again, and received from him the teachings and practices of the order. 
Moreover, Tijaniyya practices were simpler than those of other orders 
— although the number of litanies to be repeated was too much for many 
— and promised sure entry to heaven for anyone who practiced its wirid 
until death, along with the devotee’s parents, spouses and children. Tijaniyya 
declared itself superior to all other Sufi orders. With such ideas, Tijaniyya 
attracted large numbers of adherents.
In 1928 Tijaniyya began to spread in Java. A respected elderly kyai in 
Cirebon, Ky. Madrais (Muhammad Rais) began to teach it after having been 
initiated into its devotions by the Arab scholar ‘Ali bin ‘Abdallah al-Tayyib 
al-Azhari. At about the same time the young and influential Ky. Anas of the 
75 On these, see Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese society, pp. 74–8. 
76 The following account is taken from G.F. Pijper, Fragmenta Islamica: Studiën over 
het Islamisme in Nederlandsch-Indië (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1934), pp. 97–121. See also 
Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Controversies and polemics involving the Sufi orders in 
twentieth-century Indonesia’, in F. de Jong and B. Radtke (eds), Islamic mysticism 
contested: Thirteen centuries of controversies and polemics (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1999), pp. 
705–28.
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pesantren Buntet in Cirebon also began to teach Tijaniyya after returning 
from Arabia. From this time on, the order spread rapidly in West Java and 
along the north coast, with Buntet as its main centre. Tijaniyya’s exclusivity 
was a major issue. Its devotees were forbidden to follow other tarekats, so its 
growth was at the expense of existing orders. Shaykhs of the other tarekats 
denounced Tijaniyya. They accused it of being the worst of all things to 
non-Modernist Islamic circles in Java in this time: they said it was Wahhabi. 
The opponents of Tijaniyya were not actually accusing it of introducing 
the austere practices of the Wahhabi leadership of Saudi Arabia.77 Rather, 
‘Wahhabi’ had become a derogatory term for all reforming movements that 
denied the traditionally accepted authority of the Shafi‘i school of law and 
the established Sufi orders. In this sense only was Tijaniyya a ‘Wahhabi’ 
innovation. The denunciations had an effect and stemmed Tijaniyya’s growth 
in some places. Tijaniyya’s defenders replied with assertions of the superiority 
and authenticity of its teachings.
In 1931, NU’s annual meeting took place in Cirebon and one of 
the major topics of discussion among these Traditionalist scholars was 
the orthodoxy or otherwise of Tijaniyya. In a classically equivocal, hair-
splitting judgment, NU concluded that Tijaniyya was good with regard 
to its devotional practices and that those of its views that were consistent 
with the law (shari‘a) were good. But those that seemed to be in conflict 
with the shari‘a were to be left to the knowledgeable leaders of the tarekat 
insofar as they were susceptible to metaphorical explanations; if they were 
not susceptible to such explanations and were clearly in conflict with shari‘a, 
then they were declared to be in error. On the basis of this tangled decision, 
Tijaniyya devotees dared to claim that NU had pronounced their tarekat to 
be acceptable. Rather than dampening the controversy, the NU decision thus 
reignited it. Tijaniyya’s fiercest opponent was a respected figure from Kracak, 
Ky. Muhammad Ismail, who taught the Qadiriyya and Naqshabandiyya 
wirids. In 1932 he published a pamphlet that denounced Tijaniyya as heresy: 
‘The tariqa of the Tijaniyya people is bid‘a [unlawful innovation], their shari‘a 
is unbelief and their Reality (haqiqa) is Hell.’78 A year later the kyai died. His 
opponents claimed that the body swelled up in an unnatural fashion as none 
other than al-Tijani himself took his revenge upon him.
Today Tijaniyya is found throughout Indonesia, but its main strengths 
remain in West, Central and East Java. In the 1980s it was accepted as a fully 
77 In fact, the Saudis were opposed to all Sufi orders.
78 Cited in Pijper, Fragmenta, p. 119.
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respectable, orthodox tarekat by NU. But even that did not prevent further 
polemics from breaking out.79
For many of the learned leaders of Modernist Islam, Traditionalists’ 
disputes about Tijaniyya — indeed the whole business of Sufism — must 
have been just further evidence of the backwardness of Indonesian Islam. Yet 
the more austere, legalistic, intellectualized version of Islam that seemed to 
represent the ideals of many Muhammadiyah leaders — and certainly those 
of Persis and Al-Irsyad — had little likelihood of winning mass support in 
Java. Even among Modernist intellectuals there seems to have been some 
awareness that Sufism and more indigenous forms of mysticism flourished 
in Java because they fulfilled the spiritual needs of many Javanese. 
But what could Modernism offer to fulfill such spiritual needs? There 
were several barriers in the way of such an offering. Modernist reliance on 
the Qur’an and Hadith as the true foundations of faith — in preference to 
the vast library of interpretative literature by centuries of learned scholars 
— left little room for the mystics and their ideas. Moreover, the devotion and 
loyalty that Sufis accorded to their spiritual guides, their shaykhs, represented 
two profound faults from the Modernist point of view. Firstly, insofar as 
Sufi shaykhs — in Java called kyais — were regarded by their followers 
as unchallengeable authorities on belief and practice, then the deference 
thereby accorded to them plainly conflicted with the fundamental and 
unequalled guidance to be found only in the Qur’an and Hadith. Secondly, 
in competition for leadership of the Islamic community, Javanese kyais 
were the direct competitors of the more intellectually sophisticated leaders 
of Modernist Islam — and, worse still, had far greater influence than they 
among the masses of Javanese. So quite apart from questions of the doctrine, 
the standing of the shaykhs or kyais in Sufism was a fundamental problem 
for most Modernists.
In 1937–9 a possible solution to the dilemmatic relationship between 
Islamic Modernism and Sufism was provided, not by a Javanese Sufi, but 
(somewhat surprisingly) by a Modernist Minangkabau intellectual — a 
solution that continues to be powerful in Java and elsewhere in Indonesia 
seven decades after its initial publication. The writer in question was Haji 
Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (1908–81), commonly called Hamka on the 
basis of his initials. Hamka’s background is of interest, for he was the son 
of one of Minangkabau’s early Modernist Islamic thinkers, Shaykh Dr Haji 
79 Sri Mulyati et al., Mengenal dan memahami tarekat-tarekat muktabarah di Indonesia 
( Jakarta; Kencana, 2004), p. 231.
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Abdul Karim Amrullah (1879–1945), better known as ‘Haji Rasul’. He 
studied for some years in Mecca and on his return to Sumatra in the early 
20th century took a leading role in educational reform in Minangkabau, 
building a modern religious school called Sumatra Thawalib (1918). 
Haji Rasul was expelled from this, his own school in the early 1920s by 
proponents of Islamic Communism. In 1925 he introduced Muhammadiyah 
to West Sumatra and it soon came to be the biggest Islamic organisation 
in the region. Haji Rasul was a prolific writer. Among the targets of his 
polemics was the Naqshabandiyya Sufi order. As Taufik Abdullah puts it, 
‘Although acknowledging the importance of tasawwuf [mysticism], [Haji 
Rasul] denied that the Naqshabandiyya order was doctrinally pure. He con-
demned the concept of rabita, mediation between creature and the Creator, 
as taught by the order’.80
Thus, Hamka came from a Sumatran background strong in Modernist 
Islamic intellectualism and socio-political engagement. Hamka himself 
became known as one of Indonesia’s leading writers as well as a major 
Modernist ulama. In 1937–8 he was editing the Islamic magazine Pedoman 
Masyarakat (the compass of the community) and, in response to requests 
from others, there wrote a series on bahagia (bliss, happiness, well-being).81 
In 1939 these articles were republished as a book entitled Tasauf 82 moderen 
(modern mysticism) which is still readily available in Indonesia.83 
In Tasauf moderen, the still-young Hamka said that he was not present-
ing his own ideas, but rather views based on the writings of great ulamas 
of the past along with the Qur’an and Hadith. He cited not only medieval 
thinkers such as al-Mawardi (974–1058), Ibn Sina (Avicenna) (980–1037) 
and al-Ghazali (1058–1111) but also the Modernist pioneers Muhammad 
‘Abduh (1849–1905) and Jamal ad-din al-Afghani (1838–97), among others. 
He also referred to Western thinkers whose works he knew through Arabic 
translations: Aristotle and Tolstoy made appearances. There were, said 
80 See the entry by Taufik Abdullah, ‘Abdul Karim Amrullah (Haji Rasul)’, in 
Gudrun Krämer et al. (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam (3rd ed.; Leiden: E.J. Brill; 
available in print as fascicules appear).
81 In his book Perkembangan tasauf dari abad ke abad (Djakarta: Pustaka Islam, 1952), 
p. 129, Hamka gives Indonesian bahagia as the equivalent of Arabic sa‘ada; on the 
range of meanings of the latter in Islamic philosophy, see H. Daiber, ‘Sa‘ādā’, in P. 
Bearman et al., Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed.), vol. 8, p. 657.
82 From Arabic tasawwuf (mysticism).
83 The edition now commonly sold in Indonesia is Hamka, Tasauf moderen (Singa-
pore: Pustaka Nasional Pte Ltd, 1997).
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Hamka, many secrets of Islam that it was proper to discuss and to make 
accessible to people who could not read Arabic. ‘I present an explanation 
that is modern, although its origins are found in books of mysticism. So this 
is Modern Mysticism, I mean an explanation of mystical sciences that is 
modernised’, he said in the introduction to the first edition.84 
Hamka explained to his readers that the intentions of the early Sufis 
were good but later unacceptable things came to be added: ‘They wanted to 
resist carnal urges, the world and the devil, but sometimes they embarked 
upon ways that were not bounded by religion’.85 His purpose, said Hamka, 
was to return to the original Sufism. In search of this bahagia and the original 
Sufism, Hamka presented chapters on ‘opinions about bahagia, ‘bahagia and 
religion’, ‘bahagia and spiritual accomplishment’, ‘spiritual and physical 
health’, ‘possessions and bahagia’, ‘pious contentment with little’,86 ‘deep 
trust (in God)’,87 ‘the bahagia experienced by the Prophet’, ‘the connection 
between contentment88 and the beauty of the world’, ‘the ladder of bahagia’, 
‘misfortune’ and, finally, (supererogatory) prayers.
The important — indeed crucial — distinction between Hamka’s 
‘Modern Sufism’ and the Sufism practised by Javanese mystics of his time 
was that ‘Modern Sufism’ was about personal spirituality and did not 
require a guru or shaykh. Nor did it require membership of a mystical order 
(tarekat).
With all of these explanations it is clear what my purpose is with this 
book. I call it tasauf, that is, to follow the intention of the original 
mysticism, as in the words of al-Junayd:89 ‘To leave behind a shameful 
way of life and embrace a praiseworthy way of life’ — with a modern 
explanation. 
 I will reestablish the original intention of tasauf, that is, to purify the 
soul, to educate and to elevate the level of character; to suppress all greed 
84 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
85 Ibid., p. 14.
86 Qana’ah, Arabic qana‘a: see Geneviève Gobillot, ‘Zuhd’, in P. Bearman et al., 
Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed.), vol. 11, p. 559.
87 Tawakkal, Arabic tawakkul. On the uses of this crucial term in Islam, see L. 
Lewisohn, ‘Tawakkul (a.)’, in P. Bearman et al., Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed.), vol. 
10, p. 376.
88 Redha, from Arabic riḍa, a term found in Sufism; see Ed., ‘Riḍa’ in ibid., vol. 8, 
p. 509.
89 Abu ‘l-Qasim b. Muhammad b. al-Junayd (d. 910) a leading proponent of what is 
known as ‘sober Sufism’.
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and voraciousness; to fight against lust that is beyond what is needed for 
personal tranquility.90
None of Hamka’s purposes required formal adherence to an order or 
initiation by a shaykh. It was the authority of those shaykhs, the pledges of 
allegiance to them, and the ritualised practices associated with repetitive 
litanies (dhikr) that much concerned Modernists. Hamka assured his readers 
that they could embrace the spirituality of mystical experience without the 
need to embrace any of those tarekat practices, all of which smacked of pre-
modernity in his eyes. 
Hamka’s Tasauf moderen of 1937–9 was thus emblematic of two 
important developments within Javanese Islam visible by the 1930s. Firstly, 
even something as fundamental to Javanese Islam as mysticism was open to 
new influences and ideas generated by the Modernist urge to return to the 
Qur’an and Hadith as a means of rediscovering the pristine truths of Islam. 
Secondly, profound new influences could come from other parts of what 
was soon to be the independent Republic of Indonesia. Javanese had never 
been isolated from the rest of the archipelago or the world. But the level of 
interconnectedness between Javanese and other societies was now increasing 
by virtue of modern communications, colonial unification of the islands, the 
consequent growth of archipelago-wide political and economic interactions 
and the national-level aspirations of religious and political organisations. 
The Javanese were well on their way to becoming a subset of the peoples 
who were soon to be known as Indonesians. It needs also to be borne in 
mind, however, that — as noted earlier in this chapter — the vast majority 
of Javanese were still illiterate in this period. So the impact of a publication 
such as Hamka’s book was necessarily still limited to the small literate elite. 
Within a few decades that, too, would change.
Abangan and santri
Regardless of how ‘Indonesian’ they were on their way to becoming, Javanese 
retained idiosyncratic cultural and social arrangements that are of central 
interest in this book. Notably, in the 1930s Javanese society was — so far as 
we can know on the basis of surviving evidence — structured along lines of 
religious identity as well as along the more usual lines of social class. On the 
one hand were the santri, the pious, self-consciously practising Muslims. They 
were themselves divided by a primary distinction between Traditionalists 
90 Hamka, Tasauf moderen, p. 17.
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(represented mainly by NU) and Modernists (represented by multiple 
groups, by far the largest being Muhammadiyah), but beyond this there were 
multiple other categories of santri: the contending Sufi orders including the 
much-contested Tijaniyya, the Ahmadiyya and various shades of Modernism. 
On the other hand were the abangan: nominal Muslims for whom Islam was 
largely a source of ritual practice at certain stages of life. An abangan rarely or 
never prayed, indeed normally did not know the ritual movements associated 
with prayer, could not recite the confession of faith or the Qur’an, rarely or 
never fasted in Ramadan and would almost certainly not contemplate the 
expenditure of resources necessary for the pilgrimage to Mecca. But at birth 
and burial, abangan would expect Islamic rituals to be carried out. And some 
version might be wanted at a circumcision or wedding.
Although we have no widespread social surveys from this period, a 
useful report from the area of Bagelen in western Central Java captures 
both the generality of the abangan-santri categorisation and the local 
idiosyncrasies found across Java. There the term for the aristocratic-
bureaucratic elite was not the more general priyayi but rather kenthol. One 
such kenthol gave a ritual communal meal (slametan) in 1939 to which all 
were invited. But the seating was far from random. The pendhapa (open 
public hall) in which the occasion was celebrated was divided into three 
spaces. On the left sat commoners who were abangan. Away from them, on 
the right sat the santri — and it is interesting to note that Bagelen was one 
area where santri was indeed the local term at this time, rather than the more 
common putihan. In a middle section between them were seated the elite 
kenthols. This categorisation reflected the cross-cutting distinctions of social 
class and religious identity later to be made famous in the 1950s research of 
Clifford Geertz and his team in East Java: santri and abangan representing 
the two main categories of Islamic identity while, sitting between them, the 
upper-class priyayi represented the continuing salience of distinctions of 
social class.91 
Polarised on the precipice
In 1930 the Javanese were predominantly rural dwellers, but there was also 
a growing urban proletariat as well as a tiny urban-based educated elite. 
Population growth already placed serious pressure on resources, which was 
91 Soekardan Prånåhadikoesoemå, ‘De kénṭol der desa Kréndétan’, Djåwå vol. 19 
(1939), p. 159.
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heightened significantly with the onset of the Depression of 1930. That 
growing urban proletariat was particularly hard hit by the Depression. A 
process of Islamisation had been going on amongst the Javanese since the 
14th century, but in the eyes of Islamic reformers there was still a long way 
to go. Indeed the process of Islamisation had been halted, in some ways 
perhaps even reversed, by developments since the middle years of the 19th 
century. Then there had emerged in Javanese society a group — in fact the 
majority of Javanese — known as the abangan, the nominal Muslims, in 
contrast to the pious santri. These social distinctions had been politicised and 
thereby made sharper by the growth in the early 20th century of political 
movements whose constituencies followed those social lines. But by 1930 
this politicisation was being halted and probably reversed, as the Dutch 
crushed the main political movements responsible for the politicisation of 
social divisions.
Javanese society was, for the most part, not only impoverished but 
also ill-educated. Literacy rates were low and close to zero in the case of 
women. But Javanese were not culturally impoverished. A rich cultural 
life gave meaning to most Javanese, from hard-pressed peasants to kraton 
aristocrats and urban ‘moderns’. Little of this cultural life was yet influenced 
by reformist Islamic norms. Women were neither secluded in their houses 
nor did they wear all-enveloping clothes in public — rarely even headscarves, 
so far as we know. Islam was a presence in Javanese life, but it was only partly 
the Islam of urban-based Modernist intellectuals. To a much greater degree 
it remained the Islam of the rural kyais, of mystical tarekats and of a majority 
of Javanese who constituted the otherwise-uninterested abangan seeking 
Islamic ritual embellishment for a birth, circumcision, wedding or funeral. 
Even pious communities in the countryside clung to beliefs and rituals which 
the Modernist reformers regarded as ignorant superstition at best and heresy 
at worst. These Modernists were challenged not only by prevailing norms in 
the countryside but also by other urban moderns for whom purified Islam 
did not seem the appropriate key to the future. Such leaders were found in 
the Taman Siswa organization and in various ‘secular’ (i.e., not religiously 
Islamic) political parties.
Urban nationalist leaders wished to mobilise a mass following to 
overthrow Dutch colonial rule. Given the repressive nature of that regime in 
the 1930s, however, such dreams were frequently dreamt behind bars. Such 
nationalist movements as were able to survive under the conditions of the 
1930s were split among themselves by ideological and personal differences.
Insofar as significant numbers of Javanese followed formal organizations 
in the 1930s, they were more likely to be led by the few Javanese kraton 
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nobles who were prepared to act on their sense of noblesse oblige, by the 
kyais of NU or by other religious organizations. The politically caged 
rulers of Central Java’s Vorstenlanden and their kraton aristocracies were 
mostly, however, more interested in preserving their social standing and the 
associated rituals that entailed supernatural powers and thereby attracted 
superstitious commoners to them. That aristocratic social standing and those 
rituals were also useful to the Dutch regime as a means of preserving as far 
as possible popular acquiescence with the status quo.
Thus stood Javanese society and its Islamic faith on the precipice of the 
cataclysmic years from 1942 through 1949. Impoverished, illiterate, socially 
polarised but depoliticised by colonial repression, Javanese society was about 
to become repoliticised by the devastating — but in the end politically 
liberating — experience of the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian 
Revolution. It would still be impoverished, illiterate and socially polarised, 
but repoliticised and freed of the colonial police-state which had prevented 
domestic Javanese conflicts from breaking out into violence. The result 
would be both the achievement of independence, with Java as a central part 
of the new Republic of Indonesia, and — tragically — the first significant 
bloodshed between Javanese santri and abangan.
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c h a p te r  3
War and Revolution, 1942–9: 
The hardening of boundaries
Sandwiched between the 1930s and 1950s lies the chaos of the Japanese 
occupation and the Indonesian Revolution. This was a time of intense 
upheaval and hardship, of political and social conflict that was immensely 
influential in shaping the future social, cultural, political and religious 
experiences of the Javanese. Oppression, violence, suffering, disease, mal-
nutrition, starvation and death became common. This was the only time in 
the period covered by this book when the population of Java appears hardly 
to have grown at all and may even have declined. While this period has been 
intensely studied, the socio-religious aspects that are of primary interest to 
us in this book are, unfortunately, poorly documented.
The Japanese occupation1
The earliest serious study of Islamic aspects of the occupation period was 
Harry Benda’s doctoral dissertation, published as The crescent and the rising 
59
1 There are many works covering the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, most of 
which give emphasis to Java. A particularly important study is Shigeru Sato, War, 
nationalism and peasants: Java under the Japanese occupation, 1942–1945 (St. Leonards, 
NSW: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin, 
1994). On the hardships of the period, see also Sato’s article ‘“Economic soldiers” 
in Java: Indonesian laborers mobilized for agricultural projects’ in Paul H. Kratoska 
(ed.), Asian labor in the wartime Japanese empire (Singapore: Singapore University 
Press, 2006), esp. pp. 131, 373 n7.
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sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese occupation 1942–1945.2 The sources 
available to Benda enabled him to write about national-level political issues 
but gave little insight into grass-roots developments during this period. 
The overriding question of interest to Benda in 1955, when he completed 
his dissertation at Cornell, was which side of Indonesian politics was 
strengthened or weakened by Japanese divide-and-rule policies. The main 
players in his analysis were defined largely by the emerging tripartite analysis 
of Clifford Geertz, who saw Javanese society as consisting of the elite (and 
rather ‘secular’) priyayi, the pious santri and the nominally Muslim peasant 
abangan. Indonesian politics of the mid-1950s — as we will see in the 
next chapter — indeed suggested that these were important distinctions. 
Benda’s attempt to make sense of the multiple directions and redirections, 
of the wartime exigencies and chaos that inevitably attended the Japanese 
occupation, however, produced a rather confusing picture. His analysis was 
disputed persuasively by, among others, L. Sluimers,3 who argued that the 
primary distinction to be observed in Japanese policy was not between santri 
politicians and secular nationalists, but rather between conservative and non-
conservative elites of all socio-religious orientations. Islam in itself was not, 
he argued, a central category in Japanese policy. The Japanese did not think 
that there was just one sort of Islam in Java. The dreaded Japanese military 
police (Kenpeitai) observed that ‘there were considerable regional differences 
in degrees of faith among the Javanese Muslims’.4 Kurasawa, too, rejected 
Benda’s analytical scheme on the basis of her analysis of Japanese sources 
for the occupation period.5 Our primary interest here, however, is less in 
what Japanese policies were intended to do than in the actual impact of the 
occupation upon the varieties of Islam lived in Java.
One of the most important departures traceable to the Japanese period 
was the political education and involvement of Traditionalist NU kyais. Prior 
to the Japanese occupation, it was urban-based Modernists who were most 
2 Harry J. Benda, The crescent and the rising sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese 
occupation 1942–1945 (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd, 1958).
3 L. Sluimers, ‘“Niewe orde” op Java: De Japanse bezettingspolitiek en de Indo-
nesische elites 1942–1943’, BKI vol. 124 (1968), no. 3, pp. 336–67.
4 Barbara Gifford Shimer and Guy Hobbs (transls), The Kenpeitai in Java and Sumatra 
(Selections from Nihon Kenpei Seishi) (intro. Theodore Friend. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project Translation Series Publication no. 65, 1986), p. 41.
5 Aiko Kurasawa, Mobilisasi dan kontrol: Studi tentang perubahan sosial di pedesaan Java 
1942–1945 ( Jakarta: Yayasan Karti Sarana and Penerbit PT Gramedia Widiasarana 
Indonesia, 1993), especially p. 329.
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likely to be politically active, although Muhammadiyah itself studiously 
avoided anti-colonial politics and continued to cooperate with the colonial 
regime in its educational and welfare work. In the countryside, Traditionalist 
kyais were mainly involved in their pesantren schools. They were regarded 
with considerable respect by their surrounding societies, even (it seems) by 
many of the nominally Muslim abangan majority. As noted in the previous 
chapter, NU was pressing the colonial government with regard to certain 
policy matters, but this was not a matter of anti-colonial agitation, no matter 
how much the kyais may have wished privately for a non-kafir government.
With the Japanese in charge, the kyais still faced a kafir government, 
but one that took a very different view of them. As the Japanese took over 
from the Dutch in Java, their first priority was to control the population, 
restrict all political activity, put down disorder and get the society under 
control. When they felt that had been achieved, their priority turned towards 
the mobilisation of the Javanese population, so as to bolster Japan’s defences 
against a possible Allied counterattack (which did not, in the end, materi-
alise). At each stage of this policy evolution, the kyais were of importance to 
the Japanese: the kyais did not have radical political demands of their own 
(unlike some of the urban Modernist politicians) and they did have extensive 
social networks and high prestige among the rural majority (again, unlike the 
Modernists). Moreover, the Japanese expected them to be rather naïve and 
manipulable, unlike the Modernists who were better educated in the ways 
of the modern world. Suddenly the Traditionalist kyais — usually regarded 
as social curiosities or poorly educated religious atavisms by both the Dutch 
colonial regime and the Modernist Muslims — thus found themselves at 
the centre of government attention. There began a politicisation that would 
eventually turn NU into a potent political party. All analysts agree on the 
significance of this development. As Benda put it, ‘The politicization of the 
ulama was the most important aspect of Japanese Islamic policy in 1943’.6
The Japanese sought to unite Modernist and Traditionalist Islam under 
moderate leaders from mid-1942 onwards.7 The occupiers decreed ‘Principles 
governing the military administration of Java’ in February 1943, which 
included the following two provisions, the first of which was a continuation 
of Dutch policy and the second a significant departure.
[1] Special care must be taken to respect local customs and practices 
in the execution of government. … Therefore, of the various items to 
6 Benda, Crescent and the rising sun, p. 135.
7 See M.A. Aziz, Japan’s colonialism and Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1955), pp. 204–5.
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which attention has been called, the most important is the respect for 
local customs. … Further, every effort is being made to respect practices 
based upon religion and thereby contribute to reassuring and holding 
the hearts of the people.
 [2] Secondly, there is the matter of the treatment accorded Islamic 
religious leaders who hold positions of social, religious, and, in some 
places, political importance. Special care has been taken in their 
treatment, and acts such as casting scorn on them with pretentious 
exhibitions of Japanese superiority, or interfering in their private lives, 
are being avoided.8
 The Japanese desire to see the contending wings of Islam brought 
together culminated in the formation of Masyumi (Majlis Syuro Muslimin 
Indonesia, Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) in late 1943. Mas-
yumi contained both Modernists and Traditionalists. Its leadership reflected 
the Japanese wish to avoid religious activists with established political 
agendas: rather than being given to the urban Modernist politicos whom the 
Japanese distrusted, it went to leading figures of Muhammadiyah and NU. 
The nominal head was Ky. H. Hasyim Asy‘ari, one of the most senior kyais 
of East Java and — along with Ky. H. Wahab Chasbullah — a founding 
father of NU. The Japanese had foolishly arrested Hasyim Asy‘ari early in 
their occupation but now turned to him for leadership; in fact he remained 
in Jombang in charge of his pesantren Tebuireng, probably the foremost 
Traditionalist school in Java for much of the 20th century. Actual leadership 
in Masyumi was exercised by his son Ky. H. Wachid Hasyim, then just 30 
years old, who later occupied cabinet positions during the Revolution and 
eventually became Minister of Religion (1949–52).9 Masyumi branches were 
set up in every residency across Java. In August 1944 Hoesein Djajadiningrat 
— one of the most distinguished priyayis of West Java — was replaced as 
head of the Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama, Shūmubu) by 
Hasyim Asy‘ari, but again he rarely in fact acted in this role. As deputy head 
of the Office a Muhammadiyah figure, H. Abdul Kahar Muzakir, was ap-
pointed and it was he who in practice led the organisation. Hasyim Asy‘ari’s 
son Wachid Hasyim was appointed as advisor (Sanyo) to the Office.10 
8 Harry J. Benda, James K. Irikura and Kōichi Kishi (eds), Japanese military 
administration in Indonesia: Selected documents ([New Haven, CT:] Yale University 
Southeast Asia Studies Translation Series no. 6, 1965), p. 73.
9 For a biography of Wachid Hasyim, see Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, 
Menteri-menteri Agama RI, pp. 81–113.
10 Kurasawa, Mobilisasi dan kontrol, pp. 282–4.
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To their lives centring on piety and pesantren, Java’s kyais now increas-
ingly added politics. Following in the footsteps of earlier Modernist activists, 
from the time of the Japanese occupation onwards many among Java’s Tra-
ditionalist leaders embraced political leadership roles. The changes brought 
by the Japanese also gave the kyais final and irreversible victory over their 
main competitors for control of rural Islam, the formerly Dutch-appointed 
pangulus. The Japanese recognised how little influence these government 
appointees had among Muslims and therefore how little use they were to 
the occupation forces. The kyais were henceforth unchallenged by any other 
religious leadership group in the Javanese countryside for many decades.
From mid-1943 to mid-1945, the Japanese ran political indoctrination 
courses for kyais in Jakarta (as Batavia was now renamed); over a thousand 
attended the 17 one-month courses that were held.11 This of course 
represented a tiny percentage — perhaps some 5 per cent — of Java’s kyais 
Illustration 8 Tebuireng pesantren, Jombang, in 1987: 
the oldest building, a dormitory for santris
11 The most authoritative account of Japanese indoctrination of village kyais is in 
Aiko Kurasawa’s 1987 PhD thesis (Cornell University), published as Mobilisasi dan 
kontrol; see especially pp. 273–340. The account here relies upon Kurasawa’s work, 
unless otherwise noted.
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but this group was significant for the future. Kurasawa’s analysis shows that 
not all of the attendees were in fact kyais, although they represented the 
largest single group. Religious officials such as pangulus and subordinate 
officers also attended, as did some secular school teachers and others. 
Most were under the age of 40. Kurasawa speculates that this may have 
reflected Japanese policy, but that it is also possible that senior kyais who 
were ordered to attend these courses sent younger representatives in their 
places. The courses for kyais were offered in the Indonesian language rather 
than Javanese — the latter being a demanding language that few (if any) 
Japanese mastered. This undoubtedly contributed to the spread of Indonesian 
and of the roman script among Traditionalist leaders, which was crucial to 
their expanding political horizons; it may also explain the preponderance 
of younger attendees, for both the Western alphabet and the Indonesian 
language would have presented difficulties for many older kyais. Nearly 40 
per cent of attendees were affiliated with NU, while some 12 per cent were of 
Muhammadiyah background. Some had studied in Mecca or Cairo but only 
very few had studied in Dutch schools. There were also some three-month 
courses held from April 1944 for teachers of Modernist madrasahs, but little 
is known about their content. The training courses for kyais covered Japanese 
history and politics, including justifications for the war against the Western 
colonial powers. Indonesian and Japanese interests were depicted as being 
consistent. To this were added practical means of assisting the occupation, 
including ways of improving peasant agriculture, and physical exercises.
The courses changed as they developed and became more Java- (or 
Indonesia-)centric. In September 1944 the Japanese Prime Minister General 
Koiso Kuniaki promised that independence would be granted — at a future 
date not yet declared — to what he still called the ‘East Indies’ (To-Indo, the 
term the Japanese employed officially until April 1945). In Java, the Japanese 
now gave emphasis to encouraging nationalist forces. Consequently, from 
November 1944 the training courses for kyais dropped the lessons about 
the Greater East Asian War and replaced them with indoctrination about 
defence of the Indonesian motherland. Japanese history was dropped at 
some point and more time was given to the history of Java, which seems 
to have been particularly popular. It was taught by Dr Prijono, who later 
served as independent Indonesia’s Minister of Education and Culture. Other 
prominent Indonesian intellectuals were reportedly also involved in teaching 
these courses, including the Modernist leaders Haji Rasul and H. Agus 
Salim,12 but Japanese instructors taught about half of the subjects.
12 Benda, Crescent and the rising sun, p. 248 n10.
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The politicisation of Islamic leaders was also visible in other ways. In 
January 1944 the colonial ban on political matters being raised in religious 
teachings was abolished. Now any teacher who wanted to explain the 
purpose of the Greater East Asia War or to encourage the masses to support 
the Japanese military as a part of religious teaching was free to do so. At the 
same time, the Jawa Hokokai ( Java Service Association) was established 
for everyone over the age of 14. Prominent among its leaders were the 
foremost ‘secular’ nationalist leaders Sukarno and Hatta, along with Ky. 
H. Hasyim Asy‘ari of NU and Ky. H. Mas Mansur, a pre-war chairman of 
Muhammadiyah.
Thus it was that the Islamic leadership groups thought by the Japanese 
to be the least political — NU and Muhammadiyah — were becoming 
involved in political leadership. We should not, however, assume that this 
development was without risks for Islamic leaders. Kurasawa suggests that 
kyais who were pro-Japanese were suspected of being Japanese spies by the 
rural populace. For example, Ky. Abas, the senior kyai of pesantren Buntet in 
Cirebon and elder brother of the Ky. Anas mentioned in the previous chapter, 
appears to have lost much (or all) of his social influence through his support 
of the Japanese; this is discussed further below. In Kurasawa’s view, even if 
rural santris continued to hold kyais in high regard, the abangan majority 
are unlikely to have done so.13 Thus, the politicisation of the kyais may have 
contributed to greater santri-abangan animosities.
We should note a significant difference between Modernist and 
Traditionalist leadership, which persists to the present day. The largely urban 
Modernists, seeking to change society and its observation of Islam, thought 
religious, social, cultural and political activism to be natural and proper. 
Muhammadiyah avoided overt political stances as a tactic to survive in the 
changing political contexts of Indonesia, but never declared political action 
itself to be improper for Muslim leaders. Many Modernist figures were 
politically active from the early 20th century into the 21st and — whether 
individuals agreed or disagreed with their particular programmes and 
activities — there was no significant questioning of their right to be so. 
The Traditionalist kyais of the countryside, however, faced a different social 
calculation. Popular respect for them rested then — as now — in large 
measure on a view of them as pious, other-worldly men, mostly gifted with 
extraordinary spiritual capacities, who stood above the grubby economic and 
political competitions of the day. The more obviously they entered the world 
of politics, the more ordinary they seemed, the less other-worldly, the less 
13 Kurasawa, Mobilisasi dan kontrol, pp. 326–8.
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immune to the complexities of daily life. And, thus, the less worthy of respect 
they seemed. The Japanese occupation’s political empowerment of the kyais 
thus commenced a dilemmatic relationship between their socio-religious 
standing and their political activism. And, in the desperately difficult 
circumstances of the occupation, their collaboration with the Japanese 
probably heightened abangan animosity towards kyais and the overtly pious 
santris in general. As for the purpose of Japanese policy, Kurasawa argues 
persuasively that the Japanese intended to use kyais to mobilise the rural 
population, but never trusted Islamic leaders enough to contemplate actually 
freeing them from the control of the Japanese-directed state bureaucracy.14
We need also to understand the mode of thought and inherited 
political traditions of Traditionalists. Whereas Modernists denied that the 
four Sunni Schools of Islam were authoritative guides to faith and practice 
and invoked the powers of human reason, Traditionalists accepted the 
authority of those Schools and of the centuries of legal traditions that arose 
from them. In the political realm, the dominant Traditionalist idea was that 
any form of government was better than no government; that even imperfect 
authority was preferable to anarchy, and merited loyalty. Their principal 
point of reference was Qur’an 4:59, which admonished believers to ‘obey 
God and obey His Messenger and those who are in authority over you’.15 
So long as the Japanese administration did not actually oppress Islam or 
prevent Muslims from worshipping — and it sought not to do such things 
— then the Traditionalist kyais were inclined to accept its authority, just as 
they had accepted that of the Dutch colonial regime. Traditionalist thought 
thus gave kyais a means of justifying an approach that served the welfare of 
their schools, their students and themselves. Over the coming decades of 
independent Indonesia, NU would often be accused of political opportunism, 
of not taking a stand on principle. Readers therefore need to bear in mind 
the ironic truth that — so long as the observation of Islam was not actually 
threatened — in political matters it was a principle of Traditionalist scholar-
ship not to stand on principle.
The general hardship and chaos of the occupation period tended to 
radicalise and politicise the entire population and religious leaders were not 
immune to this effect. This did not always lead them in directions supportive 
of the Japanese. In Tasikmalaya — in West Java, outside the Javanese-
14 Ibid., pp. 329–31.
15 An overview of this issue is to be found in Gregory John Fealy, ‘Ulama and politics 
in Indonesia: A history of the Nahdlatul Ulama, 1952–1967’ (PhD thesis, Monash 
University, 1998), pp. 50 et seqq.
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speaking heartland — an anti-Japanese rebellion broke out at a pesantren, 
led by its kyai. The uprising was, of course, crushed by the Japanese and the 
head of the pesantren, Ky. Zainal Mustafa, was executed with 22 others.16 
The Japanese authorities were shocked by this episode. The Kenpeitai called 
this ‘the greatest purely civilian rebellion in the history of the military 
government of Java’, which ‘clearly brought home to us the fearsome nature 
of religious rebellion’.17
In Indramayu — on the boundaries of the Javanese and Sundanese 
cultural areas — several similar episodes of resistance occurred that almost 
totally disrupted local government from April to August 1944.18 This was 
an area noted for high levels of Islamic observance, many pesantrens and 
large numbers of locals who had accumulated sufficient wealth to undertake 
the hajj. Here, as in many parts of Java, peasant farmers hated the Japanese 
administration’s increasingly heavy rice requisitioning. Low-level resistance 
was no doubt common throughout Java, but in Indramayu it became overt 
village-level rebellion. The farmers were in most cases led by hajis who were 
usually also the foremost land-owners and patrons. Several local officials 
were murdered by the insurgents and Chinese shops were attacked. In some 
cases kyais offered support in the form of sanctified water that was thought 
to convey invulnerability. But kyais were also employed by the Japanese to 
attempt to calm the uprisings; when this failed, the Japanese used force to 
arrest protesters, execute many and send others into flight and hiding. The 
Japanese sent Ky. Abas (mentioned above) to invite rebels at the village 
of Kaplongan to a meeting in Cirebon, with guarantees of their personal 
safety. A dozen came, were arrested and were never seen again. Ky. Abas was 
reputedly so enthusiastic in his support of the Japanese that locals said of 
him, ‘Kyai Abas is finished (abis), a kyai of Japanese stamp’.
Despite the terrible hardships of the occupation, the Japanese bushido 
style, with its emphasis on martial and spiritual values, honour and loyalty, 
struck a responsive chord in many young rural Javanese men, whose pesantren 
milieu also emphasised spiritual disciplines, obedience to the kyai and martial 
arts.19 The Japanese veneration of violence and creation of indigenous armed 
forces encouraged such ideas further. Peta (Pembela Tanah Air, Protectors of 
16 Kurasawa, Mobilisasi dan kontrol, pp. 457–71.
17 Shimer and Hobbs, Kenpeitai in Java and Sumatra, p. 41.
18 The account here is based on Kurasawa, Mobilisasi dan control, pp. 471–88.
19 Similar observations are made in Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, Java in a time of 
revolution: Occupation and resistance, 1944–1946 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1972), pp. 31–4.
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the Fatherland) was established in 1943. Its officer corps included officials, 
teachers, kyais and Indonesian soldiers of the former Dutch colonial army. 
By the end of the war it had some 37,000 men in Java. Jawa Hokokai had 
a youth organisation called Barisan Pelopor (Vanguard Column), which 
began guerilla training in May 1945. By the end of the war it reportedly 
had 80,000 members. In December 1944 Masyumi acquired its own armed 
group called Barisan Hizbullah (God’s Forces) which was said to have 50,000 
members at the end of the war. An important element in Hizbullah was 
NU’s paramilitary arm, later known as Banser (Barisan Ansor Serba Guna, 
Ansor All-Purpose Forces).20
By mid-1945, kyais as well as urban Modernists were accustomed to 
political leadership roles. In some circumstances this enhanced these figures’ 
social leadership; in others it undermined it. In either case, all of Javanese 
society was thoroughly churned up by the occupation experience and 
religious leaders were as affected as anyone else. With religious leadership 
available, with the masses of Java mobilised and politicised both by Japanese 
propaganda and by the extreme hardship of the occupation, with indoc-
trinated armed groups trained to resist an Allied reconquest, Java was ripe for 
a revolution in which Islam would play a major role; it should not surprise 
readers by this stage to learn that this role was not always a unifying one.
The Revolution
The Indonesian Revolution has been intensively studied and is covered 
in many fine works of scholarship; we need not review its general history 
here.21 This was a time of confusion in which — in common with many 
another revolution — violence was often among Indonesians themselves 
as much as between Indonesians and the colonial forces that sought to 
reconquer the archipelago. As the nationalist elite and the national armed 
forces struggled to win independence — and eventually succeeded in doing 
so — in the countryside of Java the pent-up animosities of the Japanese 
occupation era, the competition for resources and influence inspired by the 
Revolution, the by-now deeply rooted social differences between santri and 
20 On the history of Banser, see Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, ‘Religion, politics and violence in 
Indonesia: Learning from Banser’s experience’, SI vol. 15 (2008), no. 3, pp. 417–42.
21 The best overview is to be found in Anthony Reid, The Indonesian national 
revolution, 1945–1950 (Hawthorn, Vic: Longman, 1974). A briefer overview is in 
Ricklefs, History of modern Indonesia, Chapter 18.
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abangan and the rapid re-politicisation of those differences produced social 
violence that affected Javanese life for several decades to come. This was the 
start of a time of overt violence and bloodshed that would build to a horrific 
climax in the mid-1960s.
Sukarno and Hatta read the declaration of independence on 17 August 
1945 but political parties were only formed after Sutan Sjahrir and Amir 
Sjarifuddin (both Sumatrans, the former from Minangkabau, the latter a 
Batak Christian, and neither of whom had collaborated with the Japanese) 
carried out a peaceful takeover within the Revolutionary government that 
created responsible cabinet government in October 1945. Five political 
parties are of particular interest to us here. The first is Masyumi, which still 
included both Modernist and Traditionalist Muslims. In November 1945, 
the Muhammadiyah and NU leaders whom the Japanese had favoured 
as leaders of Masyumi lost out to urban Modernist politicians, among 
whom the most prominent were the Javanese Sukiman Wirjosandjojo and 
the Minangkabau intellectual Mohammad Natsir, a leading figure in the 
quite puritanical Modernist organisation Persatuan Islam. On the left of 
Indonesian politics, reflecting secularist and socialist leanings, were found 
Amir Sjarifuddin and his Pesindo (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian 
Socialist Youth). Sjahrir formed the Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis), which 
Amir’s group joined for a time. On the far left was a revived Communist 
Party (PKI). In January 1946 the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) was 
revived. As President of the new nation, Sukarno was supposed to be above 
politics so PNI was now in principle detached from his influence, but of 
course it continued to carry the air of being the Sukarnoist political vehicle, 
with many pre-war PNI figures still among its leaders. 
For our purposes, it is important to understand the socio-religious cat-
egories in Java to which these political parties related, and which they further 
politicised. Their constituencies may be understood roughly as given below:
• Masyumi: Both Modernist and Traditionalist santri, the former 
mainly in urban areas and the latter mainly in the countryside. 
Given the predominantly rural character of Java’s population, our 
principal interest here is in the rural Traditionalist santri followers 
of NU within Masyumi. This included fighters in Hizbullah.
• Pesindo: Leftist abangan youth militia, soon to be connected with 
the People’s Democratic Front (FDR, Front Demokrasi Rakyat) 
coalition and then PKI.
• Partai Sosialis: Leftist and abangan, but not PKI-affiliated and in 
fact with little following in the countryside.
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• PKI: abangan villagers and urban proletariat.
• PNI: priyayi bureaucrats with an abangan following as well.
There was a history of animosity between PKI and Islamic organisa-
tions going back to the 1920s and it was about to get worse. According 
to Saifuddin Zuhri, Hizbullah fighters (among whom he was a leader) 
— and no doubt many other Traditionalists — interpreted the political 
spectrum that now emerged in the light of Qur’an 56: 27–56.22 This passage 
distinguishes between ‘those on the right’ and ‘those on the left’. On the Day 
of Judgement, those on the right are promised the pleasures of paradise: gold 
and jeweled couches under shade trees, with virgins as companions. Those 
on the left, however, will find only scorching winds, thick black smoke and 
boiling water. Thus, for Traditionalists who relied on Qur’anic sources, the 
leftists of the emerging Indonesian political scene represented not just a 
contending political ideology and competing faction, but people in rebellion 
against God who were destined for hell.
Islamic organisations gave full support to the Revolution. In October 
and November 1945 conflicts between British-commanded — mostly Indian 
— South East Asia Command (SEAC) forces and the Revolutionaries grew, 
particularly in Surabaya. Kyais and their pesantren students flooded into the 
city to fight. NU held a massive meeting there on 21–2 October at which 
it declared that defence of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia 
and simultaneously of Islam had the character of Sabilullah (Holy War). 
Resistance against renewed colonial conquest was a personal obligation for 
all Muslims.23 The Surabaya violence culminated in a bloody sweep in No-
vember in which SEAC regained control of the city at a cost of at least 6,000 
Indonesian lives. On the eve of the SEAC advance, the fiery Sutomo (‘Bung 
Tomo’) used his revolutionary radio broadcasts to encourage resistance:
Our slogan remains the same: Independence or death! And we know, 
brothers, that victory will be ours, because God is on the side of the 
righteous. You can believe that, brothers: God will protect us all. Allahu 
akbar [God is great]! Allahu akbar! Allahu akbar!24
The Indonesian fighters’ sacrificial heroism provided a rallying-cry for the 
Revolutionaries thereafter. This was also one of the episodes that persuaded 
22 Saifuddin Zuhri, Berangkat dari pesantren, p. 322.
23 Anderson, Java in a time of revolution, p. 157; Fealy, ‘Ulama and politics’, p. 42.
24 Quoted in William H. Frederick, Visions and heat: The making of the Indonesian 
Revolution (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), p. 266.
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the British to remain neutral in the Indonesian conflict and leave it to the 
Dutch to try to reconquer their colony for themselves.
A characteristic phenomenon of the early revolutionary period, from 
late 1945 into 1946, was a series of ‘social revolutions’ in the name of the 
‘people’s sovereignty’. In these episodes, local people took action against 
officials and others who had collaborated with the Japanese, engaged in 
black marketeering to the detriment of their fellows, or in other ways 
were regarded as enemies. Such figures were humiliated, deposed, beaten, 
imprisoned and/or killed. In some cases abangan or santri villagers overthrew 
headmen who were from the other faction. In Pare — the East Java research 
site later studied by Clifford Geertz and his colleagues — evidently it was 
mostly santri village headmen (lurahs) who were overthrown and replaced 
by abangan figures.25 In the Javanese-speaking enclave of Banten in West 
Java, santris (many of them enlisted in Hizbullah) led by kyais effectively 
overthrew ‘the entire ruling class of Banten … in a matter of weeks’.26 At 
this early stage, however, there were still episodes in which PKI activists and 
santri activists cooperated.27
Abangan-santri violence
The year 1948 was crucial in entrenching leftist vs Islamic — which is to 
say also abangan vs santri — tensions and taking them to a higher, bloody 
level. This ended episodes of cooperation across these lines, of the kind 
seen in some circumstances early in the Revolution. In general, that year 
was crucial in a more general sense in the Indonesian Revolution’s history. 
It saw the return of Musso, the PKI leader of the 1920s who had not been 
in Indonesia since the failed Communist uprising of 1926–7, except for a 
clandestine visit in 1935. He was an orthodox Stalinist in outlook and had 
little understanding of how much Indonesian dynamics had changed in his 
absence — in which he was like the Dutch who were then attempting to 
25 Robert R. Jay, Religion and politics in rural Central Java (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Southeast Asian Studies Cultural Report Series no. 12, 1963), p. 68.
26 Anderson, Java in a time of revolution, pp. 336–7.
27 See, for example, Michael C. Williams, ‘Banten: “Rice debts will be repaid with 
rice, blood debts with blood”’, pp. 55–81 in Audrey R. Kahin (ed.), Regional dynamics 
of the Indonesian Revolution: Unity from diversity (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i 
Press, 1985); Anton Lucas, One soul, one struggle: Region and revolution in Indonesia 
(Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin, 
1991).
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reconquer the archipelago. He believed that there should be only one party of 
the proletariat, so ordered other leftists to unite under the leadership of the 
PKI. The leftists had formed themselves into a coalition called the People’s 
Democratic Front (Front Demokrasi Rakyat) led by Amir Sjarifuddin, who 
announced that he had been a secret Communist since 1935; his followers 
now came under the Communist umbrella.
In September 1948, PKI activists seized power in Madiun, announced 
the creation of a new ‘National Front’ government and began killing their 
opponents, including PNI and Masyumi people. Sukarno called upon 
Indonesians to reject Musso’s Soviet-style rebel government and to unite 
behind himself and Hatta. The army followed his orders and in a series of 
bloody encounters drove the Communists out of Madiun, killing Musso in 
the process. Amir Sjarifuddin was captured and later executed. Some 35,000 
supporters of the Madiun uprising were imprisoned. The death toll is not 
known with confidence, but was probably of the order of 8,000. The army 
carried out anti-PKI actions widely throughout Java in the wake of Madiun, 
entrenching a tradition of army-Communist hostility. It was this armed 
destruction of a Communist putsch that finally impelled the United States 
— by then convinced that the world was caught in a struggle between a 
‘Soviet bloc’ and a ‘free world’ — into fully fledged support of the manifestly 
anti-Communist Indonesian revolutionaries. This galvanised international 
support and, along with the resistance of the Indonesians themselves, 
ultimately brought the Revolution to a successful conclusion in 1949. Here, 
however, we need to delve below the level of these grand politics to see what 
we can of socio-religious dynamics on the ground in Java.
In the months before the Madiun uprising, tensions were rising 
in Central Java.28 A strike led by PKI’s workers’ union SOBSI (Sentral 
28 The general account of the Madiun affair here rests upon Ann Swift, The 
road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist uprising of 1948 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series, 1989); A.H. Nasution, Sekitar 
perang kemerdekaan Indonesia (11 vols; Bandung: Penerbit Angkasa, 1977–9), vol. 
8; Himawan Soetanto, Madiun dari republik ke republik: Aspek militer pemberontakan 
PKI di Madiun 1948 ( Jakarta: Penerbit Kata, 2006); and George McTurnan Kahin, 
Nationalism and revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952), 
Chapters 9–10. On Surakarta specifically, see Julianto Ibrahim, Bandit dan pejuang di 
simpang Bengawan: Kriminalitas dan kekerasan masa revolusi di Surakarta (Wonogiri: 
Penerbit Bina Citra Pustaka, 2004), esp. pp. 172–7. See also Kuntowidjojo (ed.), 
Sejarah perjuangan Hizbullah Sabilillah Divisi Sunan Bonang (Surakarta: Yayasan 
Bhakti Utama and Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia Cabang Yogyakarta, 1997), 
pp. 132–6.
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Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, All-Indonesia Workers’ Organisation 
Central) and its peasant union BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian 
Peasants’ Front) broke out in June 1948 at Delanggu. This involved workers 
at seven cotton plantations and over 15,500 laborers at a gunny-sack 
factory. They initially demanded better conditions, such as clothing and 
rice to be supplied to workers, but the strike soon acquired the shape of 
political action against the Republican government based in Yogyakarta. 
The Communist constituency was from the abangan peasantry, while santri 
peasants were in Masyumi’s Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia (Indonesian 
Islamic Peasants’ Union).29 The latter continued working in the cotton fields, 
and were attacked by SOBSI activists. Houses were burned and people were 
kidnapped. On 10 July opponents of the strikers who said that they were 
Hizbullah fired on demonstrating strikers. The conflict lasted 1.5 hours and 
left two strikers and seven Hizbullah wounded. The leftist coalition FDR 
issued a statement in support of the strikers, signed by (among others) Amir 
Sjarifuddin for the Socialist Party, the PKI’s D.N. Aidit (just 25 years old, 
one of the new leadership group emerging in the Party) and the Pesindo 
leader Sudisman (another of the new PKI Politburo members, only three 
years older than Aidit). The army sent troops into Surakarta to quell the 
violence. The strike itself was settled on 18 July with the assistance of Vice-
President Hatta, largely on terms demanded by BTI and SOBSI. The army 
commander Sudirman ordered the military units on the two sides — the 
pro-government Siliwangi Division and the leftist, FDR-sympathising and 
heavily Pesindo-derived Panembahan Senopati Division — to cease fire. 
Indonesian navy troops were also on the Communist side.
Radicalism and conflict continued in Surakarta, creating what A.H. 
Nasution (both a senior military commander and, later, a writer of the 
history of the Revolution) and others called a ‘Wild West atmosphere’30 on 
the eve of the Madiun uprising. On 15 September Sukarno declared martial 
law in Surakarta. Heavy fighting erupted thereafter but within two days the 
Siliwangi Division had expelled the leftist fighters from Surakarta. Pro-
PKI forces thus lost this battle in the streets of Surakarta so that, as Henri 
Alers observed, ‘the Communist uprising was in fact militarily defeated 
29 See Soejatno, ‘Revolution and social tensions in Surakarta, 1945–1950’ (transl. 
Benedict Anderson), Indonesia no. 17 (Apr. 1974), p. 106. Masyumi established 
Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia in 1946 initially for the purpose of collecting zakat; 
Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 307–8.
30 Nasution, Sekitar perang kemerdekaan, vol. 8, p. 222.
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before it began’.31 Driven from Surakarta, the leftist forces led by Pesindo 
fighters retreated to Madiun. Tensions had also been rising there. Already 
in March 1948 the influential ‘national Communist’ (i.e., non-PKI) Tan 
Malaka observed tensions between Hizbullah fighters and Pesindo forces 
surrounding the town.32
Another prologue to the Madiun uprising occurred in the area of 
Ngawi. There Communist-led peasants unilaterally seized formerly Dutch-
owned lands that were now government plantations. The lands of rich 
peasants and the holdings of pesantrens and prominent Muslims were also 
targeted. Hizbullah’s leaders in the region — including Munawir Syadzali, 
later Minister of Religion33 — ordered 50 Hizbullah fighters to intervene to 
protect santris and the pesantrens. On 17 September 1948, the day before the 
Madiun uprising, the Communist side attacked pesantrens at Tempureja and 
Walikukun in large numbers and forced the Hizbullah fighters to withdraw. 
While they held the area, the Communists — that is, FDR activists, Pesindo 
fighters and pro-PKI military — reportedly carried out widespread slaughter 
of ‘kyais, members of the [santri] Muslim community, nationalists [i.e., PNI 
members] and anti-Communist civil servants’. Among the victims were Ky. 
H. Dimyati, the head of Masyumi and Sabilillah34 there, and Suwandi, the 
local head of Muhammadiyah.35
Then, on 18 September 1948, the Communists in Madiun declared 
their rebellion against the government of the Republic. Musso and other 
PKI leaders hastened to Madiun to try to gain control of this uprising. The 
pro-government forces that marched on Madiun were mostly regular Tentara 
Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Republican Army) troops of the Siliwangi 
Division, but also included some Hizbullah and other irregular units.36
31 Henri J.H. Alers, Om een rode of groene merdeka: 10 jaren binnenlandse politiek 
Indonesië, 1943–1953 (Eindhoven: Vulkaan, 1956), p. 187.
32 Tan Malaka, Dari penjara ke penjara (3 vols; Jakarta: TePLOK Press, 2000), vol. 
3, pp. 319–21.
33 Munawir was a graduate of the first modern Islamic school in Java, Manba‘ 
al-‘Ulum in Surakarta. For a biography, see Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, 
Menteri-menteri Agama RI, pp. 369–412.
34 Anderson, Java in a time of Revolution, p. 222 n40, observes that Sabilillah ‘had 
no formal antecedents in the Japanese period, had no formal military training, and 
was not organised in regular formations. It seems never to have become an integral 
organization, but was rather a generic name for the myriad rural kyai-led armed 
bands that sprang up during the period of the takeovers from the Japanese.’
35 Kuntowidjojo, Hizbullah, pp. 133–6.
36 Nasution, Sekitar perang kemerdekaan, vol. 8, pp. 260, 319, 339.
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The Communists killed many PNI and Masyumi figures, including 
several notable kyais. Saifuddin Zuhri recalled that 
The PKI rebellion at Madiun began with lootings, burnings and 
kidnappings targeted mainly at the kyais, Islamic proselytisers (para 
mubaligh), Masyumi leaders, and government officials, particularly civil 
servants who were mostly PNI members.37
Eye-witness accounts collected much later emphasised the killing of 
religious leaders in Madiun and elsewhere. According to such memories, the 
Communists took over Madiun, Magetan, Ponorogo, Pacitan, Trenggalek, 
Ngawi, Purwantoro, Sukoharjo, Wonogiri, Blora, Pati, Cepu, Kudus and 
other towns. They carried out widespread attacks on pesantrens where their 
main enemies were found, and killed many militant young Muslims and 
kyais. They also attacked local officials, police and military. The 28-year-old 
Ky. Imam Mursyid Muttaqien, who was a leader of the Shattariyya tarekat, 
was among their victims but his body, like others’, was never found. His 
pesantren, Takeran, was burned down. In Magetan one of Ky. H. Sulaiman 
Zuhdi Effendi’s own pesantren students was a PKI follower and ordered 
the kyai’s capture. There the Communists burned 72 houses in the Kauman 
and took away all the men; before they could be killed, however, they were 
rescued by the Siliwangi Division.38 Not surprisingly, given the mystical and 
supernatural traditions of rural Javanese Islam, magical legends arose from 
these bloody events. According to one informant, who was in his mid-20s at 
the time of the events and was interviewed 40 years later, near Magetan one 
Ky. H. Imam Sofwan and his two sons, who were also kyais, were murdered 
and their bodies thrown into a well (a common motif in these memoirs). 
From within the well resonated the voice of Ky. H. Imam Sofwan singing 
the call to prayer, ‘which was heard by the Muslims’.39
Recollections from the East Java village of Madukoro collected over 
40 years after the events are similar. There political parties were introduced 
in 1947. People living in the low areas of the village were ‘fanatical’ NU 
and Masyumi supporters, while those on higher ground supported PKI 
and PNI, which reflected conflict between santri and abangan respectively. 
In September 1948, violence across these lines occurred for the first time. 
37 Saifuddin Zuhri, Berangkat dari pesantren, p. 360.
38 Agus Sunyoto Maksum and A. Zainuddin, Lubang lubang pembantaian: Petua-
langan PKI di Madiun ( Jakarta: Grafiti untuk Jawa Pos, 1990), pp. 15–20, 31–4, 40–3. 
See also Kuntowidjojo, Hizbullah, pp. 134–6.
39 Maksum and Zainuddin, Lubang lubang pembantaian, pp. 55–9.
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Santri armed themselves against the Communists not only with firearms and 
grenades but also with ‘spiritual weapons’ such as sharpened bamboo lances 
(bamboo runcing) that had been blessed by kyais. For the older generation 
of Madukoro’s inhabitants, the Madiun affair was an unforgettable demon-
stration of Communist brutality. For the younger generation, it would prove 
to be a precedent for their own offensive against the PKI two decades later.40 
Similarly, memories of the Madiun killings of 1948 were also revived in the 
minds of santri anti-PKI activists in the Semarang and Salatiga areas at the 
time of the 1965–6 violence, according to later oral evidence.41
We would be wrong to think that the Communist side had a 
monopoly of aggression. Militant Muslim activists who joined Hizbullah, 
Sabilillah and other ‘struggle groups’ to resist the Dutch reconquest were 
not reluctant to take up arms against their Communist opponents. Five 
years after the Madiun uprising, it was claimed (but hardly believable) 
that in Ponorogo about half of the male population died in the fighting. 
The leftists slaughtered kyais and santris, then became the target of santri 
counter-attacks themselves. In Pare, later accounts said that Hizbullah units 
were prepared to move against Pesindo forces but the police intervened and 
prevented violence.42 The rebels also held Kudus for a time and killed some 
santri there, but the foremost religious leaders managed to escape the town, 
to return with Hizbullah forces for its recapture, whereupon PKI activists 
were murdered.43 
By the time many of the memoirs of Madiun were being collected 
decades after the events, Java’s social environment had changed in a more 
Islamised direction, which no doubt influenced depictions of the past, 
portraying the santri side as the main victims of the violence. Furthermore, 
during the Soeharto era it would have been difficult to find a surviving 
Communist at all — or at least anyone who would admit to having been 
a Communist — to tell that side of the story. After the fall of Soeharto 
in 1998, things changed. Then it became possible to publish the self-
justificatory recollections of Soemarsono, PKI’s military governor of Madiun 
40 Imam Tholkhah, Anatomi konflik politik di Indonesia: Belajar dari ketegangan politik 
varian di Madukoro ( Jakarta: PT RajaGrafindo Persada, 2001), pp. 119–29.
41 Singgih Nugroho, Menyintas dan menyeberang: Perpindahan massal keagamaan pasca 
1965 di pedesaan Jawa (Yogyakarta: Syarikat, 2008), pp. 78–9.
42 Jay, Religion and politics, pp. 28–9, 74–5.
43 Lance Castles, Religion, politics and economic behavior in Java: The Kudus cigarette 
industry (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Cultural Report 
Series no. 15, 1967), p. 67.
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at the time of the uprising. By the time his memories were assembled, he 
was an Australian resident in his late 80s. In his book Revolusi Agustus, 
published in 2008, he essentially retails the PKI line of the 1950s that the 
Party was the victim of Hatta’s counter-revolutionary plotting with the 
Americans, whereas Sukarno was an innocent dupe. Even the documents 
cited by Soemarsono himself undermine his version of events. He observes 
— rather bizarrely — that anti-Communists sought to kill Communists but 
rejects the claim that ‘thousands of kyais’ were killed at Madiun, ‘because 
there was no point in Communists killing anti-Communists’.44 Soemar-
sono’s book is most significant not for what it says about Madiun but for 
the angry reaction it inspired after publication, which is covered in Chapter 
7 below.
On the Islamic side, the concept of jihad (Holy War) would certainly 
have been in the minds of many activists. Saifuddin Zuhri recalled that the 
great pesantrens of Central and East Java became centres of military training 
during the Revolution — schools such as Tebuireng, Tambakberas, Denanyar 
and Peterongan near Jombang; Lirboyo, Jampes and Bendo in Kediri; 
and Jamsaren, Jenengan, Krapyak, Tegalreja and others in Central Java. 
Surrounded by PKI forces, he wrote, ‘the pesantrens Gontor and Tremas … 
were forced to set out on the path of Holy War (berjihad)’.45 The Minister of 
Religion at the time of the Madiun uprising, the NU leader Ky. H. Masykur, 
gave a speech in Yogyakarta in which he denounced the uprising as being 
against religion.46 Masyumi as an organisation shared this view and called 
for Holy War. Ann Swift observes,
While the PKI ‘terror’ was well reported in the press, Masyumi counter-
terror was not, although the existence of this ‘terror and counter-terror’ as 
he termed it, was admitted by Hatta in a radio broadcast on November 
17. … It appears that some indiscriminate anti-abangan killing may have 
taken place, although most seems to have taken the form of rounding 
up PKI leaders, giving them a summary trial, and executing them. … 
Most PKI members, however, were simply imprisoned. Killings on the 
scale of 1965 [to be discussed later in this book] do not seem to have 
44 Soemarsono, Revolusi Agustus: Kesaksian seorang pelaku sejarah (ed. and translit. 
Komisi Tulisan Soemarsono di Eropa; intro. Wilson. [ Jakarta:] Hasta Mitra, 
2008); quotation from p. 263. See also Hersri Setiawan, Negara Madiun? Kesaksian 
Soemarsono pelaku perjuangan ([ Jakarta?] Forum Studi Perubahan dan Peradaban, 
2002).
45 Saifuddin Zuhri, Berangkat dari pesantren, p. 358.
46 Nasution, Sekitar perang kemerdekaan, vol. 8, p. 258.
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taken place on either side, perhaps because Madiun did, on the whole, 
remain a confrontation between opposing troops rather than the civilian 
population.47
Madiun left a legacy of enhanced santri-abangan antipathy that was 
now reified and intensified by political party competition. The Islamic 
Communism seen in Java in the 1920s was inconceivable after the 
Revolution. Communism and Islam were now seen as utterly incompatible. 
In the political competition of the coming years, parties inspired by Islam 
and representing a santri constituency were implacably opposed to PKI 
and its abangan constituency. As a legacy of Madiun, the army was also 
now utterly opposed to PKI, which it saw as having attempted to stab the 
Revolution in the back just when it was most at risk of being reconquered 
by the Dutch. PNI was left in an ambiguous position in this contest. Its 
leaders and abangan constituents found little that was attractive in Masyumi’s 
presumably Islamising agendas but they had also been targets of PKI 
violence. The following years would find PNI tacking in changing winds, 
as did the other parties, but with less clarity in terms of either ideology or 
ultimate objectives.
Madiun did not, however, bring the army and Masyumi closer 
together, even though both were enemies of PKI. For 1948 also saw the 
outbreak of the West Java-based rebellion known as Darul Islam, led by 
the Javanese mystic and Hizbullah leader S.M. Kartosoewirjo. He was 
angry at the withdrawal of the Republican Siliwangi Division from West 
Java in February 1948 as a consequence of the Renville agreement with the 
Dutch of the previous month, so in May 1948 Kartosoewirjo declared the 
foundation of the Negara Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic State), 
commonly referred to as the Darul Islam rebellion (from Arabic dar al-Islam, 
territory or house of Islam). Darul Islam continued in West Java — and later 
won support elsewhere in the archipelago as well — until Kartosoewirjo’s 
capture and execution in 1962, by which time it had become an exercise as 
much in brigandage as Islamist piety. To the military and other leaders of 
the Republic, this was the Islamist equivalent to PKI’s uprising at Madiun. 
As Ruth McVey has pointed out, Darul Islam and other conflicts between 
Islamic irregular forces and the Indonesian army ‘encouraged a tradition of 
army distrust of militant Islam’48 — a distrust that was to remain powerful 
47 Swift, Road to Madiun, p. 76 n130.
48 McVey, Ruth. ‘The post-revolutionary transformation of the Indonesian army’, 
Indonesia, no. 11 (Apr. 1971), pp. 138–9.
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for nearly half-a-century until, as we will see in Chapter 6, elements in the 
military and Islamist militants found that they had some shared interests. 
At the point of independence, the army stood as a player in its own right, 
opposed both to Islamists and Communists, shorn of most of its Islamist 
elements after Darul Islam and of its leftist elements after Madiun, distrustful 
of civilian politicians in general and above all committed to itself as the 
embodiment and sole guarantor of the Republic of Indonesia.
The Revolution came to a successful end in 1949 with the independence 
of Indonesia, accepted by the Dutch and recognised internationally. For 
ethnic Javanese as for all Indonesians, this was a great triumph. The social 
consequences of the war and Revolution period, however, were pregnant 
with risks for the future. For all its gaps and inadequacies, the surviving 
evidence suggests strongly that Javanese society was more polarised than 
ever in 1949. Santri and abangan were more divided from each other than 
before and this division was again politicised as it had been earlier in the 
century. Now, however, that polarisation and politicisation had an even 
greater impact for having been inscribed in blood. The Japanese occupation 
and the Revolution left bitter memories of social conflicts, which would soon 
be further enhanced by the increasingly polarised and volatile politics of the 
early years of independence.
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c h a p te r  4
The first freedom experiment: 
Aliran politics and Communist 
opposition to Islamisation, 1950–66
The period of liberal democracy and the subsequent ‘Guided Democracy’ 
period (from the late 1950s to 1965) were characterised by what is known as 
aliran politics. The term aliran is found in both Javanese and Indonesian in 
closely related meanings. In Javanese it means a channel for diverting water, 
which also acts as a sort of boundary marker in a rice-field; in Indonesian, 
it means more generally a current or stream. Ruth McVey’s authoritative 
account of aliran is as follows:
a ‘current’ or ‘stream’ of ideological-cultural identification, [which] was 
an important concept in Indonesian politics from 1945 to 1965. The 
term refers to divisions in Javanese society, principally along the lines 
of observant Muslim santri and Javanist abangan, groups that were 
mobilised around political parties and their satellite mass organisations. 
These associations provided an environment for their adherents’ social 
activities and segregated them from competing communities. The 
distinctions on which the aliran rested were not those of formal religion, 
language, or territory but rather degrees of Islamic observance, and so 
their boundaries were fixed by custom and organisational affiliation 
rather than more permanent markers. …
 The parliamentary period of 1950–9 saw the full flowering of 
communal identification as the basis of politics. The abangan position 
was represented primarily by the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), 
which reflected the aristocratic priyayi values of abangan high culture 
and its conservative following, and the Communist PKI, whose lower-
class appeal ate away increasingly at the PNI’s peasant base. The santri 
80
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were shared between the Masyumi, which was Modernist … and the 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which represented the pious of rural Java. … 
Among the abangan Javanese, political stalemate and economic privation 
led to a steady advance of the Communists.1
These politicised aliran inflamed santri-abangan relationships and made PKI 
and (to a lesser extent) PNI into formidable opponents to the Islamisation 
projects of the santri side.
The santri-abangan balance
Before considering the history of aliran politics in the 1950s and early 1960s, 
however, we should try to assess the balance of numbers between the two 
sides of Javanese society. This is a difficult task, for even though Javanese 
villagers might have been confident about whether they or their neighbours 
should be classified as santri or abangan, for outside analysts there are many 
grey areas and absolutely no social surveys that tell us anything reliable on 
the matter. So we must make some educated guesses. We may note the data 
cited by B.J. Boland suggesting very low levels of santri observance in the 
1960s: that in Central Javanese villages 0–15 per cent of the people prayed; in 
1967 only 14 per cent of the people of Yogyakarta paid zakat and in Central 
Java only 2 per cent observed the fast.2 But these are just snapshots and the 
actual basis of the statistics is not clear.
We may employ data from Central and East Java to support very rough 
estimates of what percentage of the population should be regarded as santris 
in the early 1950s. Of the five pillars of Islamic orthopraxy — reciting the 
confession of faith (Shahada), praying in the direction of Mecca five times a 
day, giving alms (zakat), fasting in the month of Ramadan and undertaking 
the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) for those who were able to do so — it is only 
zakat that is useful to us in assessing how many people were santris in the 
1950s. We cannot know whether someone who recites the Shahada is truly 
devout, cannot know whether a person who claims to pray or to fast really 
does so, and know that going on the hajj is a function of financial resources 
as well as of piety. Since, however, most people can pay the modest amounts 
of rice expected of them as zakat, these payments are an indicator of how 
many observant santris there were. There is, however, a complication to be 
1 R.T. McVey, ‘Aliran’, in Gudrun Krämer et al. (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam (3rd ed.; 
Leiden: E.J. Brill; appearing in fascicules).
2 B.J. Boland, The struggle of Islam in modern Indonesia (VKI vol. 59; The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 186.
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noted in that evidently many abangan villagers also paid zakat — not out of 
piety, but from a sense of village solidarity and sympathy for the deserving 
poor, and often as a part of the whole village’s observation of the festivities 
at the end of the fasting month. So we must regard the number who paid 
zakat as a kind of maximum figure for the number of santris, recognising that 
abangan, too, were amongst zakat payers.
We have two sets of figures that are of some use. From the Ministry 
of Religion we have data on the number of people who paid zakat fitrah 
(the alms due at the end of the fasting month) in 1954 across Central and 
East Java and Yogyakarta (an administratively separate Special District). 
Zakat fitrah would have been paid by the head of a household, but a family’s 
fitrah obligation is based on the number of people in the entire household, 
including babies. It is evident that the figures for donors listed in the 1954 
zakat fitrah payment figures reflect such a calculation and thus represent the 
total population of fitrah-paying households, rather than just the number 
of household heads who paid.3 We do not really know, however, how 
comprehensive the Ministry’s figures are. From a survey taken in Indonesia 
in 2004, we learn that at that time 45 per cent of Muslims claimed that they 
paid zakat fitrah directly to beneficiaries (which could include, for example, 
needy family members, neighbours or kyais) rather than through more 
formal organisations.4 So if we guess — and it can only be a guess — that 
a similar portion paid fitrah directly in 1954 and that such payments were 
not captured by the Ministry figures, then we should multiply the reported 
figures by 1.8 to get an estimate of the total fitrah-paying population. We 
must accept, as noted above, that many abangan Javanese also paid zakat 
fitrah; on the other hand, santris were probably more aware of correct Islamic 
practice and were thus more likely to pay their fitrah through mosques and 
prayer houses rather than giving it out individually — and because of this, 
their donations are more likely to appear in the Ministry figures. If that is 
so, then the fitrah-payers who were not captured in the Ministry of Religion 
figures used below are more likely to have been abangan than santri. Thus, 
we may proceed cautiously with this data.5
3 Comparing the number of donors listed in the Daftar statistik Zakat Fitrah sources 
in n8 below with the amount of rice which was given shows that the rice donations 
were just over 2 kg per head, approximately the fitrah amount expected for each 
member of a family.
4 Amelia Fauzia, ‘Faith and the state: A history of Islamic philanthropy in Indonesia’ 
(PhD thesis, University of Melbourne, 2008), p. 221.
5 I am grateful to Dr Amelia Fauzia for her help in trying to unravel what this fitrah 
data may be able to tell us.
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To understand this as a percentage of the population, we also need 
Java population data for the time, but there are none. There was no census in 
Indonesia between 1930 and 1961. If, however, we assume that population 
growth in Java between 1954 and 1961 returned to the level of the 1920s for 
all of Java and Madura (1.73 per cent per annum),6 then working backwards 
from the 1961 figure we can arrive at a population estimate for 1954 of 90 
per cent of the 1961 figure.7 All of these assumptions and guesses yield the 
following calculations.
Table 3  Population, payment of zakat fitrah and estimate of santri percentage  
 of the population, mid-1950s8
 A B C D E
 Population  A x 0.9 No. of C/B D x 1.8
Region (1961) (= estimated zakat fitrah (%) (= estimated
  population contributors  maximum %
  1954) (1954)  of santris in 
     population)
Central Java 7,753,570 6,987,213 374,896 5.4 9.7
Yogyakarta 2,231,062 2,007,986 70,399 3.5 6.3
East Java 11,177,595 10,059,835 359,637 3.6 6.5
TOTAL 21,162,227 19,046,004 804,932 4.2 7.6
6 Volkstelling 1930, vol. 2, p. 12.
7 This is consistent with — and probably rests on the same calculation as — the 
estimates reported in Widjojo Nitisastro, Population trends in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY, 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 126.
8 Based on Sensus penduduk 1961: Penduduk desa Jawa, vols 2–3 (Yogyakarta: Pusat 
Penelitian dan Studi Kependudukan, Universitas Gadjah Mada, and Biro Pusat 
Statistik, 1980); Djawatan Urusan Agama, Bagian ‘D’ (Ibadah Sosial), Daftar statistik 
Zakat Fitrah Propinsi Djawa Tengah th. 1954; idem, Daftar statistik Zakat Fitrah 
Propinsi Djawa Timur th. 1954; idem, Daftar statistik Zakat Fitrah D.I. Jogjakarta dan 
Prop. Sum. Selatan th. 1954 (these latter documents all in typescript).
For comparison, we can look ahead to the outcome of the 1955 
elections in Central and East Java. By this time — as will be seen below 
— NU stood as a separate party, having split bitterly from Masyumi in 1952. 
The latter thus became a Modernist and largely urban-based party, with most 
of its strength in non-Javanese parts of Indonesia. The 1955 national elections 
were free and fair, the first such national elections in Indonesian history, and 
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the last for 44 years. In assessing the results, we again must accept that some 
— perhaps, in fact, many — abangan Javanese still voted for NU in 1955, 
probably out of respect for the kyais who led it, even though they themselves 
were no santris. This is confirmed by the several hundred thousand voters, 
particularly in East Java, who — as will be seen below — switched support 
from santri parties to abangan parties (especially PKI) in the 1957 regional 
elections, as aliran boundaries were hardening. So again, seeing these 1955 
election outcomes in terms of aliran can give us a rough estimate of a 
theoretical maximum percentage of Javanese who might have been santris.
Table 4 1955 national election outcomes for the ‘big four’ parties in Central  
 and East Java9
Party Aliran identity % of total vote
NU Santri 30
Masyumi Santri 12
Santri party sub-total  42
PKI Abangan 27
PNI Abangan 32
Abangan party sub-total  59
Such data cannot give us very robust results, but it seems reasonable 
enough to conclude that santris were in a minority among Javanese in the 
1950s. Tables 6 and 7 below include the breakdown of the 1955 voting 
patterns across Central and East Java. It will be seen there that the santri 
parties won only 33 per cent of the ‘big four’ vote in Central Java and 
Yogyakarta in 1955, and 49 per cent in East Java. If we were to guess 
that perhaps 10 per cent of NU’s 1955 vote came from people who were 
themselves abangan in their personal life, then NU’s vote across Central and 
East Java would drop to around 25 per cent and the santri voter total would 
be reduced to under 40 per cent. As we will see in the outcomes of the 1957 
provincial elections below, these are not unreasonable guesses. Taking the 
zakat figures and assuming that a portion of NU’s vote in 1955 came from 
people who were in fact abangan, we might think that something between 10 
and 40 per cent of Javanese were pious, observant santris in the mid-1950s 
9 See the sources in n55 below.
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and about 60–90 per cent were abangans. By the time we get to the end of 
this book, we will still not have any really reliable social surveys, but we will 
see those percentages evidently reversed, and aliran itself largely dead and 
buried as a political phenomenon.
Given the minority status of santri Javanese, it is not surprising that 
when Clifford Geertz and his colleagues worked at Pare (near Kediri) in the 
early 1950s, it was possible for Geertz to make an extraordinary observation 
that, only a few decades later, would become inconceivably wrong-headed:
It is very hard, given his tradition and his social structure, for a Javanese 
to be a ‘real Moslem’. … The otherness, awfulness and majesty of God, 
the intense moralism, the rigorous concern with doctrine, and the 
intolerant exclusivism which are so much a part of Islam are very foreign 
to the traditional outlook of the Javanese.10
It is one of the aims of this book to assess why judgments such as that — 
which were consistent with observed social phenomena of the time — were 
so rapidly rendered untrue by social change. Politics is an important part of 
that story.
The pilgrimage to Mecca (the hajj) continued to be an important way 
of maintaining one’s sense of Islamic identity and was observed by Javanese 
santris and other Indonesian Muslims, but it is notable that the number of 
people going on the hajj in the 1950s from Javanese-speaking areas — as 
seen in Table 5 below — was significantly lower than before World War II. 
In 1914 there were 10,006 pilgrims departing from Javanese-speaking areas 
and Madura,11 and in 1921 there were 15,036, although those were atypically 
large numbers. More generally, in the years for which we have data over 
1913–30, the number of pilgrims from Javanese-speaking areas and Madura 
averaged about 8,400 per year and never fell below about 5,000.12 Although 
the 1950s were times of little prosperity in Java, it is difficult to explain the 
post-war drop in hajj departures on the basis of declining prosperity among 
santris, for the 1920s and 1930s were probably even worse in this respect. We 
may therefore wonder whether these numbers reflect an actual diminution in 
the number of Javanese who were sufficiently devout to undertake the hajj, 
10 Clifford Geertz, The religion of Java (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-
Macmillan Ltd, 1960), p. 160.
11 Madura was included with Javanese-speaking areas in the colonial-era data, but 
was usually not included after independence. The data quoted here is thus not strictly 
comparable, but the general pattern remains significant.
12 Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese society, p. 215.
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that is, a sort of ‘abanganisation’ or even ‘de-Islamisation’, to use Wertheim’s 
term quoted below. It is, however, true that the all-Indonesia figures were 
also lower than before the war, which might support an explanation based 
on lower incomes across Indonesia.
Table 5 Hajj departures from Javanese-speaking areas, 1950–813 
Year C. Java E. Java Yogyakarta Javanese (All-Indonesia
    TOTAL  total)
1950 1148 1281 35 2464 5132
1951 1146 262 N/A  2647
1952 N/A 2022 94  8706
1953 1903 2129 99 4131 11,803
1954 1606 1647 60 3313 8993
1955 1573 1584 54 3211 8777
1956 1706 2133 50 3889 9114
1957 1771 1655 N/A  11,507
1958 786 1220 31 2037 6874
Aliran in politics and culture and the elections of 1955–7
We have seen how NU’s kyais had become politically active during the 
Japanese occupation and Revolution and had thus finally and completely 
displaced the pangulus as the leaders of Traditionalist Islam. But NU in 
the early 1950s was not a strong organisation. At heart it was a network 
of kyais and their families, linked by experiences as each others’ students or 
teachers, connected through marriage, centred on a few famous pesantrens, 
particularly in East Java, and — at the top of this informal hierarchy — led 
by the families of NU’s founding fathers from Jombang, Ky. H. Hasyim 
 13 ‘Rekapitulatie statistik djemaah haji musim haji’ (typescript document in George 
McT. Kahin papers, Kahin Center, Cornell University), presumably compiled 
from Ministry of Religion data. Different figures for 1950 and 1951 are given 
in Vredenbregt’s analysis of the hajj, but it should be noted that those are (as 
Vredenbregt explains) merely the quotas approved by the Indonesian government, 
not the actual number of departures. See Jacob Vredenbregt, ‘The haddj: Some of its 
features and functions in Indonesia’, BKI vol. 118 (1964), no. 1, pp. 111, 145 n1.
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Asy‘ari and Ky. H. Wahab Chasbullah.14 These families represented the 
‘blue bloods’ of NU — a term used in the network itself. NU held up the 
semi-legendary ‘nine saints’ (wali sanga), who are said to have brought Islam 
to Java, as model bridgers of cultural boundaries. They were thought to have 
operated in ways that accommodated pre-Islamic Javanese ideas, whereas 
the Modernists of the 20th century were regarded by NU as enemies of 
Javanese culture. Similarly, Sufism was accepted as an orthodox aspect of 
Islam in NU, whereas it faced many opponents on the Modernist side. But 
the Modernists had been much better organisers than the Traditionalists. 
Whereas Muhammadiyah was a massive nation-wide organisation with 
several hundred thousand followers, NU had only some 51,000 followers 
— it is inaccurate to speak of ‘members’ in such a loosely structured network 
— and 87 branches in 1952.15
NU’s kyais were dissatisfied with the Modernist and urban political 
domination of Masyumi. Ky. H. Wachid Hasyim drew a distinction between 
the ‘clever’, Western-educated Modernists and the religious experts found 
amongst the kyais in 1951:
Within the Islamic community there are two kinds of leadership groups. 
There is the group of political leaders who use the brand or stamp of 
Islam: they usually consist of clever people with Western education. 
The second group consists of the religious experts who really master 
Islamic religious knowledge widely and are called ulama. These have 
great influence among the populace and occupy greatly honoured 
positions.16 
NU members had occupied the position of Minister of Religion almost 
from the beginning of the Revolution. As the ministry expanded in the early 
1950s, NU followers were given most of the positions. When a new cabinet 
was formed in 1952, however, a Modernist was given the post of Minister 
of Religion. Traditionalists now saw even this treasured possession falling 
to their competitors for Islamic leadership, and decided that they had had 
14 The lives of Hasyim Asy‘ari and Wahab Chasbullah are described in Jajat 
Burhanudin, ‘Traditional Islam and modernity: Some notes on the changing role of 
the ulama in early twentieth century Indonesia’, in Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk 
and Nico J.G. Kaptein (eds), Varieties of religious authority: Changes and challenges in 
20th century Indonesian Islam (Singapore: International Institute for Asian Studies 
and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), pp. 61–6.
15 Fealy, ‘Ulama and politics’, pp. 107, 109.
16 Quoted in Choiratun Chisaan, Lesbumi: Strategi politik kebudayaan (Yogyakarta: 
LKiS, 2008), p. 99.
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enough. NU withdrew from Masyumi and formed itself into a separate 
political party, which Wachid Hasyim led until his death in an automobile 
accident in 1953, at the age of only 38.17 His loss was a major blow to 
NU. His impeccable ‘blue blood’ ancestry had given him unquestioned 
leadership, yet he was also more modern in lifestyle than many kyais and 
thus had been more able than many of them to deal with the better-educated 
Modernists.18 The Masyumi-NU split left an enduring legacy, a thick layer 
of political animosity added to the long-standing differences in religious 
understandings.
The Traditionalists of NU now set about more modern activities like 
setting up branches and creating subsidiary organisations. In 1952 NU had 
only its young men’s wing Ansor, the women’s branch Muslimat NU (includ-
ing the young women’s organisation Fatayat), and the farmer’s organisation 
Pertanu (Pertanian Nahdlatul Ulama, NU Farming). After splitting with 
Masyumi, NU added trade unions and organisations for veterans (both 
of which former Hizbullah and Sabilillah fighters joined), set up groups 
for male and female students and began producing its own publications, 
including the newspaper Duta Masyarakat (The People’s Messenger). By the 
time it held its congress in 1954, it had grown to 200 branches.19 By the 
1950s, young women were becoming pesantren students in greater numbers. 
It was only in 1934 that NU had formally approved education for women, 
although in fact there had been some initiatives taken before then. Women 
were far from equals to men in NU, however, for as late as 1959 they had to 
sit behind curtains at meetings where both men and women were present. 
Muhammadiyah had abandoned such a policy in 1944.20
This organisational activity was a significant step in strengthening NU 
as an actively Islamising organisation, supporting the communal identity 
17 Fealy, ‘Ulama and politics’, Chapter 3, covers NU’s secession from Masyumi in 
detail.
18 Ibid., p. 119.
19 Ibid., pp. 109, 114–5. There were some pre-war NU publications of a fairly amateur 
standard, but Duta Masyarakat was something new: a daily with significant political 
content. On the earlier ‘embryonic’ publications, see Andrée Feillard, ‘From handling 
water in a glass to coping with an ocean: Shifts in religious authority in Indonesia’, 
in Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (eds). Varieties of religious 
authority: Changes and challenges in 20th century Indonesian Islam (Singapore: 
International Institute for Asian Studies and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2010), pp. 159–60.
20 Pieternella van Doorn-Harder, Women shaping Islam: Indonesian women reading the 
Qur’an (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006), pp. 173–4, 208.
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of the santris. This was not without contest from the Modernist side, of 
course. In Kudus, for example, the santri community split between Masyumi 
supporters and NU supporters. Modernist ideas continued to be spread there 
through Qur’anic study groups (pengajian) and were successful particularly 
among business people. The main entrepreneurial families of the town 
were mostly Modernists and Muhammadiyah supporters. The town also, of 
course, split on political aliran lines: West Kudus, where the grave of the 
local wali is found, was dominated by Masyumi whereas in East Kudus, 
PKI was strongest. Traditionalism was stronger among the peasantry and 
public servants.21
Islamisation of both the Modernist and Traditionalist style, however, 
encountered heightened opposition as aliran politics strengthened. Especially 
in Central and East Java, Feith observed, 
party and party-related organisational activity … spread from small 
towns to surrounding villages. … Each major party was the centre of an 
interrelated set of voluntary organizations — women’s, youth, veterans’, 
labor, peasant, religious, educational, cultural and sporting organizations 
— with the whole complex forming an aliran or political stream.22
A process of polarisation that can be traced from about the middle of 
the 19th century thus became sharper and potentially more violent. Writing 
in the mid-1950s, Wertheim commented,
If there is a process of de-Islamisation going on in the urban and rural 
society of Java there would on the other hand seem to be a deepening 
Islamic consciousness among those who take their religious duties to 
heart. Undoubtedly this polarization process, reinforced by the political 
party system, has been disruptive for the village community in large 
parts of Java.23
The most active and successful political party was PKI, which adopted 
practices that it dubbed ‘small but effective’ to win grass-roots support 
among the abangan. Farmers were supported through the distribution 
of agricultural implements, seeds and fertilisers; village festivities were 
assisted; irrigation works, wells, roads, bridges and other public facilities 
21 Castles, Religion, politics and economic behavior, pp. 45, 57, 67–8. 
22 Herbert Feith, The decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 125.
23 W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian society in transition: A study of social change (The Hague: 
W. van Hoeve Ltd, 1964), p. 230. The first edition of this book was published in 
1956.
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were improved; basic education and literacy were promoted; village sporting 
teams were supported; those who had suffered from natural disasters were 
helped and so on. As the election campaigning heated up from about 1953, 
such actions and associated political mobilisation intensified.24 PKI worked 
particularly hard to develop the Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI, Indonesian 
Peasants’ Front) as a PKI organisation.25 By 1957 nearly 70 per cent of BTI’s 
membership was in Central and East Java, where it claimed 2.3 million 
members.26 Hindley noted, 
Because PNI has largely relied for winning popular support on the 
elite of government officials, village officials, and schoolteachers, and, 
despite much talk to the contrary, is clearly a party of ‘haves’, PKI 
and its mass organizations have had a virtual monopoly in channeling 
whatever social protest or aspirations there have been among the poorer 
abangan population. PKI has gone further and, in many abangan areas, 
deliberately exploited the abangan fear and dislike of the santris in order 
to win support.27 
This animosity was of course reciprocated, with some santris de-
nouncing their political opponents as kafirs and a group of religious teachers 
in West Java even saying that PKI members should be denied burial as 
Muslims.28 
Campaigning for the elections of the mid-1950s was second only to 
the Madiun incident of 1948 in deepening santri-abangan animosities. It 
was just at this time that Clifford Geertz, Robert Jay and their colleagues did 
their field work in ‘Modjokuto’, a pseudonym for Pare (near Kediri). Their 
publications give us invaluable insights into this area of East Java in 1953–4, 
24 See Feith, Decline of constitutional democracy, esp. pp. 353–4; Donald Hindley, The 
Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951–1963 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1966), p. 174.
25 In the early years of independence PNI also sought to control BTI at local level, 
but lost out to the Communists; see Soegijanto Padmo’s introduction to Fadjar 
Pratikno, Gerakan rakyat kelaparan: Gagalnya politik radikalisasi petani (Yogyakarta: 
Penerbit Media Pressindo, Yayasan Adikarya Ikapi and The Ford Foundation, 2000), 
p. xix.
26 Hindley, Communist Party of Indonesia, p. 167.
27 Ibid., p. 12. It may be noted that Hindley’s research covered the period discussed 
here and his fieldwork was done in 1959–60, i.e., before the chaos of Guided 
Democracy, the subsequent Soeharto era and the latter’s attendant re-rememberings 
of the past.
28 Feith, Decline of constitutional democracy, p. 357.
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when they observed hardening santri-abangan identities and animosities. Jay 
noted ‘a religious schism that cuts straight through local society’29 and the 
rapidly advancing nature of that schism over the months of his fieldwork. 
He saw how each side was progressively ridding itself of the styles and 
rituals of the other. Where santri women had usually but not always worn 
the headscarf (kerudung) and abangan women had sometimes but usually 
not worn it, progressively the kerudung was becoming an essential symbol of 
santri identity, always worn by santris and never by abangan women. Stories 
about the Madiun episode were part of the hardening boundaries, as santri 
communities saw the PKI reviving and feared that they would again become 
the targets of Communist violence. As the 1955 elections approached, the 
most important consideration in voters casting their ballot was whether 
a candidate was santri or abangan.30 The santris in Jay’s area opposed the 
veneration of village-founder and guardian spirits adhered to by the abangan 
side, and indeed these cults were reduced or suppressed in santri villages. The 
boundaries hardened so much that, by the end of their fieldwork, even Jay 
and his wife were finding it difficult to move between the two communities, 
being suspected by each side of sympathy towards the other.31
Clifford Geertz also described Pare in the pre-election period. He 
noted inter alia the presence of Permai, a ‘vigorously anti-Moslem politico-
religious cult, … a fusion of Marxist politics with abangan religious patterns’ 
in a village where the santris mostly supported Masyumi and the abangans 
followed Permai.32 The organisation’s name means beautiful or charming, 
and was an acronym derived from the full name Persatuan Rakyat Marhaen 
Indonesia (roughly, Indonesian Proletarian Union).33 Permai not only pro-
moted leftist politics, but provided rituals for ordinary abangan villagers, 
divination, mystical doctrines, supernatural healing, and so on. ‘Charging that 
Islam is a foreign import, unsuited to the needs and values of the Javanese, 
29 Robert R. Jay, Javanese villagers: Social relations in rural Modjokuto (Cambridge, 
MA, and London: The RMIT Press, 1969), pp. 4–5.
30 Jay, Religion and politics, pp. 28–9, 55, 71, 74–5, 79, 85.
31 Jay, Javanese villagers, pp. 17–9, 324, 329.
32 The following account rests on the essay ‘Ritual and social change: A Javanese 
example’ in Clifford Geertz, The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1973), pp. 151–69.
33 Marhaen is a piece of Sukarnoist rhetoric, representing the ordinary, naturally wise 
rural proletarian; a turgid explication by Sajuti Melik in1963 is available in Herbert 
Feith and Lance Castles (eds), Indonesian political thinking, 1945–1965 (Ithaca, NY, 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 174–7.
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the cult [urged] a return to “pure” and “original” Javanese beliefs’ — an echo 
of the anti-Islamic ideas mentioned in Chapter 1 above, which appeared 
from the 1870s particularly in the Kediri area, where Geertz was working. 
A crisis erupted in mid-1954, however, when a Permai leader’s nephew died 
and the religious leader (the modin) refused to officiate at the funeral on the 
grounds that a follower of Permai was not a Muslim. If, however, the Permai 
leader were to sign a statement saying that he was a believing Muslim and 
wanted the boy buried as a Muslim, the modin would then officiate — which 
produced rage on the part of the Permai leader. In the midst of this crisis, 
‘an old, traditionalistic man of about eighty’ muttered to Geertz, ‘Everything 
these days is a political problem; you can’t even die any more but what it 
becomes a political problem’. Eventually the dead boy’s father asked for 
a Muslim burial and ‘the santris, somewhat gleefully, now chanted their 
prayers over the corpse’. By the time Geertz left his fieldwork site some four 
months later, ‘the tensions between the santris and abangans had increased, 
and everyone wondered what would happen the next time a death occurred 
in a Permai family’.
When a Permai leader was quoted in the press as having claimed that 
Muhammad was a false prophet, a Masyumi leader prophetically said to a 
meeting in Kediri,
Muslims are patient, but they won’t be patient forever. You had better 
realise that they will take only so much and then they will fight. You 
must consider that your actions may bring about the flow of blood, that 
if you allow these insults to Islam to continue we may end up in civil 
war.34 
Permai was, however, an idiosyncratic local-level phenomenon; the more 
important representative of anti-santri politics was PKI.
We should remember that the bitter election campaigning of the mid-
1950s took place in a society where most people were still illiterate. The 
government and non-government organisations were investing in education 
and achieving great advances over the lamentable record of the colonial 
period, but there was a long way to go. By the time of the 1961 census, 59.2 
per cent of males over the age of 10 in Java were literate (in any character) 
but only 32.6 per cent of females, for an overall literacy figure of 45.5 per 
cent.35 In such an environment, newspapers and other publications had 
34 Quoted in Geertz, Religion of Java, p. 364.
35 Widjojo Nitisastro, Population trends, p. 191.
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increasing influence, but many voters were more motivated by rumours, 
superstitions, slogans and demagoguery. There was plenty of the latter.
Brawls, threats, slander, kidnappings and some killings occurred during 
the campaigning. There were false rumours that food and wells had been 
poisoned. Santri-abangan fears were manipulated both in the countryside 
and in the towns: the abangan feared that a Masyumi victory — which 
many people expected — would lead to them being persecuted, while on 
the santri side it was rumoured that a PKI victory would bring with it the 
murder of kyais. There were predictions of supernatural events and there was 
good business in selling amulets and potions to provide invulnerability. Issues 
such as the acceptability of gambling or of various forms of popular theatre 
divided the santri and abangan sides of politics.36 NU persuaded young 
women students that the 1955 campaign was a life-or-death struggle. One 
was told, as she later recalled, ‘If you do not help NU win … the Communist 
Party will win, and you will end up being hacked to death’.37
NU used Friday sermons for political propaganda, while PKI used 
popular theatre for this purpose. One of Bambang Pranowo’s informants 
from a village near Mount Merbabu recalled how PKI put on kethoprak 
performances in which kyais and hajis were insulted and equated with 
landlords.38 Similarly, Surabaya’s famous ludruk theatre attracted a basically 
pro-PKI proletarian audience, portraying the life of the poor and mocking 
the elite in a style that Peacock describes as ‘wildly comical and often gross’, 
featuring ‘aging transvestites and hare-lipped clowns’ before an audience 
including ‘whores, thieves and gamblers’. But ludruk was ‘no pure Marxist 
trumpet’ — it was too bawdy and ribald, too iconoclastic for that.39
A valuable source on the campaign period is a 1956 book mainly by 
one Soekirno, then Acting Head of the Information Service of Semarang 
city, about whom we know nothing other than that he was evidently of a 
leftist political persuasion, perhaps PKI. He wrote that social conditions 
in Semarang — and, of course, more widely in Java — were poor, as an 
36 Feith, Decline of constitutional democracy, pp. 360–2, 427–9; idem, The Indonesian 
elections of 1955 (Ithaca, NY: Interim Reports Series, Modern Indonesia Project, 
Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1957), pp. 16, 46–8.
37 Quoted in van Doorn-Harder, Women shaping Islam, p. 219.
38 Bambang Pranowo, Islam factual: Antara tradisi dan relasi kuasa (Yogyakarta: 
Adicita Karya Nusa, 1998), p. 30.
39 James L. Peacock, Rites of modernization: Symbolic and social aspects of Indonesian 
proletarian drama (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 
pp. 25, 28.
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imperialist and capitalist bloc opposed Communism. He wrote of social 
conflicts, economic problems for the masses, corruption, unstable prices, 
falling currency values and shortages of housing. Soekirno went on,
A moral crisis raged everywhere. … At the level of the masses it was 
clear that they had lost hold of their spiritual compass (pegangan jiwa): 
Kebatinan [indigenous Javanese spiritual cults] and black magic teachings 
arose widely among the populace …. Evils such as banditry, robbery, 
deceit, gambling, prostitution and murder were difficult to combat. The 
same was true of armed gangs that caused great losses to the people and 
the nation. Banditry, killings and burning people’s houses still just carried 
on in the villages. Fanaticism — especially regarding Islam — increased 
dreadfully.40
Parties were identified by their symbols on posters, billboards and 
banners: PKI’s hammer and sickle, PNI’s buffalo in a triangle, Masyumi’s 
crescent moon and star, and NU’s globe surrounded by a looped cord and 
stars. These were frequently defaced by opponents. They also inspired claims, 
counter-claims and political jokes that were easy for illiterates to grasp. In 
voting, party symbols on the ballot paper were to be punctured. Masyumi 
urged voters to puncture its crescent moon and star, for that was what 
illuminated all of the ummah (the Islamic community); opponents countered 
with the accusation that punching the crescent moon and star would plunge 
the world into darkness. NU supporters said to voters that they lived in the 
world and the world was round, and thus if not tied it could wobble, so they 
should choose the picture of the globe secured with the cord around it. Or 
that NU’s symbol was not a human creation, but was received in the form 
of a divine inspiration. In the case of PKI, poor voters were urged to pierce 
the hammer-and-sickle because they needed or hoped to pierce (i.e., plow) 
a piece of land.41 Soekirno’s account of the campaigning in Semarang no 
doubt reflected developments more widely in Java in 1954–5. Parties created 
slogans and songs to remind supporters how to vote.42 A simple question-
and-response PNI song in Javanese went as follows: 
40 Soekirno et al., ‘Semarang’ (Semarang: Djawatan Penerangan Kota Besar Semarang 
[1956]), pp. 138–40.
41 Soekirno, ‘Semarang’, pp. 144–5. Some of the material in the Soekirno book is 
repeated in Soetomo (ed.), Biografi R.M.T.P. Mangunnegoro, Gubernur Jawa Tengah 
periode 1954–1958 ([Semarang:] Pemerintah Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Tengah, 
Proyek Inventarisasi Sejarah dan Peninggalan Purbakala Daerah Jawa Tengah 
1991/1992), pp. 47–51.
42 The following songs are from Soekirno, ‘Semarang’, pp. 176–80.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t94   94 6/20/2012   1:20:52 PM
Aliran Politics and Communist Opposition to Islamisation, 1950–66 95
1.  Pilihanmu apa ‘What is your vote?
 Aku kandhana Do tell me.’
 Pilihanku siji ‘My choice is just one,
 Ora liya mung PNI None other than PNI.’
2.  Aku apa kena ‘Can I 
 Melu milih kuwi Follow in that vote?’
 Ya luwih utama ‘Yes, that would be the very best,
 Yen kok pilih siji iki If you vote for that one.’
3.  Tengerane apa ‘What is its symbol?
 Aku durung ngerti I do not yet know.’
 Banteng segi tiga ‘It is the buffalo in the triangle
 Ngunjung drajad bangsa That builds up the standing of the people.
 Partai kang sejati The party that truly
 Pembela Ibu Pertiwi Defends the Motherland.’
Masyumi of course emphasised its Islamic character in its campaign 
ditties, the following one being in Indonesian (reflecting Masyumi’s Modern-
ism, its urban base and its appeal to non-Javanese voters):
Bismillah sudah mari memilih  In the name of God we are about to vote
Gambar bulan bintang putih For the crescent moon and star of white
Atas dasar hitam nan bersih On a base that is black and clean:
Tanda gambar Masyumi The symbol of Masyumi,
Partai berjasa nusa dan bangsa The party that serves nation and people
Demi setia agama In the name of religious faithfulness.
NU repeated stock Islamic phrases in their Javanese version and 
employed the Javanese calendrical system in appealing to its Traditionalist 
flock:
Allah huma sali salim alla O God, give blessings and salvation to
Sayidina wa maulana  Our Lord and Master Muhammad.
 Muhammadin43
Tanggal 13 Sapar tahun ngajeng On the 13th of Sapar next year,
Kemis Legi aja lali nyoblos  On the day Kemis-Legi,44 don’t forget to
 jagad-gad   pierce the globe.
Platforms were clear enough, but it is doubtful whether they actually 
had much resonance among voters whose choices in many cases were based 
on whether a candidate was santri or abangan. NU presented itself as the 
43 A slightly Javanised spelling of the Arabic Allahumma Salli wa Sallam ‘ala Sayyidina 
wa Mawlana Muhammadin.
44 The days of the Javanese seven- and five-day weeks respectively.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t95   95 6/20/2012   1:20:52 PM
96 Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java
party of Sunni Muslims — the ahlu sunnah wal-jamaah.45 Its platform as 
recorded in Semarang was Islamist: ‘to implement shari‘a law with reference 
to one of the four Sunni Schools of Law …; to implement Islamic law 
among the people’.46 Masyumi was just as blunt: it wanted to ‘carry out the 
teachings and laws of Islam in life for the blessings of God, based upon the 
Islamic nature of an Islamic state’. PKI’s platform was predictable: ‘to go 
in the direction of a Communist society, on the theories of Marx, Lenin 
and Mao Zedong; to unite the working class, peasants, lower bourgeoisie 
and democratic elements to oppose imperialism and capitalism’. PNI, less 
flamboyantly, sought ‘to perfect the sovereignty’ of Indonesia, bring about 
social justice, and suchlike.47
More important than official platforms amongst less sophisticated 
voters were claims such as NU’s that a vote for it meant a path to heaven, 
that it was like going on Holy War. At the Friday sermon, some kyais told 
their audiences that it was compulsory for Muslims to vote for NU.48 Public 
meetings were held to which sympathisers were trucked in large numbers. 
There opposing parties were denounced and followers were promised 
prosperity, portions of land for farmers, a better life for workers, lower prices 
for necessities, and so on.49 Village headmen pressured people to vote for 
PNI while PKI village guards urged support for the Communist Party.50 At 
village level, PKI and its peasant front BTI emphasised that the Communists 
would distribute land to the landless and even sometimes promised land to 
everyone who voted for PKI. Such ‘sweeping general promises’ led to ‘acute 
45 Arabic ahl al-sunna wa’l jama‘a: the followers of the Prophetic Tradition and the 
Community, i.e., the Sunnis.
46 NU’s national-level ‘Struggle program’ (Program perdjuangan), developed c. 1954–5, 
was a bit more ambiguous. It said that the party ‘upholds (menegakkan) Islamic shari‘a 
in a principled and consistent fashion following one of the four Schools of Law … 
and struggles for its implementation as the living law (Hukum-Hidup) that develops 
within society. … The Nahdlatul Ulama party endeavours to bring into being a 
national state based on Islam that guarantees and protects basic human rights in the 
freedom to embrace a religion.’ See Aboebakar Atjeh (ed.), Sedjarah hidup K.H.A. 
Wahid Hasjim dan karangan tersiar (Djakarta: Panitya Buku Peringatan Alm. KHA 
Wahid Hasjim, 1957), pp. 494–5. I am grateful to Dr Greg Fealy for locating this 
document and advising me about its date.
47 Soekirno, ‘Semarang’, pp. 187–8. 
48 Fealy, ‘Ulama and politics’, pp. 143–5.
49 Soekirno, ‘Semarang’, pp. 149–51.
50 Feith, Decline of Constitutional democracy, pp. 432–3.
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social tensions, … particularly in Java as election day approached’. According 
to PKI propaganda, PNI was the party of the elite priyayi, Masyumi and NU 
were parties of the santri but PKI was the party of the people.51 The Party 
tried to avoid seeming completely anti-religious while positioning itself as 
the party of the abangan, but the santri side emphasised the atheistic nature 
of Communism.52
PKI was also denounced by PNI and NU as Partai Kriminal Indonesia: 
the Criminal Party of Indonesia, which would steal your land. NU supporters 
called PKI followers kafirs. Communists denounced NU people as wong 
Nadhah Udan: people standing with their hands held palms upward to catch 
the rain, both an accusation of passivity and a mocking of one of the prayer 
positions. Masyumi said that it faced two enemies, both called PKI: the 
Partai Komunis Indonesia (i.e., the real PKI) and the Partai Kyai Indonesia 
(i.e., NU).53 Villages split. As in the Kediri area studied by Jay, Geertz and 
their colleagues, so also in the pasisir area of Pemalang, for example, relatively 
well-off santri farmers and traders in one hamlet supported NU, relatively 
poor abangan villagers in the adjacent hamlet supported PKI and in a third, 
mixed, hamlet PNI was dominant.54
Despite this social, religious, cultural and political polarisation, however, 
when polling finally took place in September 1955, it was peaceful. There 
were no significant episodes of conflict; nor did the sky darken or black 
magic prevail. To this surprise were added other and more significant ones. 
We have already noted above in Table 4 that in the Javanese heartland of 
Central and East Java, and looking only at the ‘big four’ party outcomes, 
51 Feith, Indonesian elections, p. 15. See also Bambang Pranowo, Islam factual, pp. 24–6; 
Imam Tholkhah, Anatomi konflik politik, p. 130.
52 Feith, Decline of Constitutional democracy, pp. 359–60. In a Yogyakarta village, 
Kim was later told that PKI had said that it, too, was religious, but that it supported 
what it called ‘Javanese religion’ (agama Jawa), while Masyumi ‘equated affiliation 
to the PKI with a straight path to Hell’; this agama Jawa, however, appeared not 
to differ much from Traditionalist practices; Hyung-Jun Kim, Reformist Muslims 
in a Yogyakarta village: The Islamic transformation of contemporary socio-religious life 
(Canberra: ANU E Press, 2007), pp. 60–1.
53 Bambang Pranowo, Islam factual, pp. 28, 33, 35; this material is based on interviews 
from 1987 onwards.
54 Frans Hüsken, ‘Living by the sugar-mill: The people of Comal in the early 
twentieth century’, in Hiroyoshi Kani, Frans Hüsken and Djoko Suryo (eds), Beneath 
the smoke of the sugar-mill: Javanese coastal communities during the twentieth century 
(Yogyakarta: AKATIGA and Gadjah Mada University Press, 2001), p. 257.
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PNI was the strongest with 32 per cent of the vote.55 Given its Sukarnoist 
and priyayi character, PNI had been expected to do well. The major surprises 
from this election for Javanese were three. The first was that Masyumi did 
so poorly in these provinces — only 12 per cent of the vote in contrast to 
its national share of 21 per cent and its predominance in most non-Javanese 
parts of Indonesia. The second was that PNI was so closely trailed by NU 
with 30 per cent in Central and East Java — and 18 per cent nation-wide. 
This dramatically increased NU’s national parliamentary representation from 
only 8 seats to 45 and confirmed that NU was a major political player. The 
third surprise was that PKI did so very well, with 27 per cent of the vote in 
Central and East Java — and 16 per cent across all of Indonesia, giving it 
39 parliamentary seats. PNI and PKI together, with their combined 59 per 
cent of the votes in Central and East Java, appeared to have created a serious 
political barrier to santri aspirations for further Islamisation of Javanese 
society through the ballot box.
Below national and provincial levels, there were many local areas in 
Java, particularly in East Java, where either PKI or NU was the largest party. 
Overall, in Central Java PNI was the largest (with 33.5 per cent of the vote) 
and in East Java NU was the largest (with 34.1 per cent). In both provinces, 
PKI was the second-largest party, with 25.8 per cent of the vote in Central 
Java and 23.3 per cent in East Java, but lower-level aliran realities were more 
complex. Among the 37 Kabupaten (regencies) and cities in Central Java, 
PNI gained the largest vote in 21, NU in 4 and PKI in 12, in the last case 
including the largest cities of Surakarta, Yogyakarta and Semarang. Among 
East Java’s 29 Kabupaten and cities, PNI was the largest vote-winner in only 
four. NU took 11 and PKI 14, including all of the major cities: Surabaya, 
Madiun, Malang and Kediri. The discrepancies in votes were sometimes 
large. In Kabupaten Madiun, for example, the centre of the PKI rebellion 
of 1948, PNI gained 57,632 votes, Masyumi 16,518, NU 44,114, but PKI 
swept into the lead with 101,477. In the city of Madiun itself, PNI got 
8,713 votes, Masyumi 1849, NU only 1261, and PKI the most at 18,133. 
In Kediri city — half a century later regarded as a great NU stronghold 
— the 1955 vote outcome was PNI 14,998, Masyumi 4521, NU 11,803 
and another PKI victory with 23,252. In Surakarta, PNI was supported by 
55 A brief overview of the election results is in Ricklefs, History of modern Indonesia, 
pp. 286–7. Detailed analyses are available in Feith, Decline of constitutional democracy, 
pp. 434–7; Alfian, Hasil pemilihan umum 1955 untuk Dewan perwakilan Rakjat 
(D.P.R.) (Djakarta: LEKNAS, 1971; mimeo).
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32,870 voters, Masyumi by 15,364, NU by a mere 1462, but PKI by 76,283, 
half again as much as the other three combined. In Yogyakarta — a major 
centre of Modernist Islam, where the headquarters of Muhammadiyah 
were found — the vote for PNI was 21,839, for Masyumi 18,027, for NU 
a paltry 2387, and for PKI 43,842. NU’s domination was as great as PKI’s 
in other places. It took a third of all the votes in Magelang and 39 per cent 
of the total in Kabupaten (not the city) of Surabaya. Madurese in East Java 
were solid supporters of NU. Thus, NU took 48 per cent of the total vote in 
heavily Madurese Probolinggo and 45 per cent of the total vote in Situbondo. 
In the former, PKI won only 23,583 votes against NU’s 183,084 and in the 
latter only 8157 against NU’s 109,751. In Probolinggo, NU’s vote was half 
again as much as the other ‘big four’ votes combined and in Situbondo it 
was nearly 30 per cent more. The party completely swept the Kabupatens of 
Madura itself. Since Christianity will become a major issue later in this book, 
it is worth noting that in 1955 it was of next-to-no political significance. 
Christian-based parties won only one parliamentary seat from each of 
Central and East Java.56
In the Javanese countryside, the stage was set for a period of increasing 
polarisation and conflict, with PKI and NU as the main political contenders. 
In the highly politicised aliran environment of the day, winners of elections 
can hardly be expected to have been modest in victory. And success bred 
more success. In some places politicians switched to parties that had done 
better in the polls, especially in the case of Masyumi people who crossed 
over to NU. This was not, however, true of PKI, whose activists were loyal 
and confident of ever-increasing influence. PKI was particularly successful 
in attracting PNI supporters and continued to build its influence among 
the rural poor and urban labourers.57 The Constituent Assembly elections 
in December 1955 were an anticlimax but the same was not true of the 
subsequent regional elections. 
By the time the regional elections were held in 1957–8, the national 
political context was in flux. Sukarno was expressing — and thus further 
promoting — widespread dissatisfaction with the corruption and broken 
promises of the parliamentary system. Regionally based rebellions were 
challenging the authority of the central government and the army was 
increasing its role in national life. The parties themselves were, in some 
56 Alfian, Hasil Hasil pemilihan umum 1955, pp. 12, 21–2, 80–1, 90–1.
57 Soetomo, Biografi Mangunnegoro, pp. 53–4, refers to such events in the context of 
Pekalongan.
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cases, uncertain to what extent they should defend the party system, seek 
to reform it or side with Sukarno in some new political structure. Nor were 
they certain how they should deal with the army, which no party dominated. 
PKI’s strength in the 1955 elections was an important element in this flux, 
for it was now reasonable to suspect that a continuation of parliamentary 
democracy could end in a Communist-dominated government. At village 
level in Java, aliran-defined political, religious and social conflicts continued. 
In this delicate, indeed potentially explosive, environment, elections were held 
in nine provinces across the country in 1957–8.
In the July 1957 Central Java and Yogyakarta elections, PKI registered 
major gains. The results were as follows.
Table 6 1957 provincial election outcome for the ‘big four’ parties in Central 
 Java and Yogyakarta compared with 1955 outcome58
Party Aliran % of total  (% of total
 identity vote, 1957 vote, 1955)
NU Santri 23 (22)
Masyumi Santri 10 (11)
Santri party sub-total  33 (33)
PKI Abangan 37 (29)
PNI Abangan 30 (38)
Abangan party sub-total  67 (67)
Thus, PKI was the great winner here, for it increased its vote by nearly 30 
per cent over its 1955 figure (from 1,772,306 to 1,865,568, in a period when 
the number of voters increased by only 1.1 per cent) and gained a larger 
percentage of the overall vote, evidently entirely at PNI’s cost. The latter shed 
over 20 per cent of the number of votes it had won in 1955. For its part, NU 
increased its vote roughly in line with the increase in voter numbers. Like 
PNI, Masyumi fell, with nearly 8 per cent fewer votes than in 1955. The 
percentage which we can regard as santri or abangan in aliran orientation 
remained stable overall.
The provincial elections in East Java also showed that PKI was 
increasing in strength, as can be seen in the following table.
58 Based on Lev, Transition to guided democracy, pp. 92–3.
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Table 7  1957 provincial election outcome for the ‘big four’ parties in East Java
  compared with 1955 outcome59
Party Aliran % of total  (% of total
 identity vote, 1957 vote, 1955)
NU  Santri 35 (37)
Masyumi Santri 11 (12)
Santri party sub-total  46 (49)
PKI  Abangan 32 (25)
PNI  Abangan 22 (25)
Abangan party sub-total  54 (50)
Here PKI increased its vote by nearly 18 per cent over its 1955 figure: 
from 2,299,602 to 2,704,523, a gain of over 400,000 voters, whereas the 
total number who turned out to vote actually declined by nearly 5 per cent. 
This growth was at all other parties’ cost, for the total number of votes and 
the percentage share of the votes of all the other ‘big four’ parties declined, 
but it was mainly a case of voters shifting allegiance from NU to PKI. The 
percentage which we might think to have been santri or abangan in aliran 
orientation thus shifted in the abangan direction, with half a million more 
voters choosing abangan parties — that is to say, voting mainly for PKI 
— than two years before. This shift also shows us that NU’s vote in 1955 did 
not rest upon a solid santri constituency, for votes were flowing from it to 
PKI — 3,370,554 having voted for NU in 1955 but only 2,999,785 in 1957, 
a loss of over 370,000 voters. The fears of a PKI march to power were further 
exacerbated by the August 1957 election in mainly Sundanese West Java, 
where PKI rose to 24 per cent of the vote from 16 per cent in 1955.60
Both in the national-level squabbles between political parties and in the 
social realities at grass-roots level, those who hoped for deeper Islamisation 
of Javanese society now faced a formidable opponent in the Communist 
Party. PKI support was increasing, PNI was losing ground to it and even NU 
was challenged by it — and that even in the NU heartland of East Java. In 
1960 Masyumi was banned for involvement in regional rebellions, further 
weakening the political structures supporting the santri side of politics.
59 Based on ibid., pp. 94–5.
60 Ibid., p. 95.
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PKI’s leader D.N. Aidit (a Sumatran Malay by ethnic origin) reiterated 
the historical revisionism that had been part of the challenge by some 
Javanese to Islam for nearly a century: the idea that the last and greatest 
pre-Islamic kingdom of Java, Majapahit — depicted as the standard of 
what was truly Javanese — was destroyed in the early 16th century by the 
unscrupulous perfidy of the first Muslims.61 Of course he now gave this 
idea a veneer of Communist jargon, injecting feudalism, capitalism and 
contradiction. ‘Moslem traders from Persia and India’, he wrote, converted 
local Hindu lords to Islam and encouraged them to abandon their loyalty to 
Majapahit. The wali sanga then overthrew Majapahit. ‘This was the result of 
the contradiction which had arisen between the Moslem feudal kingdoms 
who had become at one with commercial capital (the merchants) and the 
Hindu feudal kingdoms that were still completely agrarian.’62 We may be 
confident that this same theme — that the best of what was truly Javanese 
was destroyed by Islam, of Islamisation as a civilisational mistake — was 
reiterated in multiple propaganda sessions at grass-roots level.
NU sought to meet the PKI presence in all fields. To challenge PKI’s 
women’s movement Gerwani, NU sought to build up Muslimat NU and 
Fatayat. PKI’s youth activists in Pemuda Rakyat were balanced by NU’s 
Ansor and its uniformed militia wing Banser (from Barisan Ansor Serba 
Guna: Ansor All-purpose Forces) which was established in 1962. Banser 
combined spiritual disciplines with martial arts and a dose of beliefs in 
supernatural powers. NU already had its farmer’s union Pertanu to counter 
the Communist BTI and (from 1954) Sarbumusi (Sarekat Buruh Muslimin 
Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Labour Union) to counter PKI’s union 
SOBSI. For higher education students, NU set up PMII (Pergerakan 
Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Students’ Movement), 
for fishermen Sernemi (Serikat Nelayan Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian 
Muslim Fishermen’s Union) and for businessmen HPMI (Himpunan 
Pengusaha Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Entrepreneurs’ 
Association). A missionary organisation was set up, borrowing the Christian 
(originally Dutch) terminology for proselytism: Missi Islam.
Others also opposed PKI initiatives. The Party established a People’s 
University (UNRA: Universitas Rakyat) in 1958 in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, 
where Party cadres, public servants and others were taught. UNRA soon 
61 See Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese society, Chapter 7 and pp. 232–3.
62 D.N. Aidit, Indonesian society and the Indonesian Revolution (Djakarta: Jajasan 
‘Pembaruan’, 1958), pp. 23–4.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t102   102 6/20/2012   1:20:53 PM
Aliran Politics and Communist Opposition to Islamisation, 1950–66 103
had branches in other cities, including Surakarta, Semarang and Surabaya 
in Javanese-speaking areas.63 In response, Islamic activists established 
Pendidikan Tinggi Da‘wah Islam (PTDI: Islamic Proselytism Higher 
Education) in Surakarta, which was moved to Jakarta in 1965. Military 
officers played a role in its leadership.64
The arts became politicised as well. PKI’s Lekra (Lembaga Kebudayaan 
Rakyat, People’s Cultural Institute, established 1950) was becoming an effec-
tive tool for intellectual repression, spearheaded by Indonesia’s greatest writer, 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer. To compete with this, in 1962 NU established 
Lesbumi (Lembaga Seniman Budayawan Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian 
Muslim Culture-Bearers’ and Artists’ Institute), which, however, struggled 
somewhat in the absence of any figure of the stature of Pramoedya.65 This 
artistic world was, in any case, a more modern one in which many kyais 
felt uncomfortable; indeed, some evidently felt that Lesbumi was not really 
consistent with NU values.66
A political war was fought around popular theater across Java. In 
Banyuwangi for example, PKI, BTI and other Communist-affiliated 
organisations set up groups to perform angklung while NU supported 
Islamic-style arts such as rebana and hadrah.67 The iconic reyog dance of 
63 Hindley, Communist Party of Indonesia, p. 94.
64 Boland, Struggle of Islam, pp. 194–5, lists Generals Sarbini and Sudirman from the 
army, General Sutjipto Judodihardjo from the police, and Commander Sukmadi from 
the navy as leading figures. M. Rachmat Djatnika, ‘Les biens de mainmorte (wakaf) à 
Java-Est’ (Doctoral thesis, Ecole des Haute Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1982), 
p. 51, says that PTDI was established in 1961, but Boland gives 1963.
65 On these various NU organizational initiatives, see Saifuddin Zuhri, Berangkat 
dari pesantren, p. 186; Fealy, ‘Ulama and politics’, pp. 228, 237–8; Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, 
‘Religion, politics and violence’. See also Choiratun Chisaan, Lesbumi. According 
to Saifuddin, Banser’s name was chosen also because if its two syllables are read in 
reverse order, they say serban (turban). Lesbumi was founded by Djamaludin Malik, 
Usman Ismail and Asrul Sani. On the abangan side, Lekra was often supported by 
the PNI intellectuals’ front LKN (Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional, National Cultural 
Institute), which was led by the writer Sitor Situmorang.
66 Choiratun Chisaan, Lesbumi, pp. 117–8.
67 Chintya Novi Anoegrajekti, ‘Kesenian Using: Resistensi budaya komunitas 
pinggir’ in Kebijakan kebudayaan di masa orde baru: Laporan penelitian ( Jakarta: Pusat 
Penelitian dan Pengembangan Kemasyarakatan LIPI and The Ford Foundation, 
2001), pp. 813–4. Angklung is an indigenous instrument using bamboo tubes held 
in a frame, which are shaken to produce musical tones. Rebana is a tambourine and 
hadrah a chant in praise of God done to rebana accompaniment.
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Ponorogo was used as a political propaganda vehicle by PKI and PNI and, to 
a lesser extent, by NU, for the santri side of politics was often uncomfortable 
with performances that involved trance (feared as a form of spirit-possession 
and black magic). Transvestite performers were sometimes employed in these 
performances, although both PKI and PNI evidently felt some discomfort 
with that, since transvestitism seemed inconsistent with the modernisation 
these parties sought to convey. In 1965, more than 300 villages around 
Ponorogo had their own reyog groups, but in the conflagration of that 
year — discussed below — many PKI-linked performers were arrested or 
disappeared.68 This happened in many other places as well, such as among 
tayuban performers in Kediri.69 In Surabaya, ludruk continued to burlesque 
the ills of a socially divided society to an audience of the poor. But by the time 
that Peacock did his fieldwork there in 1962–3, ludruk’s leftist, iconoclastic 
message was diluted, for the army had banned explicitly ideological messages 
other than Sukarno’s idiosyncratic doctrine of Nasakom.70 Elsewhere in East 
Java, too, ludruk and other cultural performances were highly politicised.71 In 
1961 Lekra claimed that large numbers of kethoprak groups in Central Java 
and ludruk companies in East Java were affiliated with it.72
NU and PKI both knew that religion was the key issue between them, 
that whatever class issues there might be as well, it was faith and aliran that 
mattered most. PKI went through various public ideological contortions to 
avoid seeming anti-religious, to no avail.73 At local levels, the conflict was 
68 Margaret J. Kartomi, ‘Performance, music and meaning of réyog Ponorogo’, 
Indonesia no. 22 (Oct. 1976), pp. 116–7.
69 Robert W Hefner, ‘The politics of popular art: Tayuban dance and culture change 
in East Java’, Indonesia no. 43 (Apr. 1987), p. 91.
70 Peacock, Rites of modernization, p. 31. NASAKOM stood for nasionalisme, agama, 
Komunisme, i.e., the unity of nationalism, religion and Communism — something 
conceivable only in Sukarno’s revolutionary humbug and unattainable in the realities 
of early 1960s Indonesia.
71 Hermawan Sulistyo, Palu arit di lading tebu: Sejarah pembantaian massal yang 
terlupakan ( Jombang-Kediri 1965–1966) ( Jogyakarta: KPG [Kepustakaan Populer 
Gramedia], Yayasan Adikarya IKAPI and The Ford Foundation, 2000), pp. 128, 
235–6.
72 Keith Foulcher, Social commitment in literature and the arts: The Indonesian ‘Institute 
of People’s Culture’, 1950–1965 (Clayton, Vic: Monash University Centre of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1986), p. 112.
73 Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and politics, 1959–
1965 (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 92–5. Mortimer’s 
book is the best account of PKI in these years.
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quite clear. One kyai recalled later that in the area of Klaten, in the 1960s 
the Party put on performances of Kethoprak PKI with a script entitled Patine 
Gusti Allah (The death of God).74 As the parliamentary system staggered 
to its end, to be replaced by Sukarno’s so-called Guided Democracy,75 PKI 
adjusted its ideological positions to support Sukarno’s successive ideological 
pronouncements. The Party was seeking protection from the hostile forces 
that faced it and believed that Sukarno represented its best hope of gaining 
power. By the early 1960s there was hardly any difference to be seen between 
Communist ideology and Sukarnoism. NU meanwhile made its own 
accommodation with the chaotic political realities of Indonesia, based on 
the ideas of accepting the existing political authority and of seeking benefit 
and avoiding harm.
A new leadership style was, however, emerging within NU. Kyais still 
dominated the organisation, but now there were younger leaders who had 
gone through Indonesia’s expanding public education system and more 
modern kinds of Islamic education as well as Traditionalist pesantrens. Some 
of these younger figures had professional qualifications and had even been 
in Western countries for higher education. As Fealy puts it, now there were 
NU cadres who were ‘just as likely to speak English as Arabic’. Among the 
new figures was M. Subchan Z.E., a ‘flamboyant and charismatic figure’ who 
would wield significant influence until his early death in 1973. He was from 
a Yogyakarta Muhammadiyah family and went to a Muhammadiyah primary 
school but spent his youth with a wealthy merchant uncle in Kudus who was 
active in NU circles, and had then gone on himself to become a successful 
entrepreneur. He was adept at managing the politics of Jakarta: ‘A debonair 
and popular figure among Jakarta’s social set, he often spent his evenings 
dancing with glamorous women at the city’s elite nightspots.’76
NU was thus developing a politically active wing which was often far 
from the lifestyle and values of the kyais, but which nevertheless gave it 
new opportunities. This produced tensions within NU, of course, but also 
gave Traditionalist Islam influence in modern political life to go along with 
74 Discussion with Ky. H. Muslim Imampura (Mbah Lim), at Pondok Pesantren al-
Muttaqien Pancasila Sakti, Karang Anom, Klaten, 27 March 2006.
75 An overview of the Guided Democracy period, with references to the main 
secondary sources, is to be found in Ricklefs, History of modern Indonesia, Chapter 
20.
76 Fealy, ‘Ulama and politics’, pp. 226, 229. For a brief biography, see Andrée Feillard, 
Islam et armée dans l ’Indonésie contemporaine: Les pionniers de la tradition (Cahier 
d’Archipel 28; Paris: Editions L’Harmatan, Association Archipel, 1995), pp. 334–7.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t105   105 6/20/2012   1:20:53 PM
106 Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java
its influence at grass-roots level.77 This combination of influences could be 
found in only two organisations in Indonesia in the early 1960s: NU and 
PKI. Less well-supported among the populace, but also powerful, was the 
army. All turned to Sukarno for legitimacy as they prepared for a contest for 
power among themselves. Given that PKI was evidently the rising power, it 
is not surprising that an anti-PKI coalition of interests grew between NU 
and the military. A group of ‘hard-line’ anti-PKI militants was strengthening 
among younger NU followers in Ansor and other NU groups at this time. 
Their leaders included Ky. H. Bisri Syansuri (a respected elder figure, by 
then in his late 70s),78 Subchan and two former army officers M. Munasir 
and Jusuf Hasjim.79 It should be noted, however, that in Central and East 
Java, Communist infiltration of the military was also advanced, so that the 
upper echelons of the military could not be confident of the loyalty of their 
own forces. 
The violent conflicts of 1963–6
In 1963 and 1964 the wobbly radicalism of Guided Democracy began to tip 
into social violence in the countryside of Central and East Java. PKI seems 
to have become confident that, while its enemies were strengthening, the 
massive following that it claimed gave it capacity for independent action. It 
is also possible that Aidit was urged during a visit to Beijing in September 
1963 to begin direct revolutionary action in the countryside. Whatever the 
case, the events suggest, as Mortimer put it, that the Communists felt ‘that 
the time was approaching when their political fate would be decided one 
way or the other’.80 In a speech that Aidit gave in Beijing, published the 
following year in Indonesian, he made the following observation, capturing 
the central social, religious and political dichotomy (he of course called it a 
‘contradiction’) faced by PKI. 
The Indonesian situation is indeed complex and filled with many 
contradictions. On the one hand, according to the statistics, over 90 per 
77 Involvement in politics also brought an increasing number of accusations of 
corruption and mismanagement against NU leaders, and the feeling that the social 
standing of kyais was declining because of involvement in politics. See Fealy, ‘Ulama 
and politics’, pp. 192 et seqq., 232.
78 For a brief biography, see Feillard, Islam et armée, pp. 326–9.
79 Fealy, ‘Ulama and politics’, pp. 235–6.
80 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, p. 278.
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cent of Indonesia’s populace is Muslim. On the other hand, the influence 
of Communism is constantly expanding.81 
While the precise motivation of the PKI leadership is not entirely clear, 
early in 1964 the Communists launched a ‘unilateral action’ (aksi sepihak) 
campaign to carry out land reform laws that had been passed in 1959–60 
but had hardly begun to be implemented. The membership numbers being 
quoted by PKI in the mid-1960s — claiming a total of perhaps 20 million 
in the Party and its affiliated organisations, the large majority being in Java82 
— were certainly grossly exaggerated. Whether the Party leadership knew 
this and was engaged in massive bluff and brinkmanship, or actually believed 
the figures themselves, is not knowable. Whatever the case, PKI activists 
— especially BTI and Pemuda Rakyat — and their landless or land-poor 
followers began taking over ‘excess’ lands in Central and East Java. This pitted 
the Communist side against many wealthy hajis and kyais, the landholdings 
of pesantrens, other santri landowners and military officers.
Ironically, PKI’s ‘unilateral actions’ worked to the benefit of some 
Islamic institutions, for there were santri landowners who preferred to 
give their land to pesantrens, mosques, prayer-houses (langgar) or other 
institutions as pious endowments (wakaf) rather than to see it fall into the 
hands of Communists. The most famous of all the modernised pesantrens of 
Java, Pondok Modern at Gontor, saw its landholdings rise from a mere 25 
ha of rice land to over 260 in this way. BTI tried but failed to prevent the 
school getting these lands.83
Santri activists — especially NU’s Ansor and Banser — fought back.84 
Brawls, kidnappings, beatings, arson attacks on houses, destruction of cane-
fields and other crops and the killing of opponents spread. PKI declared 
that ‘true revolutionaries’ must place themselves on the side of the peasants 
81 D.N. Aidit, Kibarkan tinggi panji revolusi! (Djakarta: Jajasan ‘Pembaruan’, 1964), 
p. 48.
82 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, pp. 366–7.
83 Lance Castles, ‘Notes on the Islamic school at Gontor’, Indonesia no. 1 (Apr. 1966), 
pp. 36–7; Djatnika, ‘Biens de mainmorte’, pp. 147–8, 150–1, 287.
84 There is considerable literature on this violence. For the account here, I have 
relied upon Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, pp. 309–27;  Fealy, 
‘Ulama and politics’, pp. 239–44; Soegijanto Padmo, Landreform dan gerakan protes 
petani Klaten, 1959–1965 (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Media Pressindo and Konsorsium 
Pembaruan Agraria, 2000), pp. 109–55; Sulistyo, Palu arit di lading tebu, pp. 91–156; 
and Aminuddin Kasdi, Kaum merah menjarah: Asksi sepihak PKI/BTI di Jawa Timur 
1960–1965 (Yogyakarta: Jendela, 2001). See also Arbi Sanit, Badai revolusi: Sketsa 
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t107   107 6/20/2012   1:20:53 PM
108 Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java
and presented the cause as if it were class-based, but of course these actions 
were not supported by all peasants. Rather, it was the abangan peasant 
followers of PKI and BTI who were claiming land, not the santri peasantry. 
The latter — led mainly by NU’s Ansor youth militia — saw it as a religious 
act to resist the ‘atheistic’ Communists. The police often became involved, 
BTI cadres were arrested, and before long serious losses of life were being 
reported. Chinese — often assumed by the santri side to be both atheists 
and Communists by definition — were also attacked in some places, and 
defended by PKI. Some santri activists believed that the Communists were 
using black magic to curse their opponents, while kyais gave supernatural 
protection, powerful prayers and amulets to NU activists. Kyais declared that 
anyone killed in action against the Communists would go directly to heaven, 
as was true of martyrs who fell in Holy War.
In this spreading violence, PKI soon found itself on the defensive, 
particularly in NU’s heartland of East Java. When the Party was put to the 
test, the millions of militants it claimed were not to be seen and aliran had 
clearly trumped class as a format for political mobilisation. By November 
1964, BTI admitted that a ‘counter-revolution’ was gaining ascendancy in 
East Java. NU and other anti-PKI forces were winning. PKI tried to back off 
from the aksi sepihak campaign but this could not be ordered immediately, 
for fear of demoralising Party cadres and losing altogether whatever peasant 
base it really had. Thousands of BTI members were already abandoning the 
organisation — for membership was a passport to trouble — and declaring 
themselves members of PNI instead, thereby maintaining their abangan 
political identity but getting out of the firing-line of santri violence. While 
the Communist side tried to restrain its activists, the santri side could smell 
victory. Mortimer observes, ‘All anti-Communists who became aware of what 
was happening were greatly encouraged. That PKI strength was preponderant 
in the villages of East and Central Java was no longer accepted as an axiom 
kekuatan politik PKI di Jawa Tengah dan Jawa Timur (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 
2000). Van Doorn-Harder, Women shaping Islam, p. 220, writes of Muslimat NU 
participating in ‘the military preparation’ and having ‘joined the fight’, but this seems 
an exaggeration; there is no evidence of women being involved in the killings (my 
thanks to Prof. Robert Cribb for confirming my impressions in this regard).
 There were some variations to the pattern of abangan followers of PKI clashing 
with santri followers of NU. In Gunung Kidul, most ‘excess’ land was held not by 
kyais but rather by the local priyayi who were supporters of PNI; Fadjar Pratikno, 
Gerakan rakyat kelaparan, pp. 87, 112–4, 138–44. Although this book does not cover 
Bali, it should be noted that serious violence also occurred there, where of course 
Islam was not a factor.
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of Jakarta politics’.85 Conflict was not confined to rural villages. In Surabaya, 
for example, Chinese-owned land was taken over and was quickly covered 
with hundreds of houses. BTI demanded that the mayor — himself a PKI 
member — give land titles to these squatters, but in fact the city government 
failed to do so. Pemuda Rakyat and Ansor confronted each other violently in 
several neighbourhoods of Surabaya, and in other towns and cities.
The air of radicalism at both national and local levels continued as the 
months of 1965 passed. The creation — over Indonesian objections — of 
Malaysia in September 1963, the consequent declaration of the Indonesian-
Malaysian conflict known as ‘Confrontation’ and the escalation of the 
American war in Vietnam during 1964 and 1965 also provided international 
fodder for Indonesia’s increasing domestic radicalism. In August 1965, Su-
karno suddenly vomited and collapsed in public. Although he soon recovered, 
both national-level political actors and people in towns and villages across the 
country began to consider the possibility of an Indonesia without Sukarno. 
Many domestic observers as well as foreigners thought that PKI was poised to 
gain power. Now that Masyumi was banned, NU remained as the only signi-
ficant santri political party. Its leaders and activists, along with other santris 
and leading military figures, were determined to prevent a PKI takeover. In 
towns and villages across Java, people believed that violence loomed and that 
the other side had lists of those to be killed when it erupted.86
At the end of September 1965, the chaotic, radical, corrupt and violent 
Guided Democracy period came to an end in Jakarta. The events in the 
capital may be briefly told here, even if many details are obscure and, we may 
suppose, will always remain so.87 A poorly organised military coup group 
removed the top leadership of the army by kidnapping and murdering six 
senior generals and an aide, in the name of forestalling what was claimed 
to be an American-sponsored coup by a secret council of generals. PKI’s 
women’s organisation Gerwani and its youth wing Pemuda Rakyat were also 
involved. It is not clear how much of this adventure was really attributable to 
PKI plotting, how much arose from intra-military issues, and how clear the 
distinction between PKI and the coup’s military activists was anyway, given 
85 Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno, p. 327.
86 For example, see the account of rising social conflict in 1965 and the emerging 
alliance between the military and the kyais of the Jombang-Kediri area in Sulistyo, 
Palu arit di lading tebu, pp. 129–31.
87 A brief overview of the 1965 coup attempt is available in Ricklefs, History of 
modern Indonesia, pp. 318–21, with references to relevant literature listed under the 
readings for Chapter 20.
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the mutual infiltration, influence and clandestine contacts that had been 
developing for years. Whatever the case, the coup attempt quickly collapsed, 
Major-General (soon-to-be-President) Soeharto, then commander of the 
Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), took charge of the military 
and commenced — cautiously and methodically — to lay the foundations 
for the removal of Sukarno as President and the implementation of his own 
‘New Order’ regime.
The crucial consequence of the 1965 coup attempt for the history 
of Islamisation in Java was that it allowed santri-abangan differences over 
degrees of commitment to Islam now to lurch into widespread, still almost-
inconceivable, slaughter. Mutual suspicions and stereotyping across harden-
ing aliran boundaries, bitter political party animosities with aliran roots, 
politicised tensions over folk rituals and arts, the part-class and part-aliran 
conflict in the countryside of Java that had already turned violent — all of 
this now gave birth to the worst domestic bloodletting in the history of 
Indonesia.88 PKI was blamed for the events in Jakarta by the military and 
by its many enemies on the santri side of politics. In Jakarta and other cities, 
young activists of various backgrounds (including Christians) with military 
support formed action groups to attack PKI people and property. Chinese 
were also targeted.
In the Javanese-speaking heartland, social violence on an unprecedented 
scale broke out. The role of the military in Central and East Java varied from 
place to place. There was a major complication there, for the army’s Central 
Java Diponegoro Division and East Java Brawijaya Division were among 
those most successfully infiltrated and influenced by PKI; some elements 
were clearly on the side of the military coup leaders in Jakarta. The loyalty 
of precisely these two crucial divisions was therefore doubtful. It was some 
time before Soeharto and his colleagues could be confident that an order 
88 The killings of 1965–6 continue to attract serious research and to produce valuable 
studies. Most of this research is handicapped by its heavy reliance on later memories 
and, of course, the almost total absence of sources from the PKI side. The most 
important study so far published is Sulistyo, Palu arit di lading tebu, covering the 
area of Jombang and Kediri. In the account of the killings here, important items of 
information will be footnoted. Otherwise, the general narrative relies upon Sulistyo, 
Palu arit di lading tebu; Fealy, ‘Ulama and politics’, pp. 248–56; Robert Cribb (ed.), 
The Indonesian killings of 1965–1966: Studies from Java and Bali (Monash Papers on 
Southeast Asia no. 21. Clayton, Vic: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1990); and Imam Tholkhah, Anatomi konflik politik di Indonesia, pp. 134–41. 
See also the November 1965 Indonesian intelligence report translated in ‘Report 
from East Java’, Indonesia no. 41 (Apr. 1986), pp. 135–49.
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given to either Diponegoro or Brawijaya forces would be followed. So the 
main mobilisers of the killing squads in most rural areas were not military 
men. Nor were they university students, for the number of higher-education 
institutions with networks into the countryside was still small. Rather, and 
not surprisingly, it was Ansor and the kyais of the countryside, who mobilised 
their pesantren students in ways seen previously in the Revolution and at the 
time of the 1948 Madiun incident.
Across Central and East Java, as well as elsewhere in Indonesia, there 
flowed together a potent conjunction of piety, profound faith, mystical 
doctrines, superstition, hatred, ignorance, magical mumbo-jumbo, villainy 
and primitive bloodlust. Pamphlets, rumours and stereotyped accusations 
abounded. It was widely believed that the Communists had prepared 
instruments to gouge out the eyes of their enemies and wells into which they 
would throw the bodies of murdered kyais.89 It was thought that the houses 
of NU and PNI people in Yogyakarta (and no doubt elsewhere) would be 
identified by secret marks for attack by Communists, so families inspected the 
perimeter of their houses each morning for the tell-tale signs of impending 
assault.90 For the santri side, it appeared to be a matter of kill or be killed.
An NU Banser activist in the Salatiga area later recalled, 
At that time ‘in-group feeling’ was very strong. So the issue of santri vs. 
abangan, or NU and Masyumi against the Communists, was very strong. 
This feeling was accompanied by very strong inter-group conflicts at local 
level. At that time, conflict at the national level encountered sentiments 
flowing at the local level. In fact, even more than that, two choices 
appeared: to kill or be killed.91
NU’s Ansor and its militia wing Banser took leading roles in the 
killings, although other Islamic organisations, notably Muhammadiyah, 
also proclaimed the extermination of the PKI a religious duty tantamount 
to Holy War.92 Kyais were not unanimous in their own fatwas about the 
fate that awaited the Communists, but most judged that killing them was 
89 Sulistyo, Palu arit di lading tebu, p. 175.
90 Rumekso Setyadi and Saiful H. Shodiq, ‘Dari ksatria menjadi paria: Degradasi 
peran dan pembunuhan politik sistematik; Catatan awal peristiwa ‘65/’66 di 
Jogjakarta’, Tashwirul Afkar: Jurnal refleksi pemikiran keagamaan & kebudayaan no. 15 
(2003), pp. 117–20. When I first lived in Yogyakarta in 1969, such stories were still 
in the minds of local people.
91 Interview of 2006 quoted in Singgih Nugroho, Menyintas dan menyeberang, p. 77.
92 See Boland, Struggle of Islam, p. 146, for a Muhammadiyah declaration of 
November 1965.
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allowed, even a religious duty. The Communist enemies were seen as rebels 
against a legitimate government and atheistic kafirs. This had the consequence 
that some escaped being murdered by pronouncing the Shahada, thereby 
‘converting’ to Islam from their previously abangan nominal Muslim status 
and making it more difficult for santris to proceed with murdering them, 
confirming that this was essentially a religious conflict in the eyes of the 
santri activists. But this did not always work. Some abangan were in fact able 
to recite the Shahada¸ just as nominal adherents of other religious systems 
can often mumble the basic ritual phrases of their cultural community, so 
people accused of association with PKI who pronounced the Shahada were 
often killed anyway. At least one kyai said that faith was a private matter 
between the believer and God: Communists who were rebels against the 
legitimate Indonesian government could be killed whether or not they were 
Muslims, but anyone who had not rebelled, whether or not a kafir, should 
be left alone:93 we should not imagine that many lives were saved through 
this subtle distinction. There were, however, some kyais who tried to stop 
the killing or offered protection to Communists, but they were few and they 
had little overall impact.94 There were even a few cases of Ansor leaders 
trying to protect people associated with PKI,95 but this was far from the 
norm. Abangan areas in Gunung Kidul came under much suspicion at this 
stage. In the village of Kajar, studied by Ann Dunham, the headman later 
recalled how an army sergeant and Ansor activists repeatedly visited and 
demanded the names of Communists to be taken away for killing, but they 
were assured that there were no PKI villagers there and ‘there was relatively 
little loss of life’.96 Near Pemalang on the north coast, the bloody santri-
abangan violence of 1965–6 gave the people of one village an opportunity to 
carry out an unrelated act of revenge, killing a hated headman in a manner 
reminiscent of the ‘people’s sovereignty’ actions of the Revolution. But PKI 
was of course the main target of an alliance there between the local military 
and two pesantrens, with the killing again spearheaded by Ansor. Before this 
93 Sulistyo, Palu arit di lading tebu, p. 184.
94 Ibid., p. 176; Fealy, ‘Ulama and politics’, p. 255; discussion with Ky. H. Muslim 
Imampura (Mbah Lim), at Pondok Pesantren al-Muttaqien Pancasila Sakti, Karang 
Anom, Klaten, 27 March 2006.
95 Kenneth R. Young, ‘Local and national influences in the violence of 1965’, in 
Cribb, Indonesian killings, p. 83; Feillard, Islam et armée, p. 66; ‘Report from East 
Java’, p. 145. 
96 S. Ann Dunham, Surviving against the odds: Village industry in Indonesia (ed. and 
preface Alice G. Dewey and Nancy I. Cooper; foreword Maya Soetoro-Ng; afterword 
Robert W. Hefner; Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2009), p. 117.
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time, PNI and PKI had been the prominent political forces in the area, but 
by the time the killings subsided in 1966 NU was — and would long remain 
— the dominant political force.97
In their pesantrens, kyais had long taught a combination of martial 
arts and spiritual disciplines — including progressively deeper initiation 
into the mysteries of the Sufi tarekats — two aspects that came together 
in ilmu kanuragan, the science of invulnerability. This ilmu was — and still 
is — widely believed. Amulets (jimat) and magically powerful formulae 
were given out by spiritually advanced kyais to their followers. Again, some 
declared that anyone who died in killing Communists would go straight to 
heaven, as happens with a martyr who falls in Holy War.
The killing in most cases was an easy affair. In a way that we may find 
incredible, PKI activists rarely resisted their fate. A side of politics that had 
taken the offensive in the aksi sepihak campaign now seemed to accept that 
it was defeated and that death awaited its followers. Only a few PKI figures 
or followers were able to escape, for in village Java it was (and is) almost 
impossible to move into a new area without being known. The killers had 
little need for firearms. They preferred their own weapons: krisses, swords, 
sickles and other farming implements. And, of course, their supernaturally 
confirmed invulnerability. In one of the few cases of PKI resistance, the 
Communists sought to defend themselves with bows and arrows.98 PKI 
activists and followers — and undoubtedly many people who just found 
themselves in the wrong group at the wrong time — were hacked, stabbed 
and beaten to death. Beheading became a common practice. In Kediri, many 
victims were beheaded on the banks of the Brantas River and their bodies 
then thrown into the water. Banser members were also injured and killed in 
some clashes,99 but there is no doubt that the deaths were overwhelmingly 
on the abangan PKI-affiliated side.
General Soemitro later reflected on what he saw when he arrived in 
Surabaya to take command of the Brawijaya Division in mid-1966 with 
orders, inter alia, to see to the destruction of PKI but to stop the insane 
mass slaughter. As the Brantas flowed through the city towards its mouth, 
Soemitro saw it ‘so full of bodies floating along, with others caught in the 
97 Frans Hüsken, ‘Continuity and change in local politics: The village administration 
and control of land and labor’, in Hiroyoshi Kani, Frans Hüsken and Djoko Suryo 
(eds), Beneath the smoke of the sugar-mill: Javanese coastal communities during the 
twentieth century (Yogyakarta: AKATIGA and Gadjah Mada University Press, 2001), 
pp. 240–1, 250.
98 Sulistyo, Palu arit di lading tebu, pp. 181–2.
99 Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, ‘Religion, politics and violence’; see also ‘Report from East Java’.
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branches of trees that had fallen in at the river’s edge’.100 A November 
1965 Indonesian intelligence report also tells of ‘many headless corpses 
… sprawling in the rivers and along the river banks’ in Mojokerto. ‘The 
Indonesian Red Cross took them away. On Sunday there were approximately 
162 corpses, and on Monday, 102.’101 
Soemitro, like everyone else so far as we can know, saw supernatural 
powers involved in these dreadful events. But his supernatural reference-
points were not those of the santris. Instead he thought in terms of 
indigenous Javanese ideas centring on the figure after whom the Brawijaya 
Division was named — the last pre-Islamic king of Java, Brawijaya of 
Majapahit, who was overthrown by Muslim conquerors but then reappeared 
(according to many Javanese) as the powerful and anti-Islamic spirit Sunan 
Lawu. Although he was at that time ‘not deeply knowledgeable of the 
Javanese kebatinan (mystical faith)’ and ‘was still raw’, Soemitro went to 
the ‘Brawijaya ruins’ to meditate ‘and to seek protection and direction from 
Almighty God. … [and] permission from Brawijaya to serve him.’102 Such 
kebatinan ideas were widely spread among Javanese military men, portending 
differences with santris that would only become manifest after 1966. 
Soemitro wanted to serve God and Brawijaya and the santris wanted to serve 
God and their kyais but, for the time being, both were mainly interested in 
slaughtering Communists. 
Young santri killers perceived supernatural forces at work in the 
bloodletting and some evidently regarded these murders as a rite de passage 
to manhood. They sometimes dismembered bodies and carried off fingers, 
ears, or genitals as tokens of their manly courage, or engaged in other ritual 
practices including tasting the blood of the dead as a means of ensuring that 
they would not be pursued by their victims’ ghosts. Kyais condemned such 
practices, for they were all contrary to Islamic teachings.103 Ky. H. Mahrus 
Aly, the senior kyai of pesantren Lirboyo in Kediri, reportedly ruled that 
respect should be shown to Communists who were being killed. Thus, their 
100 Ramadhan K.H., Soemitro, former commander of Indonesian security apparatus: Best 
selling memoirs ( Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996), p. 114. See also ibid., p. 101: 
‘Every day large numbers of bodies were spotted floating in the local waterways.’
101 ‘Report from East Java’, p. 141
102 Ramadhan, Soemitro, pp. 102–3. The term ‘Brawijaya ruins’ evidently refers to the 
old Majapahit site at Trawulan. For further discussion of the Brawijaya legends, see 
Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java, p. 134; and idem, Polarising Javanese society (see the 
indexed references to Brawijaya).
103 Sulistyo, Palu arit di lading tebu, p. 205, citing later interviews.
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deaths should be delivered with a sharp knife or sword, his reasoning resting 
on analogy with Islamic rules for the slaughtering of animals.104
No one knows how many people were slaughtered in this orgy of 
murder, which continued to August 1966, for no one counted. Only as the 
killings began to subside in mid-1966 was it more likely that bodies would 
even be buried. Some scholars have tried to come up with a total number 
for the dead, but they lack the information on which a reliable calculation 
must rest. There is a general consensus that the dead across Indonesia — and 
that means mostly in Central Java, East Java and Bali — amounted to 
somewhere between half a million and two million. Most analysts probably 
regard the half-million figure as more likely simply because it is lower, but 
there is in fact no data to give this consensus any real substance. While such 
a number is below the scale of the murderous Pol Pot regime in Cambodia 
and far below that of the Holocaust of Nazi Germany, Indonesia’s killings 
still rank as one of the worst cases of mass slaughter of the 20th century. This 
bloodletting took a toll across Javanese society — the dead themselves; the 
distress, poverty, disempowerment and discrimination suffered by survivors 
and victims’ descendants; the tens of thousands who were imprisoned without 
trial for many years; the burden of guilt on the part of many killers — and 
the sanguinary pride on the part of many others. The legacies of this killing 
still resonate amongst Javanese.105
Among many santris at the time, there was a belief that the utter 
physical annihilation of the Communists was a decisive watershed. Santris 
found themselves cooperating and sharing interests with the military and 
the emerging New Order regime led by Soeharto. PKI’s destruction, they 
imagined, meant the removal of the main barrier to ongoing Islamisation. 
At last Islam would take its proper place among Javanese and in Indonesian 
society more broadly. At last its beliefs and practices could dominate society, 
Indonesia could become a society shaped by God’s book and his Messenger, 
and nothing would now stand in the way of progress towards an Islamic state 
and society. They were wrong.
104 Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, ‘Religion, politics and violence’, pp. 431–2. For a more detailed 
account of ‘the central role of Lirboyo in the annihilation of PKI’, see Tim Pengelola 
Majalah Misykat, Gus Maksum: Sosok & kiprahnya (prologue Ali Maschan Moesa; 
Kediri: Pondok Pesantren Lirboyo Kediri, 2004), pp. 57–68.
105 In 2000, the leadership of Ansor and Banser in Yogyakarta apologised to the 
families of victims of the killings, saying that ‘at that time, the people of NU, in 
particular Banser, were just used by and made instruments of the military’. Banser 
than assisted in the reopening of a mass grave of victims in Boyolali. Hairus Salim, 
Kelompok paramiliter NU (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004), pp. 62–3.
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c h a p te r  5
The totalitarian experiment (I): 
Kebatinan, Christian and 
government competition and the 
end of aliran politics, 1966–80s
The political regime that developed in the second half of the 1960s was 
dubbed the ‘New Order’ by its leader, General Soeharto.1 It aspired to 
totalitarian control through condominium by a dominant military — above 
all the army — and a collaborating civilian bureaucracy, which together 
would control the society to its very roots. In aspiring to control rather than 
to mobilise the populace, the New Order resembled the colonial order, but 
the latter had never attempted the degree of social control that Soeharto 
and his colleagues eventually sought. Through such control, they hoped, the 
threat of Communism could be completely uprooted. Looking back from the 
early 21st century, we may be tempted to think of Soeharto’s New Order as 
a monolithic authoritarian state, but it was not that, except in aspiration. In 
its first years, it was quite unstable and many an observer (notably political 
scientists) expected it not to last long. This was paralleled by those (notably 
economists) who, in its last years, expected it to go on forever.
The regime faced enormous challenges at its start. Indonesia was a 
regional pariah because of its previous radicalism and armed hostility against 
116
1 An overview of the period may be found in Ricklefs, History of modern Indonesia, 
with references to the major scholarly works in the readings listed for Chapters 
21–2.
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Malaysia, and an economic ‘basket case’. There were real possibilities of a 
violent political backlash by Sukarno supporters. Runaway inflation, political 
uncertainty, military brutality and social instability were part of the common 
daily experiences of Indonesians. Soeharto’s government quickly brought 
‘Confrontation’ with Malaysia to an end and restored relations with the ‘Free 
World’ side of international politics. The Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) was created in August 1967, its main initial purpose 
being the rehabilitation of Indonesia as a responsible regional neighbour. 
Purges of the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly, the military 
and the bureaucracy tossed out — and frequently imprisoned without trial 
— anyone who might be suspected of pro-PKI sympathies. ‘Left PNI’ 
persons also came under suspicion. Over many months, a more loyal military 
and bureaucracy were thus constructed. The Soeharto regime achieved a 
remarkably rapid turnaround in the nation’s affairs. Inflation was brought 
down from over 600 per cent in 1966 to about 10 per cent in 1969. The 
government could then begin its programme of economic development.
Muslim Modernist politicians soon learned that the destruction of 
PKI and the army-Islamic alliance that had played a central role in that 
destruction would not, in fact, make it possible to revive Masyumi, even 
under another name. A party led by Modernists called Parmusi (Partai 
Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslims’ Party) was created in 1968. In 
that year’s Consultative Assembly session, Parmusi and NU both urged that 
a curiosity of constitutional history called the Jakarta Charter — which in 
the eyes of some obliged the state to impose Islamic law on all confessed 
Muslims — should be recognised as having the force of law.2 The proposal 
was defeated. The government spotted the reviving potential for Modernist 
Islamist trouble-making, which for the regime revived the spectres of Darul 
Islam and Masyumi’s support for the late 1950s Sumatran rebellion. When 
former Masyumi leaders — but not Natsir — were elected to the leadership 
2 The Jakarta Charter was a compromise proposed during the drafting of the 1945 
constitution. It declared that the state was based upon belief in God, but ‘with the 
obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law (syari’at)’. This was not 
adopted in 1945 and became irrelevant with the adoption of the interim constitution 
of 1950. But it again arose as an issue surrounding the reintroduction of the 1945 
constitution in 1959 as the constitutional basis of Guided Democracy. On this, see 
Daniel S. Lev, The transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian politics, 1957–1959 
(Ithaca, NY: Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 
1966), pp. 263–77. The 1945 constitution has remained in force ever since, unchanged 
until it underwent a series of amendments after the fall of Soeharto.
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of the party later that year, the government intervened and left Parmusi 
effectively leaderless for two years. The regime would in fact shortly act to 
emasculate all surviving political parties.
Islamic political activists’ frustrations with the regime thus arose early 
and were well-founded. In no small part this frustration arose from their 
recognition that Soeharto’s growing personal domination of the political scene 
brought with it a style of spirituality greatly at variance with their own.
Soeharto’s spirituality
General Soeharto — who was declared Acting President of Indonesia in 
1967 and substantive President in 1968 — was truly a son of rural Java. 
He was born in 1921 in Central Java,3 but there is uncertainty about his 
parentage. Various romantic rumours arose, including that he was secretly 
descended from Yogyakarta royalty. Elson concludes that ‘he was the 
illegitimate child of a well-placed villager … or someone of some means who 
might come in continuing contact with villagers. … From the age of about 
8 … he joined the family of a lower Javanese official living in a town’,4 the 
latter being Wuryantoro in the area of Wonogiri, in the mountainous area 
south of Surakarta. Soeharto also came to know and was much influenced by 
a local mystic and healer named Kyai Daryatmo. Here Soeharto encountered 
that village world thick with secret doctrines and supernatural powers, allied 
to Traditionalist Islam. He went on to formal schooling in a Muhammadiyah 
junior high school5 in Yogyakarta, which he left in 1939.
After 1965, any Islamic activists not already aware of Soeharto’s 
personal beliefs soon learned that they were a long way from Islamic 
orthodoxy. Among his spiritual gurus in adulthood, two were of particular 
importance: his former Diponegoro Division comrade General Soedjono 
Hoemardani6 and Soediyat Prawirokoesoemo, known with the Javanese titles 
3 The best biography published so far is R.E. Elson, Suharto: A political biography. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). This does not, however, give much 
attention to Soeharto’s spirituality.
4 Ibid., p. 5.
5 This was at the level of MULO, which stood for Meer uitgebreid lager onderwijs 
(more extended lower education), a sort of junior high.
6 Soedjono Hoemardani was also the founder of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies in Jakarta, a major New Order think-tank. He was slightly 
older than Soeharto, having been born in Surakarta in 1919; O.G. Roeder, Who’s who 
in Indonesia: Biographies of prominent Indonesian personalities in all fields (Djakarta: 
Gunung Agung, 1971), p. 143.
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for a spiritually advanced person as Empu Rama Diyat. In his quite arrogant, 
but dull, memoirs written in the late 1980s, Soeharto dismissed Soedjono’s 
spiritual influence on him, saying that he knew more about kebatinan (i.e., 
Javanese spiritualism) than Soedjono.
Regarding Soedjono Hoemardani, people have been heard to speak as 
if he knows more than I about kebatinan. Even though Djono himself 
usually sungkem [paid obeisance] to me. He regarded me as the elder and 
more knowledgeable in the science of kebatinan. So anyone who reckons 
that Djono was my kebatinan guru is nuts. Such an allegation is false. 
Soedjono more often asked me than I asked him about the science of 
kebatinan. He himself once said, ‘I am a student of Pak Harto’.7
Rama Diyat presided over an annual ritual at the site called Jambe 
Pitu, on Mount Selok near Cilacap on the south coast of Java. There is 
conflicting evidence as to whether, after becoming President, Soeharto 
continued to attend these ceremonies or merely sent emissaries on his 
behalf.8 These occasions took place in the first month of the Javanese 
lunisolar year, beginning with a ritual raising of the national flag and then 
proceeding to an all-night session in which Rama Diyat gave spiritual 
teachings and predictions for the coming year. The language throughout was 
Javanese, but with the occasional Indonesian key word, such as pembangunan 
(development) and kebudayaan (culture). Rama Diyat described his teachings 
as ‘Ilmu Kebatinan Tanggap-Warso saha Napak-Tilas’ (the inward science 
of attending to the year and the traces of the past) and wrote, ‘Based on 
understanding of Tanggap-Warso we will always remember especially the 
7 Soeharto, Pikiran, ucapan dan tindakan saya: Otobiografi (as told to G. Dwipa-
yana and Ramadhan K.H.; Jakarta: PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989), pp. 
441–2.
8 See George Quinn, ‘National legitimacy through a regional prism: Local pilgrimage 
and Indonesia’s Javanese Presidents’, in Minako Sakai, Glenn Banks and J.H. Walker 
(eds), The politics of the periphery in Indonesia (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), pp. 
181–4. According to Arwan Tuti Artha, Dunia spiritual Soeharto: Menelusuri laku 
ritual, tempat-tempat dan guru spiritualnya (Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2007), p. 
114, at Jambe Pitu there is displayed a photograph of Soeharto with Rama Diyat. 
This book depicts Soeharto as a product and at the same time a master of Javanese 
mysticism, but unfortunately the foundations of this discussion are rather thin. The 
author, a journalist and creative writer, relies largely on secondary sources and did not 
interview Soeharto (who was still alive at the time). He did, however, speak to some 
relevant guardians (juru kunci) of sacred sites and the book has useful photographs 
of several of the spiritual sites associated with Soeharto.
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originality of Javanese culture’.9 Talk of an original Javanese culture was, at 
this time, code clearly implying the non-originality of Islam.
We may take the Jambe Pitu ritual on 24–25 November 1979 as an 
example. It opened with a pre-Islamic invocation in ‘Kawi’ using the Hindu 
sacred syllable ‘Om’, and then proceeded to a more Islamic invocation that 
posited an identification of Rama Diyat with the Prophet Muhammad, the 
kind of idea that is found in Javanese mystical traditions10 but anathema to 
orthodox Muslims:
Exalted thoughts and deeds serve as the foundation to restore culture, 
in the midst of Development, both outer and inner.
OM! Let us analyse the origins of being, applying the one place of 
spells [?].
I act in the role of the Bloom of God’s emissary; my nature is that of 
Muhammad; my actions are the doings of Faith.11
The teachings that followed emphasised the originality of Javanese culture 
and the need to preserve those ‘exalted thoughts and deeds’ upon which it 
rested. The followers of [world] religions and the influence of ‘foreign culture’ 
were blamed for causing conflict among Indonesians.12
Soeharto’s own spiritual maxims were gathered together in a privately 
printed and distributed book, the dedication of which is in his hand and 
9 The proceedings at Jambe Pitu were recorded in privately printed booklets of 
around 50–60 pages, of which I have photocopies of the versions for 1979 and 1980. 
I do not know how widely these booklets were distributed. The quotation here is 
from the preface (p. 9) in the 1979 booklet, dated 25 November 1979 and signed 
‘Sesepuh/Pengayom R.P. Soediyat Prawirokoesoemo’. The 1980 booklet has the same 
text, dated 10 November 1980.
10 On these traditions, see P.J. Zoemulder, Pantheism and monism in Javanese suluk 
literature: Islamic and Indian mysticism in an Indonesian setting (ed. and transl. M.C. 
Ricklefs; KITLV translation series 24; Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995), esp. pp. 209 
et seqq.
11 This quote is from p. 17 of the 1979 Jambe Pitu booklet. The translation is 
conjectural in parts. Such invocations were meant as much to create an atmosphere of 
mysterious powers as to convey specific meanings. Kawi is a term used for language 
meant to be Old Javanese, but in modern practice this is often a self-consciously 
literary style of Javanese which is in fact not — or not wholly — Old Javanese. The 
original text (in its non-scholarly spellings) reads, Budi pakarti luhur pinongko dasar 
mulyakaken kebudayaan, salebeting Pembangunan lahir soho batin. Hong wilaheng 
purwaning sido, matek sawiji dunung aji. Ingsun makarti pakartining Sari utusaning 
Pangeran, sipatku Mohammad, pakartiku lakuning Iman.
12 1979 Jambe Pitu booklet, pp. 19–20.
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dated 1986. In this dedication, he said, ‘I give this book to my children as 
a guide in life’. Despite its Indonesian title Butir-butir budaya Jawa (seeds 
of Javanese culture), the text is in Javanese (in Javanese script) accompanied 
by an Indonesian translation and a (frequently poor) English translation.13 
The sources for the aphorisms are listed at the back of the volume; these 
are Javanese works mainly associated with the great literati of Surakarta of 
the 18th and 19th centuries. These books teach the old Mystic Synthesis 
of Islamic Java: Serat Centhini (written at the behest of the Crown Prince 
of Surakarta in the early 19th century), Serat Cipta Ening (taken from the 
Arjunawiwaha), Serat Dewa Ruci, works by Ronggawarsita (the most famous 
of the 19th-century Surakarta writers) including Serat Jaka Lodhang and 
Serat Kalatidha, the prophecies of Jayabaya (regarded as the thoughts of a 
12th-century king of Kediri), Serat Nitisastra, Serat Tridharma ascribed to 
Mangkunagara I, Serat Wedhatama by Mangkunagara IV, and Serat Wulangreh 
by Pakubuwana IV.
The maxims chosen by Soeharto as ‘a guide in life’ for his children 
included ideas entirely unacceptable to orthodox Muslims. For example:
Where is the location of God? God is also within you, but do not dare 
to admit that you are God.
God can take shape, but the shape God takes is not God.
Humankind is from the being (dat) of God and thus has also the 
qualities (sipat) of God.14
Stones and wood have the being (dat) of God but are not God.
Humankind can be occupied by the being (dat) of God, but do not 
embrace the idea that humankind can be called God.
Whosoever dares to change things as they are, that is not just any person, 
but is to be regarded as an emissary (utusan) of God.15
13 This work is a bibliographic nightmare with regard to its date. The photocopy that 
I have (205 pp.) is of a version put together by Soeharto’s daughter Siti Hardiyanti 
Rukmana (commonly known as Tutut) on the occasion of the Soehartos’ 40th 
wedding anniversary in December 1987, but with the original dedication by Soeharto 
of June 1986 and a further handwritten dedication (with a signature that is not clear 
to me, but is not Soeharto’s) dated 1993. A note on p. 197 says that its compilation 
was completed in 1983 on the occasion of eight windus (eight-year cycles) in the 
Javanese calendar (since Soeharto’s birth in 1921). I am grateful to Dr Syafi‘i Anwar 
for providing me with this copy. 
14 From Arabic dhat (being, essence) and sifa (attribute). Along with the Arabic term 
asma (names), these are crucial terms in Javanese Islamic mysticism, which is full of 
speculations about the essence, attributes and names of God.
15 These examples are from pp. 2, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16 of the book described in n13.
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The aphorisms quoted above contradicted central Sunni Islamic 
doctrines. Islam posits that God created the world but does not enter into 
it; his transcendence and unity are absolute. It also states that Muhammad 
was the last of the Prophets sent to humankind. For orthodox Muslims, 
therefore, there is no room for the idea that God might be ‘within you’, 
whether or not it was a secret doctrine that one should not admit to. Nor can 
humankind ‘be occupied by the being of God’, or can there be an ‘emissary of 
God’ subsequent to the Prophet Muhammad, however much such a person 
might ‘dare to change things’ (as, indeed, Soeharto himself could be said to 
have done). Yet such ideas are unremarkable within the traditions of Javanese 
mysticism of both the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods. They were — and are 
— also common among adherents of modern kebatinan movements, which 
we will consider below.
Despite pushing the boundaries of orthodoxy, however, such ideas 
did have resonance in the Traditionalist community with its commitment 
to Sufism. In the mid-1960s, kyais were — as indeed they often are now 
— regarded as having superhuman powers. They may master ilmu laduni, 
that mystical knowledge that God can impart directly to a Sufi practitioner. 
Kyais may thus directly master various Islamic sciences without the need 
actually to study them, have the gift of prophecy, and be able to cure the sick 
and confer invulnerability. The powers of a kyai indeed extend beyond his 
death and thus constitute a crucial element in the continuity of Sufi orders 
and the cults of saints.16 In 2008, the new NU museum in Surabaya was 
displaying an armband and a carved stone used to confer invulnerability 
when fighting PKI in 1966.17 In Banyuwangi, the very ability to read the 
Qur’an is thought to be associated with supernatural powers, sometimes 
with negative results if the person is thought to be a sorcerer and on those 
16 See Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi pesantren: Studi tentang pandangan hidup kyai 
( Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982), p. 69; Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Pesantren and kitab kuning: 
Continuity and change in a tradition of religious learning’, in Ethnologica Bernensia 
4/1994: Texts from the islands (Bern: Institut für Ethnologie, 1994), p. 124; Suzaina 
Abdul Kadir, ‘Traditional Islamic society and the state in Indonesia: The Nahdlatul 
Ulama, political accommodation and the preservation of autonomy’ (PhD thesis, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1999), pp. 95–7.
17 I visited the museum on 23 October 2008. On a previous visit, the museum was 
also displaying a stone in which indentations in the shape of splayed fingers could be 
seen, where a particularly powerful kyai was said to have touched it. I was told that 
it was no longer displayed because the owner of the stone had fallen ill in its absence 
and had therefore taken it back, implying that it was the absence of this powerful 
stone that had caused his illness.
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grounds is attacked, even killed, by other villagers.18 These are not just ideas 
held by rustics unfamiliar with the urban and modern worlds. In 1995, NU’s 
leader Ky. H. Abdurrahman Wahid — a man deeply imbued with esoteric 
spiritual ideas as well as a well-travelled and sophisticated thinker and 
political operator — introduced me to his brother Hasyim Wahid as a Sufi 
with gifts of prophecy.19 
In 1977, Abdurrahman Wahid asserted that many kyais believed in the 
reality of the Goddess of the Southern Ocean (Ratu Kidul or Ni Lara Kidul). 
She is a major figure in Javanese legends, one of the most powerful spiritual 
forces in the minds of believers in old-fashioned Javanese spiritualism, 
and certainly not of Islamic origin. ‘There are’, Abdurrahman said, ‘many 
legends about successful kyais that were married to Ni Lara Kidul, not 
just princes’. He claimed that many kyais accepted that the Goddess was a 
divine being who lived in the Indian Ocean. Was this not heresy, I asked? 
He responded, 
OK, it’s heresy and it’s clearly in opposition to Islamic teachings, but 
according to the ulama, including my grandfather [Ky. H. Hasyim 
Asy‘ari], certain rules are not applied to those extraordinary beings, 
like the Imam Mahdi or the Ratu Adil: those people are not bound by 
ordinary rules. So they don’t want to reject those figures while in the 
meantime they just say that for us ordinary beings, human beings, we 
have to follow not them, but the rule of law.20
Abdurrahman also a provided a veneer of orthodoxy with regard to super-
natural amulets by saying that one could believe in them so long as one 
regarded them as tools by which God’s grace flowed to the Prophet, then to 
the saints, then to the gurus and thence to oneself.21
Such Traditionalist ideas were, and remain, as unacceptable to most 
Modernists as Soeharto’s quotations from classics of the Mystic Synthesis 
would have been. And for political reasons, as we will see below, NU found 
that even if its spirituality had overlaps with Soeharto’s, its relationship with 
the regime in its early years was hardly less problematic than that of the 
Modernists.
18 Andrew Beatty, Varieties of Javanese religion: An anthropological account (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 123 (Beatty’s fieldwork was done in 1991–3, 
1996–7).
19 Discussion with Abdurrahman Wahid and Hasyim Wahid, Jakarta, 14 Nov. 
1995.
20 Discussion with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 7 Aug. 1977.
21 Ibid.
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Soeharto’s choice of spiritual maxims was not of course distributed 
publicly, but there could hardly have been anyone who doubted that the 
new President was more sympathetic to kebatinan than to orthodox Islam. 
It was also notable that, in the early years of the New Order, several senior 
figures in the military, bureaucracy and elsewhere were Christians to a degree 
that overrepresented the Christian proportion of the population. While this 
mainly reflected the legacy of better education enjoyed by Christians across 
Indonesia, it supported Islamic leaders’ suspicions that the new regime 
was fundamentally unsympathetic to Islam. And NU, with its extensive 
networks in the rural countryside, represented a potential source of political 
competition for the regime, so it came under suspicion from the beginning, 
as we will see below.
Soeharto led a regime whose style reflected his own. It was, as Ruth 
McVey depicted it, abangan, secularist, modernising, corrupt, amoral 
and materialist. It thus distanced itself at the beginning from Islamic 
piety.22 One should not, however, imagine that this regime was either 
stable at the start or consistent in its policies.23 There were many twists 
and turns as the New Order sought its goal of dominating Indonesia. Its 
totalitarian aspirations were tempered at all times by the vast scale of the 
nation, its social complexity, the generally low level of competence of its 
administrative machinery, and bureaucratic and military discipline that 
had significant limits. Jakarta’s policy was often interpreted in some village 
in Java’s countryside not quite as Jakarta intended but rather as seemed 
appropriate to a local headman, a provincial governor, a military commander 
or the army sergeant who lived there. Indonesia was, in other words, 
saved from genuinely totalitarian rule by general incapacity and pervasive 
incompetence.
One might imagine that the regime’s sympathetic view of Javanese 
mystical ideas and its general abangan style would also incline it to favour 
old-fashioned Javanese art forms and local cults. Yet this was not at first 
the case in the New Order, for those art forms and cults were tainted with 
Communism.
22 Ruth McVey, ‘Faith as the outsider: Islam in Indonesian politics’, in James P. 
Piscatori (ed.), Islam in the political process (Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University 
Press in association with the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983), pp. 203, 
207–11, 219–21.
23 Cf. the observations by Robert Hefner in his Civil Islam: Muslims and democrati-
zation in Indonesia (Princeton, NJ, and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), 
p. 71.
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Abangan folk arts and cults in the early New Order
PKI had been quite successful in influencing folk art and using performances 
such as kethoprak, ludruk and reyog for propaganda purposes. We noted above 
Lekra’s 1961 claim that large numbers of kethoprak groups in Central Java 
and ludruk companies in East Java were affiliated with it. Because of this 
affiliation with PKI, many of these performing troupes suffered heavily in 
the arrests and killings of 1965–6. Thereafter, regime suspicions of these 
essentially lower-class art forms continued, for fear that they could facilitate 
a Communist revival. In this, the regime was at one with many religious 
leaders, who saw in these performances not only latent Communism but also 
hostile forces such as spirit possession and immoral conduct.
Reyog performances in Ponorogo reportedly came to a halt for nearly 
seven years and thereafter were subjected to a process of Islamisation.24 The 
art form had been heavily used by PKI — even though the Communists at 
times felt uncomfortable with the presence of transvestite performers, which 
seemed inconsistent with the Party’s claim to be an agent of modernity. 
In the mid-1970s PNI- and NU-affiliated reyog groups still existed but 
the form was in decline and transvestites were no longer acceptable, being 
inconsistent with the ‘present-day official concept of law and order’. They 
were banned from performing by some local governments in East Java, 
partly under pressure from santri activists. As the 1971 elections approached, 
however, reyog was used by Golkar (the regime’s political vehicle) to gain 
popularity.25 In Banyuwangi, the leaders of the local barong dance troupe in 
Beatty’s village ‘Bayu’ were arrested because of their leftist sympathies but 
then released. The troupe was, however, under suspicion and tainted with the 
charge of leftism, so was disbanded.26 In the same area, gandrung dancers 
inserted Islam-influenced tunes into their performances and thus fended off 
religious objections: saving their art from being abolished by Islamising it.27 
Based on his fieldwork in the Pasuruan highlands in 1978–80 and 1985, 
Hefner observed that tayuban dancing was ‘everywhere in decline’.28 Around 
24 Bisri Effendy, ‘Pengantar: Kesenian Indonesia, pertarungan antar kekuasaan’, in 
Kebijakan kebudayaan di masa orde baru: Laporan penelitian ( Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian 
dan Pengembangan Kemasyarakatan LIPI and The Ford Foundation, 2001), pp. 
663–5.
25 Kartomi, ‘Performance, music and meaning’, pp. 116–8.
26 Beatty, Varieties, pp. 80–1.
27 Chintya Novi Anoegrajekti, ‘Kesenian Using’, p. 815.
28 Robert W. Hefner, ‘Islamizing Java? Religion and politics in rural East Java’, 
Journal of Asian Studies vol. 46, no. 3 (Aug. 1987), p. 547.
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Blora, tayuban had flourished until 1965–6, but thereafter local authorities 
and Muslim activists pressed for its prohibition. This was usually on the 
grounds that it was an expensive extravagance and a venue for immorality, 
for drunkenness and prostitution were common. In Yogyakarta, tayuban 
was banned except for certain occasions, such as the annual bersih desa 
observances.29 Across Central and East Java one still encounters memories of 
such folk arts coming under combined political and religious pressure early in 
the New Order period. In some places, local Golkar officials or the military 
took over performing troupes, purged them of leftist actors and influences, 
and then employed them themselves. This was, for example, true of both 
kethoprak in East Java and ludruk in Yogyakarta.30
29 Amrih Widodo, ‘The stages of the state: Arts of the people and rites of hegemoni-
zation’, RIMA vol. 29 (Winter and Summer 1995), pp. 10–1.
30 Barbara Hatley, Javanese performances on an Indonesian stage: Contesting culture, 
embracing change (Singapore: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association 
with NUS Press, 2008), pp. 31–2. In the case of the Sapta Mandala kethoprak 
group set up by the Diponegoro Division in Yogyakarta, some actors who had been 
imprisoned because of links with PKI were allowed to perform again.
Illustration 9 Performance stage at the village Tutup Ngisor, 2005
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On the slopes of Central Java’s Mount Merapi, the village of Tutup 
Ngisor had avoided involvement with political parties and thereby managed 
to escape the unwelcome attentions of either religious or regime zealots. 
Artistic performances began there in the 1920s under the leadership of the 
village ancestor Rama Yasasudarma, once a court servant of the Mangku-
nagaran. Performing arts became central to village life. Various idiosyncratic 
taboos were observed, confirming the essentially spiritual grounding of these 
arts. The villagers would make no images of Semar, Dewa Ruci, Sang Hyang 
Wenang or Batara Guru because these are too elevated above humankind, 
for example; nor would they make the gunungan puppet in the wayang. 
During violence associated with the Madiun uprising of 1948, while there 
were killings in surrounding villages, Tutup Ngisor remained peaceful and 
the performances went on. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Tutup Ngisor 
put on its wayang topeng based on Panji stories, its wayang wong, ande-ande 
lumut, and Maulid Nabi performances but stayed resolutely clear of political 
parties. Thus the villagers escaped repression under the New Order. They 
were under scrutiny like all the rest of society and needed police permits to 
perform, but were given them. In the nearby village Sengi, however, the local 
arts had been dominated by Lekra and the village was unable to revive its 
arts during the whole of the New Order period.31
Local cults led by charismatic figures were a common phenomenon in 
Javanese history, but now these, too, came under suspicious scrutiny from 
a young, nervous, muscle-flexing New Order. The bloodiest suppression of 
such a movement took place in the mountainous region on the boundaries 
of Blora and Ngawi in 1966. A local holy man calling himself Mbah 
Suro gathered a large peasant following there. This appears to have been a 
revival of Saminist movement led in the early 20th century by Surantiko 
Samin, which rested on indigenous peasant ideas in which Islam played 
little or no role, and general resistance to any forms of outside authority.32 
31 Hairus Salim, ‘Pergumulan politik seni: Pengalaman komunitas Tutup Ngisor’, in 
Kebijakan kebudayaan di masa orde baru: Laporan penelitian ( Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian 
dan Pengembangan Kemasyarakatan LIPI and The Ford Foundation, 2001), pp. 
821–30. Yasasudarma’s dates are given as 1865–1990, making him an improbable 
125 years old at death.
32 The Saminist movement, which led to the colonial government arresting and 
exiling Surantiko Samin (?1859–1914) from Java, rested on a nativist Javanese 
religion that its adherents called elmu nabi Adam (the science of the prophet 
Adam). This stressed the importance of agricultural labour and sexuality, passive 
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The government, however, regarded this as a covert Communist revival, so 
sent in the army para-commandos. Mbah Suro and an uncertain number 
— evidently around 80 — of his followers were killed.33
A happier fate awaited a local cult in the area of Blitar although it, 
too, came under hostile scrutiny early in the New Order. This region was 
predominantly populated by poor abangan — classic recruiting ground for 
the PKI. In the 1955 elections in Blitar, 46.5 per cent of voters backed PKI 
and 17.3 per cent voted for PNI, with another 4.8 per cent backing other 
small abangan-oriented parties, for an abangan proportion of 68.5 per cent 
of the vote. The largest santri party was — it need hardly be said, in this 
predominantly rural area — NU, which won 26.8 per cent of Blitar votes, 
whereas Masyumi picked up a mere 2.3 per cent. Along with some votes 
for minor santri-oriented contestants, this made for a santri percentage of 
just 29.5 per cent of the vote.34 In 1968 there was discovered a genuine PKI 
underground remnant in southern Blitar. Some surviving leaders of PKI had 
gone into hiding there, but lost control of their clandestine followers and 
sympathisers, who began killing NU figures. After about 60 of these had 
been murdered, the government realised that it was facing a serious PKI 
remnant. The military crushed this organisation and arrested its leaders along 
with some 800 followers and then, on the basis of the intelligence gathered, 
proceeded to purge more PKI sympathisers from the military.35 Intensive 
Islamisation efforts followed in this region.
The movement of particular interest to us, centred on the village of 
Tugurejo in South Blitar, escaped accusations of Communism. Its history is 
emblematic of much else in village Java in the New Order period, and the 
resistance and the primacy of the nuclear family, and rejected the money economy, 
non-Saminist village structures and any form of external authority. It is discussed in 
Harry J. Benda and Lance Castles, ‘The Samin movement’, BKI vol. 125 (1969), no. 
2, pp. 207–40; J. Bijleveld, ‘De Saminbeweging’, Koloniaal Tijdschrift vol. 12 (1923), 
pp. 10–24; and Takashi Shiraishi, ‘Dangir’s testimony: Saminism reconsidered’, 
Indonesia no. 50 (Oct. 1990), pp. 95–120.
33 K.E. Ward, The 1971 election in Indonesia: An East Java case study (Clayton, Vic: 
Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Papers on Southeast Asia 
no. 2, 1974), p. 147. Soeharto. Pikiran, ucapan dan tindakan saya, p. 193, simply calls 
this ‘an attempted PKI revival’.
34 Raharjo Suwandi, A quest for justice: The millenary aspirations of a contemporary 
Javanese wali (VKI 182; Leiden: KITLV Press, 2000), p. 38.
35 Harold Crouch, The army and politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY, and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 227.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t128   128 6/20/2012   1:20:57 PM
Kebatinan, Christian and Government Competition, 1966–80s 129
superb study by Raharjo Suwandi enables us to observe the cult closely.36 
Here the wayang became a folk dance performance involving the people 
of Tugurejo and others from surrounding villages. The founder and leader 
was a local peasant called Embah Wali. In this area, near the south coast of 
Java, the Goddess of the Southern Ocean was a powerful spiritual force in 
the minds of villagers. Also powerful was the search for the just king (Ratu 
Adil), an idea that we have encountered above and one that has resonated 
throughout much of Javanese history. Embah Wali was probably born 
sometime in the early 1910s.37 In 1935 he began a series of wanderings 
around Java, followed by a time of ascetic disciplines back in his village. 
In 1940, he and his wife began living almost entirely naked. Such oddities 
of behavior, which might invite accusations of mental instability in other 
societies, in Java marked a person in touch with extraordinary powers.
Late in the Revolution, Embah Wali had a dream and thereupon 
asked the villagers to perform a wayang play. Imitating the sounds of 
gamelan instruments — for they had none — and with no actual puppets 
to work with, they proceeded to do so mimetically. Soon the villagers were 
making gamelan instruments of whatever they had to hand and performing 
wayang wong dances every night, which continued until 1954. The librettos 
all had to do with the search for the Ratu Adil. In 1955, Embah Wali 
suddenly reappeared fully dressed in black garb like an ordinary peasant — a 
mysterious event confirming in the eyes of villagers that he was anything but 
an ordinary peasant. His following, however, began to dwindle in the 1960s.
Embah Wali was thoroughly ordinary in his demeanor but was widely 
recognised by his followers as an extraordinary person — a kerene ratu, ‘king’s 
beggar’, who was unlike those who acted as if they were great but lacked 
true greatness. The movement focused on Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX (r. 
1939–88) of Yogyakarta as the true Ratu Adil of which Embah Wali declared 
himself the witness. His further ideas rested on wayang analogies — that 
humans relate to the divine as wayang puppets relate to the dhalang, that is, 
with no control of their lives themselves. Sexuality was also a key concept. 
36 This account rests on Raharjo Suwandi, Quest for justice. Raharjo calls the village 
‘Lively Rock’, a pseudonym for Tugurejo, in the Lodoyo district of Blitar. There are 
also two ethnographic films about this cult made by Raharjo Suwandi, James Fox and 
Patsy Asch, entitled In the play of life and Consulting Embah Wali.
37 See Raharjo Suwandi, Quest for justice, p. 59 n6, for a discussion of the probable 
date of birth. Like many Javanese, Embah Wali thought the conjunction of seven- 
and five-week days at his birth (which is essential information for divination) to be 
important, but not the year.
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Embah Wali divided reality into male and female, the former synonymous 
with life and giving, the latter with death and taking. He reinterpreted the 
phrase Gusti Allah (the lord God) ‘into a composition of two contradictory 
entities, namely Gusti, “Lord” which was understandably male, and Allah, 
which was reinterpreted as kalah, or “losing”, which was a female quality’. 
So Gusti Allah did not even refer to God in Embah Wali’s teachings.38 ‘The 
nature of the male was reducible to the nature of the male sexual organ,’ 
he taught, and ‘the vagina (female, earth) was only a place of origin and 
destination.’39 Such ideas rested on peasant concepts and experiences of life. 
They had no foundation in Islamic thought and were characteristic of many 
idiosyncratic cults that could be found across Java — and which would, in 
coming years, become the targets of Islamising movements.
Embah Wali behaved oddly in the weeks before the coup attempt of 
30 September 1965 in Jakarta, digging massive rubbish holes in the village, 
later interpreted by villagers as a prediction of the killings to come. On the 
night of the coup attempt he left his house and retired (he used the term 
ngungsi, to take refuge) to a small hut in the rice fields. Such oddities again 
confirmed his extraordinary status in the minds of villagers. He then suffered 
a stroke and was completely paralysed for two years. It was his isolation 
from society in this most troubled of times that probably saved Embah Wali 
from the fate of Mbah Suro in 1966. Because it was a strong base for PKI, 
southern Blitar indeed saw some of the worst bloodshed in 1965–6. Raharjo 
points out40 that Islamic activists put heavy pressure on locals to conform to 
more orthodox standards. The result was, inter alia, a backlash that produced 
widespread conversion to Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism (matters 
that we will consider below).
In 1970, Embah Wali had recovered from his paralysis and returned to 
the village, where his followers constructed a new house for him. He began 
to hold sessions on the veranda, in Javanese called the emper. This invited 
comparison with the sessions of the People’s Consultative Assembly in 
Jakarta, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR, pronounced em-pe-
er. So now Tugurejo was the national capital in microcosm and Embah Wali 
was its master. In the 1971 election campaign, he supported the government 
party Golkar. This was after he had gone to Jakarta where he stayed with one 
of his sons who was in the para-commandos. He visited the Jakarta office of 
38 Ibid., p. 90.
39 Ibid., pp. 87, 92.
40 Ibid., pp. 110–1.
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Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX and was given an election leaflet bearing the 
Sultan’s photo, which Embah Wali took as a charter from the Ratu Adil to 
support Golkar.
In 1978 when the government cracked down on student dissent and 
press criticism (discussed below), Embah Wali’s emper sessions were ordered 
to end lest they become a cover for PKI remnants to reassemble. Thereupon 
Embah Wali declared that one scenario (lakon, a term from the wayang) had 
ended and now life must determine the next. Some of his female followers, 
distressed at this, turned to the gamelan, which had not been used since 
1954, and again began to play and to dance. ‘From the outset, people sensed 
that this dancing was not normal dancing. Very soon symbolic meanings, as 
defined by Embah, were attached to the dancing. … Most saw Embah Wali 
as a prophet currently engaged in the great work of preparing the coming of 
a new era of justice, and they wanted to be party to that great work of prepa-
ration.’41 Within six months, some 600 people were attending the weekly 
dancing session, with the highest recorded attendance being over 900.
Also in 1978, Embah Wali led over 2,000 followers on a 50-bus joint 
pilgrimage to Yogyakarta to demonstrate their loyalty to their Ratu Adil, 
the Sultan. Embah Wali was also said to be consulting the Goddess of the 
Southern Ocean regarding a bridge that he was building in Tugurejo, to 
which messianic expectations were attached. It was opened in 1980 with 
hundreds of followers dancing wayang-style across it. Thereafter more 
dancing sessions were added to the weekly schedule, so that this curious 
dancing cult peaked in the early 1980s. One of the major contingents among 
the dancers came from a neighbouring village and followed an evidently 
anti-Islamic local faith, which they called agami Budha Jawi Wisnu (the 
Vishnuite Javanese Buddhist religion). They liked eating dog meat in part 
because Islamic law declared it haram.
In October 1988, Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX died.42 Embah Wali 
just closed the door of his house and marked the Sultan’s death in no other 
way. When Hamengkubuwana X (r. 1988–present) went on the hajj to Mecca 
shortly after his accession, Embah Wali announced that the Ratu Adil had 
gone. In May 1990, Embah Wali himself died. The dancing continued, but 
the decline that is inevitable when such a figure is lost soon became visible. 
His third son, the one who had been in the para-commandos, came home and 
41 Ibid., p. 123.
42 Ibid., pp. 175–6. Note that Raharjo wrongly gives 1987 as the year of the Sultan’s 
death.
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was elected head of the village, but he brought with him a formal bureaucratic 
style that did not suit everyone, and there was discord within the family.
Raharjo makes a crucial point which we will see applying more broadly 
to abangan affairs after 1965:
As a reaction to the doctrinal trend of the prevailing religious systems, 
there is a strong feeling in the group against formalized teachings. 
… Therefore, the chance for Embah’s philosophy and ideology to be 
systematized for propagation to a wider audience is slight. There are no 
cadres who can regenerate the ideology; all looked to Embah as the only 
source of understanding.43
Such an absence of institutionalisation was, and is, a cherished feature of 
abangan village life. We will see, however, that when the few institutions 
which supported abangan life — mainly the political parties PKI and PNI 
— were removed from the scene, the abangan side of Javanese society was 
left vulnerable and disadvantaged in the face of Islamisation projects.
Kebatinan under the early New Order
Soeharto’s personal inclinations towards kebatinan did not mean that ke-
batinan groups prospered under the New Order, for they, too, were suspected 
of PKI sympathies. There were multiple kebatinan groups that had become 
more formalised and organised through the 1950s and 1960s. In his hostile 
account of kebatinan published in 1973, Rahmat Subagya — a pseudonym 
for the Dutch Jesuit Jan Bakker — lists approximately 280 such groups across 
Indonesia.44 Some were quite large, such as Sumarah, Sapta Darma, Pangestu 
(all of them founded in the Surakarta and Yogyakarta area of Central Java) 
and — the most widespread of all — Subud.45 But most movements were 
43 Ibid., p. 204.
44 Rahmat Subagya (pseud. for Jan Bakker), Kepercayaan, kebatinan, kerohanian, 
kejiwaan dan agama (Yogyakarta: Penerbitan Yayasan Kanisius, 1976 [first published 
in 1973]), pp. 130–8.
45 On such movements, see especially Antoon Geels, Subud and the Javanese mystical 
tradition (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997); Harun Hadiwijono, Man in 
the present Javanese mysticism (Baarn: Bosch & Keuning, 1967); Suffridus de Jong, 
Een Javaanse levenshouding (Wageningen: H. Veenman & Zonen B.V., 1973); Paul 
Stange, ‘“Legitimate” mysticism in Indonesia’, Review of Indonesian and Malaysian 
Affairs vol. 20 (Summer 1986), pp. 76–117; Niels Mulder, Mysticism and everyday life 
in contemporary Java (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1978); and the work 
cited in the previous note. Subud is the only Javanese kebatinan movement that has 
become international; see its website at http://www.subud.org/.
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quite small and local. In 1955 seventy of these groups founded the All-
Indonesia Kebatinan Congress Body (Badan Kongres Kebatinan Seluruh 
Indonesia, BKKI) in Semarang. After 1965, however, many kebatinan groups 
were banned. According to de Jong, among 286 known groups in Central 
Java — of whom 177 were small and local — 54 were banned.46
In the tense atmosphere of the early New Order, many followers of 
kebatinan converted to major world religions to defend themselves against 
the charge of lacking a religion, which was tantamount to being accused of 
Communism. According to official statistics, in Surakarta in 1970 there were 
13 kebatinan groups registered with a total following of 15,068. The largest 
groups were Sapta Darma and Jiwa Hayu, each said to have 5,000 followers 
— the very roundness of the figure demonstrating it to be no more than 
an estimate. Pangestu was listed with 3582 members. The rest had between 
30 and 300 adherents.47 Other religious affiliation data from Surakarta, 
however, gives a different picture, suggesting much larger adherence to 
kebatinan or at least non-affiliation to recognised religious groups. These 
figures also suggest the scale of conversions to recognised world religions, 
as people sought refuge there.
Table 8 Religious affiliations in Surakarta, 1974–548
Year  Muslim Catholic Protestant Hindu Buddhist Confucian Other Total
1974 334,889 38,688 42,552 2395 3398 5980 39,396 467,298
1975 340,496 40,548 45,668 2178 3288 3960 19,879 456,032
Let us assume that the New Order’s statistical capacity by 1974–5 was 
reasonably reliable, a function both of the improvement of its bureaucracy 
and the intensity of its surveillance of the society. Let us also assume that 
the ‘other’ category in Table 8 (for which the census volumes offer no 
definition) can only mean kebatinan or other non-orthodox forms of belief.49 
These Surakarta figures thus give us a snapshot of extraordinary religious 
change. Between 1974 and 1975, 19,517 people disappeared from the ‘other’ 
46 De Jong, Javaanse levenshouding, pp. 11–2. See also Donald J. Porter, Managing pol-
itics and Islam in Indonesia (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), p. 64.
47 Sala dalam angka 1970: Terbatas (14 vols [Surakarta, 1972]; mimeo), vol. 6, p. 2.
48 Kantor Sensus dan Statistik Kotamadya Dati II Surakarta, Statistik Kotamadya 
Daerah Tingkat II Surakarta 1974–1975 ([Surakarta, 1977] mimeo), p. 60.
49 The number of Jews, Sikhs, Jains, Baha’is or followers of other minority faiths in 
Java is insignificant.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t133   133 6/20/2012   1:20:57 PM
134 Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java
category: 49.5 per cent of those listed in 1974. The figures suggest that they 
went roughly equally to Christianity and Islam. The Catholic and Protestant 
numbers together for 1974 are 81,240 and for 1975 they are 86,216, an 
increase of 4976. The Muslim numbers rose from 334,889 to 340,496, an 
increase of 5,607. Nearly 9,000 more of the ‘others’ just disappear from the 
statistics. Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism all declined, the last by 
2,020 people. The total population accounted for in 1975 was 11,266 less 
than in 1974, so the decline in the number of Hindus and Buddhists may 
not be significant, but the decline in Confucianism (an exclusively Chinese 
faith) probably is. The drop in ‘others’ certainly is. Seen as percentages, the 
significance of those changes is clear.
Table 9  Major religious affiliations in Surakarta as percentages of total
  population, 1974–550
Year  Muslim Christian Other Total
  (Catholic + 
  Protestant)
1974 71.7 17.4 8.4 97.5
1975 74.7 18.9 4.4 98.0
Thus, a city that had once had a wide variety of religious affiliations with 
a strong kebatinan presence was, by 1975, becoming a city largely divided 
between Muslims and Christians. The latter already represented nearly 19 per 
cent of the population, a figure reflecting the growth of Christianity among 
the Javanese after 1965 — a topic we will turn to shortly. Our immediate 
interest here, however, is in the decline of kebatinan.
It is possible that, as well as government suspicion and suppression 
and Islamic antipathy, there may have been internal psychological causes 
for the decline of kebatinan early in the New Order. The occult doctrines of 
kebatinan movements commonly include the idea that advanced practitioners 
acquire superhuman abilities, but not always for positive purposes. Niels 
Mulder observed in 1969–70 that ‘it is hard to draw the line between 
magical mysticism and the practice of pure kebatinan … Man can penetrate 
the cosmos and acquire power and inspiration from higher forces; he may 
also consciously relate to any of the lower cosmic beings … [and] … may 
50 Source as for Table 8.
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be led astray on his mystical journey’.51 Pangestu taught that practitioners 
represented God: ‘Outer and inner perfection are what enable us to carry out 
our task as people who are sent by God, to create prosperous tranquility in 
the society which needs this world to be well-ordered, calm, prosperous, and 
so on’.52 One of the country’s foremost experts and practitioners of Javanese-
style mysticism, Dr Abdullah Ciptoprawiro, commented in 1977, ‘In the 
Javanese community there are many persons who can come into contact 
with the spirits…. the spirit of Mount Lawu, the spirit of Mount Merapi, 
the spirit of the Southern Ocean which is a queen, the queen of the southern 
seas’. I asked whether someone who achieved ultimate insight (makrifat) 
thereby acquired supernatural powers. ‘Yes, indeed yes’, he replied. ‘He may 
heal persons, see the future, he may rise upwards, he may go to Mecca within 
one moment, he may walk on air, he may walk on water, and so on. Many 
miracles can be done.’53
In the wake of the horrific murders and arbitrary arrests of hundreds 
of thousands of Javanese — in a situation in which the world was manifestly 
not ‘well-ordered, calm, prosperous’ and kebatinan’s practitioners were 
demonstrating no miracles — kebatinan’s claim to be a true understanding of 
the temporal and spiritual worlds may simply have lost much of its credibility, 
and with it many followers. If one were seeking supernatural powers and 
spiritual protection in 1965–6, kebatinan simply did not look like a credible 
direction in which to turn. Based on research done 30 years later, Mudjahirin 
Thohir noted in the area of Jepara that after 1965 abangan people washed 
their hands of politics and ‘the Javanist experts (ahli kejawen) no longer dared 
serve the community’.54 This was not, of course, true everywhere and at all 
levels of Javanese society. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many youths 
in Surakarta were still studying with gurus who promised to confer both 
invulnerability and ultimate mystical insights.55 Undoubtedly the same was 
true across the Javanese-speaking world. It was so in Yogyakarta kampung 
life at that time. But there, youths’ claims to have mastered various forms 
of ngelmu — invulnerability, magic to attract women, and so on — were 
51 Mulder, Mysticism and everyday life, pp. 24, 33.
52 Quoted in de Jong, Javaanse levenshouding, p. 34
53 Interview with Dr Abdullah Ciptoprawiro, Jakarta, Aug. 1977. He was a 
psychiatrist by training and the former head of the navy’s medical service.
54 Mudjahirin Thohir, Orang Islam Jawa pesisiran (Semarang: FASindo, 2006), p. 254. 
His fieldwork was conducted in 1999–2002.
55 James T. Siegel, Solo in the New Order: Language and hierarchy in an Indonesian city 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 139.
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dismissed by the older generation. The latter said that the young lacked the 
self-control required really to master such supernatural capacities.56 However 
much young fellows sought the old ngelmu, in the face of government and 
religious pressure to follow a recognised world religion, the influence of 
a whole body of such indigenous speculation and spiritual practice was 
diminishing. Never again would nearly 40,000 people in Surakarta declare 
themselves to belong to some faith other than a major world religion.
One should not imagine, however, that kebatinan entirely lost its 
influence within the New Order context or that the initial regime hostility 
persisted. After the suppression of kebatinan groups regarded as Communist 
or sympathetic to Communism — a suppression welcomed by santri activists 
— the dominant kebatinan style of Soeharto and other senior Javanese in the 
regime had a predictable impact. In fact, in his book of 1978 — resting on 
fieldwork in 1969–70 in Yogyakarta — Niels Mulder already observed that 
‘politically, mysticism appears to advance steadily with much of the current 
military and administrative leadership firmly rooted in an abangan Javanese 
background’.57 Muslim leaders regarded kebatinan with loathing and by 
the early 1970s feared that the regime would accord it the official status of 
a religion (agama) under the Constitution — something which kebatinan 
movements had sought since 1957 — and thus encourage kebatinan’s 
growth and protect it from persecution.58 The village arts that had suffered 
so much in the immediate wake of 1965 also revived in some areas, as the 
New Order government found them useful as a tool of political propaganda, 
just as PKI had done. Muhammadiyah people in Kota Gede regarded 
kethoprak as a source of immorality, with its obscenities and its stories of 
— as Nakamura describes it — ‘rapes, abductions, conspiracies, betrayals, 
assassinations, sorceries [and] massacres’, with prostitution and gambling 
going on around the performances. Muhammadiyah leaders thus welcomed 
kethoprak’s precipitate decline with the destruction of PKI and Lekra, but 
were dismayed to discover that as the 1971 elections approached, Golkar 
was encouraging it again.59
56 Patrick Guinness, Kampung, Islam and state in urban Java (Singapore: Asian 
Studies Association of Australia in association with NUS Press, 2009), pp. 124–5.
57 Mulder, Mysticism and everyday life, p. 7.
58 See Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 169–71.
59 Mitsuo Nakamura, The crescent arises over the banyan tree: A study of the 
Muhammadiyah movement in a Central Javanese town (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada 
University Press, 1983), pp. 169–71.
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Many santris therefore continued to regard kebatinan as a serious threat 
to their Islamising agenda. In the case of many Modernists, this was also an 
agenda for greater rationality. The former Masyumi politician and Modernist 
thinker H. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara said in 1977 that, 
kebatinan in reality doesn’t believe in the real God, but they believe in a 
god which is created by their own thinking. … And so not only do they 
form a clear danger for true religious thinking and feeling, but they form 
also a danger for scientific development…. I fear especially the influence 
of the so-called kebatinan, because kebatinan members are people who 
are … far from scientific thinking.60
The fear of Communism masquerading as kebatinan was also in the minds 
of Modernists long after even many New Order regime leaders thought that 
risk to have been dealt with.61
Kebatinan’s social and political position was finally regulated in 1973. 
Islamic leaders resisted any idea of the government recognising these 
indigenous faiths as religions (agama), which would give them support and 
protection through the Ministry of Religion. In the face of implacable Islamic 
hostility, the government was obliged to compromise. The 1945 constitution 
guarantees the right of all citizens to worship according to their ‘religions’ 
(agama) and ‘beliefs’ (kepercayaan). The regime used this distinction to say 
that kebatinan groups should be regarded as ‘beliefs’ rather than ‘religions’ and 
thus belonged under the Ministry of Culture rather than that of Religion. 
This was an arrangement that Islamic leaders could live with, if grumpily. 
Kebatinan sects were watched over by a surveillance body called PAKEM, 
originally set up in 1954 under the Ministry of Religion. This name was an 
abbreviation for Peninjauan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat62 (Observation 
of People’s Belief Streams) but it was also a Javanese pun, for a pakem is 
a kind of handbook, particularly for briefly noting the content of wayang 
stories. In 1960 PAKEM was moved from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Religion to the Attorney General’s department. After 1973, kebatinan groups 
were thus not abolished, but they were not accepted as religions either, and 
they were subject to government surveillance. Soeharto’s own kebatinan style 
60 Interview with H. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Jakarta, 3 Aug. 1977.
61 Interview with H. Ir. Basit Wahid, Yogyakarta, 9 Aug. 1977. He was from 
the Faculty of Exact Sciences at Gadjah Mada University and a prominent local 
Modernist figure.
62 This and related matters are set out in a chronology of kebatinan in Rahmat 
Subagya, Kepercayaan, pp. 115–27.
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was a mixed blessing, for as the quotes from him above suggest, it is unlikely 
that Soeharto thought anyone else’s versions of kebatinan to be of comparable 
merit to his own.
The threat of kebatinan was a major issue for Islamic activists, but it 
was an old issue. The new issue was Christianisation, the scale of which 
startled santris in the wake of the violence of 1965–6. Just when they 
thought that Islam might at last have got rid of its major opponent — the 
Communist Party — Islamic organisations found themselves facing one 
of the highest rates — some claimed the highest rate — of conversion to 
Christianity in the world. Thus, to political frustration was added profound 
religio-social frustration.
Christianisation and other conversions away from Islam
Conversions by abangan away from nominal Muslim status were widespread 
in the early New Order and compounded the frustration and anger of many 
Islamic activists. For a time it even seemed possible that Java might become 
the only major area of the contemporary Islamic world where Islamisation 
was brought to a halt, perhaps even reversed. As Boland observed in the 
late 1960s, ‘After 1965 Muslims have more and more realised that the 
Islamisation of Indonesia would in fact mean the Islamisation of Java, and 
this was a question of now or never’.63
Conversions to Hinduism and Buddhism were significant in some areas, 
but of less significance overall than Christianisation and in some places not 
enduring, as Hindus and Buddhists later reconverted to Islam. Conversions 
to Christianity, on the other hand, produced a major and ongoing transfor-
mation of Javanese society. One of the driving forces in these conversions 
was animosity towards Islam among abangan who had previously supported 
or been sympathetic to PKI. Connected with this was widespread revulsion 
at the role of Islamic activists in the slaughters of 1965–6. There was a long-
standing pattern of whole families, hamlets and villages being either Muslim 
or Christian, with the latter in a small minority. After 1965, it was still true 
that conversions were often communal, but sometimes they were individual, 
so that villages, hamlets and even families became multi-religious. In 1969 an 
elderly court servant in Yogyakarta whom I worked with in the court library 
for many months — an elegant traditional gentleman beyond the squabbles 
of the young — told me that one of his sons was a Catholic and tried to 
63 Boland, Struggle of Islam, p. 191.
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persuade him to go to mass, while another was a devout Muslim and pressed 
him to join in ritual prayer; his response was to say to both that he was Java-
nese and, therefore, would they please not bother him about such matters.
We will briefly consider some examples of the Hinduisation story 
before discussing Christianisation. In turning to Hinduism, of course 
abangan Javanese could think of themselves as returning to something older, 
perhaps more authentically Javanese, than Islam. For kebatinan devotees, 
it was the easiest way to move to a recognised world religion. Moreover, 
the neighbouring island of Bali was almost entirely Hindu and thus a 
source of inspiration and support. The Parisada Hindu Dharma (Council 
for the Hindu Religion, est. 1959) was active in promoting more orthodox 
forms of Hinduism not only in Bali itself, but also where Hinduism was 
spreading; from 1968 it was affiliated with the regime party Golkar and 
thus insulated against attack.64 Early impressions were that conversion to 
Hinduism was, as Mulder put it, ‘phenomenal and sustained’.65 And indeed 
Hindu communities were reestablished among Javanese for the first time in 
several centuries. Yet this was not to prove as widespread or abiding as many 
observers expected at the time. In the 1971 census, some 168,000 Hindus 
were counted across Central and East Java and Yogyakarta — a significant 
figure in itself, but not even half of 1 per cent of the population of those 
areas. This increase was, however, concentrated in particular areas, particularly 
Gunung Kidul, Klaten, Boyolali and Banyuwangi.66
In southern Banyuwangi, just across the narrow straits from Bali, heavy 
pressure for deeper Islamisation after 1965 led to a backlash and large-scale 
conversions to Hinduism. A Hindu priest was brought in from Bali to serve 
these new believers. But by the 1990s reconversion to Islam was occurring. 
By 1992, reports Beatty, only a ‘handful’ of Hindus were left in one village; 
when one of them died, he was given a Muslim burial. Nevertheless, in a 
64 M.L. Lyon, ‘The Hindu revival in Java: Politics and religious identity’, in James 
J. Fox et al. (eds), Indonesia: Australian perspectives (Canberra: Research School of 
Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 1980), pp. 205–20; Freek L. 
Bakker, ‘Balinese Hinduism and the Indonesian state: Recent developments’, BKI 
vol. 153 (1997), no. 1, pp. 15–41. There is some confusion over the name of the 
national Hindu organisation: Bakker explains that it called itself Parisada Dharma 
Hindu Bali when set up in 1959, but in 1964 adopted Parisada Hindu Dharma to 
reflect the idea that Hinduism was not restricted to Bali.
65 Mulder, Mysticism and everyday life, p. 7.
66 Gavin W. Jones, ‘Religion and education in Indonesia’, Indonesia no. 22 (Oct. 
1976), p. 35 n35.
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sense there was a return to a pre-Islamic past in this area, with Balinese and 
East Javanese Hindus again in touch with each other. A grand new Hindu 
temple was opened on Mount Sumeru in 1992.67 North of Kediri, the period 
after 1965 saw the first conversions to Hinduism. A local person had gone to 
study Hinduism in Bali and brought the faith back to the village of Tanon, 
whose inhabitants were mostly peasant labourers. Christianity also came, not 
as a process of conversion, but rather as new people moved into the village. 
In 2004, 30 per cent of the village was Hindu, compared with 10 per cent 
Christian (mostly Catholics) and 60 per cent Muslim, plus one person who 
was Buddhist. Because of interreligious marriage there, many families had 
several religions within themselves.68
On the slopes of Mount Lawu near Surakarta, where are located the 
famous 15th-century Hindu temples Candhi Cetha and Candhi Sukuh, the 
village Milir had a head known for his supernatural abilities and contact with 
local spirits. He pressed for his beliefs to be recognised by the government 
as part of Hinduism so as to defend this local faith from pressure for greater 
Islamisation coming from the lowlands. At the time of his fieldwork in the 
mid-1980s, Joseph Errington observed how the electronically amplified 
call to prayer emanating from a government-sponsored mosque downhill 
could be heard clearly in Milir, and how Islamic activists were trying to 
abolish local spirit cults. Having successfully won government recognition 
as Hindus, however, the Milir people found themselves obliged to become 
orthodox Hindus. A Hindu teacher was introduced into the local school and 
the religion was taught on the basis of Education Ministry textbooks. Old 
Javanese — seen as the sacred language of Javanese and Balinese Hindus 
— was also taught. In 1991 the Hindus of Milir opened their own temple 
built with Parisada Hindu Dharma support.69
Thus Hinduisation was significant, but it had nothing like the impact 
of Christianisation. Nor did it evoke the anxiety — indeed frequently the 
rage — of santri Muslims as Christianisation did.
The increase in conversions of abangan Javanese to Christianity appears 
to have begun already in 1964 in some areas, but massive growth took place 
beginning in 1965. A major study was done near the time by the Baptist 
67 Beatty, Varieties, pp. 150, 217–9, 223–4.
68 RK, 13 Dec. 2004.
69 J. Joseph Errington, Shifting languages: Interaction and identity in Javanese Indonesia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 29–34. The village is identified, 
à la anthropology, with the pseudonym ‘Mulih’; I am grateful to Prof. Errington for 
giving me the correct name of the village.
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missionary Avery Willis Jr., provocatively (to Muslims) entitled Indonesian 
revival: Why two million came to Christ. The author worked as a missionary 
in Bogor (West Java) and Jember (East Java) from 1964 and moved to the 
Baptist Theological Seminary in Semarang in 1970.70 The research is not 
quite as authoritative as it seems at first sight. It implies at times that it rests 
on interviews with 500 recent converts, but in fact among the 515 people 
interviewed, there were only 270 converts. The rest were Christian leaders of 
five Protestant denominations in Java and older Christians, people who were 
thought to be well-informed about the conversions. The interviews were done 
by Baptist Seminary students or by Willis himself, which — we may presume 
— would have had some impact on the responses received.71 Nevertheless, 
the patterns uncovered by Willis are consistent with other evidence.
Willis found that converts were consistently from the abangan com-
munity, where PKI had found its support. Politics was clearly central to this 
wave of conversions — it was not entirely the fruit of ambitious proselytising 
by the Protestants. As Willis commented, ‘The sickle of political turbulence 
reaped a harvest of Indonesians for Christianity’.72 His respondents cited 
the government requirement (formalised in 1966) that all Indonesians 
must adhere to one of the five recognised religions as being among the 
main reasons for their conversion. As abangan, they found themselves 
accused of not really having a religion, and thus were at risk of being labeled 
Communist. They also cited the role of Islamic activists in the killings of 
1965–6 as a major reason for turning away from their nominal allegiance 
to Islam. The support that Christian churches offered to the families of 
those who had been murdered or arrested also attracted them. And, Willis 
believed, the Christian denominations’ greater openness to local culture made 
Christianity an attractive choice.73 He did not assess the role of Christianity’s 
70 Avery T. Willis, Jr, Indonesian revival: Why two million came to Christ (South 
Pasadena, CA: William Carey Library, 1977). This was originally a D.Theol. thesis 
at the Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, Fort Worth, Texas.
71 Ibid., pp. 221–2. The denominations were the Gereja Kristen Jawi Wetan, Gereja-
Gereja Kristen Jawi, Gereja Kristen Jawa Tengah Utara, Gereja Injili di Tanah Jawa, 
and Gabungan Gereja-Gereja Baptis Indonesia.
72 Willis, Indonesian revival, p. 14.
73 Ibid., pp. 13, 14, 21, 24, 50, 63–4, 196. ‘Spiritual need’ was also given as a reason for 
conversion, which, says Willis (p. 14), was often depicted as ‘inner need, emptiness 
of soul, not at peace’. But the meaning of this is vague and we need to remember 
that converts were conversing either with the missionary Willis himself or with his 
seminary students.
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less onerous ritual obligations — weekly church attendance rather than five 
daily prayers, permission to eat pork and so on — in conversions. These may 
not, in any case, have been aspects that new converts would have emphasised 
to the seminary students interviewing them.
The growth in the five Protestant denominations in Java that Willis 
studied was truly remarkable. Total membership rose from around 60,000 in 
1945 to 90,000 in 1955 and 95,000 in 1960 — a rate of growth somewhat 
ahead of general population growth.74 In 1965, however, it exploded to 
around 200,000. Willis describes the challenge that these unexpected 
conversions posed for the Christian churches:
Pastors soon found that they could not possibly minister to all of those 
requesting their counsel, so they turned to elders and other church 
leaders for assistance. Teams were organised by some churches to go 
into the surrounding countryside, teach the catechism or new members’ 
classes, and conduct services. … In many cases local leaders took over 
the day-by-day ministry in their villages, with only occasional visits by 
representatives from the mother church.
 Calls often came from surrounding villages, requesting these new 
groups of Christians to come tell about their new faith; thus some 
new churches were responsible for as many as nine or ten more village 
congregations. The mother churches and their pastors sought to control 
the situation through occasional visits, administration of baptisms and 
the Lord’s Supper, and training classes for new leaders.75
Between 1960 and 1971, the membership of the five denominations 
studied by Willis grew phenomenally from 96,871 to 311,778, an increase 
of over 220 per cent. In 1965–7 the annual rate of growth was 27.6 per cent; 
in 1968–71, 13.7 per cent.76 Most conversions in his study were of groups. 
‘Individuals, often village leaders, talked to their “in-groups” about the 
possibility of their becoming Christians together. Occasionally all of them 
did so together, but more frequently one group would be followed by related 
groups over a period of months or years.’ 77
Across Central and East Java and Yogyakarta, in the 1971 census nearly 
1,024,000 Christians were recorded. While this was of the order of 2 per 
74 Ibid., p. 7; Widjojo Nitisastro, Population trends, p. 161, estimates Java’s population 
in 1960 to have been 1.25 times the population of 1945. The growth in church figures 
here shows a growth of approximately 1.6 times.
75 Willis, Indonesian revival, p. 20.
76 Ibid., p. 110.
77 Ibid., p. 128.
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cent of the total population, it was largely concentrated in urban areas and 
thus more visible — particularly to the Modernists whose own base was 
overwhelmingly urban. The urban population of all of Java other than Jakarta 
was 9.5 per cent Christian; in Central Java and Yogyakarta it was 11.6 per 
cent Christian. Conversions were particularly notable among young adults. 
Of the urban population between the ages of 20 and 29, 15.8 per cent of 
those in Central Java and Yogyakarta were Christian in 1971 and 9.3 per 
cent of those in East Java. Only 0.8 per cent of rural dwellers across Java 
were Christian.78 As will be seen in Table 10, the 1980 census showed that 
Christianity was still spreading, but — except in Yogyakarta — at a slower 
pace than in 1965–71.
Table 10  Muslim and Christian religious affiliations as percentages of total
  population, 1971 and 198079
 Islam Christian Total
Area   (Catholic + Protestant) 
 1971 1980 1971 1980 1971 1980
Central Java 96.4 96.1 2.1 2.6 98.5 98.7
Yogyakarta 93.5 92.4 4.6 6.8 98.1 99.2
East Java 96.9 96.6 1.7 2.0 98.6 98.6
In Surakarta — one of the most polarised urban societies in polarised 
Java — the trend towards Christianisation continued. We noted above 
(Table 9) that by 1975 the Christian (Catholic and Protestant) population 
of Surakarta had already reached 18.9 per cent. Christianisation continued 
through the 1970s until the city of Surakarta was about one-quarter 
Christian, and then remained at that level through the 1980s, as the 
following table shows.
78 Jones, ‘Religion and education’, pp. 28, 31–2, 34–5.
79 Beberapa ciri pemeluk agama di Indonesia 1980 ( Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik [1984] 
(mimeo), p. 4. The data in this source also reflects the educational differences between 
Christians and Muslims, with the latter being less likely to be literate, less likely to 
command Bahasa Indonesia and more likely to be agricultural workers.
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In other cities the Christian population also grew, but less dramatically, and 
it tended to stabilise, even decline slightly, in the 1980s. In Yogyakarta, for 
example, the Christian population in 1980 was 18.1 per cent of the total 
population, but in 1990 a lower proportion at 16.6 per cent.81 We will see 
below that in the 1970s Surakarta was also the birth place of several of the 
most puritanical Modernist and Revivalist movements, suggesting that there 
developed a dialectical relationship there between vigorous Dakwahism and 
Christianisation, each feeding the other.
Boland observed that the wave of conversions attracted the attention 
of some of Christianity’s ‘most fanatical representatives’, including Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and the Seventh Day Adventists.82 But more established Prot-
estant denominations such as those represented in Willis’s study and the 
Table 11  Christian population in Surakarta as percentage of total population,
  1977–9080
Year Christian population 














80 Based on relevant volumes of the Statistik Kotamadya Surakarta series: see the 
bibliography. Note that the figures for 1978 were not locatable.
81 Statistical data gathered on my behalf by Arif Maftuhin from Yogyakarta 
statistics.
82 Boland, Struggle of Islam, p. 233.
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Catholic church also faced a deluge of aspirant converts. The Catholic church 
was said at the time to be more cautious about baptising new members until 
it was confident of the genuineness of their new faith. Growth was never-
theless significant. In the diocese of Semarang, for example, the Catholic 
church more than doubled in membership in only a decade. It grew from 
some 103,000 members in 1964 to 234,000 in 1973, increasing by a factor 
of 2.27.83 
Several case studies have captured the grass-roots dynamics of this 
religious change. In 1999–2002, Mudjahirin Thohir gathered memories of 
these events in the north coastal villages of Bondo and Bangsri, near Jepara. 
There, many abangan — accused of not actually having a religion — were 
suspected of pro-PKI attitudes and were thus threatened by Ansor and 
other youth groups. Many were killed or jailed. Churches already existed 
in the area, and now abangan flocked to them. One informant reported 
that he had been a Muslim, but seeing many of his friends murdered led 
him to become a Christian in order to be safe. A few locals also embraced 
Buddhism. In 2001, Bangsri’s population was 7.2 per cent Christian (96.9 
per cent of them Protestants); in Bondo the figure was fully 48.8 per cent 
(entirely Protestant).84
Singgih Nugroho also gathered memories of these events in the region 
of Salatiga, in an abangan area where PKI had been strong.85 In the 1960s, 
the Islam of many local people was so nominal that a former village secretary 
in the years 1961–74 recalled that ‘at that time many people, like me, said 
they followed Islam but never carried out the practices that it taught. In fact 
the modin [religious leader] never prayed. In fact he was a seeker of Javanist 
ilmu.’86 In Singgih Nugroho’s field site, which he calls ‘Ngampel’, Christian 
proselytism had begun as early as 1963, as rural politics heated up during 
the PKI’s ‘unilateral action’ campaign. The Protestant pastor who was invited 
to come there employed songs in Javanese and kethoprak performances, 
reinforcing the idea that Christianity was consistent with Javanese identity. 
In December 1963, Christmas was observed in ‘Ngampel’ and baptisms 
were held in May 1964. Santri-abangan differences in the village now began 
83 Singgih Nugroho, Menyintas dan menyeberang, p. 8.
84 Mudjahirin Thohir, Orang Islam Jawa pesisiran, pp. 149, 223, 252–3.
85 The following account concerning ‘Ngampel’ rests on Singgih Nugroho, Menyintas 
dan menyeberang, particularly pp. 97 et seqq. His interviews were gathered over 
2001–8.
86 Quoted in ibid., p. 149.
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to transform into Muslim-Christian distinctions. There were initially some 
difficulties between the new converts and church authorities over non-
Christian Javanese practices, however, for the new Christians maintained 
circumcision and slametans in the interest of village solidarity. Eventually, 
however, they abandoned these practices.
When the killings began in surrounding villages in 1965–6, many 
abangan asked the local Christians to be allowed to join them. In July 1966, 
106 new Christians were baptised in ‘Ngampel’ (a village of only some 
200 people); by then over 80 per cent of the village was Christian. When 
Singgih Nugroho conducted his interviews over 40 years later, he gained 
the impression that most of these people had converted for political reasons, 
i.e., as abangan accused of being Communists, they sought protection 
in Christianity, and were driven away from Islam by the role of Islamic 
activists in the killings. But the cultural and, we might say, comfort factors 
also played a role. One respondent commented that ‘the reason I converted 
to Christianity … was entirely because that religion uses Javanese so that 
I could study and follow it. That is very different from Islam that uses 
Arabic and has many prohibitions.’87 As time passed and politics became 
less violent, however, some Christian converts did return to Islam or turn 
to Buddhism. Islam was sometimes thought more appropriate for ordinary 
villagers than Christianity, with its more affluent and better educated 
followers, while Buddhism was thought by some to be more authentically 
Javanese.
Many who had been held without trial as political prisoners after 
1965 also embraced Christianity, either during their captivity or after their 
release. Factors in their decision were the support shown by Christian 
churches to their families and the Christian proselytism they encountered 
while in captivity. Some priests and pastors active in this work — politically 
courageous as it was in the early New Order period — were indeed detained 
and interrogated by a suspicious military. This contrasted strongly with the 
approach of Islamic organisations in some areas. The animosity between PKI 
and Islamic organisations — particularly NU at grass-roots level — was 
so profound that when prisoners were released, rather than launching 
proselytism programmes among them, Muslim organisations sometimes 
monitored them like enemies about to arise again. These new Christians 
sometimes faced discrimination from more established Christians, who 
doubted the sincerity of their faith, or who feared that their presence would 
87 Quoted in ibid., p. 177.
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make the Church suspect in the eyes of the New Order regime. But for 
former political prisoners, Islam was still far less welcoming.88 
The reaction of Islamic leaders — particularly Modernists — to this 
wave of Christianisation was dismay and fury. There appeared, as Boland 
puts it, an ‘endless stream of apologetic and polemic publications’ by Muslim 
activists attacking Christianity.89 In 1968 the Muhammadiyah newspaper 
Mertju Suar wrote,
Now when Sukarno and the Communist Party have disappeared 
from the scene, it should not be thought that attempts to strike at the 
Muslims have vanished, too. There are new enemies who are no less 
‘fierce’ against the Muslims. They belong to a group known in Islamic 
literature as ‘the Book Disciples’ [Christians], who have grown big by 
virtue of the tolerance of the Muslims.90
This tolerance had its limits. The foremost Modernist leader, Moham-
mad Natsir, said the following in 1977:
Let us start with the principle that Islam teaches tolerance, religious 
tolerance. That means that there should be co-existence between 
religious communities; that is one thing. The second thing is that does 
not mean that a Muslim should be idle and look with crossed arms at 
the activities of the [Christian] missionaries — and most of them are 
missionaries from outside Indonesia — to practice their proselytism, to 
convert the Muslims into Christians. Now this is becoming a problem 
in Indonesia. … What is very strange, according to my opinion, is the 
88 In Kim’s research site near Yogyakarta, too, seven ex-PKI households converted to 
Protestantism; Kim, Reformist Muslims, pp. 62, 185.
89 Boland, Struggle of Islam, pp. 225–9. Boland summarises several of these publica-
tions. An authoritative study of Muslim-Christian relations in the New Order is 
provided by Mujiburrahman, Feeling threatened: Muslim-Christian relations in Indo-
nesia’s New Order (Leiden: ISIM; Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).
90 Translation by Alan A. Samson in his article ‘Islam in Indonesian politics’, 
Asian Survey vol. 8, no. 12 (Dec. 1968), pp. 1014. His term ‘the Book Disciples’ 
is undoubtedly what is more usually translated as ‘the people of the book’ (Arabic 
ahl al-kitab), a Qur’anic term used to describe both Jews and Christians as prior 
recipients of books of divine revelation. Sharon comments, ‘Most references to ahl 
al-kitāb in the Qur’an are polemical. These peoples (or, frequently, the “disbelievers” 
from among them) are basically the enemies of the Muslims, who wish that the 
former accept their revelation in the Qur’an. … On the other hand, the Qur’an also 
seeks common ground between Muslims and ahl al-kitab’; M. Sharon, ‘People of the 
Book’, in Jane Dammen McAuliffe (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān (6 vols; Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 2001–6), vol. 4, p. 36.
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missionary organisations, especially from Europe and America and so 
on, are very much [more] concerned with the de-Islamisation of Islamic 
countries than the de-Christianisation of the Christian communities in 
Europe.91
Muslim leaders frequently quoted Qur’an 109 to explain their tolerance 
towards other religions: ‘Disbelievers: I do not worship what you worship, 
you do not worship what I worship, I will never worship what you worship, 
you will never worship what I worship: you have your religion and I have 
mine.’92 This evident license for religious difference did not, however, 
embrace the idea of religious change. Islam — like many another faith — has 
an abhorrence of apostasy. The punishment for apostasy conventionally 
approved by the medieval jurists, on the basis of several Hadiths, was death.93 
In independent Indonesia, such punishment was and is inapplicable, but it 
reflects the depths of Muslim animosity to conversion from Islam. So when 
the principle of tolerance ran into the fact of apostasy in the early New 
Order, the patience of Muslim leaders wore thin.
Prof. Rasjidi, whom we have already met above, commented after 
attending a Christian-Muslim conference in Spain that, ‘Mutual respect is 
alright and this is what we have to do, all of us and especially Islam. … But 
mutual recognition is something which is contrary to religion itself because 
everything has its own teaching and its own dogma.’94 The Muhammadiyah 
leader Djarnawi Hadikusuma struggled somewhat to balance the imperatives 
of each-one-to-his-own-religion and abhorrence of apostasy. After first citing 
Qur’an 109, he said, ‘So we have the opinion that the followers of a certain 
religion should not be the target of the propagation of another religion’. 
Specifically, he said that the building of churches in Muslim communities 
constituted ‘an act of intolerance’. He went on, rather remarkably in the light 
of conventional Islamic jurisprudence, ‘Every man has the right to change 
his religion with his own will and conscience, beyond any compulsion and 
persuasion’. But the abhorrence of apostasy soon emerged: ‘Although every 
Muslim has the right to do so, but in doing so he has condemned himself 
91 Interview with H. Dr Mohammad Natsir, Jakarta, 14 Aug. 1977.
92 Abdel Haleem’s translation: The Qur’an: A new translation by M.A.S. Abdel 
Haleem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 441.
93 An authoritative study of this issue is to be found in Abdullah Saeed and Hassan 
Saeed, Freedom of religion, apostasy and Islam (Aldershot, Hants, and Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2004).
94 Interview with Prof. Dr H.M. Rasjidi, Jakarta, Aug. 1977.
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to the wrong path. I think every religion abhors this act.’ He nevertheless 
asserted that ‘Islam can work together with the followers of other religions 
and Islam does not attack any other religion’. What if Islam is attacked itself, 
I asked? ‘In case Islam itself is attacked, of course, the Muslims will — you 
know — take the necessary steps,’ he said, slamming his fist on the table 
before him.95
Although there were Muslims in Java at all levels who were unhappy 
with the rampant Christianisation going on, the level of distress at these 
conversions was rather less on the Traditionalist side of Islam. This was no 
doubt in part because Christianisation was more prominent in urban than in 
rural contexts. Furthermore, in rural villages it was occurring among abangan 
who had formerly supported or sympathised with PKI and were thus already 
thought of as NU’s enemies. Abdurrahman Wahid said that ‘Not all of us 
are feeling threatened’ and himself often took part in church gatherings, 
explaining Islam to Christian pastors. Differentiating NU from Modernists, 
he said that he saw no need actively to campaign against Christianity. 
Instead, ‘we try to improve our followers’, he said.96 When the World 
Council of Churches insensitively proposed to hold its fifth international 
assembly in Jakarta in 1975, Modernist leaders were incensed. ‘What is the 
use of that?’ Mohamad Roem asked himself. ‘Is it not something of a show 
of force? … There are not so many Christians here. So I think that is the 
limit.’97 The Modernist magazine Panji Masyarakat also used the term ‘show 
of force’ in denouncing the idea. Rasjidi denounced it in a book published by 
the Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, about which, more below) in 
1974. Yet, when the head of the Indonesian Council of Churches, the retired 
senior army figure T.B. Simatupang, had first explored the possibility of 
holding the assembly in Indonesia, the idea was welcomed by the NU leader 
Idham Chalid. In the end, however, Muslim opposition led to the assembly 
being held in Nairobi instead.98
If Traditionalist NU, with its networks of kyais and pesantrens across 
rural Java, felt less threatened by Christianisation than did the urban-based 
Modernists, it was more threatened by the New Order regime itself. For 
there began a competition in the countryside that pitted NU’s dominance 
95 Interview with H. Djarnawi Hadikusuma, Yogyakarta, 11 Aug. 1977. At this time 
Djarnawi was Secretary-General of the Muhammadiyah Executive Board.
96 Interview with Ky. H. Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 7 Aug. 1977.
97 Interview with Dr Mohamad Roem, Jakarta, 3 Aug. 1977.
98 Mujiburrahman, Feeling threatened, pp. 65–71.
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of religious life against the regime’s totalitarian aspirations to control every 
aspect of society, including Islam at village level.
Government competition
From its inception, Soeharto’s New Order regime was determined to root 
out Communism and to control how people from the top of society to the 
bottom behaved and thought. Clearly religion — above all Islam — was a 
useful tool to this end. There was nothing peculiarly Indonesian, Javanese 
or Islamic about this. As Isaiah Berlin observed more generally from his 
understanding mainly of Western history, ‘Some unscrupulous managers 
of men have, in the course of history, used religious teachings to make 
men less discontented with brutal and iniquitous treatment’.99 But there 
were local peculiarities to be dealt with, above all that rural Islam was 
dominated by NU, for Soeharto’s was not a regime that wished to share its 
hoped-for control of society with an organisation it could not itself control. 
Indeed, NU had shown itself nearly impervious to control by any regime. 
Its foundation was a network of personal and familial relations among kyais 
and its institutional base was its pesantrens, which operated as independent 
educational institutions teaching the classic works of Traditionalist Islam 
— the so-called ‘yellow books’ (kitab kuning)100 — with funding from the 
students, their families, business activities of the kyais and endowments. It 
was not easy for any government to take control of such a network, so the 
New Order decided instead that it would compete.
It was one of the political ironies of New Order history that the 
polarisation between abangan and santri was, at its start, still so strong 
that abangan were unlikely to lend political support to any Islamic party 
and thus ended up supporting the new regime — even though it was that 
regime that had so convincingly weakened or destroyed the main abangan 
political institutions, PNI and PKI. Christian converts of course frequently 
shifted allegiance to the small Indonesian Christian (that is, Protestant) 
Party (Parkindo: Partai Kristen Indonesia) or to the Catholic Party (Partai 
Katholik). But when the regime turned Golkar into an electoral vehicle — 
which it claimed was not really a party, but the alternative to parties — the 
99 From his essay ‘From hope and fear set free’, first published in 1978, to be found 
in Isaiah Berlin, The proper study of mankind: An anthology of essays (ed. Henry Hardy 
and Roger Hausheer. London: Pimlico, 1998), p. 112.
100 See van Bruinessen, ‘Pesantren and kitab kuning’.
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abangan constituency supported it heavily as a bulwark against Islam. Thus 
the New Order regime inherited the constituency of the PKI, along with 
many others who did not wish to support a religious party. In his study of the 
1971 election in East Java, Ward observed that ‘The core Golkar constituency 
… consisted of the two aliran and the two parties of East Java most affected 
by the military-bureaucratic power: the abangan peasantry of the PKI and 
the abangan population still under the sway of the priyayi civil service of the 
PNI.’101 Inheriting an abangan constituency and intending to dominate the 
santri constituency as well, the New Order regime embarked on processes 
that would, in the end, make aliran politics a thing of the past in Java.
At the level of national politics, NU fell into some disfavour with 
the regime in its early years. The author of the authoritative study of NU’s 
political relations with the New Order, Andrée Feillard, writes of the 
estrangement between NU and the regime in this period.102 In 1971, NU 
lost the post of Minister of Religion, for the first time since 1953, when 
the government appointed Prof. Mukti Ali, who had studied at McGill 
University under the noted scholar Wilfed Cantwell Smith. Mukti Ali was 
to become a crucial figure in the modernisation of Islamic education in 
Indonesia,103 but when he first visited East Java in 1971, the kyais there were 
unsure what to make of him and were concerned that regime programmes 
would interfere with their influence in village societies.104
At local level, the early effects of the regime’s determined depoliticisa-
tion and demobilisation of the countryside could be seen. The New Order’s 
emphasis was on economic development and security, not on mobilising the 
masses. A comfortable quiescence, indeed political boredom, was the goal, 
and anyone watching the excruciatingly dull discussions of development 
on Indonesian television in those years would be confident that this goal 
was achievable. In this environment, Hermawan Sulistya reports that in the 
Jombang-Kediri area, pesantrens began to lose their influence.105 Ward noted 
the ambivalence of NU’s views of the government, which combined ‘a self-
101 K.E. Ward, The 1971 election in Indonesia: an East Java case study ([Clayton, Vic:] 
Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Papers on Southeast Asia no. 
2, 1974), p. 172.
102 Feillard, Islam et armée, p. 119 et seqq.
103 For a biography of Mukti Ali, see Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, Menteri-
menteri Agama RI, pp. 271–319. He was born in Cepu, Central Java, in 1923, and 
served as Minister of Religion from 1971 to 1978. He died in 2004.
104 Ward, 1971 election, p. 113.
105 Sulistyo, Palu arit di lading tebu, pp. 224–5.
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satisfying conviction that it is still struggling for an Islamic state’ with what 
others regarded as opportunism in trying to work with the regime.106
We have already noted how senior military figures were involved in 
establishing Pendidikan Tinggi Da‘wah Islam (PTDI: Islamic Proselytism 
Higher Education) in Surakarta during the Guided Democracy period, 
which was moved to Jakarta in 1965. This was a proselytism body that 
intended to have branches down to village level.107 Other regime initiatives 
followed in the early New Order. Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar (Gus War) of the 
Jamsaren pesantren in Kediri spoke of government sponsorship of religious 
education in surrounding, ex-PKI areas after 1966. Both kyais and Christian 
pastors were sent by the government to promote religion, he recalled.108 
The first Five-Year Development Plan allocated funds for mosque-
building, which grew in subsequent Plans. This state funding contributed to 
a major expansion in the number of mosques and prayer-houses, although 
of course there was pious private funding committed as well.109 In East Java, 
the number of mosques grew as seen in Table 12. It will also be seen there 
Table 12 Number of mosques in East Java and mosque density, 1973–90110 
Year Number of % increase  Mosque density
 mosques  over 1973  (av. population/mosque)
1973 15,574  1639  (based on 1971 pop.)
1979 17,750 14.0 1644  (based on 1980 pop.)
1984 20,648 32.6 1503  (based on 1985 pop.)
1990 25,655 64.7 1267
106 Ward, 1971 election, p. 95.
107 Boland, Struggle of Islam, pp. 194–5.
108 Interview with Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar (Gus War), Jamsaren pesantren, Kediri, 
28 Aug. 2003.
109 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the state in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2003), p. 168.
110 Mosque numbers from Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 121. Population figures from 
Graeme J. Hugo et al., The demographic dimension in Indonesian development 
(Singapore, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 42; and Statistics Indonesia Table 
1.1.1. Jumlah Penduduk menurut Provinsi, at http://www.datastatistik-indonesia.
com/component/option,com_tabel/kat,1/Itemid,165. Readers will notice that the 
year for the population figures and for the mosque numbers sometimes vary slightly, 
but they are close enough for our purposes here.
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that the density of mosques available — measured by the average number 
of people per available mosque — increased. In the early 1970s there was 
approximately one mosque for every 1639 persons (of all ages) in East Java, 
but by 1990 that had increased to one mosque for every 1267 persons, 
representing a rise of nearly a quarter in the mean availability of mosques 
per capita. In Central Java, the number of mosques rose from 15,685 in 
1980 to 28,748 in 1992, an increase of 83.3 per cent over that period. This 
represented an increase in density from one mosque for every 1618 persons 
in Central Java in 1980 to one for approximately every 1,000 in the early 
1990s.111 
Such figures reflect increasing piety in the society in general — that 
deepening Islamisation that is the central topic of this book — but it is 
important to emphasise that in the early New Order this arose from a degree 
of competition between government and pious private interests to reshape 
and control the spirituality of Javanese. Both sides of this competition 
were driving increasing Islamic piety. In 1982 Soeharto established his 
own Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila (Pancasila Muslim Charitable 
Foundation), which collected money from public servants. By 1991 it 
had funded the construction of 449 mosques and funded a thousand 
Islamic teachers to go to areas of the outer islands of Indonesia to which 
transmigrants (mostly from Java) were sent. In 1991, the regime also 
assisted in the establishment of the first Islamic bank in Indonesia, the Bank 
Muamalat Indonesia.112 Boland, whose research in Indonesia extended to 
1969, depicted the government’s promotion of religious activities through 
the Ministry of Religion as ‘not only social control within the community 
of a Muslim kampung or desa, but also something like a “religious dirigisme” 
by the government’.113 
We should not, however, imagine that ordinary Javanese villagers were 
without agency in this Islamisation, that they were the passive objects of 
governmental and other Islamising agendas. It can hardly be doubted that 
for many villagers, greater Islamisation was appealing because it offered more 
certainty and much-needed solace after a traumatic time. Aliran politics 
with its politicisation and polarisation of village society had led to terrible 
111 Sources as in the preceding note. I am unable to find a figure for Central Java 
population in 1992. If one uses the figure for 1990, then the density is 1/992; using 
the figure for 1995 it is 1/1031.
112 Effendy, Islam and the state, pp. 168–9.
113 Boland, Struggle of Islam, p. 189.
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violence. Even if there were villages and families that escaped significant 
conflict, they would have known of the dreadful events that surrounded 
them. Above we looked at Christianisation and other conversions away from 
Islam, a significant phenomenon of the early New Order period. But the 
vast majority of Javanese remained Muslims and operated within an Islamic 
frame of reference. For that majority, deeper Islamisation offered a template 
to define the parameters of restored village harmony — one sanctioned by 
supra-village authorities, both governmental and religious, and associated 
with modernity and development. Thus, we can reasonably presume that 
when deeper Islamisation was promoted by religious organisations in the 
interest of their pious agendas and by the government in the interest of its 
social-control agenda, many Javanese villagers willingly embraced it in the 
interest of restoring village harmony.
Government initiatives in education were decisive, particularly as the 
government’s increasing revenue in the 1970s — the fruit of the world 
revolution in oil prices — made possible a massive increase in the provision 
of public education. Over 100,000 schools were built across Indonesia, 
especially in rural areas, and over 500,000 extra teachers employed. By 1980, 
71.3 per cent of the 5–12 age group in Central Java was attending school, 
78 per cent in Yogyakarta and 72.1 per cent in East Java.114 This supported a 
rapid rise in literacy across Indonesia, which reached 89.9 per cent for males 
over the age of ten and 78.7 per cent for females in this age group in the 
1990 census. Along with this rise in education and literacy went increasing 
command of the national Indonesian language. In the 1971 census literacy in 
Indonesian was still a minority affair, but the spread of education along with 
the mass communications media transformed that situation. The 1980 census 
reported that the vast majority — from 95 to 98 per cent — of the people 
in the Javanese heartlands spoke Javanese at home. But in Central Java 50.6 
per cent, in Yogyakarta 55.4 per cent, and in East Java 48.5 per cent of the 
population could also speak Indonesian.115 The spread of Indonesian was not 
without a cost. Many older Javanese began to lament that the young were 
losing command of the subtle (and quite difficult) hierarchical levels of the 
Javanese language, and with them the courtesies and politesse of the past.116 
Command of Javanese script was almost unknown among the young already 
in the 1960s.
114 Hugo et al., Demographic dimension, p. 67.
115 Ibid., p. 104.
116 See Guinness, Kampung, Islam and state, p. 127.
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In the state schools, two or three hours of religious instruction a week 
were required from 1967 onward. This meant, of course, orthodox forms of 
religions acceptable to the government. Consequently, unorthodox beliefs 
such as kebatinan — which, as we have seen, was defined as a ‘belief ’ and not 
a ‘religion’ — began to lose their hold on the minds of the young. Orthodox 
religion was thus associated with modern schooling, literacy, modernity and 
all the trappings of the government’s obsession with ‘development’. The 
Modernist madrasahs were also brought into the broader national education 
system. In 1975 the government decreed that 70 per cent of madrasah 
curricula must consist of standard ‘secular’ subjects as in the state schools and 
only 30 per cent of religious studies. This meant that students could move 
from the madrasah system across into the state system and that madrasah 
certificates were equivalent to state school certificates.117
In the midst of this educational revolution, the Traditionalist pesantrens 
lost the centrality they once had in rural education. In 1977, across Central 
and East Java, there were 355,870 students reported to be studying in 
Traditionalist pesantrens.118 In public schools there were 5,691,827 — 16 
times as many. There were far more students in the modern madrasahs as well: 
1,394,990. If one takes religious schools of all kinds (i.e., both Traditionalist 
pesantrens and Modernist madrasahs), there were 1,750,860 students reported. 
State schools still had over three times as many pupils.119 As Siegel observed 
in Surakarta in the late 1970s, ‘The real heirs of the religious schools are the 
public schools; it is there that youths today acquire a moral education’.120 
NU having lost control of the Ministry of Religion in 1971, later in the 
decade government subsidies to pesantrens were cut off if they taught only 
religious subjects. So Traditionalist schools began to introduce the state 
curriculum, thereby regaining state subsidies.121 This was a significant step 
in the modernisation of pesantrens and upgrading the intellectual range and 
formal qualifications of their graduates. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
117 Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, Menteri-menteri Agama RI, pp. 313–4.
118 Given that in 1893 there were reported to be some 272,000 student in religious 
schools in Java and Madura (Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese society, p. 70), the 1977 
figure suggests that enrolments had not even kept up with the growth of population 
over the previous eight decades.
119 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi pesantren, p. 43. Some public-school pupils also 
attended pesantrens, so there is probably some degree of double-counting in these 
figures.
120 Siegel, Solo in the New Order, p. 139.
121 Abdul Kadir, ‘Traditional Islamic society and the state’, p. 106.
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Traditionalism was looking less backward than it had once seemed; in fact 
some observers were beginning to think it more progressive than Modernism, 
which by comparison appeared ‘disunited, politically cowed, and absorbed in 
legalistic debate’.122
Because of the expansion of government schools, Traditionalist 
pesantrens were no longer the only, or even the main, way in which the rural 
young learned about Islam. Nor was the government-approved curriculum 
for teaching Islam sympathetic to ideas such as kyais having supernatural 
powers. For their part, Modernists already had extensive school networks that 
were modern in style and curriculum, had always worked with governments, 
and were therefore less challenged by the regime’s educational revolution. 
Traditionalists also faced a decline in pious donations (wakaf) of land, 
which were important to the growth and financial survival of pesantrens. 
Over 1966–79, the area of land given as wakaf in the NU heartland of East 
Java plummeted. Whereas 71 ha of wakaf land were registered in East Java 
during 1961–5, that figure fell to under 20 ha during 1976–9. Population 
growth meant that more land was needed for agriculture and housing, and 
land values rose. Pious Muslims therefore preferred to sell land to the highest 
bidder and then make a donation in cash.123 
Some government-sponsored Islamisation programmes at grass-roots 
level did offer opportunities for kyais to play a role, but they were few. In 
1971 Jakarta set up a Proyek Pembinaan Mental Agama (P2A, Religious 
Mentality Promotion Project) which reached down to village level, aiming 
to increase general religiosity. Both Muhammadiyah and NU figures were 
brought in to assist. In East Java, well-known kyais were invited by village 
P2A committees to take part. Djatnika even perceives a ‘petite renaissance’ of 
Islam in 1971, despite the drop in wakaf donations noted above.124 But other 
initiatives directly competed with the Traditionalists.
Majlis Dakwah Islamiyah (MDI, Islamic Mission Council) was set up 
by the regime in the early 1970s as a youth organisation to promote deeper 
Islamisation at village level. To NU this was a threat to the standing of 
kyais. MDI was linked to Golkar and campaigned for the government side 
while promoting Islamisation. GUPPI (Gabungan Usaha Pembinaan Pen-
didikan Islam, Federation of Islamic Education Promotion Efforts, originally 
established in 1950) was encouraged unofficially by the government, which 
122 McVey, ‘Faith as the outsider’, p. 210.
123 Djatnika, ‘Biens de mainmorte’, pp. 156, 160–3.
124 Ibid., pp. 254–5.
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made sure that reliable clerics were in charge of it, and was seen by NU as a 
direct competitor to the pesantrens. In the early New Order period, GUPPI 
affiliated with Golkar.125 
Some of the most dramatic government innovations were at the tertiary 
level, particularly beginning during Mukti Ali’s time as Minister of Religion. 
The New Order inherited a system of Islamic tertiary teaching institutions 
called IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State Institute for Islamic 
Studies). Mukti Ali himself had been a teacher at the IAIN in Yogyakarta, 
where he had introduced the revolutionary subject of comparative religion. 
Most IAINs, however, were of a low standard, so the government took 
decisive steps. Of 112 IAINs, in 1975 all but 13 were shut down. The 
remaining IAINs were then turned into serious tertiary institutions. Under 
the guidance of Mukti Ali, later Ministers of Religion and a series of highly 
able leaders of IAINs, this system developed into a powerful intellectual force 
in support of what has been called ‘enlightened’ or ‘liberal’ Islam.126 By the 
early 21st century there were 14 IAINs across Indonesia and 38 lower-order 
STAINs (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri, State Colleges of Islamic 
Studies). The foremost IAINS played major educational and intellectual roles 
in national life, and several — notably those of Yogyakarta and Jakarta, and 
subsequently others — were converted into fully fledged universities as UINs 
(Universitas Islam Negeri, State Islamic Universities) beginning in 2002.
As the IAIN system developed during the New Order, many of its 
academic staff were sent to Western universities for higher study, particularly 
to the Netherlands, Canada, the United States and Australia.127 There they 
added modern social science and humanities disciplines to their mastery of 
Islamic sciences. Their postgraduate theses constitute a major contribution 
to the study of Islam, with (naturally) particular reference to Indonesia. A 
125 Abdul Kadir, ‘Traditional Islamic society and the state’, pp. 183–4; Andrée Feillard 
and Rémy Madinier, La fin de l ’innocence? L’lslam indonésien face à la tentation radicale 
de 1967 à nos jours (Paris: Les Indes Savants & IRASEC, 2006), pp. 38–9. See also 
Mudjahirin Thohir, Orang Islam Jawa pesisiran, p. 217.
126 Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, Menteri-menteri Agama RI, pp. 285–319. 
‘Enlightened’ and ‘liberal’ are the terms used in Luthfi Assyaukanie, Islam and the 
secular state in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 
pp. 143–6.
127 This developed particular during the time of Munawir Syadzali as Minister of 
Religion (1983–93); he had an MA from Georgetown and had pursued a career in 
the foreign service; for a biography, see Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, Menteri-
menteri Agama RI, pp. 369–412.
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large proportion of these young academics were of Traditionalist background. 
IAINs thus also functioned as an effective ladder of social mobility for 
young men and women, mainly from pesantren pre-tertiary educational 
backgrounds, to become members of the national intellectual elite.128
We should not think, however, that everything the New Order did in 
higher education had the desired effect of controlling Islam or achieved the 
regime’s objectives in more general terms. In the late 1970s, the government 
was concerned about the potential for university student activism to threaten 
stability. This was in response to rising student criticism of the corruption 
and oppression of the New Order as it approached and entered its second 
decade in power. Student activists and Soeharto’s government undoubtedly 
noted how a student-led popular uprising overthrew the Thai government of 
Thanom Kittikachorn in October 1973 — the former being further inspired 
by these events and the latter being made more apprehensive. Students were 
prominent in protests against a proposed marriage law in 1973, even invading 
a sitting of the national parliament in September.
Urban protests culminated in the so-called Malari129 riots of January 
1974, when a state visit by the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei 
precipitated the worst mob violence in Jakarta since the fall of Sukarno. 
Student activists and poor urban youths joined to condemn what they saw 
as the corrupt connivance of the government and the Japanese in looting 
Indonesia’s resources. At one point, some 20,000 demonstrators were sur-
rounding Tanaka’s guest house and 5,000 were at the presidential palace. 
The government’s security apparatus only intervened on the second day, and 
then cracked down decisively. Eleven people died, some 200 were seriously 
injured, 8,000 cars and 100 buildings were burned, shops selling Japanese 
goods were looted and 770 people were arrested, some being held for over 
two years. Three student activists were imprisoned. This time, instead of 
blaming clandestine Communists for the violence, the regime denounced 
former Masyumi and Socialist Party activists, thus reviving the image of 
political Islam as a threat to the nation. In the 1977 national elections, 
Golkar still triumphed with 62.8 per cent of the votes, but the new fusion of 
Islamic parties within PPP (discussed below) — which had NU within it and 
thus garnered NU’s relatively reliable constituency — won 29.3 per cent of 
the vote, reflecting a potential for organised Islam to challenge the regime’s 
128 See further the essays in Fuad Jabali and Jamhari (eds), IAIN dan modernisasi Islam 
di Indonesia (Ciputat: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2002).
129 A contraction of Malapetaka Januari, January Disaster.
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supremacy. So the government saw a potential for Islamic organisations and 
student activists to destabilise itself. Further student demonstrations took 
place on campuses in 1977–8.
The government decided that it must reign in the students — who 
were inspired, as students often are, by a degree of morality and principle 
that the government found unwelcome. This meant in the first place shutting 
down the activist-dominated student councils at major universities. This was 
dubbed ‘campus normalisation’, but its consequences were hardly what the 
government intended. Government security forces invaded the troublesome 
campuses — among which Yogyakarta’s Universitas Gadjah Mada was 
prominent — and arrested both students and academic staff. Then student 
councils were replaced by bodies controlled by the university administrations. 
The effect of this, however, was to relocate student activism underground and 
to the area of the university where the regime was reluctant to intervene with 
force — the mosque. At Gadjah Mada, for example, the Salahuddin mosque 
became a centre of student piety and political discussion. Campus mosques 
— among which the Salman mosque at the Institute of Technology in 
Bandung was also prominent — spawned Muslim Brotherhood-style study 
circles that fostered general student piety as well as Dakwahist and Islamist 
groups, some of which later embraced extremist actions.130
The New Order sought further institutions to control and direct 
Islam. One of the most important was the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, 
Indonesian Islamic Scholars’ Council), established in 1975. At that time, 
this was intended as a means for the government to direct Islam and in 
some Islamic circles it was stigmatised for this reason. Only after the fall 
of Soeharto would MUI become a means for Islamic interests — mainly 
from the most conservative, Islamist and Dakwahist quarters — to direct 
the government. Although he initially criticised the idea of such a council, 
Hamka accepted appointment as its first chairman, but then resigned in 1981 
in protest at MUI’s lack of independence from government influence.131
130 See Guinness, Kampung, Islam and state, pp. 128–9; Nancy J. Smith-Hefner, 
‘Javanese women and the veil in post-Soeharto Indonesia’, Journal of Asian Studies 
vol. 66, no. 2 (May 2007), p. 396; Porter, Managing politics and Islam, p. 58. Guin-
ness points out that there were parallel developments among Christians in this 
period.
131 See Mohammad Atho Mudzhar, Fatwa-fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Sebuah 
studi tentang pemikiran hukum Islam di Indonesia, 1975–1988 ( Jakarta: INIS, 1993), p. 
56 et seqq. The immediate issue prompting Hamka’s resignation was his view that it 
was haram for Muslims to join in Christmas celebrations, quite a common practice in 
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Government initiatives in promoting what it regarded as acceptable 
forms of Islam competed not only with NU at grass-roots level, but also 
with the newly established Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, 
Indonesian Islamic Mission Council). This was set up in May, 1967 by Natsir, 
to whom is frequently ascribed the saying, ‘Before, we conducted dakwah 
through politics; now, we pursue politics through dakwah.’132 He was utterly 
excluded from any form of political activity but the regime allowed him to 
create this crucially important proselytism body. Why it should have done 
so remains unclear. Natsir was a man of broad learning who was attracted 
to the more puritanical versions of Islam from his early years, when he 
became an important figure in Persatuan Islam. In the 1950s he had his 
first experience of an international Islamic gathering when he attended a 
conference in Damascus and there met major Muslim figures including the 
Pakistani Islamist thinker Sayyid Abu ’l-a‘la Mawdudi and the Indian scholar 
Syed Abu Hasan an-Nadwi.133 Natsir developed close relations with Saudi 
Arabian leaders and thus became a founding member and vice-president of 
the Saudi-sponsored Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami (Muslim World League), 
established in 1962. This organisation benefited from the Saudi kingdom’s 
vastly increased income in the wake of the oil price rises of the 1970s; it 
thus became a major vehicle for promoting Wahhabi thought in the Islamic 
world.134 DDII became the Rabitat’s main channel in Indonesia. DDII 
trained preachers, supported the building of mosques, distributed free copies 
of the Qur’an, sponsored and distributed translations of Wahhabi works and 
Indonesia at the time. The government, however, approved of such joint celebrations 
as vehicles for multi-religious harmony. Discussions of MUI can be found in multiple 
sources. See, for example, Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Reformasi, religious diversity and Islamic 
radicalism after Suharto’, Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities vol. 1 
(2008), p. 26 (http://www.kitlv-journals.nl/index.php/jissh/index); Porter, Managing 
politics and Islam, pp. 78–9.
132 R. Michael Feener, Muslim legal thought in modern Indonesia (Cambridge, etc.: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 103.
133 Interview with Dr Mohammad Natsir, Jakarta, 14 Aug. 1977.
134 When I asked Mohammad Roem in 1977 whether the rise in oil prices in the 
Middle East was contributing to increasing Islamic activism in Indonesia, he replied, 
‘Oh certainly, certainly. It is at least beginning. But I think it’s increasing because we 
have no idea how rich they are’ (interview, 3 Aug. 1977). On the establishment of 
the Rabitat, see also Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The trail of political Islam (transl. Anthony 
F. Roberts. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), 
pp. 52, 72.
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the writings of others, including Mawdudi135 and the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood thinker Sayyid Qutb. It was particularly influential among 
students at state universities, where it promoted Muslim Brotherhood-
style religious study circles; it had much less success in penetrating IAINs. 
In future years, many of the most puritanical and, indeed, extremist of 
Indonesia’s Dakwahists and Islamists would be associated with DDII at 
some stage in their lives.136
Natsir and his DDII were motivated by a perceived need to purify 
Islam from local corruptions and to defend the Islamic community against 
what was seen as a pervasive threat of Christianisation. Opposition to local 
traditions was deeply rooted in Natsir’s mind, as the following comments 
about slametans — a central ritual of Javanese abangan life — show:
Wayang and gamelan are not forbidden in Islam. But it is just a tool to 
propagate Islam if you wanted to use it. It was also a tool during the old 
days. … But all the slametans, for instance: it is uneconomic and when 
you have to develop the country economically, you have to get rid of all 
this nonsense. … The people in the villages … have their tradition. … 
We cannot leave them in that superstition. For instance, when somebody 
dies, their tradition is that the family should slaughter a buffalo or a cow 
and there is quite a feast [i.e., a slametan]. Why [are they] having a feast 
when somebody has died? You are in sorrow. … Now all these things 
which came into Islam during all the ages we have to purify.137
Between the thinking of Natsir and those who agreed with him on the one 
hand and the dancing followers of Embah Wali in Tugurejo on the other 
yawned an immense religious, cultural, social and educational chasm, the 
source of much dissent and tension as Islamisation deepened in Java.
135 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, later renowned as a progressive and pluralist leader of 
Muhammadiyah, reports in his autobiography how in his younger years, in the 
1950s–70s, he was ‘one of the strong supporters of the idea of an Indonesian Islamic 
state. The thinking of Masyumi figures and Mawdudi were my primary references’; 
Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Titik-titik kisar di perjalananku: Otobiografi Ahmad Syafii 
Maarif ( Jogjakarta: Ombak and Maarif Institute, 2006), p. 195.
136 Further on DDII, see, inter alia, Assyaukanie, Islam and the secular state, p. 183; 
Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Traditionalist and Islamist pesantrens in contemporary 
Indonesia’, in Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen (eds), The 
madrasa in Asia: Political activism and transnational linkages (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2008), pp. 230–1; Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘The Salafi madrasas of 
Indonesia’, in ibid., pp. 250–1; Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 107, 109.
137 Interview with Dr Mohammad Natsir, Jakarta, 14 Aug. 1977.
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Thus it was that by the 1970s there was established a clear pattern of 
competition between the government on the one hand and private pious 
individuals and organisations on the other, each pursuing and trying to direct 
its own version of the deeper Islamisation of Java, and of Indonesia more 
generally. Unlike the pattern in the 1950s and early 1960s, there was no 
element in this competition that was seeking to resist Islamisation. Except, 
of course, for Christian churches and those still defending kebatinan — both 
of them targets of much animosity from the private Islamisers. At grass roots 
level, the push for a more exacting compliance with the demands of Islam 
was tangible. It was also audible, for the electronic amplification of the five-
times-daily call to prayer became a standard part of life in the course of the 
New Order, promoted not only by the increasing number of mosques we 
noted above but also by the spreading supply of electricity to urban areas 
and, much more slowly, to rural villages.138
The death of aliran politics and Islamisation from below
The destruction of PKI was clearly instrumental in facilitating the 
Islamisation surge, for thereby one of the pillars of aliran politics was 
demolished. The government took a crucial further step in this direction 
in the wake of the 1971 election. New Order elections were neither free 
nor fair, but they allowed a degree of public political competition; for the 
purposes of its own legitimacy the regime sought big Golkar victories. Its 
success in the New Order’s first elections in 1971 exceeded even its own 
expectations, with Golkar winning 62.8 per cent of the national vote. PNI 
still existed, but its glory days were over: Golkar had taken over much of its 
previous constituency of priyayi bureaucrats and abangan followers. PNI won 
just 6.9 per cent of the national vote. NU was the strongest of the surviving 
parties from the past, winning 18.7 per cent nationally. The Central and East 
Java voting patterns confirmed the dominance of Golkar, but PNI’s vote in 
Central Java remained significant and NU’s was even more so, especially 
138 As late as 1984, only 15 per cent of Indonesian households had electricity, and 
the figure was even that high mainly because of superior electricity supply to urban 
areas, the figure for Jakarta being over 40 per cent. In rural areas, barely 10 per cent 
of homes had electricity and, at national level, only about one-quarter of villages 
had effective electrical supply. The government planned major expansion in the 
1984–9 five-year plan. See Mohan Munasinghe, ‘Rural electrification: International 
experience and policy in Indonesia’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies vol. 24, 
no. 2 (Aug. 1988), p. 94.
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in its heartland of East Java, where it took 35.1 per cent of the vote. The 
Modernist Parmusi, however, was clearly of little significance.
The government took this result as grounds for finally eliminating 
the old parties altogether. It decreed that all political parties — which did 
not, of course, include Golkar since it was claimed to be an alternative 
to parties rather than a party itself — were to be fused into two party 
coalitions from January 1973. Thus was born the Islamic-based PPP (Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party), which brought 
together NU and Parmusi with some minor parties; for the first time since 
the bitter split of 1952, Traditionalists and Modernists were to be in the 
same political party. Their marriage would last a little longer but be just as 
difficult this time around. Out of non-Islamic parties — of which the most 
important was PNI, but also including the Catholic and Protestant parties 
— was born PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democracy 
Party). Except during election campaigns, these parties were not allowed 
to have organisations below Kabupaten (regency) level. So the idea of the 
populace as a depoliticised ‘floating mass’ — an idea first suggested by the 
Islamic intellectual Nurcholish Madjid (about whom more below)140 — was 
adopted as government policy. This did not, again, apply to Golkar, which 
was represented all the way down to village society by its minions, the 
bureaucracy and the military.
It is difficult to emphasise enough the significance for the Islamisation 
of the Javanese of this final destruction of the old political parties. Abangan 
villagers generally distrusted and avoided institutions. Village harmony was 
the most valued objective in their society, and it was for this that slametans 
were so important, for they symbolised, enacted and reinforced the solidarity 
Table 13  Percentage of valid votes won by major parties in Central and East
  Java, 1971139 
Region Golkar PNI NU Parmusi Others
Central Java 50.3 19.4 23.1 4.5 2.3
East Java 54.9 4.9 35.1 2.7 2.2
139 Masashi Nishihara, Golkar and the Indonesian elections of 1971 (Ithaca, NY: 
Monograph Series no. 56, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1972), p. 
[69].
140 Ward, 1971 election, pp. 188–9.
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of village society at important times. Of village institutions — beyond those 
imposed by supra-village authorities in the name of administration — there 
were hardly any. Except, that is, for the political parties that had rested 
upon abangan constituencies. In the post-independence period, the most 
important of these were PKI and PNI. The earlier chapters of this book and 
my study of the 1830–1930 period, Polarising Javanese society, have depicted 
how the existence of these political parties and their competition with santri-
based parties politically reified and socially reinforced the tension between 
abangan and santri. This worsening conflict became bloody at Madiun and 
reached a murderous peak in 1965–6, with echoes that reverberated for 
decades thereafter.
Now, with PKI annihilated and PNI swept into a cumbersome political 
amalgam without village branches, there were no significant institutions 
remaining to defend and promote abangan social, cultural and spiritual styles. 
De-institutionalisation of abangan village life was virtually complete. The 
santri side of Javanese life also suffered a loss of political institutions under the 
New Order, of course. But santris had many other institutions that promoted, 
reinforced and defended their more pious styles. Mosques and prayer-houses, 
pesantrens and madrasahs, universities, clinics and hospitals, orphanages, books, 
magazines, sermons, Muhammadiyah, NU, DDII, Persatuan Islam, a host 
of other organisations that we will meet below in this book, government 
programmes promoting Islam — all these institutionally strengthened the 
santri side of Javanese life. There were no abangan equivalents of any of them 
of any consequence. Pious Islam was identified with progress, modernity 
and development. Abangan were regarded as backward, ignorant peasants. 
The advanced philosophical speculations of the Mystic Synthesis style that 
were so influential among priyayi Javanese in the past — not to mention 
the anti-Islamic works of the 19th century — were likely now only to be 
studied in private by the older generation. Meanwhile, their children and 
grandchildren were increasingly learning more standard forms of religion in 
school. Kebatinan challenged Islamisation, but was itself in most cases poorly 
institutionalised. The institutional weight was utterly overwhelmingly on 
the santri side — that is, on the side of deeper Islamisation, against which 
there were now no significant institutionalised religious barriers other than 
Christianity and no significant political barriers at all.141
141 See also the comments in Affan Gaffar, Javanese voters: A case study of election 
under a hegemonic party system (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1992), 
pp. 190, 195.
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Muslim leaders knew that there was no real prospect of them claiming 
political power, so their attention turned decisively towards Islamisation 
from below. In a situation in which Islamism had no hope of success, 
Dakwahism came to dominate the agenda, exemplified by Natsir’s DDII, as 
we noted above. This turn to dakwah had the effect of diminishing Islamic 
organisations as potential political threats in the eyes of Soeharto and his 
circle: Communism was exterminated and political Islam was cowed. ‘We 
have become wiser’, said Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. ‘We have seen the 
experience of Pakistan. We have seen the efforts of the so-called Darul 
Islam in Indonesia and … I think it’s not necessary to try to obtain an 
Islamic state.’ Rather, people should be led to understand Islam as it truly 
is, he believed. ‘If they understand Islam, and are willing to live according 
to Muslim rules then necessarily, automatically, we will get a Muslim state 
in the long run.’142 For Natsir and many others, the ‘long run’ was always 
about political power. I asked him whether he thought it necessary for Islam 
to exert influence at the very centre of government. ‘Oh yes. Oh yes,’ he 
replied. ‘Not only for Islam, for every ideology.’143 The influential Islamic 
broadcaster Osman Raliby (of Acehnese descent) also took the view that 
emphasis on dakwah was simply a necessary interim measure. Islam had not 
failed politically: ‘It is not ripe yet, that is why we start with this dakwah,’ he 
said. ‘Every teaching should have coercive power; otherwise what is the use 
of the teaching if there is no power for it?’144
Nurcholish Madjid (1939–2005) played an important part in develop-
ing a more accommodating attitude on the part of Islamic activists towards 
the increasingly dominant — but also authoritarian and increasingly corrupt 
— Soeharto regime. Nurcholish was born in Jombang in East Java, was 
educated at the famous modern Islamic boarding school at Gontor,145 and 
emerged as an original thinker in the early New Order. In the 1980s he 
went to the University of Chicago where he gained his doctorate under the 
Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman. Nurcholish’s 1984 thesis on the medieval 
thinker Ibn Taimiyya established him as the foremost proponent in Indonesia 
of a Historicalist approach to Islam. Even before this, however, in the early 
142 Interview, Jakarta, 3 Aug. 1977.
143 Interview, Jakarta, 14 Aug. 1977.
144 Interview, Jakarta, 14 Aug. 1977.
145 On Gontor in the early New Order period, see Castles, ‘Notes on the Islamic 
school at Gontor’. Nurcholish described his time at Gontor in 1955–61 as ‘one of 
the most valuable phases of my life’; interview, Jakarta, 6 Aug. 1977.
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1970s Nurcholish provoked much controversy by proclaiming that there was 
no need for an Islamic political party and the idea of an Islamic state was 
dead. Rather, Islamisation from below should be the objective. ‘I would say 
that the older generation emphasise too much politicising Islam’, he said, 
‘making Islam a political weapon to gain power. … The younger generation, 
especially represented by my friends and I, emphasise the ethics and not the 
political ideology of Islam.’146
Nurcholish’s dismissal of Islamic politics and call to distinguish between 
what was truly sacred and what was secular enraged some ex-Masyumi 
politicians and older-generation thinkers, among them Natsir, Rasjidi 
and Hamka. Nurcholish came to be regarded as one of the foremost new, 
moderate Islamic intellectuals along with a few others, most notably NU’s 
Abdurrahman Wahid.147 Nurcholish was driven by a sense that Islam needed 
a major reformation, not unlike the Protestant Reformation in Christian 
history. To him, the modernisation brought about by the great Modernist 
icons of the 19th and 20th centuries, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 
‘Abduh and Muhammad Rashid Rida, was ‘very incomplete’.148 But there 
was no need to pursue an Islamic state, he insisted. This was one of the first 
steps towards what would eventually become a coalition of some leading 
Islamic — eventually even Islamist — activists and New Order power-
holders in the period to be discussed in the next chapter.
The increasing Islamisation of Javanese society was already becoming 
obvious by the 1970s; there was much variety in how this happened from 
place to place, but the general trend was consistent. Islamisation was 
facilitated not only by the developments already discussed in this chapter, 
but by the fact that, in some places, Islamic leaders at grass-roots level were 
not as doctrinaire as national-level Modernists were. During his fieldwork 
in 1970–2, Nakamura found Muhammadiyah in Kota Gede — regarded as 
146 Interview, Jakarta, 6 Aug. 1977.
147 There is a great deal of literature on the ideas of Nurcholish Madjid and 
Abdurrahman Wahid. See particularly Effendy, Islam and the state, pp. 65–101; 
Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 115–8; Greg Barton, ‘Neo-Modernism: A vital synthesis of 
traditionalist and Modernist Islamic thought in Indonesia’, SI vol. 2 (1995), no. 3, 
pp. 1–75; Fauzan Saleh, Modern trends in Islamic theological discourse in 20th century 
Indonesia: A critical survey (Leiden, etc.: Brill, 2001), pp. 246–78. A broad account of 
Muslim intellectuals’ relations with the New Order regime, especially in the 1980s, is 
in M. Syafi’i Anwar, Pemikiran dan aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah kajian politik tentang 
cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru ( Jakarta: Penerbit Paramadina, 1995).
148 Interview with Nurcholish Madjid, Jakarta, 6 Aug. 1977.
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a Muhammadiyah stronghold — to be so. ‘It looks aggressive and fanatic, 
but in fact its ways of propagation are gradual and tolerant,’ he concluded. ‘It 
may appear anti-Javanese’, but it was not in fact so in his view.149 Mohamad 
Roem was also of the view that Modernism had become more flexible and 
tolerant than in the pre-independence days.150 But, as we will see shortly, 
and as Modernist responses to Christianisation described above have already 
suggested, there was still plenty of anger and doctrinaire thought on the 
Modernist side in the early New Order.
The increase in those going on the hajj to Mecca was an indicator of 
both increasing piety and increasing wealth as Indonesia’s economy began 
to improve. I have only been able to locate evidently reliable figures for the 
early New Order period with regard to Central Java, as seen in Table 14.151 
There was thus nearly a six-fold increase in pilgrimage traffic from Central 
Java in just five years. This is consistent with what Nakamura observed in his 




1972 1336  
1973 2121  
1974 4024  
149 Nakamura, Crescent arises over the banyan tree, pp. 182–3.
150 Interview, Jakarta, 3 Aug. 1977. 
151 An ongoing problem was corruption within the Ministry of Religion, particularly 
with regard to the administration of the pilgrimage. So too much reliance should not 
be placed on these figures.
152 Nazir Djalal, ‘Djumlah djemaah hadji Indonesia tahun 1970/71’ (unpublished 
typescript based on Dep. Agama data, in papers of George McT. Kahin at 
Cornell University); idem, ‘Perintjian djemaah hadji tiap propinsi tahun 1969–70’ 
(unpublished typescript based on data from Direktorat Urusan Hadji, Dep. 
Agama, in papers of George McT. Kahin at Cornell University); Tim Penyusun 
Monografi Daerah Jawa Tengah, Monografi daerah Jawa Tengah ([ Jakarta:] Proyek 
Pengembangan Media Kebudayaan, Ditjen Kebudayaan Departemen Pendidikan dan 
Kebudayaan RI, n.d. [1976?]), p. 53.
153 The figure for this year includes Yogyakarta, which is excluded from the later 
figures.
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study in Kota Gede (Yogyakarta area) in the early 1970s, where increasing 
numbers of abangan were ‘moving towards the category of santri, becoming 
more orthodox in their thought and deed as Muslims’.154 And going on the 
pilgrimage.
Mudjahirin Thohir’s study of Bangsri, in the Jepara area, exemplifies 
the connection between educational reform and Islamisation.155 This was 
an area where, in the past, abangan had only rarely prayed. The key activists 
in the Islamisation that commenced in the New Order arrived from Jepara, 
Klaten and Yogyakarta to teach in the primary school. By 1977 Bangsri had 
a Muhammadiyah junior high school. Across the whole Kabuten (regency) 
of Jepara, the number of local people going on the hajj grew rapidly. In 1971, 
59 people went. Thereafter there were some fluctuations, but the pattern was 
one of growth. In 1980, 256 departed. In 1990, the number was 404. From 
1984 onwards, over a thousand went on the pilgrimage each year, reaching 
2474 in the year 2000. A notable development is that down to 1978 the 
majority of aspirant hajis were male; from that year onwards, women were 
usually in the majority.
It is notable that this Islamisation in Bangsri took place in the early 
years of the New Order, when NU was still so distrusted by the regime 
in Jakarta and thus by local government that its grass-roots networks in 
that area were hardly mobilised for this purpose. According to Mudjahirin 
Thohir’s sources, local schools that had NU in their names dropped them. 
When NU people became public servants, they had to distance themselves 
from NU activities and establish links with Golkar, which generated further 
tension between them and NU activists who were not in public employment. 
NU’s large public religious lectures (pengajian akbar), often conducted to 
audiences in the hundreds, had to be curtailed. Pesantrens carried on, but 
political subjects had to be avoided.
In Kediri, too, the early New Order is remembered as a time of 
Islamisation, looked back upon from an NU perspective.156 The senior kyai of 
the great pesantren at Lirboyo, Ky. H. Mahrus Aly, already had contacts with 
the cigarette company Gudang Garam, which during Guided Democracy 
154 Nakamura, Crescent arises over the banyan tree, p. 13.
155 The following discussion of Bangsri rests upon Mudjahirin Thohir, Orang Islam 
Jawa pesisiran, pp. 48, 108–11, 159, 215–6, 218–9, 254–5.
156 The following is from a discussion with Ky. H. Imam Yahya Mahrus (Ky. Imam), 
the son of Mahrus Aly, Lirboyo, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007. Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar (Gus 
War) of the Jamsaren pesantren in Kediri (discussion of 28 Aug. 2003) spoke of 
government sponsorship of religious education in former PKI areas.
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had faced many difficulties from PKI unions. According to Mahrus Aly’s 
son Ky. Imam, Mahrus Aly also had close links with the Brawijaya Division 
of the army and was a senior confidant of the local police. In 1966 Gudang 
Garam asked his help in getting rid of the PKI and, with his instructions, 
Ansor played the role already described in the previous chapter. Thereafter, 
Gudang Garam’s business developed rapidly and its alliance with the 
kyais of Kediri remained firm. The local people around Lirboyo had been 
overwhelmingly abangan and supporters of PKI, but as time passed they 
responded to Islamic proselytism and became loyal Muslims. Kebatinan 
declined. Abangan practices such as the annual ritual cleansing of the village 
(bersih desa), veneration of the grave of the village founder, the holding of 
slametans and making of offerings (sajen) to spiritually powerful beings and 
places came to an end. They were replaced with Traditionalist devotional 
practices such as tahlilan157 and yasinan.158 
As was true of new converts to Christianity in their relations with 
established Christians, abangan who became newly committed Muslims were 
sometimes suspected of lacking real sincerity in their faith. The north coast 
village of Kajen, which is famous for its numerous Traditionalist pesantrens 
and the grave of a local saint, also experienced conversions of previous 
abangan to more committed Islamic life after 1965–6. But they were not 
admitted to the status of santri. Rather, these newly practicing Muslims 
were called tangklukan. This term comes from Javanese taklukan (those who 
have submitted), but it was, in effect, re-Arabised by inserting the ng — the 
way the Arabic ‘ain appears in Javanese — thereby invoking its Arabic root 
ta‘alluq (attachment, devotion), to produce tangklukan. Arabising of course 
makes something seem more properly Islamic. These tangklukan were kept 
separate from santri in certain circumstances, for example during Ramadan 
prayers. ‘We pray separately’, one tangklukan informant told Ahmad Syafi’i 
Mufid during his fieldwork in 1989, ‘because we have to repay our debt for 
157 Group repetitive chanting of the first part of the confession of faith, that there is 
no God but God (La ilaha illa ‘llah).
158 Group repetitive chanting of Qur’an sura 36. This is, as Abdel Haleem puts it, ‘A 
Meccan sura that emphasises the divine source of the Qur’an and defends it from 
the charge of being poetry made by man …. It warns of the fate of men who are 
stubborn and always mock God’s revelations. They are reminded of the punishment 
that befell earlier generations, and of God’s power as shown in His Creation. The 
end of the sura gives strong arguments for the reality of the Resurrection’; in Qur’an: 
A new translation by Abdel Haleem, p. 281. It is particularly used at funerals and other 
commemorations of deaths.
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the prayers that we omitted in the past’. They also tended to follow different 
tarekats, the tangklukan favouring Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya and santri 
joining Naqshabandiyya of the Khalidiyya branch, which was regarded as 
being more elite in religious terms.159
Modernists’ laments at national level
The changes described above in this chapter were profound, and many of 
them profoundly angered senior figures of Modernist Islam. The advancing 
Islamisation of society was welcome to them, but they did not find 
themselves in control of it and indeed felt threatened by the competing 
advance of Christianity. The government had sidelined them politically, 
competed with their institutional tools for Islamising the society, failed to 
outlaw kebatinan — indeed after initial hostility to kebatinan, the government 
was becoming sympathetic to it — and had not halted Christianisation. It 
was clear that, under the New Order regime, Islam was not a tool for 
modernising and liberating the society in the ways that senior Modernists 
thought it should be; rather, it was meant to be a tool for government social 
control. Younger Islamic leaders like Nurcholish Madjid were meanwhile 
challenging some of the most basic ideas held by the senior Modernists, 
and earned their denunciation for doing so. The government attracted their 
ire, too. Many of these Modernist leaders were men of deep conviction and 
courage in the face of government authoritarianism and their complaints 
sometimes tested the limits of regime tolerance. A few examples will convey 
the flavour of this discourse.
In December 1969, Hamka spoke lengthily and in uncompromising 
terms to a Muhammadiyah conference in Ponorogo. He was rather more 
Revivalist than Modernist on this occasion, reflecting a stream within 
Muhammadiyah that would strengthen in coming years, and clearly angry. 
He emphasised that Muhammadiyah was a renewal movement (gerakan 
tajdid) that was Salafi, that is, which sought to hold firm to the example of 
the Prophet and his companions as found in the Qur’an and Hadiths. ‘To 
do that, it is important for us to pay attention to the fruits of new thinking 
159 Ahmad Syafi’i Mufid, Tangklukan, abangan dan tarekat: Kebangkitan agama di 
Jawa ( Jakarta: Yayasan Obor, 2006), esp. pp. 131–46. The local saint in question is 
the 18th-century figure Ky. H. Ahmad Mutamakin; see M.C. Ricklefs, The seen and 
unseen worlds in Java: History, literature and Islam in the court of Pakubuwana II (St 
Leonards, NSW, and Honolulu: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association 
with Allen & Unwin and University of Hawai‘i Press, 1998), pp. 131 et seqq.
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discovered by modern Islamic thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb and … Mawdudi 
… and others. … Their thinking is very different from the previous period, 
for example the time of Muhammad ‘Abduh’. Hamka went on,
In the period since the Muslim Brotherhood, pioneered by Sayyid Qutb, 
we are invited to think how to stand firm on the base of Islam itself. 
Islamic movements are nowadays pioneered by intellectuals who have 
fathomed Western culture and, after discovering all its secrets, have 
returned to Islam with full conviction. … If the Western world were 
asked, which do they regard as more dangerous, Communism or Islam, 
Westerners will spontaneously answer, ‘Islam is more dangerous’. … 
Because of this, even if political colonialism has ended, the West and the 
Communist world want to try to introduce a new colonialism which is 
more dreadful; that is, colonialism of thought. …
Thought Attack160 
 Thought Attack is an amazing propaganda technique, via every 
avenue, whether crude or smooth, whether cultural or scientific, so that 
the way the Islamic world thinks should change from its religious base, 
and so it unconsciously thinks that the only way for Muslims to progress 
is to abandon Islamic Thought. …
 Since Indonesian independence, the continuation of [the colonial 
government’s] ‘neutrality’ is ‘secularism’. … The minority [meaning the 
Christians] has got on top and the majority [meaning the Muslims] finds 
its way diminished. … The word ‘tolerance’ is used to cover up idleness 
and weakness. So without limits the followers of that other religion I 
just mentioned erect churches in Muslim areas, even though there are no 
Christians there. And if the Muslim side opposes and challenges this, it 
is they who are called fanatics. …
 When the post-Sukarno age came, after PKI was successfully 
neutralised, a new sound arose — that is, the sound of modernisation. 
… Human instinct certainly believes in the supernatural. After people 
rejected militant and dynamic Islam, they channelled their sense of the 
supernatural and their secularism into other paths. Thus arose rituals of 
meditating at graves, …lighting candles at midnight, meditating in front 
of a grave to ask blessings. … Thus arise ‘tolerance’ holidays, praying in 
the Islamic fashion, praying in the Christian fashion and meditating in 
the Hindu Balinese fashion in a halal bi halal 161 gathering. And in lots 
160 Hamka uses the Arabic phrase al-ghazwu’l-fikri, meaning literally an assault 
upon the realm of thought. It is commonly used in the Islamic world to describe the 
perceived attack upon Islam by Western ideas.
161 The paying of mutual respects and seeking forgiveness for past mistakes and 
offences.
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of other ways, until secularism becomes a kind of religion — just so long 
as you change from Islam, which is feared, because according to colonial 
teaching, Islam is dangerous. It is Extreme Right. …162
 There is constant contriving so that people implement and preserve 
Pancasila, but anybody at all who consistently adheres to tauhid,163 the 
unity of Allah, Ketuhanan yang maha esa [‘the one and only God’, the 
first principle of the Pancasila] at some time or other will be accused of 
being anti-Pancasila. …
 The spread of immorality nowadays is also from the influence of 
ideological colonialism; Christianity and Zionism have united to face 
Islam which is arising. … Pornographic films, miniskirts, the Beatles 
and the hippy movement — their targets are the youths. … This moral 
destruction has been spreading since from America and Europe, youths 
have been inhaling marijuana. … In big cities like Jakarta, Surabaya, 
Bandung and others, there is spreading the association [of young men 
and women] before marriage. When there is a child in the belly: just 
because of that, they marry. …
 In the West, no one cares any more about religious values. … There 
is a philosopher named Jean-Paul Sartre — that is, a Jew — who teaches 
the philosophy of ‘Wujudiyya’164 (Existentialism), which proposes 
awareness of one’s own self. … This doctrine is more extreme than 
Communism and its creator, too, is a Jew. …
 Family planning is also within the realm of Thought Attack, of 
thought-colonialism. … And then comes every kind of gambling. Nalo, 
Lotto, Hwa Hwee, casino. This is clearly immorality, but who dares to 
prohibit or resist it? None other than youths who are educated in Islamic 
sentiments…. If government seeks money … by opening up gambling, 
that means that government is collecting money by destroying the 
mentality and morality of the people. …
 There were festivities in Surabaya that were full of immorality during 
National Sports Week165 — immorality that was very striking! Many 
cultural figures asked very politely that the government curtail this 
immorality, but that request was not granted. Then a bomb went off in 
the midst of these festivities. And who was arrested? An Islamic youth! 
162 A term used in Soeharto’s time for extremist Islam, as opposed to Extreme Left, 
which was Communism.
163 The unity, the oneness, of God, the most central of all Islamic doctrines, affirmed 
in the first part of the confession of faith, that there is no God but God (La ilaha 
illa ‘llah).
164 Not, of course, the term used by Sartre. Wujudiyya was a Sufi doctrine of emana-
tion that was denounced as heretical by Nuruddin ar-Raniri in 17th-century Aceh.
165 PON, the Pekan Olahraga Nasional held in Surabaya in August–September 
1969.
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In the time of [the 1965] Gestapu/PKI,166 … in Surabaya it was Muslim 
youths who helped ABRI167 wipe out the PKI’s strength. Now it is these 
youths who are arrested and are thrown into jail and accused of being 
Communist. …
 Anyone at all who suggests ‘to command the right and forbid the 
wrong’168 is accused of engaging in ‘political guerilla war’ and shortly 
thereafter may even be accused of being anti-Pancasila. …
 We haven’t yet even considered the other forms of immorality which 
are known in Javanese as ma-lima [the five Ms]!169 …
 These things are all organised and put together from outside, in order 
to subjugate independent Indonesia by demolishing its moral and mental 
defences. It is regrettable, too, the implementation of this can sometimes 
be found in the institutions of government themselves.
 It is also regrettable that leaders of a certain Islamic political party 
collude in the importation of pornographic films,170 while the opening 
of a ‘nightclub’ — a place to exhibit naked women — whether in Jakarta 
or Surabaya, begins with the reading of prayer for which a kyai is invited 
— a figure from an Islamic political organisation.171 …
 Radio and television are full of songs imitating or plagiarised from 
the West, with Indonesian language that is Englished. …
 Militant Muhammadiyah youths have already pioneered resistance 
to immorality everywhere. Muhammadiyah youths sit in jail in Makassar 
166 The conventional way of describing the coup attempt of 1965. Gestapu was 
short for gerakan tigapuluh September (the 30 September movement) and an obvious 
allusion to the Gestapo of Nazi Germany.
167 The armed forces: Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia.
168 Amar ma‘ruf nahi mungkar, a fundamental obligation upon all Muslims, based 
on several Qur’anic passages, e.g., Qur’an 3:104: ‘You are the best community 
singled out for people: you order what is right, forbid what is wrong, and believe in 
God’; Qur’an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem, p. 42. On this crucial concept, see 
further Michael Cook, Commanding right and forbidding wrong in Islamic thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
169 The ma-lima are regarded — both by pious Muslims and abangan themselves — as 
the vices characteristic of abangan: main (gambling), madat (smoking opium), maling 
(thievery), madon (womanising, adultery) and minum or mendem (drinking alcohol).
170 I am not certain of this allusion, but imagine that it refers to NU.
171 Given the reference to a kyai, NU must be meant here. The specific reference may 
well be to Ky. Hamim Jazuli (1941–93, usually known as Gus Mik) from the Ploso 
pesantren (Kediri), an idiosyncratic and controversial, beer-drinking kyai frequently 
seen in the nightclubs and brothels of Surabaya, believed by his followers to be a 
saint (wali). See the account in Arif Zamhari, Rituals of Islamic spirituality: A study 
of Majlis Dhikr groups in East Java (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010), pp. 219–27. Gus 
Mik’s activities in Surabaya are described as dakwah like that of the wali sanga in 
MmK, 15 Oct. 2003.
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[as also] the head of the Tulungagung Muhammadiyah branch [and] 
several Muhammadiyah youths [because of ] the incident when grenades 
were thrown during the all-night festivities in Surabaya ….
 In the future we will see how amazing Thought Attack is — until 
sometimes even we ourselves, our neighbours, our way of thinking, like 
it or not, will suffer infiltration from this Thought Attack.
 In our renewal movement, in our belief and in our worship, we 
return to the Salaf school.172 … And in worldly affairs, we make use of 
all modern instruments to build the Ways of the Prophet. … Amin!173 
The anger displayed by Hamka in this speech in 1969 was repeated by 
many Modernist leaders on many occasions during the early New Order. 
Consider this speech on ‘various efforts to destroy the Islamic community’, 
delivered at the opening of a Muhammadiyah Youth conference in 1976 by 
the Muhammadiyah leader H.A.R. Fakhruddin:174
There are those whose target is the disappearance of Islam from Java 
within 15–30 years and from Indonesia in 50 years. In fact, there are 
some even more daring: Islam should be wiped out entirely by three 
years after the 1977 elections.
 If these efforts to destroy the Islamic community are unsuccessful, 
then there will be efforts to render superficial their understanding of 
the true teaching about Islam. That in addition to efforts to slander and 
divide the Islamic community, above all its leaders and organisations. … 
Not even I have escaped calumny. …
 There are also efforts to undermine Indonesia’s youth by destroying 
their moral character in various ways, for example by using films, 
licentious publications and so on.
 Because of this, the Muhammadiyah Youth (Angkatan Muda 
Muhammadiyah) which is active in the field of dakwah, in ‘commanding 
the right and forbidding the wrong’,175 must constantly increase the 
dynamism of its movement.176 
172 Madzhab Salaf, that is, of the time of the Prophet and the pious forefathers of 
Islam.
173 Hamka, ‘Beberapa tantangan terhadap Islam dimasa kini’, Pandji Masjarakat yr 
4, no. 50 (Dzulkqaidah 1389H / Djanuary 1970), pp. 3–5, 32–4. Hamka — who was 
editor of Panji Masyarakat — gave this speech at the conference of the Majlis Tanwir 
of Muhammadiyah, 25–8 December 1969, in Ponorogo.
174 Fakhruddin was born in Yogyakarta in 1916 and headed Muhammadiyah from 
1971 to 1985.
175 Amar ma‘ruf nahi mungkar. See note 168 above.
176 Fakhruddin, ‘Berbagai usaha ingin hancurkan ummat Islam’, Suara Muhammadiyah 
yr 56, no. 13 (Rajab II 1396 / 1 July II [sic] 1976), p. 1.
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Many similar examples could be found from the 1970s and later of 
national level Modernist leaders’ laments. They denounced Christianity, 
warned that kebatinan was a barrier to progress and development as well as 
a way for Communists to re-infiltrate the society, suspected the government 
of secret anti-Islamic agendas, bemoaned the corruption of the young by 
Western ideas and materialism, and feared that the abangan would continue 
to resist deeper Islamisation — despite mounting evidence to the contrary 
— and, along with them, so would many other Indonesians. While these 
fulminations were going on at national level, and doubtlessly encouraged by 
them, at the grass roots of Javanese society, activists inspired by Modernist 
and Revivalist ideologies, and with both Islamist and Dakwahist agendas, 
were taking action to purify their society and its practice of Islam. We can 
see this process — and its widely varying styles and consequences — best in 
the city of Surakarta.
Grass-roots purification movements in Surakarta in the 1970s
Surakarta was strongly pro-PKI in the late Sukarno period. In October 1965, 
Surakarta’s mayor was a Communist and announced his support for the coup 
action in Jakarta. The lives of many PKI members and sympathisers from the 
abangan community, along with Chinese lives and property, were lost there 
in the subsequent violence. Thereafter Islamisation efforts were intensified, 
with a significant increase in Qur’an study sessions (pengajian). This activity 
was initiated particularly by Modernists, for NU was, and remains, quite 
weak in the city. In the early stages the Jamsaren pesantren played a leading 
role. Its Ky. Jamaluddin (d. 1995) was particularly influential.177 He was of 
a Modernist inclination in his reliance upon reason to understand Islam’s 
revelations. He stood out above all the other Islamic leaders in Surakarta 
of the time, recalled Hj. Siti Aminah Abdullah (one of the founding pair 
of Assalaam school): he used his intellect to understand Islam and was 
moderate in his views.178 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir — later to gain fame as the 
177 See M. Hari Mulyadi, Soedarmono et al., Runtuhnya kekuasaan ‘Kraton Alit’ 
(Studi radikalisasi sosial ‘wong Solo’ dan kerusuhan Mei 1998 di Surakarta) (Surakarta: 
Lembaga Pengembangan Teknologi Pedesaan, 1999), pp. 330–1. Jamsaren was 
founded in the 18th century, had its ups and downs over time but began to develop 
again from c. 1960; it was in considerable danger in October 1965 because the 
surrounding population was heavily PKI; this according to notes on its history 
provided by Drs Soedarmono, 11 Nov. 2004.
178 Interview with Hj. Siti Aminah Abdullah, Surakarta, 11 Sept. 2008.
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reputed spiritual mentor of Jemaah Islamiyah ( JI) terrorists — dismissed 
him for the same reasons: he was a ‘rationalist’ who relied too heavily on 
human reason to understand supernatural matters. For his part, the moderate 
Jamaluddin also criticised Ba’asyir and his colleague Abdullah Sungkar, for 
reasons which will become clear below.179 The main actors in the purification 
movements in the 1970s and 1980s created major new schools, notably three 
Abdullahs — Abdullah Marzuki, Abdullah Thufail and Abdullah Sungkar. 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was also involved, but of less prominence in the 1970s 
and 1980s. These men exemplify the diversity of ideology and aspirations 
in Java’s Islamic world, and even display a not-irrelevant diversity of ethnic 
backgrounds — from Javanese to Pakistani to Arab.
Abdullah Thufail (or Abdullah Thufail Saputra or Abdullah Topel 
Suryasaputra) was the oldest of Surakarta’s three Abdullahs. He founded 
Majelis Tafsir al-Qur’an (MTA, The Qur’anic Interpretation Council) in 
Surakarta in 1972 and ran it until his death in 1992.180 His father was a 
Pakistani gem trader with a Javanese wife, who gave birth to Abdullah 
Thufail in Pacitan in 1927. Abdullah Thufail attended a Taman Siswa 
school at least at some point, was thus familiar with Javanese arts, and could 
perform classical Javanese dance. He became a trader as a means to support 
himself and, as he travelled throughout Indonesia, became persuaded that 
religious reform was essential and could only be achieved by returning to the 
Qur’an and Hadith. His religious thought was Modernist, with Modernism’s 
characteristic reliance on the human intellect to understand the true meaning 
of Islam. He was influenced by the great figures of Modernist thought such 
as al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh and Muhammad Rashid Rida, and by 
Mohammad Natsir, whom he much admired. His successor Ust. Ahmad 
Sukina describes MTA thought as very similar to that of Persatuan Islam. At 
some earlier stage, when he was living in Bali, Abdullah Thufail was regional 
head of Natsir’s DDII for the Nusatenggara Barat region.
Abdullah Thufail was active in proselytising work in Surakarta in the 
wake of the upheaval of 1965–6 and collaborated in pengajian sessions with 
Abdullah Marzuki and Abdullah Sungkar, both discussed below. Abdullah 
Thufail sought to join no faction and avoided politics. ‘We are without 
179 Interview with Ust. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Ngruki, Surakarta, 13 Sept. 2008.
180 The following account of Abdullah Thufail and MTA, unless otherwise indicated, 
rests upon interviews with Ust. Drs Ahmad Sukina et al., Surakarta, 6 Nov. 2006 and 
24 March 2008; and Sekilas tentang Yayasan Majlis Tafsir al-Qur’an (MTA) (mimeo 
brochure, n.d.). Further information on MTA is available through Majlis Tafsir Al 
Qur’an Online at http://mta-online.com/v2/.
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a school (madzhab)’, he told his followers, meaning that they adhered to 
no Traditionalist interpretation of Islam. MTA exemplified Modernist 
epistemology, with its reliance on the Qur’an and Hadith, and on human 
reasoning to understand them. Abdullah Thufail nevertheless sought to 
remain neutral in Modernist-Traditionalist disagreements. MTA regarded 
Sufism as full of deviations and had nothing to do with it, but was respectful 
towards those who wished to believe in it.
MTA avoided conflict with the New Order regime. When that regime 
demanded that everyone recognise the supremacy of Pancasila (which we 
will discuss in the next chapter), Abdullah Thufail saw no problems and 
introduced the required Pancasila lessons into the MTA curriculum. Abu 
Bakar Ba’syir remembered him as being easy-going with regard to the 
government’s shortcomings and progressively more easy-going over time 
towards Javanese culture.181
Illustration 10 MTA headquarters, Surakarta, 2008
181 Interview with Ust. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Ngruki, Surakarta, 13 Sept. 2008.
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Whereas for many reformers of Modernist inspiration, Christianisation 
was a major issue, for MTA — according to Ahmad Sukina — it was not, 
because the Islam that MTA teaches is ‘pure gold’, whereas the gold offered 
by others is counterfeit. So MTA was confident that Islam would prevail. 
Local Javanese traditions, however, were important matters. Javanese art 
forms were respected and, indeed, some were taught by MTA, including 
gamelan and wayang, so long as the supernatural ideas associated with them 
were expunged. But those that necessarily involved non-Islamic spiritual 
forces — which meant, of course, such crucial matters as slametans, pusakas, 
honouring the dead and propitiating local spirits and Ratu Kidul — must 
be abolished, for this was a form of polytheism. The MTA co-educational 
school in Surakarta eventually spawned a national network amounting to 134 
branches by the early 21st century.
The rigorous, indeed rather puritanical, intellectualism of Abdullah 
Thufail was not, however, to the taste of two other reformers, Abdullah 
Marzuki and his wife Siti Aminah Abdullah (who was also his cousin).182 
They were both Javanese in descent, from a pious santri background, and 
their parents had all been students at the famous Termas pesantren in Pacitan. 
Abdullah Marzuki was born in the early 1940s and came to know Islam 
initially in its village and Traditionalist Javanese style. Both his and Siti 
Aminah’s fathers were in a Sufi tarekat — in the case of Abdullah Marzuki’s 
father, at least, it was reportedly Naqshabandiyya — and Abdullah Marzuki 
himself followed Naqshabandiyya at least for a time. He and his wife became 
primary school teachers. For all their piety, neither of them was a learned 
scholar of Islam or expert in Arabic. In 1958 they were living in Wuryantoro 
(where Soeharto also had once lived) and set up a small printing business to 
produce materials needed in schools. From this beginning, an entrepreneurial 
flair enabled Abdullah Marzuki and Siti Aminah Abdullah to provide an 
economic foundation to their dakwah that the other, more learned, purifiers 
lacked. According to Siti Aminah’s brother Ahmad Syamsuri, they also had a 
committed work ethic in the secular world that made them different in style 
from the other Surakarta activists.
182 The following account of the history of Assalaam rests upon interviews with Hj. 
Siti Aminah Abdullah, Surakarta, 11 Sept. 2008; Drs Ahmad Syamsuri, Surakarta, 
20 March 2008; and Bambang Arif Rahman (who was teaching at the school), 
Surakarta, 20 March 2008. Further information on the school can be found at 
http://www.assalaam.or.id/.
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They moved their Tiga Serangkai (triumvirate)183 printing business 
to Surakarta in 1972 and there deepened their study of Islam with Ky. 
Jamaluddin, who had the greatest influence on them, and with others, 
including Abdullah Thufail. The latter they found too puritanical, too extreme 
in his views, so they formally advised him that they were withdrawing from 
his circle of followers. In their intellectual and religious progress, the pair 
had thus moved from their Traditionalist background to Modernist-style 
purifying ideas.
The couple organised pengajian for the employees of their printing firm 
and for the wider Surakarta society during the 1970s, in the new freedom 
made possible by the annihilation of PKI. In 1982 they formally established 
what they called Pondok Pesantren Modern Islam Assalaam for both male 
and female pupils. This was, says Ahmad Syamsuri, specifically set up to resist 
the extremism that the founders saw in other Islamic organisations around 
them. Assalaam was modeled in many ways on the famous school at Gontor, 
but it was not meant to be an exact copy. The government curriculum was 
combined with Islamic subjects so that graduates were qualified for higher 
Illustration 11 Assalaam pesantren, Surakarta, 2006, with a banner saying, 
‘Welcome, santris of Assalaam: return to Assalaam with 
new enthusiasm to become the best’
183 So named to commemorate the ‘Book Store Three’ — Toko Buku Tiga — which 
had been acting as their agent in selling the publications. Nowadays, it would be 
surprising for a Modernist Islamic organisation to use ‘three’ in a title, for that is 
frequently — and irrationally — taken by extremists as a covert sign of the Christian 
Trinity.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t179   179 6/20/2012   1:21:06 PM
180 Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java
education and employment. Here, with fully Javanese leaders of a small-town 
background and past links with Sufism, the Javanese arts were allowed, but 
not of course the ideas about supernatural forces that are associated with 
them. ‘Modern Sufism’ like Hamka’s tasawwuf modern has also come to be 
discussed more recently (although not as part of the formal curriculum). 
Wayang and gamelan were acceptable there. Nor, it seems, was there any 
haste about getting rid of ideas about Ratu Kidul or Sunan Lawu: that was 
something that would come in time through education. Today, Assalaam is 
one of the foremost pesantrens of Central Java, situated on over 10 ha with 
over 2,000 students.184
If, however, Abdullah Thufail was too hard-line for Abdullah Marzuki 
and Siti Aminah, he was not firm enough for the real hard man of the three 
Abdullahs: Abdullah Sungkar.185 He, like his associate Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, 
was of Arab ancestry, but neither of them was a Habib. That is to say, neither 
could claim descent from the Prophet and the special spiritual authority 
that attaches to it. Abdullah Sungkar was a native of Surakarta, having been 
born there in 1937; in the early 1970s he was chairman of the Central Java 
branch of DDII. His associate Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was born in Jombang in 
1938; from 1959 to 1963 he studied the Arabic language at Gontor, and then 
moved to Surakarta, just as the political conflicts of the late Sukarno period 
were reaching their peak. There he met Abdullah Sungkar. Audiotapes of 
sermons by these two capture something of their different styles. Sungkar’s 
184 Bambang Arif Rahman advises me (email of 1 July 2010) that the Assalaam 
enrolment figures at that point were 1,259 male and 1,011 female pupils, for a total 
of 2,270. It should be noted that Assalaam has arrangements to keep boys and girls 
separate from each other, including separate library spaces, separate dormitories and 
separate entrances to the school.
185 The following account of Adullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Ngruki rests 
upon interviews with Ust. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Ngruki, 26 March 2007, 20 March 
2008 and 13 Sept. 2008; and with Ust. H. Wahyuddin (Abdullah Sungkar’s son-in-
law, in charge of the school while Ba’asyir was in jail), Ngruki, 26 March 2006; as 
well as International Crisis Group, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the ‘Ngruki 
network’ in Indonesia (Asia briefing; Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 8 
Aug. 2002), esp. pp. 8–11. See further van Bruinessen, ‘Traditionalist and Islamist 
pesantrens’, pp. 231–2. There are many other publications with information (and 
not a small amount of disinformation) on these subjects. In general, the work of the 
International Crisis Group in Indonesia under the leadership of Sidney Jones is to 
be preferred over other sources. Publications by self-proclaimed terrorism experts, on 
the whole, either are based on International Crisis Group material if they are reliable 
or, if not based on that material, are frequently unreliable.
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 Illustration 13 Audiotapes of sermons by Abdullah Sungkar and 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir on ‘serving God’, ‘recognising the character of 
hypocrites’ and ‘recognising the character of unbelievers’
sermon on ‘serving God’ was coldly analytical, scholarly 
in a narrow-minded way, and uncompromising. Even 
Ba’asyir himself described Sungkar as ‘very rigid’ (sangat 
keras).186 Ba’asyir’s sermons on ‘recognising the character 
of unbelievers (kafir)’ and ‘recognising the character of 
hypocrites’ were more populist and entertaining, less 
scholarly, but just as uncompromising.187 These two were 
the most political of Surakarta’s purifiers and hence, in 
the atmosphere of the New Order, the ones who got into 
the most trouble.
Illustration 12 Ust. H. Wahyuddin, Ngruki, 2006
186 Interview, 13 Sept. 2008.
187 These tapes were purchased while visiting the school at Ngruki on 20 March 
2008.
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Sungkar’s and Ba’asyir’s views were more Revivalist than Modernist. 
Later interviews with Ba’asyir confirmed his distrust of human intellect 
and his belief that he was directed by God to have correct understandings 
of Islam. Needless to say, such divine guidance leaves no room for debate 
or doubt. For Ba’asyir, the most crucial command in the Qur’an is found in 
sura 2:208: ‘You who believe, enter wholeheartedly into submission to God 
and do not follow in Satan’s footsteps, for he is your sworn enemy.’188 It is 
this uncompromising wholeheartedness that Ba’asyir sought to maintain and 
to instill in others. He and Sungkar read the works of Muslim Brotherhood 
figures, including Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Banna and often agreed with 
them, but were not influenced by them, Ba’asyir claimed, for they sometimes 
saw flaws in the argumentation. In the late 1960s Sungkar, Ba’asyir and 
others established radio stations to promote Islamic reform. The first was 
connected with the Arab-led Al-Irsyad organisation, but the leaders of 
that organisation found it too hard-line. So Sungkar and Ba’asyir instead 
established Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Solo189 in 1970, in which Abdullah 
Thufail was also involved. Security forces shut down the radio station in 1975 
on the grounds that it was critical of the regime. 
In 1972 Sungkar and Ba’asyir set up their own school, which they 
called Al Mukmin (the Believers). This was initially located in Surakarta 
but was moved in 1973 to the village of Ngruki, just outside Surakarta, and 
the school is thus frequently referred to simply by the name of the village. 
The Ngruki school catered mainly for students from poorer backgrounds. It 
has come to be regarded as a sort of ‘Eton for terrorists’, since most of the 
prominent Indonesian terrorists of the late 20th and early 21st centuries 
passed at some stage through Ngruki or other schools associated with it. The 
vast majority of its students, however, have never been associated with any 
violent activity. As is common among Revivalists, Ba’asyir (and presumably 
Sungkar) believed that women could not be leaders and were the source of 
temptations that could distract men from their devotion to God. Ba’asyir 
confessed that he even felt uncomfortable hearing female voices reading the 
Qur’an, but had not yet issued a fatwa on the matter. Ngruki was nevertheless 
co-educational. Girls should be educated equally with boys — but of course 
separately from them.
188 Qur’an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem, p. 23.
189 Solo is the original name of the place that became the court city of Surakarta and 
is still used as an alternate name for it.
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Illustration 14 Entrance to pesantren Al-Mukmin, Ngruki, 2007
Ngruki aimed to train proselytisers to spread its uncompromising 
Revivalist views, but there was also a clear Islamist political agenda in 
the minds of Sungkar and Ba’asyir. Islam must have power and that must 
be exercised through the restoration of a caliphate. Kafirs would have to 
submit to the superior political authority of the Islamic state. In the minds 
of such people, interpretations of law were crucial. Ba’asyir’s view — and 
no doubt that of Sungkar — was that because Indonesia did not have 
shari‘a law as its constitution and its legal system did not rest upon the 
punishments found in the Qur’an (such as amputating the hands of thieves 
and stoning adulterers), it could not be regarded as part of the peaceful 
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Islamic world (dar al-Islam). Indonesia was, instead, still part of the ‘land 
of war’ — the dar al-harb — where holy war (jihad) is legal.190 The idea of 
secular government was, Ba’asyir believed, a Jewish invention whose purpose 
was to destroy Islam. 
Around 1976 Sungkar and Ba’asyir were inducted into the underground 
remnant of Darul Islam. ‘Our struggle was consistent with their principles,’ 
said Ba’asyir, but later Sungkar and he broke away to form their own 
organisation. Somewhere in the midst of all this conspiracy, Jemaah Islamiyah 
( JI) was born as a clandestine terrorist organisation. In January 1979 the 
Assistant Rector of Universitas Sebelas Maret in Surakarta was murdered, 
apparently because he was believed to have revealed JI’s existence to the 
authorities and thereby to have brought about the arrest of Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir two months before. This murder the government blamed on JI and 
an organisation it labeled Komando Jihad (Holy War Command). Sungkar 
and Ba’asyir were arrested in November 1978, tried and then sentenced 
to nine years’ imprisonment for subversion in 1982. Legal manoeuvres a 
few years later gave them a period out of jail, which they used to escape 
to Malaysia in 1985, where they remained until the fall of the Soeharto 
government in 1998.191
With its foremost leaders gone from the scene in Java, Ngruki never-
theless carried on with its educational work. Its attitudes towards local 
culture were generally hostile. While in principle the school took the view 
that anything in local culture could be maintained so long as it did not 
contain either immorality or polytheism, in practice virtually everything 
did. Much Javanese culture was a survival from Hindu-Buddhist Majapahit, 
said Ba’asyir, and it had to go. Slametans were of course a major target. Ideas 
about the Goddess of the Southern Ocean or the wayang’s god-clown 
Semar, the power of krisses, propitiating ancestral spirits, the magic of the 
waringin trees that stand before the kratons — all such nonsense had to go. 
Batik cloth was about the only acceptable item on the traditional Javanese 
scene, for it was regarded as mere technology and Muslims were allowed 
to borrow technology even from kafirs in Ba’asyir’s view. Wayang could 
190 For further information on these concepts, see A. Abel, ‘Dār al- Ḥarb’, in P. 
Bearman et al., Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed.), vol. 2, p. 126.
191 A valuable account of the connections from Darul Islam to JI is found in Quinton 
Temby, ‘Imagining an Islamic state in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah 
Islamiyah’, Indonesia no. 89 (Apr. 2010), pp. 1–36. On Komando Jihad, see also 
Feillard and Madinier, Fin de l ’innocence, pp. 39–41.
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remain if it were purged of non-Islamic concepts — not an easy task for an 
art form resting mainly on pre-Islamic stories. But in fact wayang, gamelan 
or Javanese dance was never performed at Ngruki. All of these things 
were regarded as the entertainments of unenlightened abangan peasants, 
something that would disappear with greater understanding. Youthful music 
was generally discouraged at the school, although nasyid (devotional songs, 
usually by males with minimal musical accompaniment) was allowed, as 
was the use of the tambourine. Ngruki taught the Indonesian, English and 
Arabic languages, but never Javanese. Sufism was rejected. Mysticism could 
be accepted only if it was kept within strict limits. Sufism’s obedience to a 
shaykh and the ritualised movements that go along with Sufi litanies (dhikr) 
were absolutely unacceptable.
Thus it was that by the mid-1970s Surakarta was already becoming 
what it has remained — a city known for active Islamic proselytisation and 
even Islamic extremism, along with high levels of Christianity. Modernist 
and Revivalist activists were engaged in vigorous Dakwahist activity and 
— at least in the case of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir — were 
promoting Islamist causes. Many local people responded positively to 
these initiatives, but a substantial minority did not and were even prepared 
to abandon Islam altogether. We noted in Tables 9 and 11 above that by 
1975 Surakarta was becoming a city largely divided between Muslims and 
Christians and that by the 1980s approximately one-quarter of the city’s 
populace was Christian, as it has remained. This makes for an instructive 
contrast with the East Javanese city of Kediri, whose history has parallels 
with that of Surakarta (see the appendix on research methodology and case 
studies below), but where Islamic life was dominated by the kyais of NU. 
In the absence of Modernist and Revivalist purification movements of the 
kind seen in Surakarta, the Christian proportion of Kediri’s urban population 
remained fairly stable at around 8–9 per cent.192
Modernist-led Islamisation
Although we have noted above — and will see again below — Traditionalist 
involvement in Islamisation efforts in the 1970s, it was nevertheless largely 
a Modernist- and government-led development. Government hostility 
towards NU continued and meant that, at grass-roots level, bureaucrats and 
192 Based on data in the Kota Kediri dalam angka series for the 1990s to 2005.
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the military were unlikely to cooperate with Traditionalist activities. Kyais 
were kept under surveillance and interrogated and many NU branches ‘fell 
into disarray’.193 Muhammadiyah, by contrast, generally distanced itself from 
political activities from c. 1969, thereby submitting to the political hegemony 
sought by the regime and making its peace with the New Order.194 Thus it 
was that Modernists mainly held the initiative at grass-roots level, despite 
the continuing laments of some senior Modernists.
This Modernist prevalence meant that many cherished NU practices 
came under criticism and attack; we have already seen examples of 
Modernists’ hostility to Sufism above. The life of Ky. H. Abdurrahim Nur 
exemplifies how such hostility could arise even from within circles where 
one might expect Traditionalism to prevail. He was born in 1932 in Porong 
(Sidoarjo), near Surabaya, so his life experience paralleled the events we 
have been observing in this book. He was a student at the Traditionalist 
Darul Ulum pesantren in Rejoso, Peterongan ( Jombang) from 1948. In 
1955, however, he went to the Persatuan Islam pesantren at Bangil and there 
imbibed Modernist ideas. Thence he proceeded in 1958 to study theology 
at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, gaining his Licentiate in 1963. In Egypt 
he came to admire the Muslim Brotherhood. From 1967, early in the New 
Order, he taught and fulfilled leadership roles at the IAIN in Surabaya. He 
also taught theology, at least for a time, at the Persatuan Islam school in 
Bangil and inspired his pupils with stories of Muslim Brotherhood figures 
such as Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and others. Abdurrahim Nur 
acquired the reputation of being a charismatic kyai, but this was no kyai of 
the Traditionalist stamp. He was an activist and leader in Muhammadiyah, 
having left his Traditionalist roots behind, and proved himself able to 
maintain smooth relationships between Muhammadiyah and the New Order 
bureaucracy. He was reputedly skilful at using wayang as a proselytisation 
tool. He defended strict Wahhabi ideas relating to the unity of God (tauhid) 
and denounced polytheism. According to the head of Muhammadiyah in 
East Java, Prof. H. Fasich, for Abdurrahim Nur, Sufism meant complete 
submission to God’s will and religious devotion ‘in accordance with the 
example of the Prophet, with nothing deleted or added’. In other words, no 
193 Abdul Kadir, ‘Traditional Islamic society and the state’, pp. 185–7; quote from 
p. 185.
194 See the account in Syarifuddin Jurdi, Muhammadiyah dalam dinamika politik 
Indonesia, 1966–2006 (intro. Ahmad Syafii Maarif; Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 
2010), pp. 199–201.
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ritualised dhikr, no Shaykh — in fact, no Sufism of the kind practiced by the 
Traditionalist tarekats at all.195
Modernists’ animosity towards Sufism was one of the most profound 
dividing issues between themselves and Traditionalists in this period. 
Prof. Rasjidi spoke of mysticism as ‘rather a kind of exaggeration of living 
according to the teaching of Islam’. He could understand that some people 
might need something beyond the five daily prayers and fasting, he said. 
But ‘as for making himself nearer to God, I think what is prescribed in the 
Qur’an and Sunnah [the ways of the Prophet, the Hadith] is sufficient if it 
is practised well. … There are many tarekats who teach their followers very 
good exercises … for their spiritual thinking. But on the contrary there are 
many other tarekats which are in contradiction with Islam.’196 The Gadjah 
Mada University engineer, scientist and local Modernist thinker H. Ahmad 
Syahirul Alim expressed similar views. He emphasised the need to purify 
the faith from traces of animism and Hindu-Buddhist thought and of 
illegal innovations. ‘There might be some opposition from other Muslims 
groups. Because in Nahdlatul Ulama, for example, they consider that some 
way of mysticism can be considered as part of religion, but according to 
Muhammadiyah that kind of innovation is nothing but sheer partnership 
to God [i.e., polytheism]: [it constitutes] wrong innovation in religion, 
neglecting the example of the Prophet.’ 197
195 The account of Abdurahhim Nur rests upon [A. Fatichuddin, Biyanto and 
Sufyanto (eds)] Pergumulan tokoh Muhammadiyah menuju Sufi: Catatan pemikiran 
Abdurrahim Nur (Surabaya: Hikmah Press, 2003), esp. pp. ix, xiii, 7–12, 55, 62, 147, 
151, 153–4, 166, 209–11. The quote from H. Fasich is on p. xiii. Perhaps I should 
thank the editors of this work for paying me the compliment of plagiarising a passage 
from my own book Yogyakarta di bawah Sultan Mangkubumi on pp. 128–9.
196 Interview, Jakarta, Aug. 1977.
197 Interview H. Ahmad Syahirul Alim, Yogyakarta, 10 Aug. 1977. The second part 
of his name is also sometimes spelled Sahirul; he was of Madurese descent, with 
an M.Sc. in Astronomy from UCLA (1964); he was a member of neither NU nor 
Muhammadiyah himself. He wrote a book ‘setting out the harmony among science, 
technology and Islam’: Ahmad Sahirul Alim, Menguak keterpaduan sains, teknologi 
dan Islam (Yogyakarta: Dinamika, 1966). After the 1985 bombing of the 9th-century 
Borobudur temple in Central Java, Syahirul Alim was detained but then released 
without charge after giving evidence against the former Minister of Industries H. 
Mohamad Sanusi, who was sentenced to 19 years imprisonment. When Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir formed his MMI (Indonesian Holy Warriors’ Council) in Yogyakarta in 
2000, Syahirul Alim was among the prominent Muslim leaders who attended 
(TempoI, 5 Aug. 2000). He died in 2007. My thanks to Sidney Jones for some of 
these details.
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For most Modernists, the general rule was that anything not specifically 
allowed by the Qur’an and Hadith as religious belief or practice was innova-
tion (bid‘a) and therefore to be rejected, whereas the Traditionalist position 
was generally that anything not specifically forbidden by the Qur’an and 
Hadith, and which was in itself good, could be accepted. Hence, as Abdur-
rahman Wahid put it, ‘Anything that’s not forbidden explicitly by religion is 
allowed even though it came from foreign sources. For example, Sufism. … 
That’s why Muhammadiyah, after they cleanse the Islamic world or … purify 
[it] from foreign elements, they found it necessary to attack Sufis.’198 
For the first two decades or so of the New Order, Sufism seemed to 
be in retreat. The largest Sufi order in Java was probably the Qadiriyya wa 
Naqshabandiyya, although Tijaniyya was also prominent. Around 1970 
there were four centres of Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya, located at the 
Darul Ulum pesantren in Rejoso, Peterongan ( Jombang), led by Ky. Musta’in 
Romly; at Mranggen near Semarang; and in two West Javanese locations: 
Suralaya (Tasikmalaya), led by Abah Anom; and Pagentongan (Bogor). 
When Ky. Musta’in announced his support of Golkar in 1976, he lost many 
of his followers, confirming the entwining of politics and spirituality. By 
the late 1980s, the other leaders except for Abah Anom had died and were 
succeeded — if at all — by less charismatic figures. The teaching died out 
altogether in Pagentongan.199 Given the generally private — not to say 
secretive — nature of many tarekats, particularly at a time when this form of 
spirituality was under criticism, it is hard to know the extent to which other 
Sufi orders suffered a loss of influence and membership in the early New 
Order period. But certainly from the late 1980s and into the 1990s, when 
Islamic mysticism became obviously popular, people spoke of this as a ‘revival’ 
after a lean period. Ironically, while Musta’in Romly may have lost followers 
upon affiliating with Golkar in 1976, Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya may 
have found it easier to grow when its leader in Tegal did the same thing in 
the different context of 1983.200 This was part of the growing reconciliation 
198 Interview, Jakarta, 7 Aug. 1977.
199 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Tarekat Qadiriyah dan ilmu Syeikh Abdul Qadir Jilani di 
India, Kurdistan dan Indonesia’, Jurnal Ulumul Qur’an no. 2 (1989), pp. 74–5. A more 
detailed account is in Mahmud Sujuthi, Politik tarekat: Qadiriyah wa Nasqsyabandiyah 
Jombang; Studi tentang hubungan agama, negara dan masyarakat (intro. Martin van 
Bruinessen; Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2001).
200 Julia Day Howell. ‘Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic revival’, The Journal of Asian 
Studies vol. 60, no. 3 (Aug. 2001), esp. pp. 713–7; Julia Day Howell, Subandi and 
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t188   188 6/20/2012   1:21:12 PM
Kebatinan, Christian and Government Competition, 1966–80s 189
of Traditionalist Islam and the Soeharto regime which we will consider 
further in the following chapter.
With regard to Javanese traditions in general, Modernist opposition 
in this period is clear. Most Traditionalists took a different view. Indeed, 
for Traditionalist kyais, accommodating Javanese concepts while promoting 
Islamisation came as second nature. Mbah Lim (Ky. H. Muslim Imampura) 
never found Javanese culture a barrier, he claimed. When he began his 
pesantren near Klaten in 1959, the local people were abangan who did not 
know how to pray. So he taught them. The Goddess of the Southern Ocean 
and the spirit of Mount Lawu (Sunan Lawu) are simply spirit beings 
(makhluk halus) that really exist, he said, but they are just ‘culture’ and don’t 
need to be destroyed. There are many other local spirits, but there is no 
need to honour them, so he never forbade this. Nevertheless, over time 
belief in local spirits just began to die out. The story with gambling was 
similar. There was resistance to this slow process of Islamisation, but that 
resistance ‘was defeated by God’.201 Teaching by example was an important 
part of this version of Islamisation, and no doubt Mbah Lim’s protection 
of PKI people who fled to him for help during the 1965–6 killings had a 
significant impact.
In the early New Order there were some voices in NU that were hostile 
to local traditions and even to Sufism. One such was Imron Rosyadi, himself 
a somewhat unusual NU leader. He had studied in Malaya, Saudi Arabia and 
Iraq, and made a career in the foreign service, acting in Saudi Arabia and Iraq 
during 1947–52 and in Switzerland in 1956–7. In Indonesia, he taught at 
the Military Law Academy. He rose through Ansor to a leadership position 
within NU itself, but lost that position because of his firm opposition to 
Sukarno’s Guided Democracy. He was a PPP member of parliament in the 
New Order and a senior member of the foreign service.202 He was, thus, far 
more internationally experienced than most NU figures. When I spoke with 
him in 1977, I mentioned some Modernists’ wish to get rid of slametans, 
Peter L. Nelson, ‘Indonesian Sufism: Signs of resurgence’, in Peter B. Clarke (ed.), 
New trends and developments in the world of Islam (London: Luzac Oriental, 1998), 
pp. 277–97.
201 Interview with Ky. H. Muslim Imampura (Mbah Lim), Pondok Pesantren al-
Muttaqien Pancasila Sakti, Karang Anom, Klaten, 27 March 2006.
202 Roeder, Who’s who, p. 322; Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, relasi-relasi kuasa, 
pencarian wacana baru (Yogyakarta: LKIS bekerjasama dengan Pustaka Pelajar, 1994), 
p. 291.
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Sufism and various cultural traditions and asked him to describe NU’s 
attitude towards traditional Javanese culture. His response was somewhat 
unusual within the NU context: ‘We want also to abolish it,’ he said, ‘but in 
a very smooth way, not confronting against them. … That is not the Javanese 
way of doing things.’203 So, for Imron Rosyadi, there was a difference of 
approach, but not of ultimate purpose. Even a devotee of Javanese traditions 
and local spiritual forces like Abdurrahman Wahid believed that, in the 
long run, Javanese arts such as wayang would survive, but with more Islamic 
content infused into them.204
The fundamental problem for most Modernists about Javanese tradi-
tions — slametans, spiritual forces in dance performances, the Goddess of 
the Southern Ocean, krisses that are ‘alive’, Sufi practices and all the rest of 
it — was that they smacked of superstition and irrationality. True to their 
basic epistemology, Modernists of this period saw Islam as fundamentally 
rational and consistent with modern science. That also made their kind 
of reformed Islam consistent with the government’s agenda of economic 
development, educational expansion and social welfare improvement.205 As 
Islamisation deepened from the 1970s in Jatinom (Klaten district, near the 
main Yogyakarta-Surakarta road), it was Muhammadiyah taking the lead. 
By the time of his fieldwork in 1990–1, Irwan Abdullah could observe that 
‘a new ethos is being formed and rationalization is being introduced, signs 
that the society is becoming more modern. The pengajians provide help in 
the rationalization of life’.206
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara said that Islam must be interpreted so that 
it is consistent with science. For example, what the Qur’an called angels was 
the same as what science called natural laws. ‘If we are really religious, we 
should also be really scientific’, he said.207 Similarly, Prof. Osman Raliby 
referred to Qur’an 55:33, which reads, ‘Jinn [spirits] and mankind, if you can 
pass beyond the regions of heaven and earth, then do so: you will not pass 
203 Interview with H. Imron Rosyadi, Jakarta, 5 Aug. 1977.
204 Interview with Ky. H. Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 7 Aug. 1977.
205 There is an interesting contrast here with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, who expressed the 
view that it is wrong to fight poverty, for the poor have been made so by God. One 
should, however, treat the poor justly. For example, they should have access to health 
care and education. Interview, Ngruki, 13 Sept. 2008.
206 Irwan Abdullah, The Muslim businessmen of Jatinom: Religious reform and economic 
modernization in a Central Javanese town (Doctoral thesis, University of Amsterdam, 
1994); p. 95; see also pp. 6, 85–8 on the role of Muhammadiyah.
207 Interview, Jakarta, 3 Aug. 1977.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t190   190 6/20/2012   1:21:12 PM
Kebatinan, Christian and Government Competition, 1966–80s 191
without Our authority’.208 This was meant as a warning, since at that time 
there were no airplanes, said Raliby. But in the modern world, with airplanes 
and rockets available, we can say, ‘Oh, that is what it means really’. Similarly, 
the Qur’anic references (which are multiple) to the seven heavens would, 
he believed, become clearer as science progressed. Qur’an 21:30 says, ‘Are 
the disbelievers not aware that the heavens and the earth used to be joined 
together and that We ripped them apart…?’209 To Raliby, this showed that 
the Qur’an contained the Big Bang Theory.210 
The rights and freedoms of women are commonly issues in religious 
reformist movements and were no less so in the Islamising Indonesia 
under Soeharto. The regime had its own image of what women should be 
— mistresses of the home, upbringers of children, supporters of their men, 
but also modern, educated and able to contribute to national development. 
The government sought ‘to define women’s private as well as public roles 
by stressing that women are primarily wives and mothers, but they should 
also serve the nation as skilled or semi-skilled professionals’.211 The views 
of Islamic activists were similar in principle, but in practice there were 
considerable variations. Several of the kyais we have mentioned in this 
book had polygamous marriages, for example, which was very rare among 
Modernists.
It is important to note that all sides supported education for women. 
There was no significant group advocating Taliban-style exclusion of women 
from education.212 But other differences separated Traditionalist and Mod-
ernist views. Muhammadiyah had a women’s branch — ‘Aisyiyah, founded 
in 1917 — and Modernist women played a role in supporting progressive 
views. But they were separate from the men who ran Muhammadiyah and 
even in the early 21st century felt that they were excluded from real power 
208 Qur’an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem, p. 354.
209 Ibid., p. 204.
210 Interview, Jakarta, 14 Aug. 1977.
211 Virginia Matheson Hooker and Howard Dick, ‘Introduction’, in Virginia 
Matheson Hooker (ed.), Culture and society in New Order Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur, 
etc.: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 11.
212 For this reason, regardless of the merits of the book’s contents, the lurid title given 
by the publisher to Bilveer Singh’s study of extremist Islamic politics in Southeast 
Asia is misleading: Bilveer Singh, The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the war 
on terror to Islamic extremists (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007). 
Not even Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar wished to exclude girls from 
schooling.
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in the main organisation. Not until 1972 did Muhammadiyah issue a ruling 
saying that women could go out in public alone, but they could do so only 
with their husband’s permission — this being an attempt by Muham-
madiyah to catch up with the reality that ‘Aisyiyah women were travelling 
widely. Yet even the national head of ‘Aisyiyah from 1965 to 1985, Prof. 
Baroroh Baried of Gadjah Mada University, reported that she had to cancel 
trips because her husband refused her permission to go. Family planning 
was a priority for the government, with a goal of only two children per 
family, but contraception was a problem for many Muslim thinkers, since it 
seemed to be interference in God’s designs. We have already noted Hamka 
denouncing it as part of ‘Thought Attack’ in 1969. Nevertheless, family 
planning was accepted by Muhammadiyah.213 ‘Aisyiyah was no feminist 
organisation, however; its views remained conservative and based closely on 
readings of the Qur’an and Hadith as interpreted by reason, as with all other 
Modernist organisations.
NU was slower to address women’s issues. Traditionalism had its 
roots in the countryside where, as we have seen, fewer women were literate 
and forces of modernisation were slower to penetrate than in urban areas. 
In 1946 a women’s branch was created called Muslimat NU, but the 
Traditionalists’ strongholds in pesantrens remained male-dominated until 
the 1970s, when women first began to appear as teachers. Their role within 
NU strengthened as years passed, assisted in large measure by the support 
of Abdurrahman Wahid and several other crucial kyais. Abdurrahman’s wife 
Sinta Nuriyah Wahid also became prominent in this cause. Early marriage 
had been common in Traditionalist circles, but now girls were encouraged to 
complete their schooling and to go on to higher education. In this context, 
as noted above, the IAIN system played an important role. Muslimat NU 
also encouraged birth control from the 1960s and, in 1972, NU itself ruled 
that it was allowable.214
MUI only issued a fatwa on contraception in 1983. This declared family 
planning for the purpose of maternal or infant health or in the interest of 
the education of children to be halal (thus providing medical and social 
grounds for limiting family size), so long as it did not employ contraceptive 
procedures that were haram in Islam. Intrauterine devices were allowed. 
Abortion, vasectomy and tubectomy were declared forbidden.215
213 Van Doorn-Harder, Women shaping Islam, pp. 79, 115, 119.
214 Ibid., pp. 10, 170, 175, 218.
215 Mudzhar, Fatwa-fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia, pp. 126 et seqq.
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Deepening Islamisation by the early 1980s
From across Java, information about the deepening Islamisation was 
accumulating by the early 1980s. Despite regime hostility to the political 
aspirations of Modernists and to the rural influence of Traditionalists, 
government policies and grass-roots Islamisers were all heading in the 
direction of the religious transformation of Javanese society and that of 
Indonesia more generally.
Between the late 1970s and mid-1980s, Robert Hefner observed in 
the remote Pasuruan highlands what was almost surely the first serious 
penetration of Islam into an area where previously Islamic allegiance had 
mostly varied from nominal to zero. None of the local anti-Islamic Javanist 
groups survived the events of 1965–6. The New Order government’s schools 
then penetrated the region and with them came teachers sympathetic to 
more orthodox forms of Islam. As elsewhere, the young thereby gained a 
new understanding of, and commitment to, their previously at-best-nominal 
faith. Madrasahs more than doubled in number. Pious Islam was associated 
with education, development and progress. To many young Javanese there, 
as Hefner puts it, ‘the transition from belief in village guardian spirits to 
orthodox Islam looks like an enlightened transition to modernity’. Officials of 
the local branch of the Ministry of Religion affiliated themselves with Golkar 
— an obligatory step for all public servants — and thereby kept their jobs. 
They and other Golkar officials promoted pengajian for the society in general. 
Education programmes for mosque officials were developed, and mosques 
and prayer-houses were upgraded and expanded (with the customary public 
address systems for the call to prayer). This was Dakwahism at government 
and activists’ behest.216
Cederroth’s fieldwork in a small village in the Malang area in the 
mid-1980s also documented an Islamisation process which, however, 
had encountered significant hindrances. This area had paid obeisance to 
village spirits and potent places, held slametans and annual village cleansing 
ceremonies (bersih desa) and performed jaranan dances. When a new village 
head succeeded in 1978, however, villagers found themselves being led 
216 Hefner, ‘Islamizing Java?’ esp. pp. 540–8. Hefner’s fieldwork was done in 1978–80 
and 1985. Quotation from p. 548. The local anti-Islamic kebatinan movement called 
agama Buda Visnu Jawi wanted to return to the ‘original’ Javanese religion of the time 
of Majapahit (ibid., p. 538). This is probably the same as the movement in the Blitar 
area that Raharjo calls agami Budha Jawi Wisnu (the Vishnuite Javanese Buddhist 
religion); Raharjo Suwandi, Quest for justice, p. 147.
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by someone with little interest in such observances. NU opposed these 
practices, too, and made headway in undermining them. Indeed, in some 
respects NU here was more intolerant of abangan ideas and art forms than 
was Muhammadiyah, which was locally represented by people who came 
in from outside. In the later 1960s, the local head of NU built the village’s 
first madrasah. There was a ‘deep cleavage’ between the Traditionalist and 
Modernist camps, but both promoted deeper Islamisation. This, however, 
produced a backlash in the form of two new kebatinan movements led by 
men claiming supernatural powers. Cederroth thus observed part of the 
revival of mysticism from the later 1980s that will be considered more below. 
In his case, however, this was not Islamic Sufism but old-fashioned Javanese 
kebatinan.217 
On the north coast, near Lamongan, older spiritual ideas were progres-
sively Islamised. In the fishing village of Brondong there had been a custom 
to propitiate spirits connected with fishing, but its leaders had been PKI 
and the practice disappeared along with them in 1965–6. Around 1970, 
however, this was revived as a new ritual called tutup layang (furling the sails), 
in which offerings were made off the coast to a spirit called Kyai Anjir, the 
supposed spirit of the waters — a sort of north-coast male counterpart to the 
south-coast female Ratu Kidul. The head of the village mosque (the modin) 
pronounced the conventional Islamic invocation, followed by a Javanese 
invocation of the spirit: ‘Bismillah218 … We make offerings to Kyai Anjir 
who reigns in the Java Sea. May we receive good fortune and welfare ….’ 
Brondong was no longer, however, just a place of abangan fishermen. Like 
everywhere else, there were now Modernists among the government school 
teachers, who established Muhammadiyah there in 1970. The idiosyncratic, 
doctrinaire — and much condemned — Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia 
(LDII, Indonesian Islamic Proselytisation Institute, discussed in the 
following chapter) came there in 1975, being greeted with initial hostility 
but eventually being accepted. NU followed with a branch in the 1980s. By 
the early 21st century, even the most extreme of Modernist and Revivalist 
217 Sven Cederroth, From syncretism to orthodoxy? The struggle of Islamic leaders in 
an East Javanese village (Copenhagen: NIAS report no. 3, 1991). Cederroth’s field-
work in the village of Bokor (Tumpang district) was done in 1986–7. Quotation 
from p. 34.
218 Short for the Arabic invocation of God’s blessing that should precede any 
important act and which opens all but one of the suras of the Qur’an: bismillah 
al-rahman al-rahim, ‘in the name of God the lord of mercy, the giver of mercy’ 
(following the translation in Qur’an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem).
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movements would be represented in Brondong.219 So the tutup layang 
ceremony became a cooperative affair, but one that clearly trended towards 
deeper Islamisation. After the initial ritual, there followed a day of pengajian 
and slametan for the Traditionalists. In the evening, local youths danced to 
the popular driving rhythms of dangdut music and frequently got drunk. 
There was also tayuban dancing and wayang, but the dancers and singers 
must all be modestly dressed, the women even performing in headscarves 
(jilbab). This was all that the believers in the old spirituality got. By the time 
that Budi Ashari did his fieldwork there in 2004–6, kebatinan adherents were 
down to about fifteen, mostly elderly, people without any formal institution 
to support them, in a village of nearly 15,000 residents. In surrounding 
villages, however, there was not even the degree of cooperation seen in the 
tutup layang ritual; Muhammadiyah and NU activists dominated there and 
were in frequent disagreement, except in their opposition — sometimes 
violent — to the entry of any new religious interpretations.220
While we do not have case studies such as those described above for 
all of Java’s thousands of villages, the pattern we have seen here appears to 
have been generally applicable. One of the most astute observers of this 
phenomenon, Robert Hefner, commented as follows:
By the 1980s anthropologists and journalists were reporting that nor-
mative Islam was making great progress in many former strongholds of 
secular nationalism, while public Javanism was in decline. The institutions 
of public Javanism were hit particularly hard. In most of the countryside, 
for example, the lavish communal rituals (slametan desa) celebrated 
by Javanists at village spirit shrines (dhanyang), so vividly captured in 
Clifford Geertz’s Religion of Java, had disappeared by the late 1980s. 
Where they survive, most operate as private celebrations no longer 
sanctioned by local authorities … By the 1980s there was clear evidence 
of Islamic revival and Javanist decline. … The policies of the New Order 
state made … full-blown public Javanism untenable.221
In 1985 the intellectual journal Prisma222 published an issue dedicated 
to ‘Islam in Indonesia: In search of a new image’. Prisma was a publication 
219 Including FPI, PKS, MMI and the Tablighi Jamaah, originally of Pakistani origin. 
These will arise later in this book.
220 Budi Ashari, ‘Tutup layang: Manifestasi masyarakat Brondong, Lamongan, Jawa 
Timur’ (MA thesis, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2006).
221 Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 84, 122, 248 n69.
222 ‘Islam in Indonesia: In search of a new image’, Prisma: The Indonesian indicator, 
no. 35 (March 1985).
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of LP3ES (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan 
Sosial, Institute for research, education and social and economic information), 
established in 1971 by young intellectuals of Traditionalist background and 
one of the most important NGOs in Indonesia. Its work received crucial 
support from the beginning from the German Friedrich Naumann Stiftung. 
The Prisma issue’s contributors were a ‘who’s who’ of the younger intellectual 
elite of both Modernist and Traditionalist backgrounds. Abdurrahman 
Wahid wrote of Islam as complementary to Indonesian nationalism. He 
emphasised the importance of NU’s decision of 1984 — discussed in the 
following chapter — to dissociate itself from any political party.
Nurcholish Madjid criticised the current state of Modernist thinking, 
accusing it of suffering from ‘blockages’ and giving inadequate attention to 
the ‘classical intellectual heritage’ — the fruit of his own study of the thought 
of Ibn Taymiyya in his Chicago doctoral thesis under Fazlur Rahman the 
year before. Amien Rais wrote of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Iranian Islamic revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini. He criticised NU for 
being easily co-opted by governments and Muhammadiyah for appearing 
to be in need of ‘reorientation and revision of its frame of thought’. Dawam 
Rahardjo described the aims of the Iranian revolution as ‘most attractive’ 
for ‘trying to develop the values of a new culture’ that was neither capitalist 
nor socialist. Ahmad Syafii Maarif wrote that in Indonesia’s Pancasila state, 
Islam must be implemented ‘gradually, wisely, carefully and responsibly’ — a 
critique of more radical aspirations. Jalaluddin Rakhmat criticised ‘Islamic 
Fundamentalists’ for their ‘low knowledge … of religion’. The writer Abdul 
Hadi W.M., who was known for his Sufi views, observed that interest in 
Islam as a political force was on the wane, but not as an ‘intellectual and 
cultural force’, and that Sufism had ‘begun to be accepted again among the 
educated elite’.
Taken together, the contributions to this 1985 issue of Prisma reflected 
the degree to which the New Order regime had been successful in dominat-
ing the Islamisation process. These young intellectuals were all thinking 
in the context of a permanent regime reality in which acceptable limits of 
ideological discourse would be set by Jakarta. Islam would not shape those 
limits, but must adjust itself to them. We will see in the following chapter 
how the acceptance of this reality by Islamic activists of most persuasions, 
and how in particular NU’s change of political course, led from the mid-
1980s to a collaborative Islamisation effort that carried dramatically forward 
the process we have already observed in this chapter. The exceptions to this 
generalisation were found among Revivalists like Ba’asyir and Sungkar. Yet 
extreme views such as theirs would also find themselves facing a more fruitful 
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environment for growth because of the general progress of Islamisation, as 
well as crucial international developments.
Soeharto himself was becoming more interested in Islam as the 1980s 
began. He employed Ky. H. Kosim Nurseha to teach himself and his family 
more about the faith. Kosim Nurseha was originally from Tegal and is said 
to have claimed expertise in martial arts that had enabled him to repel a 
PKI assassination attempt. He was a member of the army’s Staf Kerohanian 
(spirituality staff ).223 He thus had the right sort of pedigree for teaching 
Islam to the Presidential household. As we have seen above in Soeharto’s 
1986 collection of inspirational ‘seeds’, Butir-butir budaya Jawa, however, the 
President’s attachment to Javanese-derived spirituality of the older Mystic 
Synthesis style and associated magical practices persisted. We may reasonably 
presume that his wish to know more about Islam derived from a desire to 
add Islam to the spiritual realms that he was able to control. It is possible 
— from what we know of the man, even probable — that he aimed to make 
of this faith that was increasingly influential in the society around him, which 
his regime had encouraged as a grass-roots anti-Communist force, also a 
supernatural force supporting him and his regime, rather than running the 
risk that it might come to threaten him. Soeharto was adept at co-opting 
and using people who might resist him — that is to say, those who were not 
so problematic that they must lose their jobs, or be denounced, imprisoned 
or killed — and probably now sought to do the same in the realm of the 
supernatural. Soeharto had little or no knowledge of the history of Java, but 
he was probably replicating what Sultan Agung had done at Tembayat 350 
years before and Ratu Pakubuwana had done 250 years before: mobilising the 
supernatural powers of Islam so that they supported, rather than threatened, 
the regime. Neither Soeharto nor Sultan Agung thought it necessary to 
abandon the occult powers of Java to do that.
Early New Order ironies
In the early New Order, from its inception in 1965–6 to the early 1980s, 
the confluence of political agendas on the one hand with socio-religious 
agendas on the other produced some ironic outcomes. Before the advent 
223 His name is sometimes spelled Qosim Nursekha. He was born c. 1936. The 
information here rests upon a 1996 interview with him entitled ‘KH. Kosim 
Nurseha, “Saya Harus Hati-hati”’, found at http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/
basisdata/1996/07/21/0011.html; I cannot vouch for this source. See also Hefner, 
Civil Islam, p. 83.
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of the Soeharto regime, there were fairly consistent patterns of political 
conduct that distinguished the Modernist from the Traditionalist side of 
Indonesian Islam. The Modernists — whose base was mainly urban and, in 
particular, outside Central and East Java — maintained a firmly reformist 
religious stance with a firmly principled political stance. It was the very 
stiffness of their political position — exemplified by Natsir and other 
leaders of Masyumi — that got their party banned during the Sukarno 
years. The Traditionalists of NU, on the other hand, spent the Sukarno 
years accommodating themselves to the changing nature of the political 
regime and were never banned. Modernists and others accused NU of being 
opportunist and unprincipled during this period, but that was not quite true. 
Rather, it was a principle of Traditionalist jurisprudence to accommodate 
established political authority so long as Islam was not oppressed, on the 
grounds that even imperfect government was preferable to anarchy. We have 
noted above that they based this on Qur’an 4:59, which admonished Muslims 
to ‘obey God and obey His Messenger and those who are in authority over 
you’. Traditionalists also believed in the idea of weighing up benefits and 
costs, and then acting in accordance with the principle of seeking the greater 
maslahat (Arabic maslaha, the general good, welfare). Thus, in the interest of 
the Islamic community (ummah) as a whole, NU worked with the prevailing 
regimes. We may say that, in a sense, it was an NU principle not to stand on 
principle. What mattered to NU was not Islamism but Dakwahism — and 
that usually of a pretty gentle, patient sort.
In the early New Order, those old political patterns were turned upside 
down. Now Modernists, who despaired of gaining political power under the 
prevailing regime, generally abandoned Islamism and turned their attention 
to Dakwahism. This new approach was pioneered and exemplified by Nat-
sir when he created DDII in 1967. Now the Modernist agenda was about 
Islamisation from below rather than the imposition of Islamic power from 
above. In effect, the Modernist politicos adopted what had always been the 
strategy of Muhammadiyah: to do good, to transform and to support the 
society while moving it in a more Islamic direction, all the while working 
with whatever government regime it had to work with. Although Modernism 
remained rooted in urban environments, through the New Order’s expansion 
of education and its mandating of religious teaching in all schools — and, in 
particular, the appearance of government-appointed school teachers through-
out Java — Modernism’s stricter understandings of Islam began to penetrate 
previously abangan and Traditionalist areas even in the countryside.
Modernists’ Dakwahism was consistent with the government’s 
own dakwah agenda. For the former, the objective was the destruction of 
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Communism and deeper Islamisation in accordance with God’s directives. 
For the latter, the objective was the destruction of Communism and 
deeper social control in accordance with Soeharto’s directives. There was no 
necessary inconsistency between these sets of objectives. Modernists still 
found much to complain about — above all about Christianisation — but in 
the Islamisation agenda they and the government were in agreement.
Whereas the Dakwahist agenda of Modernism was consonant with 
New Order priorities, NU now found itself under suspicion and, in effect, 
increasingly in opposition to the regime. NU’s Ansor had played a prominent 
role along with the military in the physical annihilation of PKI, so NU 
might reasonably have expected collaboration with the regime to continue. 
After all, it had grass-roots networks outside towns and cities, across Java’s 
countryside — particularly in East Java — that were far more extensive than 
anything the Modernists could offer. But instead NU found itself treated 
with suspicion, its kyais under surveillance, bureaucrats and the military 
reluctant to associate or cooperate with it, and its branches, as Suzaina Abdul 
Kadir has it, falling ‘into disarray’.224 NU grew increasingly critical of New 
Order policies. It was dissatisfied with several regime policies, including 
its domestic economic development priorities that favoured foreigners and 
Indonesian Chinese over the indigenous entrepreneurs who were a core NU 
constituency. It also became critical of New Order foreign policy. Just two 
years into the new regime, Andrée Feillard notes, NU was looking more and 
more like an opposition party.225
The reasons for this inversion of political roles lay in the nature of the 
regime itself, for here was the first government in Indonesian history that had 
the desire and some real capacity to impose totalitarian control. It sought to 
shape not only the conduct but also the thought of its citizens, and intended 
to brook no opposition. We have already noted above the actual constraints 
upon the New Order’s totalitarian aspirations — that Indonesia was spared 
genuinely totalitarian rule by general incapacity and pervasive incompetence. 
But the Soeharto regime went further in this direction than any before. Pre-
colonial states were ramshackle affairs that certainly would have embraced 
totalitarianism if they could have, but couldn’t. The Dutch colonial regime 
sought to impose a quiet, controlled and economically efficient peace upon 
the countryside, but never sought to control what everyone thought. The 
Japanese sought to mobilise the populace and to imbue it with appropriate 
224 Abdul Kadir, ‘Traditional Islamic society and the state’, p. 185.
225 Feillard, Islam et armée, pp. 79–95.
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ideas, but the chaos of the Second World War period made real totalitarian 
indoctrination impossible. The Revolutionary years and the Sukarno period 
were full of contradictions, and it was consistently true that the central state 
was barely in control of the nation and many schools of thought contended. 
Only now, with the New Order regime, did control of both what people did 
and what they thought become imaginable. Thus, to understand the new 
position in which NU found itself, we must consider further the nature of 
the New Order state itself.
The New Order as an historicist state
As we think of the New Order regime in broader, more universal contexts, we 
may reasonably conclude that Soeharto’s government was, in Karl Popper’s 
terms, historicist. Its view of history and of its own place in it, and its socio-
political aspirations, were comparable to those that inspired Popper’s analysis. 
Its approach to society was equivalent to what Popper calls
an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction 
is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by 
discovering the ‘rhythms’ or the ‘patterns’, the ‘laws’ or the ‘trends’ that 
underlie the evolution of history.226
The applied purpose of this historicism is what Popper calls ‘Holistic or 
Utopian social engineering’, which is 
never of a ‘private’ but always of a ‘public’ character. It aims at remodeling 
the ‘whole of society’ in accordance with a definite plan or blueprint; it 
aims at ‘seizing the key positions’ and at extending ‘the power of the 
State … until the State becomes nearly identical with society’, and it 
aims, furthermore, at controlling from these ‘key positions’ the historical 
forces that mould the future of the developing society.227
Popper’s targets in The poverty of historicism (first published in 1957) 
were the ideas that he saw as underpinning the most devastating totalitar-
ian regimes of the first half of the 20th century: Nazi Germany and the 
Soviet Union. Such ideas were found in the New Order of Soeharto as well. 
From early in the regime it was concerned to produce an account of history 
226 Karl R. Popper, The poverty of historicism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1974), p. 3.
227 Ibid., p. 67. The quotes within Popper’s passage here are from the sociologist Karl 
Mannheim (1893–1947).
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that served its purposes and made itself seem the culmination and agent 
of inevitable development and modernisation, the heir of those ‘rhythms’, 
‘patterns’, ‘laws’ and ‘trends’ which ‘ underlie the evolution of history’. Or, 
to put it more simply, it was anxious to promote what Hannah Arendt 
— like Popper, an analyst of the greatest tyrannies of the early 20th century 
— called ‘the monstrous forgeries in historiography of which all totalitarian 
regimes are guilty and which announce themselves clearly enough in 
totalitarian propaganda’.228
This project was seen most clearly in the production of the six-volume 
Sejarah nasional Indonesia (Indonesian national history) which was to be 
the approved account of history for all students to absorb. It was rather 
dismissively nicknamed ‘the standard book’ (buku standar) by professional 
historians, who found (and still find) the idea of a politically correct 
‘standard’ version of history something between scandalous and comical. The 
project was directed by Prof. Nugroho Notosusanto, a historian from the 
University of Indonesia who was also head of the historical section of the 
Ministry of Defence and bore the titular rank of Brigadier General. Many 
of Indonesia’s serious historians were engaged in this project and found 
themselves under pressure to produce ideologically acceptable accounts. 
Sukarno’s shortcomings and the evils of Communism of course received 
much attention. The volumes first appeared in 1975, with further editions 
following in 1977, 1981–3 and 1993.229
The Sejarah nasional Indonesia passage on the New Order’s initiatives 
in religious education reflects the regime’s view of how little NU’s pesantrens 
had to contribute and of how essential it was that they receive government 
‘assistance and direction’:
In the field of religious education and the training of religious 
personnel there was also a raising of quality. To this end there was 
inter-departmental cooperation …. Cooperation inter alia in building-
construction, assistance with textbooks, curriculum improvement and 
the upgrading of teachers. At the same time, to improve the guidance of 
228 Hannah Arendt, The origins of totalitarianism: New edition with added prefaces 
(Orlando, FL, etc.: A Harvest Book, Harcourt, Inc., n.d. [1973 edition]), p. 332. 
We will return to the parallels with the ideas of Popper, Arendt and other writers 
in Chapter 14.
229 This ‘standard book’ is among the topics described in the doctoral thesis by 
Katherine E. McGregor, published as History in uniform: Military ideology and the 
construction of Indonesia’s past (Singapore: Asian Studies Association of Australia in 
association with NUS Press, 2007).
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pesantrens, assistance and direction were given so that these institutions 
could develop and be among the centres for the cultivation of village-
level development cadres, along with their function as institutions for 
Islamic education.230
Traditionalist pesantrens were thus useful if they were guided by the regime 
to become agents of development, but were otherwise rather dismissed.
For the historicist and aspirant totalitarian New Order, the central 
problem about NU was, almost surely, simply that it was so independent 
of government. Totalitarian, historicist regimes may be able to oppress, im-
prison, murder or co-opt opponents, but they find it difficult to deal with 
actors who are simply independent. NU’s kyais and pesantrens had local social 
roots, local networks, local sources of income and an organisational network 
hardly more substantial than a list of who was married to, had studied with, 
or was descended from whom. This was not something that the Soeharto 
regime could just take over. It could not be given a directive that would be 
carried out in all its branches — NU just did not (and does not) work that 
way. Jakarta could intervene in a political party, and frequently did so. It 
could shape the national education curriculum, and did so. The regime could 
do many such things, but it couldn’t just make the network that was NU do 
whatever it wanted it to do. So NU had to be cold-shouldered. Its control of 
the Ministry of Religion could be ended; its educational subsidies could be 
cut away; its existence as a political party could be ended when it was ‘fused’ 
into PPP in 1973. It could be subjected to surveillance, to suspicion, to isola-
tion from the bureaucratic and military interests that dominated the nation. 
The government, which could not just take over the NU network, could 
compete with it, so that the Traditionalist pesantrens even ceased to be the 
main vehicles for conveying religious knowledge to the rural young. But the 
government couldn’t make NU conduct its affairs at government direction.
Over time, as NU was progressively cold-shouldered by the state, 
Traditionalists found themselves becoming willy-nilly an opposition force. 
Eventually new leaders in NU realised that the only way forward was 
to reconcile with the regime. We will see in the following chapter how 
this became unavoidable when Soeharto took a decision to impose all-
encompassing ideological conformity upon the nation — the ultimate step 
for any totalitarian regime, the formal definition of how people must think.
230 This quotation is taken from the 1993 edition. Marwati Djoenoed Poesponegoro 
and Nugroho Notosusanto (eds), Sejarah Nasional Indonesia (6 vols; Jakarta: Balai 
Pustaka, 1993), vol. 6, p. 500.
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While all of this was going on, the abangan side of Javanese society 
lost the only institutions that had previously sustained and promoted the 
abangan view of life: the abangan-supported political parties. PKI was 
slaughtered, imprisoned and made illegal. PNI was fused into PDI and 
political irrelevance. The abangan constituency was garnered at election 
time by Golkar and subject at all times to the Islamisation projects we have 
seen in this chapter. There was resistance to this Islamisation, of course, 
and the deeper Islamisation of a society once so polarised and embittered 
along santri-abangan lines could not proceed smoothly or quickly. But it 
was proceeding.
We will see in the following chapter how, in the last years of the New 
Order, political alignments and social contexts changed. This would facilitate 
both the further Islamisation of Javanese society and the emergence of 
extremist Islamic movements. Some of these movements — unlike Abdullah 
Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s oppositionist group — would gain 
legitimacy by sharing in the totalitarian vision of the regime.
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c h a p te r  6
The totalitarian experiment (II): 
Grass-roots Islamisation and 
advancing Islamism, c. 1980s–98
The break between the preceding chapter and this one is rather artificial, as 
often with historical periodisations, and the years covered overlap. The aim 
of this chapter is to show how, from roots that we have seen in the preceding 
chapter, in the last 20 years or so of the New Order four major departures 
grew to fruition:
• a regime push for ideological hegemony,
• rapprochement between NU and the regime which served to 
advance Dakwahism, 
• the emergence of Revivalist and Islamist groups whose aspirations 
were consistent with some elements within the regime elite, and
• consequently deeper Islamisation — at the time commonly called 
‘greening’ — of the regime itself.
Taken together, these developments accelerated the Islamisation of Javanese 
society — and of Indonesian society more generally — and prepared the 
ground for Islam to return as a political force, as well as a social and cultural 
one, after the regime fell in 1998. The New Order would end with little room 
remaining for opposition to deeper Islamisation.
At the start of the period discussed here, the regime was far more stable 
than it was at the beginning of the period covered in Chapter 5. It was never 
as monolithic as it aspired to be, but by the 1980s, Soeharto’s regime had 
tentacles and loyal acolytes from one end of Indonesia to the other. Through 
204
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the combined dominance of the bureaucracy and the military down to 
village level, with Golkar as an electoral vehicle, it was close to inconceivable 
that the New Order regime could be overturned by any domestic force, 
including any form of politically organised Islam. Internationally, the 
regime was widely admired for its economic management, its suppression of 
Communism, its apparent domestication of Islam — a major international 
strategic issue in the wake of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 — and its near-
miracle of actually seeming able to govern the world’s largest archipelago. 
Despite international criticism of the New Order’s human rights record and 
corruption, Soeharto was received as a state visitor in Washington and Tokyo, 
and himself received in Jakarta heads of government from nations such as 
Japan, India and Pakistan. Such facts no doubt reinforced the regime’s self-
confidence and Soeharto’s own belief that he was something much more 
than a village-boy-made-good-through-the-army: he was a statesman, a seer 
perhaps, possibly even (as suggested by his musings in Butir-butir budaya 
Jawa and his memoirs, both done in the 1980s) a philosopher king.
By the 1980s, Soeharto’s New Order regime was coming under 
increased criticism domestically for its corruption and brutality. In May 1980 
a ‘Petition of 50’ signed by prominent people criticised Soeharto, accusing 
him of misrepresenting Pancasila as if he himself were its embodiment. 
Nonetheless, the regime was successfully dominating most of the context 
for social transformations, although such transformations were not always 
susceptible to regime control, given the scale and complexity of the society 
on the one hand and, on the other, the regime’s own administrative and 
other limitations.
Religion was at issue here. As we noted above, Soeharto was evidently 
taking a greater interest in Islam himself, without abandoning his commit-
ment to what Hefner has called ‘power-oriented mystical magic’1 of a 
more familiarly Javanese type. The possibility of Islam becoming difficult 
to manage, however, was suggested when PPP staged a walkout of the 
parliament in 1978 and Islamic extremists hijacked a Garuda aircraft in 
1981. It may have been the regime’s perception of the depth of ongoing 
Islamisation and the possibility of Islamic forces becoming difficult to 
control, along with the government’s permanent anti-Communism, that 
led it to decide to implement thorough-going ideological conformity across 
the nation. But let us first look at the changing social context of the 1980s 
and 1990s.
1 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 83.
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A changing, Islamising society
The New Order’s developmental, educational and religious initiatives 
had already spawned significant changes in Javanese society. People were 
becoming more urban and fewer were working in agriculture. In 1961, 71.2 
per cent of men and 64.3 per cent of women were employed in agriculture; 
by 1980 these figures had fallen to 52.6 and 46.6 per cent respectively, while 
employment in manufacturing, construction, trade, transport and services had 
risen. In rural areas, many women were employed in cottage industries.2
During these last two decades of the regime, an urban middle class 
became visible in Indonesia — if it remained notoriously difficult to define or 
quantify.3 Observers noted that this middle class often displayed a high level 
of Islamic piety. We saw above how Islam as it was being promoted in the 
expanding educational system was associated for many young Javanese with 
the very idea of modernity. Beatty noted in his fieldwork in the early 1990s 
that piety was ‘a prominent aspect of an emerging national youth culture’.4 
Elite Islamic schools were being created in major cities for the middle class, 
with good facilities and offering the national curriculum along with Islamic 
studies.5 Salaried urban workers in modern enterprises or government 
employment and university-educated professionals, fixing up older houses 
or living in newly built suburbs, sending their children to university and 
driving new automobiles, while also observing Islam’s requirements for the 
faithful — these became a more prominent feature of Indonesian life than 
ever before.
It has to be remembered, however, that for most Indonesians in both 
the cities and the rural countryside, life remained hard. Poverty, malnutrition 
and chronic illness all declined in this period, but none was eliminated. From 
the 1930s to the 1960s, a Javanese villager might aspire to own a bicycle 
and a sewing machine. By the 1980s and 1990s those aspirations could 
extend to a motorbike and a radio, and eventually a television set. But most 
2 Diane L. Wolf, Factory daughters: Gender, household dynamics, and rural industrializa-
tion in Java (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 43, 45.
3 For example, see the papers in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young (eds), The Politics 
of middle class Indonesia (Clayton, Vic: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1990).
4 Beatty, Varieties, p. 129.
5 On such schools, see Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Islamizing formal education: Integrated 
Islamic school and a new trend in formal educational institution in Indonesia’ 
(Working Paper no. 172. Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 
2009), p. 5.
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people living in Java or in Indonesia more generally remained poor as well 
as inadequately supported by social services, even by the standards of other 
Southeast Asian countries. Nevertheless, there were significant changes. 
Among them was the impact on literacy of the regime’s increasing provision 
of education.
Literacy, as already noted above, was rising dramatically. We saw figures 
in the previous chapter confirming rising literacy across Indonesia. By 1995, 
as the New Order neared its end, the more detailed picture was as follows 
for Central and East Java.
Table 15  Literacy in Central and East Java as percentages of total population,  
 19956
Area Urban  Urban  Total  Rural  Rural  Total
 male female urban male female rural
East Java 94.4 84.3 89.2 82.3 64.9 73.4
Central Java 94.6 84.5 89.4 88.1 74.5 81.2
By 2003, there would be further improvement on these figures, as seen in 
Table 16.
Table 16  Literacy in Central and East Java and Yogyakarta as percentages of  
 total population, 20037 
Area Urban  Urban  Total  Rural  Rural  Total
 male female urban male female rural
East Java 95.3 87.9 91.6 85.8 71.7 78.5
Central Java 94.6 86.5 90.5 89.8 78.7 84.2
Yogyakarta 95.1 86.8 90.9 86.9 74.4 80.5
6 The statistics relate to literacy in the Latin script on the part of persons aged ten 
and over. Penduduk Jawa Timur / Population of Jawa Timur: Hasil survey penduduk 
antar sensus 1995 / Results of the 1995 intercensal population survey 1995 (Seri S2.13 
[ Jakarta:] Biro Pusat Statistik [1996]), pp. 47–9; Penduduk Jawa Tengah / Population 
of Jawa Tengah: Hasil survey penduduk antar sensus 1995 / Results of the 1995 intercensal 
population survey 1995 (Seri S2.11 [ Jakarta:] Biro Pusat Statistik [1996]), pp. 47–9. 
I do not have figures for the Special District of Yogyakarta for 1995.
7 The statistics, like those in Table 15, relate to literacy in the Latin script on the part 
of persons aged ten and over. Statistik kesejahteraan rakyat 2003 / Welfare statistics 2003 
( Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik [2003]), pp. 144–9. Figures relating to those over the 
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Thus, male literacy was approaching 100 per cent and female literacy 
was improving dramatically. Males and urban dwellers were still ahead of 
females and rural dwellers, a reflection principally of differential educational 
opportunities. We noted in Chapter 2 above that in 1930 it would have 
been nearly impossible to find a literate woman in many parts of Java; by 
the 1990s it was becoming difficult to find anyone who was not literate. It 
should also be noted, however, that concerns about the loss of facility in 
Javanese script were well-founded: literacy in other than the Latin script 
was below 1 per cent in all of the categories covered in Tables 15 and 16 
except for East Java in both 1995 and 2003, where 1.5 per cent of rural 
dwellers were literate in a non-Latin script. That might have been literacy 
either in Javanese script or — even more likely — in Arabic script.8 It was 
clear that Javanese society was becoming more modern in many ways, more 
urban, less agricultural, more literate and, as we saw in the last chapter, more 
deeply Islamic. But perhaps it was also growing less Javanese in culture by 
the standards of the past.
The growth of modern communications media under the New Order 
played an important role in improving the dissemination of information and 
ideas across Javanese society, and thus in its modernisation. In its anti-Com-
munist enthusiasms, the Soeharto regime banned many leftist publications 
and continuously remained alert for anything that might disturb the regime’s 
stability or question its virtue.9 Pornography was also suspect of course, but 
violence in the media was not usually a concern — perhaps unsurprisingly, 
given the regime’s own bloody birth and continuing violence.
In an increasingly literate society, newspapers played an increasingly 
important role. Newsprint circulation remained rather low for a country of 
such size, in 1991 being just over 13 million. It tended to be concentrated 
age of 15 are given in Statistics Indonesia Tabel 3.1.1 Angka melek huruf penduduk 
umur 15 tahun ke atas menurut provinsi dan Kab/kota at http://www.datastatistik-
Indonesia.com/component/option,com_tabel/task,show/Itemid,181/
8 Javanese-language Islamic religious works are often written in Arabic script (in 
these circumstances called pegon) rather than Javanese script.
9 This included the first edition of my own History of modern Indonesia, published in 
1981. It was being sold openly even in fairly remote parts of Indonesia for about a 
year before someone who mattered read it and discovered in its final chapter, inter 
alia, the comment that Soeharto was ‘adept at gaining the loyalty of others, not 
least by allowing them to reap the financial rewards of loyalty with little concern for 
legality’. The publishers (Macmillan) and I were invited to alter the text, to withdraw 
the book from sale voluntarily, or to face it being declared illegal. I refused to alter 
the text and Macmillan withdrew the book from sale in Indonesia.
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in urban areas — particularly in Jakarta — but papers were read by multiple 
persons so their real readerships are hard to assess. Local newspapers 
were important in Java, as in the outer islands of Indonesia.10 Even more 
important was radio, the reach of which expanded greatly as economic 
development brought greater prosperity and allowed even rural villagers 
to buy radio sets. By 1996, Sen and Hill report, most households in Java 
owned a radio set and radio was ‘the primary mass medium for much of 
rural Indonesia’.11 Television was introduced in Indonesia only in 1962 and 
really developed from the 1970s onwards. We have already noted above 
the pervasive dullness of television programmes under Soeharto — its 
programmes mainly about development, always about the government’s 
view of things, always emphasising the unity of Indonesia and the harmony 
that must prevail among its ethnic and religious communities, whenever 
possible reminding viewers of the perfidy of Communists. There was a 
state-controlled TVRI, but in the late 1980s private television was allowed 
and — hardly surprisingly — members of the Soeharto family and their 
cronies were prominent in this new branch of business.12 Television and 
radio, however, also created a problem for the regime’s totalitarian aspirations, 
for citizens could access some foreign radio broadcasts — particularly the 
BBC and Australian radio — and some could get Singapore and Malaysian 
television. By the mid-1990s the Internet was beginning to provide another 
means of bypassing regime control of information.
Signs of deepening Islamisation continued to appear throughout the 
1980s and 1990s. Religious education, as we have seen, was an obligatory 
part of the national educational system from the early days of the New 
Order. A new education law in 1989 reinforced this and introduced a 
provision — which Islamic activists, particularly from Muhammadiyah and 
MUI, had demanded in the face of Christian objections — that a religion 
must be taught in schools by an adherent of that faith. In principle (if not 
always in practice) this guaranteed that Muslim children in Christian schools 
would be taught about Islam by a Muslim.13 The government’s IAIN system 
continued to be upgraded and expanded. By 1991 there were 2200 teaching 
staff in the 14 IAINs and a hundred thousand students were enrolled. At 
the end of the Soeharto period, according to Hefner, 18 per cent of all 
10 Krishna Sen and David T. Hill, Media, culture and politics in Indonesia ( Jakarta and 
Kuala Lumpur: Equinox publishing, 2007), pp. 66–7.
11 Ibid., pp. 90–1.
12 Ibid. pp. 109–17.
13 Effendy, Islam and the state, pp. 155–6.
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Indonesians in higher education were studying at IAINs.14 At lower levels 
of education, after 1984 — that is to say, after the rapprochement between 
the regime and NU discussed below — government subsidies to pesantrens 
grew.15 Muhammadiyah also continued to be a provider of Islamically 
inspired education, but (as was also true of NU’s pesantrens) these schools 
were a small part of the government-dominated educational system. Across 
all of Indonesia, in 1988 Muhammadiyah’s 44,430 teachers at 4,262 schools 
taught just 1.6 per cent of all school-age children (a group amounting to 
some 37.5 million by then).16
We have already noted in the preceding chapter the increasing 
number of mosques in Central and East Java into the 1990s, just one of 
many indications of profound social change. Feillard noted that by the 
later 1980s government officials and Golkar apparatchiks felt that it was 
no longer inconsistent with their career prospects to attend pengajian 
sessions, as religion grew more fashionable across Indonesia. Even quite 
zealous organisations like DDII enjoyed better relations with the regime.17 
In the mid-1990s, Feillard wrote of ‘un phénomène général de renouveau 
religieux’.18 By this time, Bambang Pranowo was arguing — perhaps a bit 
prematurely, but surely based on shrewd observation — that ‘the santri-
abangan dichotomic approach is no longer relevant to an understanding of 
the religious life of Javanese Muslims’.19 In fact ideas and practices associated 
with the abangan life style survived — and still survive today — but by the 
1990s it was already seeming likely that abangan had become a minority 
among Javanese. Kebatinan appeared to be weakening further.20
14 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 120; idem, ‘Islam, state, and civil society: ICMI and the 
struggle for the Indonesian middle class’, Indonesia no. 56 (Oct. 1993), p. 10. See also 
Porter, Managing politics and Islam, pp. 53, 60; Feillard, Islam et armée, p. 261.
15 Feillard, Islam et armée, p. 227.
16 Ibid., p. 253.
17 Andrée Feillard, ‘Traditionalist Islam and the state in Indonesia: The road to 
legitimacy and renewal’, in Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatich (eds), Islam in 
an era of nation-states (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1997), pp. 146, 150.
18 Feillard, Islam et armée, p. 260.
19 Bambang Pranowo. ‘Islam and party politics in rural Java’, SI vol. 1 (1994), no. 2, 
p. 18.
20 Abdurrahman Wahid’s characteristically idiosyncratic explanation for this was 
that the empus were finding it hard to gather their spiritual forces because it was 
very difficult to find a place where the call to prayer could not be heard, and where 
they could therefore conduct their ascetic exercises (tirakat); discussion, Jakarta, 14 
Nov. 1995.
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The jilbab — the headscarf that fits tightly around the face — was 
an indicator of change. It was rarely worn by Javanese women in the first 
decades of independence. Leading Modernist figures whom we have already 
met in this study — Natsir, Sjafruddin and Roem, for example — did 
not regard veiling or covering the head as necessary for Muslim women 
and most of their wives did not wear a jilbab.21 The diaphanous kerudung 
headscarf was sometimes seen in the 1950s and 1960s, but rarely the jilbab 
and never — at least to my knowledge — the face veil. In the late 1970s, 
Nancy Smith-Hefner reports, less than 3 per cent of female students on the 
campus of Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta wore the jilbab. Veiling 
was prohibited in government offices and state schools until 1991. After 
these restrictions were abolished, wearing a jilbab became not only a sign of 
Islamic identity and piety but also a mark of protest against the Soeharto 
regime among some girls and young women. By the time Smith-Hefner 
surveyed Gadjah Mada students in 1999, 2001 and 2002, over 60 per cent 
of females had adopted the jilbab.22 
Local-level observation confirmed the broader picture of deepening 
Islamisation. In Jatinom at the time of Irwan Abdullah’s fieldwork of 
1990–1, Muhammadiyah was having considerable success in deepening the 
Islamisation of the town, where it had taken ‘deep root’, but less success in 
the surrounding villages, where ‘the population does not consider Islam a 
central issue in their lives’.23 Traditionalism remained strong in the villages. 
Abangan styles also continued, but they were in decline.24 Even Mystic 
Synthesis ideas about local spiritual forces were being Islamised in some 
cases. A dukun informant of Kim Hyung-Jun reported that in the past the 
Goddess of the Southern Ocean had had no religion, but now — in the 
1990s — she had become a Muslim and was able to read Arabic.25
Kim studied a rural village in the Yogyakarta area in the 1990s. This 
had once been a majority PNI and PKI village, with neither a prayer-house 
nor a mosque. Early in the New Order period, Muhammadiyah activists 
grew in number there. Religious education was, of course, introduced into 
the school curriculum. Significant Islamisation followed. Regular pengajian 
21 Luthfi Assyaukanie, Islam and the secular state (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2009), p. 85.
22 Smith-Hefner, ‘Javanese women and the veil’, pp. 390, 397.
23 Irwan Abdullah, Muslim businessmen of Jatinom, p. 87.
24 Ibid., pp. 98, 140, 155.
25 Kim, Reformist Muslims, p. 167.
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sessions began in the mid-1980s and a mosque was built in 1988.26 In 
Bambang Pranowo’s study village on the western slopes of Mount Merbabu, 
new mosques were built in 1981 and 1984 to meet the ‘urgent need’ for more 
places to worship. By 1987 another was planned. This deeper Islamisation 
— dubbed santrinisasi (santrinisation), an increasingly common Indonesian 
term — was observable not just as a political phenomenon but rather as part 
of ‘a genuine religious resurgence among the villagers’.27
Imam Tholkhah’s study of a village in East Java can also give us a sense 
of countryside realities in the early 1990s. He conducted interviews in 1993 
in a village called Madukoro near Magetan, 90 km east of Surakarta.28 This 
was a poor area, where poverty had been at its worst in the mid-1960s as 
the Indonesian economy approached collapse. Instead of the terms santri 
and abangan being used, the local terms were jama’ah and non-jama’ah 
(congregation and non-congregation respectively), with about 50 per cent of 
the population in each category, but we will continue to use the more familiar 
terminology here. The story, too, is familiar and consistent with the general 
pattern that has already emerged in this book. The abangan mostly lived in 
the upland part of the village and were poorer than the santri, who lived 
mostly in the lowland part. The leaders of the local mosques estimated that 
nearly 80 per cent of the upland villagers were abangan while in the lowland 
area abangan were not to be found. There was political tension between the 
two groups during the pre-Soeharto period and killings took place in the area 
in 1965–6. Such tensions subsided during the New Order. The destruction of 
PKI and the general depoliticisation at village level meant that the abangan 
side lost its institutional support and the santri side could grow. After the 
government’s push for ideological hegemony and reconciliation with NU in 
the early 1980s — discussed below — the regime was more relaxed about 
cooperation at grass-roots level with Islamic organisations. The general 
Islamic revival visible across the country thus proceeded also in Madukoro, 
leading to deeper Islamisation.
Cultural differences remained between abangan and santri in Imam 
Tholkhah’s study village. The former enjoyed performances of gamelan, 
wayang, kethoprak, ludruk, reyog and so on. They gambled for small amounts 
26 Ibid.
27 Bambang Pranowo. ‘Islam and party politics in rural Java’, pp. 15–6.
28 The following account rests entirely on Imam Tholkhah, Anatomi konflik politik 
di Indonesia, esp. pp. 1, 10, 26–9, 45–6, 53, 70–3, 76, 79–81, 91–2, 94–6, 115–6, 
143–8, 160.
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and drank alcohol. The lowland santri, by contrast, preferred what they called 
‘Islamic arts’: rebana and terbangan (playing tambourines), kasidah and samrah 
(Arabic devotional poetry) and suchlike. Marriages across the santri-abangan 
divide were rare. One of Imam Tholkhah’s informants from the abangan side 
told him,
My religion is Islam and I believe that God exists. When I married, I 
recited the Shahada (confession of faith). But I am a Muslim who cannot 
read the holy Qur’an and I can’t carry out the prayers. According to me, 
what is most important for everyone is to do good, be honest and not 
to harm to others.29
The most important tensions in the early 1990s were, it seems, no 
longer between santri and abangan, but rather within the santri community 
between those whom Imam Tholkah calls the ‘fanatics’ and the ‘moderates’. 
The former tended to be people in private employment and without political 
power, often zealous supporters of the PPP, while the latter were in the 
government sector and of course affiliated to Golkar — reflecting again 
that regime hegemony over ‘acceptable’ forms of religion.30 Kyais competed 
with each other for influence and resisted the influence of Modernists, but 
generally Traditionalist Islam remained dominant. In this village of some 
4,600 people (850 families), there were two mosques and fifteen prayer-
houses in the upland part of the village and three mosques and ten prayer-
houses in the lowland area. The Naqshabandiyya tarekat was found there, but 
was mainly followed by older women.
Schooling reflected, and maintained, the difference between upland 
abangan and lowland santri. The upland children went to government schools 
(where, of course, they were also taught about Islam). The lowland children 
mostly went to two schools run by private Islamic institutions. One was 
established in the 1960s by an organisation promoting Traditionalist-type 
education called Pesantren Sabilil Muttaqin, and the other by NU in the 
1970s. The slametan — the object of so much animus from the Modernists 
— provided something of a bridge between Traditionalist santri and abangan. 
It was observed by both on such occasions as the first, third, seventh, fortieth, 
hundredth and thousandth day after a death. The difference between them 
was that a santri slametan was led by a kyai who prayed in Arabic while an 
abangan slametan was led by the village modin (the head of the local mosque) 
29 Ibid., p. 70.
30 Ibid., p. 28. See also Mudjahirin Thohir, Orang Islam Jawa pesisiran, p. 229, 231, 
on PPP hostility to the government in Jepara.
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or by a village elder and the prayers were in Javanese, but still reflected 
Islamic values.
In general, there had been a progressively deeper Islamisation of 
Madukoro society. In the wake of the murderous crisis of 1965–6 abangan 
villagers flocked to the mosques and were welcomed by the santri. The central 
sacred site of the abangan, the village pundhen31 where their annual village 
slametan had taken place, was demolished by the santri so that site was gone, 
and with it the annual ritual. Political differences at village level of course 
changed in the wake of the 1973 amalgamation of political parties and the 
depoliticised ‘floating mass’ policy. Now it was no longer politicised santri 
vs abangan but rather PPP (i.e., NU) supporters opposing the government’s 
vehicle Golkar. When core leaders of Pesantren Sabilil Muttaqin decided to 
lend their support to Golkar, the santri side of Madukoro became split. Some 
of the pesantren’s anti-Golkar leaders were imprisoned on a charge of being 
involved in Komando Jihad in the 1970s. In the elections of 1971–92, Golkar 
consistently won a majority of votes in the village, with PPP never gaining 
more than 40 per cent and PDI never more than 7 per cent. By the time of 
the 1982 general election, all of the village kyais had thrown their support to 
Golkar in recognition of political realities and the benefits to be gained.
One version of events credited spiritual powers for Golkar’s dominance 
of Madukoro. The village head claimed in an interview in 1993 to have used 
supernatural formulae (mantras):
The day before the election [of 1987], I and the village officials visited 
every polling station to bewitch the place. We circled each vote-box 
three times and spread salt around the place and prayed for the victory of 
Golkar. … I think that many people, above all the older generation, still 
believe in supernatural forces. By doing this, we were able to explain that 
the victory of Golkar was assisted by hidden powers. If anyone protested 
about the outcome of the vote-counting, we were able to explain that 
many people in fact punctured the Golkar symbol, although what they 
saw with their own eyes was that they were puncturing the symbol for 
PPP or PDI.32
Other case studies also show a picture of Islamisation at village level as 
a process that was consistent with the regime’s continuing dominance — a 
synergy of interests whose roots we have already seen in the previous chapter. 
31 Imam Tholkhah, Anatomi konflik politik di Indonesia, p. 145, does not say what 
form this took.
32 Ibid., pp. 164–5.
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It was not the case that abangan had disappeared, but they were almost surely 
declining as a proportion of the population and had virtually no political 
significance, since the only meaningful political choice they might make was 
to support Golkar, a choice also made by many santri.
Endang Turmudi’s research on the Jombang area presents such a 
picture.33 This was based on field work in 1992–3. As we have already noted 
above, Jombang is an area noted for its famous pesantrens and is at the very 
centre of the NU network of relationships. The relative political solidarity 
of Jombang’s kyais was disrupted when Ky. Musta’in Romly, the leader 
(murshid) of the Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya at the Darul Ulum pesantren, 
announced his support for Golkar as the 1977 elections approached, thereby 
losing many of his followers. Mutual bitter accusations that those on the 
other side of the political divide were kafirs followed. In fact, Golkar won 
all the elections in Jombang during the New Order period. After the NU-
regime reconciliation of 1984 to be discussed below, many more local kyais 
transferred their support to Golkar, on the grounds that this was the best 
way to pursue the interests of the ummah, leaving others embittered at their 
defection from PPP. The political divisions among kyais, however, had two 
local consequences. On the one hand, cynicism about kyais necessarily grew, 
and their overall political influence began to decline within the community. 
This was true even of tarekat members, who continued to recognise the 
authority of their murshid in mystical matters but no longer followed his 
political allegiance. Secondly, these political differences were reflected more 
broadly in the santri community, so that PPP supporters were sometimes 
uncomfortable attending pengajian led by Golkar supporters. By the early 
1990s, Turmudi could describe the relations between the kyais of Jombang 
and the New Order regime as ‘harmonious’ and politics as ‘secularised’.34 
He goes on to say that, since politics was ‘no longer intertwined with Islam’, 
there was no longer a ‘moral obligation for a Muslim to affiliate with a 
certain political party’.35 In fact, Islam and the dominant political force 
— the regime itself — were by that time quite thoroughly intertwined, 
and it was for that reason that many Muslim leaders saw no difficulty in 
supporting Golkar.
33 The following account rests on Endang Turmudi, Struggling for the umma: Changing 
leadership roles of kiai in Jombang, East Java (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006), esp. pp. 
90–6, 121, 128–30, 132 et seqq., 139–41, 153, 157, 159, 161, 170–1, 179–80, 185, 
188, 198–9. This was originally a PhD thesis of 1996.
34 Ibid., pp. 152, 170.
35 Ibid., p. 152.
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As these developments were going on among Jombang’s santri, a 
process of deepening Islamisation was underway among its abangan. The 
gentle type of dakwah for which NU was known had considerable success. 
Added to this were the influences of religious education in public schools, of 
the local Islamic schools and of students returning to the area after studying 
at Islamic higher education institutions. The result was ‘a decrease of abangan 
practice in general’.36 Abangan beliefs and practices were increasingly found 
only among the older generation. Islamic Modernism was represented in 
Jombang by Muhammadiyah, but although it remained ‘essentially anti-
tradition’37 Muhammadiyah was more moderate in its attitude to local 
traditions than in some other places, or indeed in principle. We also noted 
this with regard to Muhammadiyah in Kota Gede in the previous chapter.38 
While there was some tension and discord between Modernists and 
Traditionalists in Jombang, this decreased significantly by the early 1990s. 
All of this promoted the further Islamisation of Jombang society.
A.G. Muhaimin did fieldwork in 1991–3 in Cirebon, a city where the 
grave of one of Java’s walis, Sunan Gunungjati, is found, which has given 
Cirebon ‘great spiritual status and made it a place of pious visitation and 
special veneration’.39 Muhaimin’s is a fine study of popular Islam there, of 
the intersection of Islam and local spirits, traditions and interpretations, 
and a detailed account of actual practice. He demonstrates the perseverance 
into the 1990s of older practices in Traditionalist circles that still resisted 
Modernist reforms. Muhaimin provides, for example, a detailed account of 
the Ruwahan observances in the middle of the month Saban, which we have 
already encountered in the 1930s in Chapter 2 above. As in the past, so at 
the time of Muhaimin’s research, pious Muslims believed that on the 15th 
of the month, the heavenly tree of life would be shaken so that some of its 
leaves would fall; the names written on those leaves foretold who would die 
during the coming year.40 Various traditional ritual practices follow from that 
idea. Muhaimin shows the continuing importance of pilgrimages (ziarah) to 
sacred sites, of the Buntet pesantren and its various kyais, and of the Tijaniyya 
and Shattariyya Sufi orders.
36 Ibid., p. 199.
37 Ibid., p. 179.
38 There citing Nakamura, Crescent arises over the banyan tree, pp. 182–3.
39 A.G. Muhaimin, The Islamic traditions of Cirebon: Ibadat and adat among Java-
nese Muslims (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2006). This was originally a PhD thesis of 
1995. 
40 Ibid., pp. 133–4.
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In the generally pious Traditionalist atmosphere for which Cirebon was 
(and is) well-known, many beliefs were preserved that also made sense to 
abangan. For instance, beside the God of the Qur’an and the other spiritual 
beings of Islamic tradition, ‘some Cirebonese do recognise a variety of other 
deities: dewa (deva, male) and dewi (devi, female), Betara (Bhatara, male) and 
Betari (Bhatari, female), and also Sang Hyang’, all of these being pre-Islamic, 
Sanskrit- and/or Old Javanese-derived terms. Interpretations differ, however, 
as to what sort of beings these are.41 Thus, Muhaimin could observe things 
reminiscent of the Mystic Synthesis of earlier times. But times were in fact 
different and here, too, New Order politics led to political splits, when some 
kyais supported Golkar in the 1992 election and some PPP.42 Muhaimin 
did not study the issue of the ongoing deepening of Islam’s influence among 
the abangan, but we can see in his study the sort of bridges of thought and 
practice that existed in Traditionalist circles and facilitated the ongoing 
Islamisation of Javanese society.
Andrew Beatty’s fieldwork in the 1990s in Banyuwangi, at the eastern 
tip of Java, also encountered the variety (a term he uses in the title of his 
book) of local Islams in Java.43 His main fieldwork site was a village on the 
slopes of Mount Ijen which he calls ‘Bayu’, populated largely by ‘Osing’ 
people — a group who regard themselves as the original inhabitants of the 
region and who speak their own dialect of Javanese. The dominant form of 
Islam in ‘Bayu’ was Traditionalist; there was little presence of Modernist 
Islam. For local villagers, the slametan remained a ritual of central importance, 
but interpretations of it differed, from the less Islamic to the more orthodox. 
Here the local terms used for abangan and santri expressed a sense of ethnic 
as well as religious identity: wong Jawa versus wong Islam, that is, Javanese 
versus Muslims, although these terms were not used rigidly.44 These two 
41 Ibid., p. 32.
42 Ibid., pp. 239–40.
43 Beatty’s fieldwork was done in 1991–3 and 1996–7. The following account derives 
from his Varieties of Javanese religion, pp. 20–1, 27, 43, 52–9, 126–7, 130–4.
44 This usage may have quite old roots in this region. A similar distinction between 
gama Jawa ( Javanese religion) and the Islamic faith, between being Javanese or being 
Muslim, was drawn in a Javanese-language Islamic text from the early stages of 
Islamisation, published in G.W.J. Drewes (ed. and transl.), An early Javanese code of 
Muslim ethics (Bibliotheca Indonesica 18; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978); see esp. 
pp. 34–6. This is a problematic text, discussed on pp. 23–4 of my book Mystic synthesis 
in Java. While the provenance of this work cannot be confidently established, I think 
it possible — perhaps even likely — that it came from the Banyuwangi area.
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groups lived in the same areas and had contrived means to tolerate each 
others’ presence and practices. ‘In the interest of social harmony and inner 
calm one adjusts one’s own behavior to others’, observed Beatty in the 
1990s. ‘Santri relativise supernaturalism as adat, custom, and thereby avoid 
confronting it as a challenge to formal religion; mystics relativise normative 
piety as a first step in knowledge, and they treat supernaturalism as a 
symbolic language referring to inner realities. Diversity is embraced as a fact 
of social life.’45 Nevertheless, local mystics were prone to ‘contrast their own 
open-minded speculation with what they see as the narrow dogmatism of 
the santri … The quiet, bewildered majority, caught between the two sides, 
is apt to defer to either as the occasion demands.’46
Thus, a relatively tolerant co-existence prevailed in ‘Bayu’. The local 
cult of the wong Jawa in ‘Bayu’ was focused on the spirit Buyut Cili, who 
was believed to be a were-tiger. Even the wife of the pangulu, the chief 
religious official of the mosque, took part in observances at Buyut Cili’s 
remotely located shrine. Such conduct was not the rule in some surrounding 
villages. In one nearby village the local spirit shrine was in the centre of the 
village and had been vandalised by pious villagers. In another, the leading 
NU figure since the time of the Revolution had pressed for thoroughgoing 
reform of local religious practices. Beatty met his son, who still insisted that 
old traditions that were inconsistent with Islam must be ‘wiped out’, leading 
by Beatty’s time to ‘fierce dogmatism’ and ‘intensive indoctrination’ in the 
village.47 Thus, in this remote southeastern corner of Java, the process of 
Islamisation varied significantly from village to village, a salutary warning 
to us not to assume too much on the basis of the local case studies available 
to us. Nevertheless, the general direction of social and religious change was 
clearly in the direction of deeper Islamisation.
The process of deepening Islamic influence was also seen in the arts. 
We have noted the vicissitudes of older Javanese arts in previous pages and 
will return to this topic below. A new musical form must now attract our 
attention, one that came effectively from nowhere c. 1965 to become within 
a decade the best-known, most popular music of Java and Indonesia more 
broadly, called dangdut. The name is onomatopoetic, reflecting the sound of 
the driving drum beat that defines the form. This was truly popular music, for 
45 Beatty, Varieties of Javanese religion, p. 157.
46 Ibid., p. 43.
47 Ibid., pp. 131–4.
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the creation of which the male singer and film star Rhoma Irama is usually 
credited. Sen and Hill describe his contribution in this way: 
He transformed the older-style orkes Melayu (Malay orchestra) and 
combined it with the rhythmic style of Indian film songs, popular with 
urban working-class audiences, into up-tempo dangdut, acceptable across 
society and patronized by Cabinet ministers.48
Dangdut or similarly popular music might be thought to be an im-
probable vehicle for Islamisation, but Rhoma Irama sought to make it such, 
particularly from the later 1970s onwards.49 One of his songs which — one 
might think, rather surprisingly — became a popular dance tune, recites the 
Shahada and says,
Say that God is One,
God, the object of our prayers and supplications;
Say that God is One,
God, who has no children and is the child of none.50
Another of his songs is about going on the hajj to Mecca. Interspersed 
among stanzas in Arabic, he sang passages such as the following:
We are coming, we are coming
To fulfill your call, O Allah.
We are coming, we are coming
To seek your blessing, O Allah.
Go on the hajj, forgiven your sins
And forge faith and piety.
Struggle in the path of God;
Hajis are the fortress of religion.
We are coming, we are coming
To fulfill your call, O Allah.
We are coming, we are coming
To seek your blessing, O Allah.
Haji haji, haji, come let us carry out the religious duty of 
 pilgrimage (x 12)
Many kinds of peoples of this earth
48 Sen and Hill, Media, culture and politics, p. 174.
49 For an early account of Rhoma Irama and the origins of dangdut, see William H. 
Frederick, ‘Rhoma Irama and the dangdut style: Aspects of contemporary Indonesian 
popular culture’, Indonesia no. 34 (Oct. 1982), pp. 103–30.
50 Ibid., pp. 116–7.
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Are as one, mixed together in front of the ka‘ba.
Many sorts of languages reverberate,
Beseeching forgiveness as they pray.51
In Rhoma Irama’s lyrics we may note the first major example of a phe-
nomenon that has been important in the Islamisation process in Indonesia 
— making Islamic piety trendy. This would have seemed strange at the time 
to most young people in Europe. While Rhoma Irama was urging his fans 
to fulfill their ‘religious duty of pilgrimage’, John Lennon was telling his to 
imagine that there was no heaven or hell, no countries, ‘nothing to kill or 
die for and no religion, too’.52 It would have seemed much less remarkable 
to many in the United States, however, where Campus Crusade and other 
evangelical Christian movements were beginning to make a major impact 
among the young, and where Americans had been singing along to the hit 
song It is no secret what God can do since the 1950s — recorded by, among 
many others, Elvis Presley, Pat Boone, Mahalia Jackson and Tammy Wynette. 
As Micklethwait and Wooldridge point out, in 1970s America, ‘Evangelicals 
produced their own blockbusters, their own pop songs, their own cultural 
forms, their own version of Bible-infused modernity’.53 Indonesia’s pattern 
was not so different.
It became — and has remained — normal for dangdut performances 
to accompany political campaigns and other major public occasions. Rhoma 
Irama used his music to support PPP in its opposition to Golkar and the 
regime, but he could not contain dangdut’s popularity in this way. It was (and 
is) often sung in utterly irreligious fashion by young females in provocatively 
short skirts with gyrations that any ustadz or kyai would find difficult to 
approve — which is not to claim, of course, that none managed to enjoy 
such performances.
From the 1970s and 1980s there also emerged another form of 
trendy devotional music called kasidah pop or kasidah modern, using modern 
instruments such as acoustic guitar and flute. The first group to become 
famous for this was a quartet of pious Muslims calling themselves Bimbo, 
whose first hit was Tuhan (God), written in 1973. The prominent littérateur 
Taufiq Ismail composed many of their lyrics. Not only their lyrics but also 
51 My translation from the lyrics of Rhoma Irama’s song Haji, taken from http://lirik.
kapanlagi.com/artis/rhoma_irama/haji.
52 John Lennon’s Imagine was released in 1971.
53 John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, God is back: How the global revival of 
faith is changing the world (London, etc.: Penguin Books, 2010), p. 101.
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their performance style mixed music and devotionalism. Sometimes the 
group was so carried away by religious fervor that they turned their backs 
on the audience and abandoned their singing in mid-song.54 Other groups 
joined the kasidah pop trend over the coming years.
Regime demands for ideological conformity
From the late 1970s and with increasing insistence to the end of his reign, 
Soeharto pursued the totalitarian goal of imposing ideological conformity 
across the nation, hoping to make all of its citizens alike in their under-
standing of the nation and its ideological underpinnings. There was, however, 
no question of designating Islam as the foundation of the state — as his 
contemporary Mahathir Mohamad sought to do in Malaysia — for that 
would immediately threaten the multi-religious nation. We have noted above 
that in the last two decades of his rule, Soeharto took a greater interest in 
Islam, but this did not mean the abandonment of his interest in more nativist 
Javanese ideas of occult powers. It is therefore not surprising — given what 
we know of Soeharto’s own beliefs and given both the multi-religious reality 
of Indonesia and the traditions of its military — that Soeharto sought to 
make Pancasila the only acceptable ideology in matters of state and, indeed, 
in everything else as well. For many Muslim leaders this looked like a direct 
challenge to Islam, an attempt to create a new national religion called 
Pancasila, an idea that was of course utter anathema to them. Continuing 
doubts about the strength of Soeharto’s Islamic identity supported such 
suspicions. So did the Soeharto fashion for choosing Javanese or Sanskrit/
Old Javanese terminology wherever possible instead of Arabic. The six 
Soeharto children all had grandiloquent names in this style: the daughters 
Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (better known as Tutut, b. 1949), Siti Hediyati 
Hariyadi (a.k.a. Titiek, b. 1959) and Siti Endang Adiningsih (a.k.a. Mamiek, 
b. 1964) and the sons Sigit Haryoyudanto (b. 1951), Bambang Trihatmojo (b. 
1953) and Hutomo Mandala Putra (known as Tommy, b. 1962). And as we 
will see, when the regime began to insist on mass indoctrination in Pancasila, 
it also inclined to the use of pre-Islamic terminology.
54 On Bimbo and other expressions of middle-class piety, see Moeflich Hasbullah, 
‘Cultural presentation of the Muslim middle class in contemporary Indonesia’, SI 
vol. 7 (2000), no. 2, pp. 1–58. Being carried away by one’s religious emotions during a 
performance is not unique to this group, of course; Mahalia Jackson was an American 
example of the same.
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Pancasila was originally adopted as the philosophical foundation of 
Indonesia in the negotiations that created the Constitution of 1945, during 
the last weeks of the Japanese occupation. Sukarno conceived these five 
principles as the foundation of a religiously neutral form of nationalism. They 
were sufficiently vague in nature that the contending leaders of the about-
to-be nation of Indonesia could agree on them. The date of his Pancasila 
speech — 1 June 1945 — was remembered during the Sukarno years with 
an annual observance on 1 June of Hari Lahir Pancasila — Pancasila birth 
day. This observance carried on for a few years under Soeharto, but it was 
clearly desirable to diminish its Sukarnoist implications. So in 1970 it was 
replaced with a new date and designation. Now, on 1 October of each year 
— the anniversary of Soeharto’s victory in Jakarta over the coup attempt 
of 1965 — Hari Kesaktian Pancasila was observed.55 The new terminology 
was significant, for kesaktian comes from sakti, an Indonesian version of 
a Sanskrit-derived Javanese term for supernatural power (sekti and hence 
kesekten), a term used widely in Javanese culture and without Islamic 
connotations. So this was the ‘Pancasila supernatural-empowerment day’. It 
is unsurprising that Islamic political leaders were offended.
In 1978 Soeharto ramped up the regime’s ideological drive through 
a formal decision of the Parliament (MPR) that mandated indoctrination 
across the nation through a programme known as P4, standing for Pedoman 
Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Guidelines for the Instilling 
and Implementation of Pancasila).56 This decision decreed, inter alia, the 
following:
These Guidelines for the Instilling and Implementation of Pancasila 
represent a manual and something to hold on to in life,57 in social life 
55 Faisal Ismail, Ideologi, hegemoni dan otoritas agama: Wacana ketegangan kreatif Islam 
dan Pancasila (Yogyakarta: TiaraWacana, 1999), p. 134. Hari Kesaktian Pancasila has 
continued to be observed in Indonesia since the fall of Soeharto; see the report of 
Cabinet discussion of this in TempoI, 23 Sept. 2005.
56 Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion of P4 here rests on the official publi-
cation Pedoman pelaksanaan P-4 bagi umat Islam ( Jakarta: Proyek Bimbingan 
Pelaksanaan Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila bagi Umat Beragama, 
Departemen Agama RI, 1982–3). See also Michael Morfit, ‘Pancasila: The Indonesian 
state ideology according to the New Order government’, Asian Survey vol. 21, no. 8 
(Aug. 1981), pp. 838–51.
57 Pegangan hidup. This term, too, could be ambiguous, for a magical amulet could 
also be called a pegangan.
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and national life, for every citizen of Indonesia, every state manager, 
every state institution and every social institution, both in the centre and 
in the regions, [to be] carried out completely and entirely.58
These Guidelines sought to neutralise accusations that P4 was meant to 
displace Islam or any other faith. Separate versions were published for each of 
the recognised religions. The version for Muslims had an introduction from 
the Minister of Religion, Alamsyah Ratu Prawiranegara — the only general 
to serve in this position59 — which was uncompromising in asserting both 
the centrality of Pancasila and its consistency with existing religion:
Pancasila as the state ideology must be understood and instilled by the 
society. This is because in truth understanding of the state ideology 
represents one of the measures for promoting consciousness of being 
part of the state and the people. … Through the approach of religion, 
Pancasila can be instilled and implemented by the people. In reality, 
religious people carrying out the teachings of their religion as well as 
possible, means that they already carry out the meaning of the whole of 
Pancasila themselves.60
Despite emphasising that P4 did not intend to meld Pancasila and 
religion, the Guidelines repeatedly offered up signals that irritated and 
offended Islamic leaders. Soeharto said that P4 could also be interpreted 
as Ekaprasetia Pancakarsa61 — again, Sanskrit/Old Javanese-derived terms 
meaning something like ‘A single oath to support the five aspirations’. Why 
not an Arabic phrase, Islamic leaders probably asked themselves, while 
knowing the answer? The Guidelines themselves contained quotations from 
the Qur’an and collections of Hadith intended to show that Pancasila was 
consistent with Islamic teachings — an effort that was, predictably, rather 
weak on sila number three, the unity of Indonesia. But counter-signals 
58 Pedoman pelaksanaan P-4 bagi umat Islam, p. 14.
59 Alamsyah was minister from 1978 to 1983. He lacked a background in formal 
Islamic educational institutions but was regarded as a practising Muslim. For a 
biography, see Azyumardi Azra and Saiful Umam, Menteri-menteri Agama RI, pp. 
321–65.
60 Pedoman pelaksanaan P-4 bagi umat Islam, p. 3.
61 Soeharto first said this in a speech of April 1976, according to Zakiah Daradjat 
et al., Pedoman pelaksanaan pendidikan P. 4 bagi lembaga pendidikan Islam tingat 
perguruan tinggi (pegangan dosen) ([ Jakarta:] Departemen Agama R.I., Proyek 
Bimbingan Pelaksanaan Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila bagi Umat 
Beragama, 1980–1), p. 11.
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said, for example, that it was necessary to support ‘the continuance of the 
supernatural power (keampuhan dan kesaktian) of Pancasila ’. The Qur’an 
certainly offered no support for the idea that something like Pancasila might 
have supernatural powers. The P4 Guidelines also exemplified the breath-
taking hypocrisy of the increasingly corrupt regime in its emphasis on 
equality and social justice as Pancasila values. ‘Indonesians feel that we must 
be able to restrain ourselves and our self-interest so that we can carry out our 
responsibilities as citizens and members of society,’ it proclaimed.62
In the end, the Guidelines were, of course, about obedience to the 
government. The Guidelines for Muslims expressed this with reference to 
the Qur’an:
Islam teaches us to be obedient to Allah, his Messenger and the ulil-
amri. Ulil-amri means the legitimate government, so long as that 
government does not force us to be immoral. Because of this, the 
obedience of the Islamic community in Indonesia towards the legitimate 
government of Indonesia is regarded as a religious obligation.63
All of this invited both the contempt and ridicule of intellectuals and the 
anger — sometimes muted, but often not — of Islamic leaders.
As these Guidelines were being implemented and the populace indoc-
trinated in all educational and other institutions across the nation, Soeharto 
took a further step by saying in 1982 that all Indonesian organisations should 
have only a single ideological foundation which must, of course, be Pancasila. 
This was known as the asas tunggal (sole foundation) and was immediately 
seen by many Islamic leaders as a threat to their faith and their institutions. 
No one saw anything encouraging in the fact that — unusually for the 
New Order at this time — an Arabic word (asas) had at last been used in 
a technical term. PPP staged a parliamentary walk-out. Leaders we have 
already encountered in this book including Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 
62 Pedoman pelaksanaan P-4 bagi umat Islam, p. 21. More examples of such hypocrisy 
are to be found in Zakiah Daradjat et al., Pedoman pelaksanaan pendidikan P. 4 bagi 
lembaga pendidikan Islam; e.g., p. 41: ‘The state is run not on the basis of just power, 
but above all on the basis of law, where implementation and changes of govern-
ment are carried out on the basis of a constitutional system and not on the basis of 
absolute power.’
63 Pedoman pelaksanaan P-4 bagi umat Islam, p. 48. The reference here is to Qur’an 
4:59: ‘You who believe, obey God and the Messenger, and those in authority among 
you’, the last being the uli l-amri; translation as in Qur’an: A new translation by Abdel 
Haleem, p. 56.
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Fakhruddin, and others took exception to the government’s demands.64 The 
Modernist academic Deliar Noer (1926–2008) — a Minangkabau with 
a Cornell PhD — wrote several pieces in the newspaper Kompas and the 
magazine Panji Masyarakat over 1982–3 criticising P4 and the asas tunggal.65 
Hamka had died in 1981; otherwise we may be sure that he would have 
excoriated the regime. Such objections had no effect and Soeharto’s demand 
for the asas tunggal was formally passed into law in June 1985.66
The two great national, but Java-based, Islamic organisations — NU 
and Muhammadiyah — had to face the issue of accepting or not accepting 
Pancasila as their sole foundation. For the former this was complicated by its 
being, as well as a socio-religious group, also a political organisation that had 
been absorbed (uncomfortably) within PPP a decade earlier. Grumpily giving 
into force majeure, PPP accepted Pancasila as its sole foundation in 1984. 
Muhammadiyah did so in stages which culminated in a formal decision at 
its national meeting in Surakarta in December 1985. It declared that it was 
based upon Pancasila but was also a socio-religious organisation that pursued 
amar ma‘ruf nahi mungkar (commanding the right and forbidding the wrong), 
consistent with the teachings of Islam as found in the Qur’an and Hadith.67 
It thus preserved its Islamic identity while acceding to the demand for 
Pancasila to be its foundation — but perhaps not such a ‘sole’ one. 
Reconciliation between NU and the New Order regime
NU’s acceptance of Pancasila as its sole foundation went along with major 
changes in its leadership and strategy, associated in particular with the rising 
influence of Ky. H. Abdurrahman Wahid (1940–2009), who was eventually, 
but rather briefly, to become Indonesia’s fourth president (1999–2001). We 
have already referred to him several times in the previous chapter. He was the 
son of Ky. H. Wahid Hasyim, whom we have met before, and grandson of Ky. 
64 Ismail, Ideologi, hegemoni dan otoritas agama, pp. 160 et seqq. Ismail’s account 
— originally a McGill doctoral thesis of 1995 — is generally sympathetic to the 
New Order government, as is suggested by its subtitle Wacana ketegangan kreatif 
Islam dan Pancasila (the discourse of creative tension between Islam and Pancasila); 
in the original English version the subtitle was ‘A study of the process of Muslim 
acceptance of the Pancasila’.
65 The articles are reprinted in Deliar Noer, Islam, Pancasila dan asas tunggal ( Jakarta: 
Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1983).
66 Ismail, Ideologi, hegemoni dan otoritas agama, p. 207.
67 Ibid., pp. 239–50.
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H. Hasyim Asy‘ari, one of the founding fathers of NU. He was, thus, a true 
NU ‘blue blood’ — a term indeed used within NU circles. He was educated 
at famous pesantrens as well as in state schools in Yogyakarta and Jakarta. He 
went to Al-Azhar University in Cairo in 1963 but was dissatisfied with what 
he found there, so he moved to the University of Baghdad. He was thus out 
of Indonesia during the terrible, bloody years from 1963 to 1966. During his 
time in the Middle East, he attended some classes but mostly read across an 
extraordinarily wide range of interests, including not only works of Islamic 
inspiration, but also Marxism, socialism, and various philosophical traditions 
of the West. He returned to Indonesia in 1970 to find the New Order 
installed and NU effectively being treated as an opposition force.
Abdurrahman Wahid — commonly called Gus Dur68 — was a char-
ismatic figure with an unusual breadth of knowledge, steeped in Javanese 
and Traditionalist ideas and knowledgeable in contemporary Western and 
Islamic intellectual trends, a man of profound humanity and commitment to 
concepts that underpin Islamic Liberalism. Indeed, in coming years he would 
become one of the most public and staunchest fighters for Liberalism. For 
him, Islam’s encounter with Indonesia required the Indonesianisation — he 
called it pribumisasi, indigenisation — of Islam no less than the Islamisation 
of Indonesia. Among his gifts was the ability to make a joke of anything, a 
gift that would provide strengths in the years of public and private challenges 
that he would face. It is important to emphasise that this extraordinary figure 
— whose personal charisma and idiosyncrasies were readily explicable within 
the NU tradition of idiosyncratic kyais — firmly believed in the world of 
hidden powers. He knew many of the traditions about Java’s past of both 
the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods and believed himself to be in touch with 
ancient spirits and supernatural powers. His versions of various traditions 
were not always quite what one might find in other Javanese sources and, 
indeed, could vary from occasion to occasion, but he was confident of their 
reality and their continuing influence and importance in his own time. 
To many of his devoted followers from the Traditionalist community, he 
was a wali — a saint, a friend of God — to whom, it need hardly be said, 
ordinary obligations and standards of conduct, in the eyes of devotees, do 
not apply.69
68 Gus is a Javanese term of respect for a scion from an elite family, while ‘Dur’ is 
derived from Abdurrahman.
69 A brief biography of Abdurrahman Wahid is to be found in Feillard, Islam et armée, 
pp. 337–8. A fuller account, done with Abdurrahman’s approval and collaboration but 
which underestimates his interest in occult powers is to be found in Greg Barton, Gus 
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By the early 1980s, many of NU’s kyais were becoming dissatisfied 
with the oppositional position they found themselves in with regard to the 
New Order regime, were critical of NU’s political leadership in Jakarta led 
by Idham Chalid, felt that Traditionalists were discriminated against within 
the PPP superstructure they were supposed to be part of, and wished to 
reclaim their authority as kyais over NU. Many wished to return to the 
original socio-religious purposes of the organisation, a move that came to 
be known as returning to the khittah 1926 (the line of action or charter of 
1926). The senior kyai Ahmad Siddiq (1926–91), who had been prominent 
in the anti-Communist actions of the 1960s, was a strong proponent of 
returning to the khittah 1926, arguing in the tradition of irenic ulama that 
confrontation with the governing authority was unwise, against the interests 
of the ummah, and obstructed the principal religious and social purposes of 
NU.70 His views accorded with those of younger reformers who gathered 
around Abdurrahman Wahid. In 1983 a meeting of kyais proposed to end 
NU’s political role, withdraw from PPP, accept Pancasila as sole foundation 
and return to the khittah 1926. This met stiff resistance from those kyais 
— notably several from Madura — who were loyal to PPP and from the 
NU political elite in Jakarta.
These issues were resolved at NU’s 1984 general conference. There, 
Ahmad Siddiq was elected to the top leadership position (rois aam) in NU’s 
advisory board (Syuriyah), the senior body within NU, a post which he held 
until his death in 1991. Abdurrahman Wahid was elected head of NU’s 
executive board (Tanfidziyah). NU withdrew from PPP, abandoned its formal 
political role, declared Pancasila to be its foundation, but also asserted that it 
was an Islamic religious organisation that followed the Traditionalist Sunni 
schools of law, consistent with its return to the khittah 1926.71 
NU’s withdrawal from political party activities diminished the regime’s 
suspicions of NU as a political opposition force and a competitor for control 
of the society at grass-roots level. Conflicts continued within NU ranks, 
Dur: The authorised biography of Abdurrahman Wahid ( Jakarta and Singapore: Equinox 
Publishing, 2002). I knew Abdurrahman Wahid from 1977 until his death in 2009, 
discussed pre-colonial history and Javanese supernatural ideas with him on multiple 
occasions, and have no doubt that he believed such powers to be real.
70 A brief biography may be found in Feillard, Islam et armée, pp. 329–31 (but with 
a mistake for the year of his death, which is printed there as 1992).
71 A detailed account of these events is in ibid., pp. 158–91. See also Robin Bush, 
Nahdlatul Ulama and the struggle for power within Islam and politics in Indonesia 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 73–5.
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where there were still pro-PPP activists, but the organisation as a whole 
was no longer in a confrontationist position with regard to the regime. 
Even before this time there had been some signs of a possible NU-regime 
reconciliation. Ansor and its uniformed militia wing Banser — NU’s youth 
and paramilitary groups — had suffered regime discrimination along with 
the rest of the organisation. Their role in the wiping out of PKI would have 
persuaded the regime that this might be the most potentially dangerous part 
of the entire NU network. For a decade after 1969 Ansor was unable to hold 
a national congress and Banser members were not allowed to wear uniforms. 
In 1979, however, Ansor’s leader Chalid Mawardi — an ally of the Idham 
Chalid faction of NU politicos — broke ranks with the senior kyais of NU 
and announced that Ansor recognised Soeharto as Bapak Pembangunan (the 
father of development) and supported his reelection as president in 1983. 
Chalid Mawardi was severely criticised by the senior kyais for this, but Ansor 
thereafter found itself more favourably treated by the regime, which even 
facilitated military exercises.72
With the whole of NU no longer seen as a political force opposing 
the regime and Golkar, grass-roots competition in Islamisation turned 
to widespread collaboration with, as Robin Bush has noted, ‘high-level 
Muslims in the bureaucracy and army who had previously denied their NU 
origins openly beginning to support NU’.73 Government funding for NU 
pesantrens grew, after a period when Modernist versions of Islam had been 
more likely to be promoted through government support. In 1990 pesantrens 
in East Java received some four times the amount of state subsidies received 
before 1984.74
Young activists, who helped to inspire, and were in turn further inspired 
by, this re-envisioning of NU as primarily a socio-religious organisation, 
began setting up organisations which collectively promoted a more open, 
tolerant and indeed modern version of Islam. It was now ironically true that 
Traditionalist Islam was the source of more modern rethinking of Islam’s 
message than was Modernist Islam. The most important of these new 
organisations were probably the following:75
72 Feillard, Islam et armée, p. 165; Hairus Salim, Kelompok paramiliter NU, pp. 16–7, 
72–3.
73 Bush, Nahdlatul Ulama and the struggle for power, p. 81.
74 Feillard, Islam et armée, pp. 227–30; also in idem, ‘Traditionalist Islam and the 
state’, pp. 141–3.
75 A fuller account of such organisations is in Ahmad Ali Riyadi, Dekonstruksi tradisi: 
Kaum muda NU merobek tradisi ( Jogjakarta: Ar-Ruzz, 2007), pp. 61–81.
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• P3M (Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat, 
Association for Pesantren and Community Development), estab-
lished in 1983 with a role in assisting pesantrens to rethink and 
modernise their teaching
• Lakpesdam (Lajnah Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya 
Manusia, Committee for the Study and Development of Human 
Resources), a think tank established in 1985 with a ‘mandate to 
carry out programs of research, education, training and publication 
and as an NU documentation centre in the context of NU’s service 
and the process of forming a society that is prosperous, just and 
democratic’76
• LKiS (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial, Institute for the Study of 
Islam and Society) — established in 1992 with a mission to ‘bring 
into being a transformative form of Islam on the side of justice 
and plurality with an Indonesian foundation’.77 LKiS became in 
due course a major publisher of liberal interpretations of Islam, the 
works of Western thinkers and more general works.
Women now became more prominent in NU’s activities and in 
grass-roots dakwah. The organisations mentioned above, and particularly 
P3M under its leader Ky. H. Masdar F. Mas’udi, were instrumental in NU 
rethinking the position of women, encouraging them as religious and social 
leaders.78 Abdurrahman Wahid’s wife Sinta Nuriyah Wahid was a prominent 
activist in this cause. By 1997, over 44 per cent of the 1.6 million pesantren 
students were girls.79 Women also came to play increasingly prominent roles 
in the IAIN network. The growing prominence of women in Islamic circles 
(both Modernist and Traditionalist) promoted consideration of major social 
issues affecting women, but there were grounds for concern. In the early 
1990s, several leaders expressed concerns that deeper Islamisation of an 
Arabian or fundamentalist sort, with its promotion of patriarchalism, could 
threaten women’s freedoms.80
76 As stated in its current self-description at http://www.lakpesdam.or.id/profil/.
77 As stated in its current self-description at http://www.lkis.or.id/index.php?option= 
com_content&view=article&id=89&Itemid=88. See also Bush, Nahdlatul Ulama and 
the struggle for power, p. 95.
78 See van Doorn-Harder, Women shaping Islam, pp. 190, 191, 237.
79 Howell, ‘Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic revival’, p. 716, citing 1997 Ministry 
of Religion data.
80 Andrée Feillard, ‘Indonesia’s emerging Muslim feminism: Women leaders on equality, 
inheritance and other gender issues’, SI vol. 4 (1997), no. 1, pp. 83–111, esp. 101–5.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t229   229 6/20/2012   1:21:16 PM
230 Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java
NU also committed itself to the government priority of economic 
development. Its pesantrens developed programmes of local activism in this 
regard and cooperatives were established. Under Abdurrahman Wahid’s 
leadership, in 1990 NU attempted to set up rural ‘People’s Credit Banks’ 
(Bank Perkreditan Rakyat) with backing from Bank Summa, a conventional 
bank run by the Chinese-Indonesian and Christian Soeryadjaya family. 
These banks would be run on conventional lines; that is to say, they charged 
interest rather than being run on interest-free Islamic banking lines. This 
enterprise, with its Christian Chinese connections and conventional banking 
rules, shocked some of Abdurrahman’s followers — hardly the only action 
on his part, it must be said, which shocked others. But ambitious plans were 
laid to set up 2,000 branches. Only a few, however, were actually opened 
before Bank Summa collapsed in 1992. In these various enterprises, a 
shortage of modern management skills in NU consistently made success 
difficult.81
Collaboration between NU’s kyais and the regime supported Islamisa-
tion in Java’s countryside but also brought dependency — a consequence 
which would naturally have been welcome to the government. Kyais 
interviewed by Abdul Kadir in 1997 expressed their reliance on government 
funds to keep their pesantrens running.82 For the regime, this collaboration 
and dependency meant that there was now a greatly diminished risk of NU 
becoming a challenger. For both, deeper Islamisation was desirable, for it 
was consistent with the aspirations of religious leaders as well as serving 
the social-control objectives of the regime, while representing an ever-
strengthening bulwark against any possibility of a Communist revival.
This NU-regime reconciliation did not mean that Islam as a political 
force was now totally under control. Nothing could deliver such a water-
tight solution. A serious clash occurred in the Jakarta port district of 
Tanjung Priok in September 1984, when mobs objecting to the asas tunggal 
policy, shouting Allahu akbar (God is great!), rampaged out of a mosque into 
the guns of the security forces. At least 28 were killed, perhaps more. This 
was followed by several bomb and arson attacks in Jakarta and a bombing of 
the ancient Borobudur Buddhist temple in Central Java. A general clamp-
down followed.83
81 See Abdul Kadir, ‘Traditional Islamic society and the state’, pp. 241–9.
82 Ibid., pp. 117, 120. Ibid., p. 126, reports that in 1996–7 NU claimed that it had 
5,742 pesantrens, the vast majority of which would have been located in Java.
83 A brief overview of this period is given in Ricklefs, History of modern Indonesia, 
pp. 358–9.
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Nor was the NU-government collaboration without its own tensions. 
After all, the values of Abdurrahman Wahid and many other kyais were 
hardly capable of reconciliation with the brutal and ever more extravagantly 
corrupt regime. Nevertheless, Soeharto had reason to be pleased with the 
general domestication of Traditionalist Islam. In the 1987 election, the 
impact of NU’s withdrawal from party politics was clear. The ‘deflating’84 of 
PPP by NU’s defection and the support many NU people gave to Golkar 
produced a dramatic effect. At national level, PPP fell from 27.8 per cent 
of the vote in 1982 to only 16 per cent in 1987. Golkar grew dramatically 
— mainly by capturing former PPP supporters — from 64.3 per cent to 73.2 
per cent. Most of PPP’s losses were in areas where NU had previously been 
the dominant santri party, above all in East, Central and West Java.85
In the mid-1990s relations between Abdurrahman Wahid and the 
government deteriorated and the government sought to unseat Abdurrahman 
as NU leader.86 This attempt failed and the subsequent renewed reconciliation 
between NU and Soeharto was such as to disturb many of Abdurrahman’s 
pro-democracy and Liberal followers. As the 1997 election approached, 
Abdurrahman went campaigning for Golkar in the company of Soeharto’s 
daughter ‘Tutut’. He told me that he could imagine several possible scenarios 
for Indonesia’s future, in most of which Tutut had a major role to play. She 
was not, he claimed, the sort of jet-setting person she was thought to be, 
but rather a serious, able and constructive person who spoke simply to the 
kyais and won their hearts.87 Two months later, and perhaps feeling less 
positive about the matter, he told Suzaina Abdul Kadir that NU had to avoid 
becoming a ‘trouble-maker’ and that it was necessary to ‘appease Soeharto’.88 
His admirers both within the country and internationally were more than 
a little stunned by Abdurrahman’s embrace of such a leading figure of the 
Soeharto family. But there was no time for this to come to much, for the 
Soeharto regime was by then in its last months.
84 As Indonesians called it: penggembosan.
85 R. William Liddle, ‘Indonesia in 1987: The New Order at the height of its power’, 
Asian Survey vol. 28, no. 2 (Feb. 1988), pp. 182–3.
86 See the account in Abdul Kadir, ‘Traditional Islamic society and the state’, pp. 
345–6, based on comments by Ky. H. Hasyim Muzadi (there spelled Hashim Muzati) 
about intimidation by local authorities and pressure not to support Abdurrahman 
Wahid in 1996.
87 Discussion with Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 5 July 1997.
88 Abdul Kadir, ‘Traditional Islamic society and the state’, pp. 335–8, 241–6, 354, 
385–6 (citing an interview with Abdurrahman Wahid on 1 Sept. 1997).
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The arts under the later New Order
In this study we have watched the changing art scene in Java because it 
provides a bellwether for larger religious and social changes. In the last 
two decades or so of the New Order, the experience of the arts in Java was 
mixed, with multiple competing tendencies. But we may say that, in general, 
once-widely spread Javanese arts such as gamelan, wayang, kethoprak, ludruk, 
reyog, jaranan, tayuban and so on — those shadow plays, masked dances, 
masquerades, horse-dances, youth dance performances, male group dances, 
village dancing and singing women, and suchlike, many of them described 
by Pigeaud in great variety in the 1930s and discussed in Chapter 2 above89 
— were becoming less common and, where they survived, they were losing 
much of their older spiritual and supernatural aspects and were subject to 
more Islamic norms. Among Traditionalist santri communities, the male 
devotional performances such as slawatan carried on, as seen in Imam 
Tholkhah’s study of a village in East Java near Magetan cited earlier in this 
chapter.90 But the increasing role of Revivalist interpretations of Islam, and 
indeed the views of many in the Modernist camp, were hostile to many 
of these performances, including those of the Traditionalists. There were 
some attempts to modernise and Islamise various art forms, but they had 
patchy success. Meanwhile all of these forms were threatened by the spread 
of television, modern films, electronic games and in some cases — notably 
wayang — by the rising cost of performing them. Modern forms of theatre 
also evolved in this period and sometimes adopted explicitly pious Islamic 
styles and themes. But this, too, enjoyed mixed success. One common 
problem was a degree of discomfort — sometimes indeed downright hostility 
— among pious Muslims to artistic performances of almost any sort.
A wave of Islamisation was evident in modern, urban-based per-
formances. In the wake of the government’s ‘campus normalisation’ of 
universities in 1977–8, discussed in the preceding chapter, much student 
activism relocated to mosques, but some students were also attracted to 
modern theatre. During this time a prominent role was played by the 
playwright, poet, musician, social activist, writer and devout Muslim Emha 
Ainun Najib (born in Jombang in 1953). He took a leading role in the 
Yogyakarta-based Dinasti theatre. His musical group Kiai Kanjeng combined 
Javanese gamelan and other folk instruments with modern instruments 
to produce a new and popular musical form, its lyrics inspired by Islamic 
89 Pigeaud, Volksvertoningen.
90 Imam Tholkhah, Anatomi konflik politik di Indonesia, pp. 71–2.
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devotionalism. In 1988, activists of the Salahuddin mosque at Universitas 
Gadjah Mada approached Emha to help them set up a theatre group. He 
and a colleague from Dinasti took up this invitation and they went on to 
produce colossal, Islamically themed productions. Their work also came to 
be supported by the Muhammadiyah women’s organisation ‘Aisyiyah, despite 
a general tendency within Muhammadiyah to disapprove of theatrical 
performance. Emha’s large-scale productions came to a halt after 1991, 
however, for no very clear reason.91 While this was going on in Yogyakarta, 
all five professional kethoprak companies there had died by the early 1990s, 
although kethoprak continued to be broadcast on Radio Republik Indonesia. 
Wayang wong carried on for a while at a single venue, then died. Kethoprak 
continued to be performed by the Diponegoro Division-sponsored ‘super 
troupe’ Sapta Mandala, which refined its folksy burlesque style with ‘proper’ 
Javanese language, written scripts, and so on. It is not clear, however, whether 
this sort of kethoprak could still function as a ‘folk art’.92
The village abangan art form that Muslim proselytisers in Java most 
hated was tayuban — the enticing dance by women, inviting men to join 
them, often accompanied by drunkenness, prostitution, and veneration 
of local spirits. Muhammadiyah had always opposed tayuban and by the 
1950s had effectively stopped it in Javanese towns and cities. The village 
countryside, however, was a different matter. In the 1970s — a time when, as 
we have noted earlier, Golkar had begun using some older-style folk arts such 
as reyog and kethoprak as vehicles for election propaganda — local officials 
tended to defend tayuban against Islamic reformers’ denunciations. But by 
the mid-1980s, in the wake of the reconciliation between the regime and 
NU and the advancing Islamisation of Javanese society, these same officials 
were inclined to share the criticism of tayuban performances and to support 
the Islamisation (which is to say, substantial revision or abolition) of such art 
forms. Hefner observed that ‘politics … in a changing Java seems certain to 
bring about [tayuban’s] demise’.93 In Gunung Kidul there was an attempt by 
local authorities in the late 1980s to stop tayuban performances, an attempt 
91 Hatley, Javanese performances, pp. 131–4, 148–54. See also Guinness, Kampung, 
Islam and state, p. 131. There was not another major production by Dinasti Theatre 
until 2008, when it put on a performance in Yogyakarta of Emha’s ‘The Devil’s bend’, 
depicting the human experience from creation to decline under the influence of the 
Devil, to audiences that nearly overflowed a theatre holding 1200 people; TempoI, 
24 Aug. 2008.
92 Hatley, Javanese performances, pp. 155, 158.
93 Hefner, ‘Politics of popular art’, pp. 90–1, 93, 94 (quotation from p. 94).
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which failed in the end. Because performances there were associated with 
veneration of the spirit of the local village spring — said to be linked with 
pre-Islamic Majapahit — Hughes-Freeland sees this as consistent with 
the New Order’s hostility to any contending sources of authority.94 That 
hostility of course existed, but this attempt also coincided with ever-deeper 
Islamisation even of remote areas like Gunung Kidul. The proponents of 
the Gunung Kidul tayuban observed by Hughes-Freeland themselves were 
trying to cleanse local tayuban of ‘low associations’ and to emphasise its 
‘sacred dimensions’.95
In the 1990s, some Golkar officials sought to promote a bowdlerised 
version of tayuban for political purposes, partly in response to a perceived 
need for symbols of local identity. We will see this tendency strengthen in 
the following chapter in the wake of the national policy of decentralisation 
which was implemented from 2001. If tayuban was to be used in this way, 
however, it had to be sanitised and made more refined. As late as 1989 in 
the Blora area studied by Amrih Widodo, tayuban was still its lascivious, 
vulgar, inebriated self. But then the government stepped in and transformed 
tayuban within a year. Officials of the Ministry of Education and Culture 
provided training and ‘guidance’ (pembinaan) to performers. Alcohol was no 
longer allowed, nor men putting money into female dancers’ breast-coverings, 
nor gambling, nor prostitution. It was emphasised that a dancer ‘should not 
try to excite her male dancing partners, for instance by moving her hips 
excessively, shaking her shoulders, giving him a sexy look’, and so on. Songs 
were to have verses conveying ‘development programs and state ideological 
teachings’. Graduates of these training courses got certificates, without which 
they would not be allowed to perform.96 In other words, tayuban dance was 
to become something quite different from what it had always been in the 
past, emulating the dullness, the demobilisation of mind, body and spirit for 
anything other than the economic development and social control sought by 
the New Order at village level.
There were occasionally attempts to create Islamic versions of older 
Javanese arts and thereby supplant them. These generally failed. Suryadi 
94 Felicia Hughes-Freeland, ‘Golék Ménak and tayuban: Patronage and professionalism 
in two spheres of Central Javanese culture’, in Bernard Arps (ed.), Performance in Java 
and Bali: Studies of narrative, theatre, music and dance (London: School of Oriental 
and African Studies, 1993), pp. 108–12.
95 Ibid., p. 114.
96 Widodo, ‘Stages of the state’, pp. 1–4, 9, 17, 20 (quotations from p. 20). See also 
Bisri Effendy, ‘Pengantar’, in Kebijakan kebudayaan di masa orde baru, pp. 668–9.
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W.S. was from a santri Javanese family. His father had forbidden him to 
study Javanese dance or other performances. The family was surrounded 
socially by ‘an atmosphere of ignorance and hedonism’, marked by the 
stereotypical abangan vices (the ma-lima). But Suryadi was inspired by a 
verse in the Qur’an which suggested to him that God used a kind of shadow 
theatre.97 He interpreted this in a different way from the older Mystic 
Synthesis metaphor of the wayang dhalang as God and the created world 
as the puppets. Rather, for Suryadi, this was a license to employ wayang for 
Islamic reform. So he created a form of wayang called wayang sadat (Shahada 
wayang).98 This depicted the age of the bringers of Islam to Java, the wali 
sanga, in the time of the kingdom of Demak. It was first performed in 1986 
but never gained any popularity. ‘Indeed, it has not yet been popularised 
in the circles of the Islamic ummah who precisely were hoped to become 
its main supporters’, he lamented.99 Two decades later, wayang sadat was 
still rarely performed. When young Muhammadiyah activists sponsored 
a performance at Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta, it evoked little 
interest because its stories were not those of the classical wayang.100
Insofar as there were attempts to preserve Javanese village arts on the 
part of Islamic organisations or leaders, they were few and not surprisingly 
they came from Traditionalist circles, which enjoyed roots in the country-
side and bridges to abangan culture. The Tegalreja pesantren (Magelang, 
Central Java) — unlike most Traditionalist pesantrens, it must be emphasised 
— celebrates its annual graduation ceremonies with a festival of folk arts. 
Wayang, jaranan (in Central Java usually called jathilan), reyog, kethoprak, 
dangdut, other bands, and many other such performances take place 
over several days, even including female performers. Religious teachings 
(pengajian) are presented during this same time. This innovation began in 
1979 and has carried on since. Some santris and kyais were critical of this, 
97 He refers to Qur’an 25:45, translated in Qur’an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem, 
p. 229, as, ‘Do you not see how your Lord lengthens the shade? If He had willed, He 
could have made it stand still’. Suryadi understood this to mean that God ‘performs 
shadows’ or ‘plays shadows’ (memainkan bayang-bayang), leading to his analogy with 
the wayang.
98 Javanese sadat is from Arabic Shahada (the Islamic confession of faith).
99 Suryadi W.S., ‘Prestasi kaum Muslimin dalam sejarah perkembangan wayang’, 
in Jabrohim and Saudi Berlian (eds), Islam dan kesenian ([Yogyakarta:] Majelis 
Kebudayaan Muhammadiyah, Universitas Ahmad Dahlan, Lembaga Litbang PP 
Muhammadiyah, 1995), pp. 162–73; quote from page 173.
100 Discussion with Fajar Riza Ul Haq et al., Yogyakarta, 20 Oct. 2005.
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seeing these as abangan performances tainted with their former political 
associations. Abangan were equally amazed at these things being performed 
at a pesantren. Over time, however, the result was that abangan communities 
began to invite Tegalreja’s kyai to give religious teachings in their villages and 
even asked his help to construct mosques. As devout Muslims came to see the 
potential for these arts to be vehicles for Islamisation, criticism declined.101
Although there was much suspicion and animosity on the part of santri 
towards abangan art forms, the fate of jaranan horse-dances reminds us that 
abangan culture was not without powers of resistance to the prevailing trend 
of Islamisation in the later years of the New Order. Against the general 
trend of decline in such arts, jaranan (jathilan) was introduced into Kim’s 
study village near Yogyakarta sometime around the early 1990s. As usual, it 
involved dancers going into trance, chewing glass, and so on. Not everyone 
believed this trance to be genuine, but most did. Devout Muslim reformers 
regarded this as possession by ‘heathen spirits’ (jinn): ‘The reformist villagers 
were certain that the responsibility lay in the heathen jinn or Satan, whose 
duty was to entice human beings. … Muslims should distance themselves 
from the jathilan, as they fought against the temptation of Satan.’102 
After the initial troubles it faced in the wake of the killings of the mid-
1960s, jaranan revived in the Kediri area in the 1970s when a group called 
Samboyo Putro was formed. The moving figure here, Sukiman Mangunsena, 
familiarly known as Pak Samboyo, was a member of the national police and 
of Golkar, which of course leant legitimacy and protection to his group. 
In the 1980s, just as was true of tayuban, the government sought to make 
jaranan more respectable and less involved with the Javanese spirit world, 
cleansing it of spirit-possession which, as Clara van Groenendael observes, 
‘many people regarded … as the essence of the horse dance’. Children’s 
groups and national-level competitions were promoted. Yet jaranan generally 
resisted the dulling-down, bowdlerisation and Islamisation that we see in 
other folk arts. Pak Samboyo himself was meditating at the site associated 
with the ancient king of Kediri, Jayabaya, when he received supernatural 
inspiration to form his group. Its performances involve spirit possession and 
always begin with a sung Javanese invocation of ‘authentic Javanese culture’ 
(budaya Jawa asli), which is of course code for ‘not Islamic’. They end with 
a version of the Javanese text Kidung rumeksa ing wengi (the song keeping 
101 Bambang Pranowo, Islam factual, pp. 69–73.
102 Kim, Reformist Muslims, pp. 155–60 (quotation from p. 158). It is not clear in 
Kim’s work just when these performances began.
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guard at night), which is regarded as ‘an exceptionally potent charm against 
evil’.103 One of the surviving elders of this group commented to me that 
slametans might be used for Islamic proselytisation, but jaranan could not 
be, for it only used ‘Javanese prayers’ (doa kejawen).104 
Revivalism, Islamism and the later Soeharto regime
We have already noted in the previous chapter how the uncompromising 
Revivalism and Islamism of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar 
led to their arrest and imprisonment, and then to their flight to Malaysia 
in 1985. There they set up another school that promoted their views and 
recruited fighters to join the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.105 Indonesian 
intelligence no doubt kept a continuing eye on this group, but they were 
marginalised from Indonesian political and social affairs and played no 
significant role in Indonesia until after the fall of the Soeharto regime in 
1998. Other forms of extreme Islamic movements, however, were able to 
survive and even grow in the latter decades of the New Order.
Among such movements that survived and grew was LDII (Lembaga 
Dakwah Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Proselytisation Institute).106 As 
its name implies, this organisation was principally Dakwahist in orientation, 
with little interest in political action beyond what was necessary for its own 
survival. Its epistemology was Revivalist in character. LDII was founded by 
H. Nurhasan Ubaidah Lubis (d. 1982), who returned from Mecca after living 
there for ten years and established a pesantren at Kediri in 1952. Nurhasan 
believed that he had the right understanding of Islam and the correct means 
103 Victoria M. Clara van Groenendael, Jaranan: The horse dance and trance in 
East Java (VKI vol. 252; Leiden: KITLV Press, 2008), pp. 36–7, 43, 198–9, 202 
(quotations from pp. 37, 202).
104 Interview with Pak Cokromiharja and Pak Pardi, Kediri, 16 March 2005. 
Cokromiharja commented that trance (dadi) occurs in the performances, but if the 
gamelan makes a mistake the performers get angry, so they are conscious at the same 
time. Samboyo Putro carries on, now under the name Sanjoyo Putro.
105 See the account of his experiences in Malaysia under Sungkar and Ba’asyir, before 
going off to Afghanistan, by Nasir Abas — a former member of the terrorist group 
Jemaah Islamiyah — in his book Membongkar Jemaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan mantan 
anggota JI ( Jakarta: Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, 2005), pp. 26–37.
106 LDII has been the name of this organisation only since 1990, following after 
previous names Darul Hadis or Islam Jemaah, then Yayasan Karyawan Islam 
(YAKARI) and then Lembaga Karyawan Islam (LEMKARI).
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to teach it — the uniquely correct manhaj (way of knowing) which would 
pass on Islam as found in Mecca and Medina. He was totally against all 
forms of innovation (bid‘a) or polytheism (shirk). His teachings were to be 
conveyed in a direct line of transmission from him to subsequent generations 
of teachers and disciples. The problem for LDII’s relations with other Islamic 
movements was that it regarded them all as being wrong; they were not true 
Muslims because they did not share LDII’s manhaj. As a consequence, LDII 
followers should not even pray together with non-LDII people.
The essence of LDII’s manhaj was studying the Qur’an and Hadith 
through word-for-word interlinear translations into Javanese (in Arabic 
script, called pegon) or Indonesian. All other sources were ignored, or indeed 
condemned. There was no room for Sufism or the Traditionalist schools 
of law. Nor for any other Islamic writings — the Qur’an and Hadith were 
totally sufficient for the understanding of Islam. In fact, the only other 
matters taught at LDII’s central pesantren in Kediri are to do with modern 
management, reflecting (its leaders say) the historic connection between 
Islam and commerce. The pesantren itself is managed like a modern school, 
with no kyai to dominate its activities. Because its teachings are restricted 
in scope, LDII’s course of study is brief; the length of time depends on 
individual progress, but no student stays at the Kediri pesantren for more 
than 1.5 years. That school therefore produced large numbers of graduates, 
amounting by the end of the 20th century to millions of people, LDII 
claimed. Its prayer halls are found throughout the Javanese countryside and 
across Indonesia more generally.107 
LDII’s uncompromising view of other Islamic movements as wrong 
won it great enmity and denunciation. Indonesia’s Attorney General declared 
it illegal to spread LDII teachings in 1971 but the organisation resurfaced 
in 1972 and affiliated with Golkar, guaranteeing it a considerable degree of 
political protection.108 The government could not, however, entirely ignore 
the ongoing animosity of other Islamic organisations. In 1988 LDII was 
subjected to an investigation by the Ministries of Religion and the Interior, 
107 Discussion with H. Kuncoro Kaseno (the chairman of LDII’s central administra-
tion) and Abdul Malik (a teacher), at LDII’s main pesantren, Kediri, 28 Aug. 2003. 
LDII’s website may be found at http://www.ldii.or.id/in/home-mainmenu-1.html.
108 H. Kuncoro Kaseno was indeed a Golkar member of the Kabupaten Kediri local 
parliament (DPRD) from 1977 to 1985; Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi interview 
of H. Kuncoro Kaseno, Kediri, 16 Apr. 2007. Other LDII figures also served as 
Golkar members in such bodies.
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MUI, the provincial attorney general’s office, local government and the police. 
The head of the East Java branch of MUI accused LDII of still spreading 
false teachings and of being disloyal to the government, saying that this 
was because the organisation was loyal solely to the teachings of its leader 
Nurhasan, who falsely claimed that his uniquely correct understanding of 
Islam was conveyed to him in a direct line from the Prophet Muhammad. 
Even the East Java head of Golkar agreed that LDII should be disbanded 
by the government. Nevertheless, the government allowed the organisation 
to survive under its new name of LDII, adopted in 1990.109 At village level, 
conflicts arose from time to time. In the early 1990s, for example, LDII 
appeared in Ngoro (East Java) and began to burn the ‘yellow books’ (kitab 
kuning) — the classic works of Traditionalist Islam taught in NU pesantrens 
— on the grounds that they were the cause of stagnancy among Muslims. 
Kyais wanted LDII banned, but the government refused to act.110 In the 
following chapter we will see renewed anti-LDII campaigns in the years 
when the Soeharto regime was no longer available to protect it, by which 
time its main protection was its claim to have millions of adherents.111 
Whatever the precise size of its following, it became a large target for 
opponents to tackle.
Other exclusive — sometimes indeed extreme — Dakwahist move-
ments were spreading in Javanese society in the 1990s. The general 
Islamisation of the society with government support provided a congenial 
environment for such movements, so long as they were willing to express 
their loyalty to the regime, Pancasila and the asas tunggal. Andrew Beatty, 
whose anthropological work centred on Banyuwangi, later wrote a quite 
personal account of how, between 1993 and 1996–7, a small group of zealots 
began to disrupt the tolerance that he had previously observed (and clearly 
preferred) in the village ‘Bayu’, an account to which he gave the evocative 
109 ‘Islam Jamaah, setelah katanya meresahkan’ in Tempo, 26 Nov. 1988. Concerning 
the serial names used by this movement, see n106 above.
110 Turmudi, Struggling for the umma, pp. 187–8.
111 I am unable to give any reliable numbers for LDII adherents. Some Internet 
sources mention a total of over 25 million, but I have no means to verify that and 
suspect it to be an exaggeration. We may note the statement by the current manager 
of the Kediri pesantren, H. Kuncoro Kaseno, that it produces some 200 graduates 
every month. If it has been doing that since 1952, its graduates would amount to 
something over 140,000 by 2011. There are other LDII pesantrens and H. Kuncoro 
claimed that in total there are millions of graduates, without providing a specific 
figure. Interview with H. Kuncoro Kaseno and Abdul Malik, Kediri, 28 Aug. 2003.
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title A shadow falls.112 ‘The Java we first knew and the Java we left in 1997 
were different places,’ he wrote. ‘A puritan, ideologically driven Islam had 
made rapid progress, pushing aside older traditions, disturbing an ancient 
pact that allowed ancestral spirits and pre-Islamic deities a place among the 
prayer-houses.’113 One reformer told him that one’s only guide should be the 
Qur’an and Hadith. ‘Anything beyond that is unnecessary, useless.’114 Beatty 
observed a phenomenon we have already noted above: ‘All that the headman’s 
generation had rejected as backward, wasteful, divisive, even foreign (Arabism, 
they quietly called it) had returned, rebranded as modernity.’115 ‘Bayu’ was 
not, however, the first village in the region to have such an experience. We 
have noted above that, when Beatty did his first fieldwork in 1993, villages 
near to ‘Bayu’ were already seeing the impact of Islamic reformers, and 
indeed what he labelled ‘fierce dogmatism’ and ‘intensive indoctrination’.116 
We have also noted that in the East Java village Madukoro, studied by Imam 
Tholkhah, in the early 1990s there was significant tension within the santri 
community between those whom Imam Tholkah calls the ‘fanatics’ and the 
‘moderates’.117
Some Dakwahism was more gradualist, less insistent, in style. In the 
1990s the Jamsaren mosque in Surakarta began Qur’anic lecture and study 
sessions (pengajian) open to the surrounding public, which gradually spread 
religious awareness and observance. The characteristically abangan vices 
known as ma-lima — gambling, opium smoking, thievery, womanising 
and drinking alcohol — began to decline and more people attended Friday 
devotions. As the years passed, the local abangan became increasingly santri 
and ma-lima became rarer.118
A significant actor in this late New Order Islamisation was the In-
stitute for Islamic Sciences and the Arab language (LIPIA, Lembaga Ilmu 
Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab). This was established in Jakarta in 
112 Andrew Beatty, A shadow falls: In the heart of Java (London: Faber and Faber, 
2009).
113 Ibid., p. ix.
114 Ibid., p. 114.
115 Ibid., p. 32.
116 Beatty, Varieties of Javanese religion, pp. 131–4.
117 Imam Tholkhah, Anatomi konflik politik di Indonesia, p. 28.
118 As reported on the basis of oral evidence in Ridwan al-Makassary and Ahmad 
Gaus AF (eds), Benih-benih Islam radikal di masjid: Studi kasus Jakarta dan Solo 
(intro. Komaruddin Hidayat; Jakarta: Center for the Study of Religion and Culture, 
Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah, 2010), pp. 243–4.
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1980 by Saudi Arabia, at least in part in order to maintain Saudi influence in 
Indonesia in the wake of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the consequent 
popularity of the Shi‘ite Ayatollah Khomeini. LIPIA became one of the main 
centres in Indonesia for the study of Arabic and Islam. It need hardly be said 
that the interpretations of the faith taught there were those acceptable to 
the Wahhabis who ruled Saudi society. LIPIA also distributed the ideas of 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ideologues Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid 
Qutb, and of Mawdudi. Many of its graduates became Revivalists and 
Islamists, but not all followed such a path.
The top students at LIPIA were supported for further study at Saudi 
universities. From there, some also went on to fight in the jihad against 
the Soviets in Afghanistan. These students began returning to Indonesia 
in significant numbers in the late 1980s and the 1990s, and proclaimed 
themselves Salafis — which is to say that they insisted that Muslims should 
follow the examples of the pious ancestors of early Islam, the Salaf al-Salih 
— an ideological position supported also by DDII. These young men were, 
as Noorhaidi Hasan puts it, ‘squarely within the puritanical Salafi-Wahhabi 
tradition’. In the terminology used in this book, these were Revivalists in 
epistemology. Their social and political projects were Dakwahist and, in 
the long run, Islamist. That is to say, they sought to change the society in 
directions which they regarded as more purely Islamic — as judged by the 
standards of what they believed early Islam to have been — and generally 
aimed ultimately for an Islamic state in which shari‘a law would rule. Saudi 
Arabia provided a model for them of what this new Indonesia might look 
like. Many of these returning Salafis taught in pesantrens and madrasahs across 
Java and won considerable influence as teachers ‘because of their command of 
Arabic and their facility with Islamic sources’.119 The emerging Salafi groups 
began to become publicly conspicuous by the late 1980s. They were marked 
by their faux-Arab appearance: ‘Bearded males wearing long flowing robes 
(jalabiyya), turbans and trousers to their ankles (isbal), and … women wearing 
a form of enveloping black veil (niqab)’.120
The spread of Revivalist thought and associated Dakwahist and Islamist 
agendas was supported — in this ever more literate society — by numerous 
publications. We have noted already the publications supported by LIPIA. 
DDII was also increasingly active in this field. Its weekly magazine Media 
Dakwah supported strict interpretations of Islam and conveyed hostility 
119 Hasan, ‘Salafi madrasas of Indonesia’, pp. 249–52.
120 Ibid., p. 249.
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towards Christianisation and local influences in Islam as well as, increasingly, 
towards globalisation, American influence and supposed international Jewish 
conspiracies (the latter three being, really, all the same to this school of 
thought). By 1991 Media Dakwah was being printed in 20,000 copies — ten 
times its initial print-run of 1967. Among DDII’s publications were also 
found Suara Mesjid (the Voice of the Mosque), a children’s magazine entitled 
Majalah Sahabat (Friend’s Magazine) and the Serial Khotbah Jumaat (Friday 
Sermon Series).121 After Natsir’s death in 1993, Anwar Harjono took over as 
DDII’s leader. He became, as Michael Feener puts it, ‘increasingly outspoken 
in his railings against the perceived threat of Kristenisasi and other dangers 
to Islam (especially Communism, atheism and secularism)’.122
Through the 1990s the New Order became progressively more inclined 
to follow its support of grass-roots Islamisation in the interest of social 
control with political, legislative and symbolic measures that were welcome 
to many Islamic leaders. One of the most significant steps was the creation 
of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia, All-Indonesia Union 
of Muslim Intellectuals) in December 1990. This was led by Dr B.J. Habibie 
(b. 1936), a rising star who combined scientific and technological standing 
with personal Islamic piety, a protégé of Soeharto himself, the man who was 
to become vice-president of Indonesia in 1998 and then Soeharto’s successor 
as the nation’s third (but brief ) president. ICMI attracted large numbers 
from Indonesia’s middle class, technocrats and bureaucrats for whom Islamic 
piety was no longer a matter that could threaten their rise but rather a mark 
of having the right values and the right connections for advancement. By 
1993 it had 11,000 members. It published its own newspaper Republika 
and established its own think tank called CIDES (Centre for Information 
and Development Studies). Under the wing of their patron Habibie, ICMI 
members rose to positions of influence across Java and more generally in 
Indonesia. Some senior generals were also regarded as being close to ICMI 
and there was talk of the ‘greening’ of ABRI. ICMI itself, however, was a 
rather divided house, for as well as devotees of the New Order it contained 
activists who sought reform and democratisation. Abdurrahman Wahid 
denounced it for being elitist and sectarian and refused to join.123 In 1991 
121 Feillard, Islam et armeé, p. 255.
122 Feener, Muslim legal thought, p. 116.
123 See Robert W. Hefner, ‘Islam, state and civil society: ICMI and the struggle for 
the Indonesian middle class’, Indonesia no. 56 (Oct. 1993), pp. 1–35; idem, Civil 
Islam, pp. 142–3, 151.
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Soeharto, his wife and close family members went on the hajj to Mecca. The 
regime also passed legislation in the early 1990s approving the wearing of 
the jilbab in schools and the introduction of Islamic banking.
Anti-Communism had been a uniting issue for Dakwahists and the 
New Order regime from the latter’s inception and now strengthened the 
burgeoning alliance between the Soeharto regime and more insistently 
puritanical versions of the faith. It has been observed that occasionally 
stimulating an almost entirely irrational fear of Communism assisted the 
regime to paper over the cracks in its own inner circle,124 but the roots of 
anti-Communism were much deeper than that on both the Islamic and New 
Order sides of the political equation. This was not just a matter of uniting the 
regime with Modernists and Revivalists, of course, for Traditionalists shared 
such views. In 1996 at the Lirboyo pesantren in Kediri, two leaders of NU’s 
Banser told Suzaina Abdul Kadir that they believed Communism ‘remained 
a threat in their midst and that they … had to [remain] vigilant against such 
potential threats in the near future’.125
The military men who were the backbone of the regime were aware 
that the international environment — for all the support given by non-
Communist nations to the regime — could not be counted on to remain 
supportive. This was particularly true as the Cold War came to an end with 
the progressive breakup and final collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire 
in 1988–91, at which point there also collapsed the political imperative for 
Western nations to support any state that was anti-Communist, no matter 
how odious. Even before that time, during Jimmy Carter’s presidency of 
the United States (1977–81), the Americans, upon whom Jakarta relied for 
aid, pressured Jakarta to improve its human rights record. The regime had 
then felt obliged to release several thousand political prisoners whom it had 
held without trial — and frequently maltreated, even tortured — since the 
events of 1965–6. Freed ex-prisoners and their families still faced severe 
discrimination, but at least were out of imprisonment, except for those whom 
the regime claimed that it would one day bring to trial.
From the late 1970s and through the 1980s ABRI elaborated a doctrine 
of ‘vigilance’ (kewaspadaan) which became the leitmotif of military thinking 
to the end of the Soeharto regime, and eventually promoted an alliance with 
the more anti-globalisation, anti-Western and totalitarian schools of Islamic 
124 Ariel Heryanto, State terrorism and political identity in Indonesia: Fatally belonging 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 33–61.
125 Abdul Kadir, ‘Traditional Islamic society and the state’, p. 159–60 n32.
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thought.126 This was based on the idea that Communism could revive as 
leftist movements particularly among university students — this in the wake 
of the suppression of student dissent in 1977–8 discussed in the preceding 
chapter — or as ‘shapeless organisations’ working within society at large. 
From the right, there was also a perceived threat of anti-regime Islamic 
fanaticism, exemplified in the 1978 furore over Komando Jihad and the arrest 
of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, described in Chapter 5.
In a paper of 1988, ABRI’s strategic doctrine concerning ‘vigilance’ ex-
tended to monitoring multiple threats to the regime and ABRI’s dominance. 
These were, as Honna paraphrases them:
(1) social organisations which in the past had shown hesitation in 
accepting Pancasila as the sole principle …;
(2) the fourth-generation Communist group which based its tactics 
on the new-style Communism, no longer using physical means but 
instead constitutional methods, intellectual activities, government 
administration, etc. in order to ‘depoliticise ABRI’;
(3) extreme groups which would try to use extra-constitutional 
methods — such as instigating mass riots — to further their 
political interests based on racial and separatist motivations; and
(4) a certain group of people … who wanted liberal democracy with 
unlimited freedom, and whose activities spread through academic 
forums, discussions and seminars as well as via the mass media.127 
A further document in 1993 about the threat of latent Communism identi-
fied globalisation as the means by which ‘capitalism, liberal thought and other 
foreign ideologies’128 that contradicted Pancasila might enter Indonesia.
In 1995 Gen. Farid Zainuddin — later to be made head of military 
intelligence in 1997 — specifically provided the link between defending Islam 
on the one hand and military concerns for ‘vigilance’ against the multiple 
threats of Communism, Western influence and globalisation on the other:
The West is always antagonistic to Islam. This is not unrelated to the 
recent international campaign for political liberalisation … which 
126 The following discussion of military thinking rests on Jun Honna, Military politics 
and democratization in Indonesia (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 
pp. 108–30.
127 Ibid., p. 114, citing Analisa lingkungkan strategi pertahanan keamanan Negara 
1988–1989 (published by the Department of Defence [Dephankam]).
128 Honna, Military politics and democratization, p. 115, citing Sekitar padnas, bahaya 
laten & Tapol G.30.S./PKI (published by the Department of Defence [Dephankam].
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has also been promoted in Indonesia as the revival of Islam becomes 
apparent …. It is globalisation that facilitates this [campaign]. It … 
also strengthens the international network of non-pribumi [code for 
Chinese] business which has dominated the Indonesian economy since 
the beginning [of the New Order].129
The strengthening alliance between the New Order regime and Islamist 
groups was in response both to the increasing confidence of Islamisers and 
to the increasingly uncertain nature of the regime itself. Regime unity had 
never been as total as outside observers were sometimes inclined to think, 
and it was certainly becoming distinctly shaky by the later 1990s. Soeharto 
and his cronies were engaging in favouritism and nepotism, including 
within the military itself, which generated considerable disaffection. Even 
military figures were by now discussing the need for reform. The elections 
held in 1997 were the most violent of the New Order period. Outside the 
regime’s inner circle, many religious, intellectual and political activists felt 
that Soeharto must go. The president’s health was beginning to look shaky, 
too. Soeharto was said to have passed tests in Germany on his heart and 
kidneys but in December 1997, at the age of 76 and with the Asian financial 
crisis gathering pace around him, he suffered what was apparently a minor 
stroke. The possibility of an end to the Soeharto era was now in the minds 
of many people.
Soeharto may now have made a calculation not unlike Sukarno’s in the 
early- and mid-1960s. Sukarno knew that he could not trust the military to 
support him, so he turned to PKI. Soeharto was also no longer quite certain 
whether he could count on ABRI support, so it seems that he, too, looked 
to civilian support. In his case, this meant Islamic forces, including more 
extreme, exclusivist, anti-pluralist and anti-Western forms of Islam. No doubt 
both presidents — surrounded by sycophants and overly confident of their 
own unique abilities — imagined that, if necessary, they could dispose of 
these civilian allies if they should become difficult to manage. 
In the middle and later 1990s, the government found opportuni-
ties to ring the anti-Communist bell again. In 1995 the nation’s greatest 
prose writer, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, was awarded the Ramon Magsaysay 
Foundation’s award for literature. As we have seen, Pramoedya had been the 
foremost literary figure in PKI’s Lekra; he had spent many years in confine-
ment for his pro-Communist activities, only being released from the Buru 
129 Honna, Military politics and democratization, p. 119, citing Farid Zainuddin’s 
article in Majalah Ketahanan Nasional 1995.
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island prison camp at the end of 1979. During his imprisonment he had 
written the tetralogy of historical novels about early Indonesian nationalism 
that won him international recognition.130 But he was no honoured figure 
in New Order Indonesia. In 1989–90 students who distributed his works 
were interrogated and put on trial.131 Great controversy followed the 
announcement of the Magsaysay award. One of Indonesia’s other great 
writers, Mochtar Lubis, had received the Magsaysay award for journalism 
and literature in 1958 but he now travelled to Manila to return his medal as 
an act of protest.132 Islamic leaders were inclined to see in this the potential 
for Communism to revive in Indonesia.
The regime’s leaders were also becoming concerned about their capacity 
to stage-manage Golkar electoral landslides. PDI had never previously 
threatened Golkar’s dominance in the elections, but from 1993 it was led by 
Sukarno’s daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri (b. 1947, later the nation’s fifth 
president) and looked like it could become a serious challenge. So Soeharto 
sought to intervene in the party by supporting an alternative candidate 
as its chair, which led to a split, a contest over who should control the 
party headquarters in Jakarta, and a standoff, with pro-democracy activists 
and Jakarta’s urban poor rallying to Megawati. Indeed, to an increasingly 
nervous military, PDI looked like it might embody all at once most of 
the threats encapsulated in ABRI’s strategic doctrine of 1988: new forms 
of Communism, extremists ready to provoke rioting and proponents of 
liberal democracy. On 27 July 1996, the PDI headquarters were attacked 
by thugs supporting Megawati’s opponent, including ABRI soldiers out of 
uniform. This sparked two days of serious rioting in Jakarta. The government 
sought to blame a new leftist group who called themselves the People’s 
Democratic Party (PRD, Partai Rakyat Demokratik) for all of this, which 
the regime denounced as an attempt to revive Communism. Several Islamic 
organisations supported the government’s conduct in the crushing of the 
PRD, as we will see in more detail below. 
Through 1995–6, the leading Islamic biweekly magazine Ummat 
underscored the risk of ‘latent Communism’. This was, said the magazine, 
exemplified by the award of the Magsaysay medal to Pramoedya. It 
quoted Mochtar Lubis: ‘We believe that the Magsaysay appreciation of 
130 Bumi manusia, Anak semua bangsa, Jejak langkah and Rumah kaca (This earth of 
mankind, Child of all nations, Footsteps and Glass house).
131 Heryanto, State terrorism and political identity, pp. 63–105.
132 See Jörgen Hellman, Performing the nation: Cultural politics in New Order Indonesia 
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2003), pp. 22–3.
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[Pramoedya] is not just for his novels, but also for his contemptible attacks 
on non-Communist writers and artists when PKI held power in the time of 
President Sukarno.’ Twenty-six other Indonesian writers and cultural figures 
wrote in protest to the Magsaysay Foundation. Others disagreed with the 
anti-Pramoedya protests — prominent among them Abdurrahman Wahid, 
the leading intellectual Goenawan Mohamad, the litterateur H.B. Jassin 
(himself a prominent victim of Communist intimidation in the past) and the 
sociologist and anti-Soeharto activist Arief Budiman. Ummat editorialised 
about the past ‘viciousness’ of PKI and Lekra towards Muslim intellectual 
figures, including Hamka, and expressed concern that ‘in certain circles, 
above all among the young, Pram[oedya] receives extraordinary sympathy’. 
Ummat continued:
Although Communist ideology is bankrupt, there are still some youths 
who are infatuated with lapping up the books of Karl Marx and other 
leftist writers. There are even many who are sympathetic towards former 
PKI figures …. What is clear is that we should pay attention to the 
warning by the chair of the East Java MUI and DDII, Ky. H. Misbach, 
who has much experience of PKI tactics: ‘Communism always represents 
a latent danger that we must be on guard against.’ … It is appropriate for 
us all to reflect upon Ky. Misbach’s admonition.133
Ummat also interviewed Brig. Gen. Suwarno Adiwijoyo, then head of 
ABRI’s information centre, who was predictably unequivocal in linking anti-
Communism and Islam:
Communism represents a latent danger that threatens the life of the 
society and the nation. Even more so because down to today they 
acknowledge no regrets or errors. … If the society is not on guard, 
there is a possibility that PKI will return, albeit in a different form. … 
Including being on guard against those who seek to make heroes of 
former PKI figures or seek to expunge the episodes of oppression by PKI 
and its mass organisations against their political opponents, including 
religious folk, in particular the Islamic ummah.134 
As political tensions rose in 1996, Ummat grew more enthusiastic in its 
support of the increasingly shaky Soeharto regime. Its issue of 22 July 1996 
had Gen. Faisal Tanjung — then ABRI commander and one of the foremost 
133 M. Syafi‘i Anwar et al., ‘Bukan dendam, tapi pelurusan sejarah’, Ummat yr 1, no. 
6 (18 Sept. 1995/22 Rabiul Akhir 1416 H), pp. 21–3.
134 Surya Kusuma, ‘PKI harus tetap dicurigai’, Ummat yr 1, no. 6 (18 Sept. 1995/22 
Rabiul Akhir 1416 H), p. 27.
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practising Muslim ‘green’ generals135 — pictured on the cover with the 
quotation, ‘There are PKI in NGOs who want to overthrow the government’. 
The article itself claimed that the supporters of Megawati’s branch of PDI 
were using the stand-off at PDI headquarters to generate rioting — just as 
in the 1988 ABRI doctrine about the next generation of Communists and 
extreme groups that would try to foment mass riots to pursue their political 
interests. Faisal Tanjung was asked deferentially whether he could clarify 
the issue of NGOs that wanted to overthrow the government. ‘Yes, we are 
examining that,’ he replied, ‘because within them there are PKI figures’.136
After the violence of 27 July, Ummat editorialised that ‘the voice of the 
Islamic ummah unanimously supports the resoluteness of the government in 
dealing with the riot of 27 July and its aftermath’. It added that,
the majority of Muslim leaders and Islamic organisations indeed support 
the resolute action of the government in suppressing the riot of 27 July. 
They have truly never sympathised with, indeed incline to be suspicious 
of, PDI. … Moreover, they subsequently received confirmation from 
government announcements, having seen and been convinced of this 
themselves, that this movement is being utilised by groups that have the 
smell of PKI. Clearly, the Islamic ummah can disagree about everything, 
but not about the issue of Communism.
Ummat then quoted statements supporting this interpretation from 
the leaders of hard-line movements including the Islamist KISDI (Komite 
Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, Indonesian Committee for 
the Solidarity of the Islamic World) and DDII (with which KISDI was 
closely linked). Other organisations’ support was also reported: that of 
MUI, Al-Irsyad, NU’s Ansor and the Muhammadiyah Youth (Pemuda 
Muhammadiyah). ‘As is known,’ said Ummat, ‘PRD and other such groups 
often adopt Islamic symbols. In their actions and protests, they recruit 
younger generation Muslims, including girls in jilbabs.’ But several other 
Muslim youth groups were then quoted as rejecting such organisations and 
emphasising that ‘PRD is a group whose ideology is Communist’. The only 
dissenting voice reported came from the leader (rois aam) of NU’s advisory 
135 Faisal Tanjung, Hartono, Syarwan Hamid and Prabowo Subianto were usually 
regarded as the foremost ‘green’ generals; see Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 151; Marcus 
Mietzner, Military politics, Islam and the state in Indonesia: From turbulent transition 
to democratic consolidation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 
p. 103.
136 Hamid Basyaib, ‘Gaduh PDI dan tuduhan Panglima ABRI’, Ummat yr 2, no. 2 
(22 July 1996/6 Rabiul Awal 1417 H), pp. 28–9.
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board (Syuriyah), Ky. H. Ilyas Ruhiyat, who told Ummat that he was neutral 
and neither accepted nor rejected the government’s claim that PDI was being 
used as a vehicle by PKI. The Islamist Yusril Ihza Mahendra — an academic 
with a Malaysian doctorate, a DDII and ICMI leader regarded by some 
as the ‘young Natsir’, later to become a cabinet minister and be accused of 
corruption — contributed an opinion piece in which he wrote, ‘[The claim 
by PRD et al. that] religion must be separated from the state … is Marxist 
secularism which in essence is hostile to religion’.137
It was thus appealing to both Islamists and the New Order regime 
to perceive Communism as a reviving threat, along with globalisation, 
Westernisation, doctrines of personal liberty and democracy and the Internet 
that increasingly conveyed these threats. Islamists and the New Order were 
alike in seeking control of what people did, what they believed, and the power 
to enforce these things: they had now discovered that they wanted people 
to do and believe pretty much the same things and thus could collaborate 
in the exercise of power. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar, out 
of Indonesia and angrily running their school in Johor, maintained their 
opposition to the regime, but many other Islamists had by now made their 
peace with it.
The increase in the public presence of more hard-line interpretations 
of Islam did not, at this stage, pose a challenge to rural-based NU, but it 
was beginning to produce a potential split within the other great Java-
based organisation, Muhammadiyah. Just as many leaders in NU were 
becoming more modern, more progressive, more tolerant of other faiths and 
more in support of democratic transition, a younger leadership group with 
such aspirations was also rising in Muhammadiyah. At the once-in-five-
years general conference in 1995, a group with such views was elected to 
Muhammadiyah’s leadership. The general chair was now M. Amien Rais, and 
supporting him were other progressive thinkers such as Ahmad Syafii Maarif 
(who succeeded Amien Rais when he went into formal politics in 1999), 
Amin Abdullah, Abdul Munir Mulkhan and others. These people were 
generally Modernist in views, Dakwahist in aspirations and sometimes even 
Liberal in their aims. They supported what they called ‘cultural proselytism’ 
(dakwah kultural), which was a means of reaching out in culturally sensitive 
ways to people less committed to Islam, above all to abangan villagers who 
remained in Java, and their analogues elsewhere. But at about the same time 
137 Taken from multiple articles in Ummat yr 2, no. 4 (19 Aug. 1996/4 Rabiul Akhir 
1417 H).
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there began to return to Indonesia a generation of Muhammadiyah activists 
who had studied in the Middle East and who wanted a narrower, more 
literalist — indeed often Revivalist — interpretation of Islam to be promoted 
by Muhammadiyah. The group led by Amien Rais, Syafii Maarif and others 
was dominant in the Muhammadiyah leadership until c. 2000, after which 
time those who opposed them began to plan a take-over of the organisation. 
Among the Muhammadiyah branches most anxious to overthrow the 
influence of the 1995–2000 reformers were those in Yogyakarta and 
Surabaya, along with some in Sumatra.138
The depth of the growing difference between these two wings within 
Muhammadiyah is suggested by the comment of Ahmad Syafii Maarif in his 
memoirs, reflecting the conclusion he had come to by the 1990s with regard 
to what he calls ‘religious fundamentalism’:
Religious fundamentalism which is eager to monopolise truth in the 
name of God will produce results not much different from those of 
atheistic secularism which is totally divorced from faith. ‘Learn from this, 
all of you with insight!’ calls the Qur’an in sura al-Hasyr (59): verse 2.139
We will see more of the ramifications of this contest within Muhammadiyah 
in the following chapter.
Thus, by 1996–8, in Java (and across Indonesia more generally) there 
was a potent mix emerging:
• a shaky regime,
• increasingly assertive Revivalist interpretations of Islam,
• deepening general Islamisation,
• increasing presence of Islamists and
• both regime and Islamic insistence that the society was surrounded 
by threats to stability, to development and to Islam itself.
There were parallels here with the late stage of Sukarno’s Guided 
Democracy and — similarly — social violence began to spread. We noted 
above that the 1997 elections were the most violent of the New Order 
period, leaving an estimated 250 dead across the nation. Significant 
violence was directed against Christian churches. This often included 
an ethnic dimension, for many of Indonesia’s Chinese were Christians; 
138 Interview with Prof. Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Kota Gede, 22 Oct. 2005. See also 
Syafii Maarif, Titik-titik kisar di perjalananku, pp. 255–8, 270–88, 294–7. 
139 Syafii Maarif, Titik-titik kisar di perjalananku, p. 251. Qur’anic translation as in 
Qur’an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem, p. 365.
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anti-Chinese and anti-Christian violence were thus sometimes the same 
thing. There was significant fighting between Muslims and non-Muslims 
in Jakarta in 1992 and some churches were attacked. In 1996 a Muslim 
mob burned six churches in the centre of Surabaya, but this was hushed up 
on military orders. Then in October 1996, around Situbondo in East Java 
— a NU stronghold of heavily Madurese ethnicity — 25 Christian schools 
and churches were burned down and five people died. Multiple Chinese 
properties were damaged or destroyed. A few months later, similar violence 
followed in Tasikmalaya, West Java, leaving four dead and Chinese properties 
damaged and destroyed. Recognising the role that NU followers had played, 
Abdurrahman Wahid publicly apologised to Christians for this violence and 
mobilised Banser to protect churches.140 Church-burnings were becoming 
more common across Indonesia in this period. One calculation has it that 
over 1985–94 13.2 churches were burned each year, but in 1995–7 that rose 
to 44.5 each year.141 
It was in this environment that the corrupt, oppressive, increasingly 
unrealistic and dysfunctional Soeharto regime ran into the spreading Asia 
financial crisis that began in Thailand in mid-1997; as it stumbled to its end, 
the New Order found its greatest support from conservative Islamic circles. 
By this time Prabowo Subianto was not only a prominent ‘green’ general and 
Soeharto’s son-in-law, but also commander of ABRI’s special forces.142 He 
was also regarded as an ally of Habibie and ICMI.
140 Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 190, 192; Abdul Kadir, ‘Traditional Islamic society and the 
state’, pp. 351–2; Mujiburrahman, Feeling threatened, pp. 293–4, 374 n164.
141 Calculation by Thalele and Santoso, cited in Mujiburrahman, Feeling threatened, 
p. 374 n165.
142 To quote my own thumb-nail description of Prabowo: ‘Major-General Prabowo 
Subianto (b. 1951) … was the son of the distinguished economist and former 
PSI politician Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and was married to Soeharto’s daughter 
Siti Hediati Hariyadi (nicknamed Titiek, b. 1959). Prabowo was brilliant, highly 
educated, and, in the eyes of his opponents, a man of unbridled ruthlessness and 
ambition. In 1983 he was named deputy commander of the army’s … Kopassus 
(Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Forces Command). This consisted of para-
commandos and covert warfare elements. Under Prabowo’s leadership, the special 
forces fought separatist movements in Papua, East Timor and Aceh. Their record 
of using terror against civilians was probably the worst of any element in ABRI. As 
Prabowo pursued his meteoric rise through the military, he won both admirers and 
bitter enemies. Some suspected for a time that here, at last, was Soeharto’s successor, 
others that Prabowo represented the ultimate corruption of ABRI by presidential 
favouritism.’ Ricklefs, History of modern Indonesia, p. 354.
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In an atmosphere of rising tension and crisis early in 1998, Prabowo 
in particular courted Islamic hard-liners, breaking the Ramadan fast 
with a gathering of 5,000 people that included well-known extremists. 
He announced that the current crisis was the result of an international 
conspiracy linked to Chinese Indonesian businessmen. Sofjan Wanandi 
(Liem Bian Koen), a Chinese Indonesian entrepreneur and Catholic, became 
a particular target of Prabowo and his Islamist allies, along with the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, of which Sofyan 
and his brother Yusuf Wanandi (Liem Bian Kie) were leading lights. MUI 
responded to Prabowo and the regime’s call for Islamic support. It declared 
that there should be a Holy War (jihad) against ‘a group of irresponsible 
people who dominate 70 per cent of the country’s economy even though 
they are only four per cent of the total population [code for Chinese 
Indonesians], in order to prevent their political conspiracy to topple the 
government and Islam’.143 
On 8 February 1998 a meeting at the Al Azhar mosque in Jakarta 
denounced Sofjan Wanandi and CSIS for being behind the monetary 
crisis. A ‘National Solidarity Front of Indonesian Muslims’ was announced 
to oppose such alleged traitors to the nation. Among those present were 
KISDI’s leader Ahmad Soemargono, Ky. H. Kholil (sometimes spelled 
Cholil) Ridwan (a DDII and MUI luminary) and others of a generally 
Islamist persuasion. The main speaker was the Arab Indonesian H. Habib 
Hamid Alatas, who said that there was a conspiracy of non-Muslims afoot 
and that ABRI and Islam must stand together against it.144 A few days later 
the Minister of Religion Tarmizi Taher opened the national conference of 
MUI. There the head of MUI, Ky. H. Hasan Basri, said that all Muslims 
should carry out a ‘national Holy War’ (jihad nasional) in concert with 
the government and ABRI to defend ‘the nation, the people and religion’ 
from all threats from a ‘certain group with an international conspiratorial 
network’. The Secretary General of DDII, Ky. H. Hussein Umar, also said 
that the enemies were hard to define, but it was clear that they were part 
of an international conspiracy. Again, the only caution came from the head 
of NU’s advisory board (Syuriyah), Ky. H. Ma’ruf Amin, who observed that 
jihad had a wide range of meanings and that it was the view of religious 
143 Honna, Military politics and democratization, pp. 48–9; the quote is Honna’s 
translation from ‘MUI serukan Jihan Nasional’, Republika, 11 Feb. 1998. See further 
Mietzner, Military politics, Islam and the state, pp. 114–5.
144 KmpsO, 9 Feb. 1998.
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scholars that the main enemy facing the nation was poverty arising from the 
monetary crisis.145
Soeharto’s reign was about to end. The tale of local and international 
manoeuvrings that attended the end of the regime has often been told and 
need not detain us here.146 The important facts are that the Islamist-regime 
alliance came to nothing, the military games played by various factions did 
not end in a new military takeover, no international players were prepared 
to salvage the regime, and in the end Soeharto — accepting the inevitable 
— announced his resignation on 21 May 1998 and handed power to his 
Vice-President Habibie. Many Islamist activists saw the latter as an even 
more attractive ally than Soeharto, because of Habibie’s long-standing 
personal piety.
Soeharto’s decision to resign was reportedly based on a combination 
of Islamic and older Javanese considerations of the kind that had typified 
his period in power. Prof. Abdul Malik Fadjar, a Yogyakarta-born Muham-
madiyah intellectual who was head of the Muhammadiyah Universities in 
both Malang and Surakarta, and shortly to become the first Minister of 
Religion in a post-Soeharto Indonesia, was present at the final discussions at 
which Soeharto decided to step down. Soeharto invited nine Muslim leaders 
to meet with him on 19 May, a gathering that also included Abdurrahman 
Wahid and Nurcholish Madjid, but not Amien Rais, who had emerged 
as Soeharto’s principal opponent. At this meeting, various constitutional 
matters were discussed along with Islamic legal issues. But Javanese books 
of divination (primbons) were evidently being consulted as well and there 
was consideration of what day would be most propitious for the momentous 
step of resignation. It was reportedly still Soeharto’s practice to sit facing in 
particular directions on particular days, depending on the location of the 
invisible but supernaturally powerful serpent (naga) on that day. This sort 
of thing created a profound gap of understanding between Soeharto and 
Habibie, because the latter could simply make no sense of such ideas.147 
In any case, there were no political, military, economic, diplomatic or 
supernatural powers available to salvage the New Order. On 21 May 1998 it 
died with Soeharto’s resignation.
145 JP, 11 Feb. 1998.
146 A brief overview is available in Ricklefs, History of modern Indonesia, pp. 378–81. 
A detailed account including the role of various Islamic figures and organisations is 
in Mietzner, Military politics, Islam and the state, pp. 146–84.
147 Discussion with Prof. H. Abdul Malik Fadjar, Jakarta, 18 June 1998.
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Java Islamised?
Social processes never come to an end, cultures never stand still, the changing 
influence of religions or ideologies has no end-point, and the story of the 
deeper Islamisation of Javanese society will not end where this book ends. Yet 
it is not inappropriate for us to observe at this stage that, when the Soeharto 
regime fell in 1998, the religious changes that had taken place in Javanese 
society over the previous three decades were profound, that something like 
a watershed had been crossed.
We have seen that the New Order period — covered in the last 
chapter and this — dramatically increased the impact of Islam at all levels 
of Javanese society, both in the towns and cities and in the countryside. The 
politics of this process were complex, with NU initially being treated as 
an opposition force by the regime, as a competitor for social control of the 
countryside, but then as an ally. We have seen how the abangan side lost 
the only major institutions — the political parties PKI and PNI — that 
supported abangan identity and practices, while the santri side retained a 
vast range of institutions that supported the ummah and further Islamisation. 
We have observed abangan Javanese becoming more observant Muslims, as 
well as followers of other faiths, particularly Christianity. We have seen how, 
in the last two decades or so of the Soeharto years, the regime intensified 
its push for totalitarian ideological hegemony and won — albeit within the 
limits imposed by its administrative shortcomings. As international waves 
of Islamic reform washed up on Indonesia’s shores, Revivalist and Islamist 
approaches to Islam became more visible, more active and more confident. 
The essential totalitarianism of such groups and the regime — the wish on 
both their parts to control not only what people did but what they believed 
— made them, in those last decades, more allies than competitors.
When Indonesia became independent in 1945–9, it was probably true 
(statistical inadequacies notwithstanding) that santri Javanese were in a 
minority, perhaps a very small minority. Intense social and political conflict 
was generated between santri and abangan. By 1998 (still in the absence of 
really satisfactory statistical indicators) it was very likely that the proportions 
were reversed. The abangan were possibly a minority now, and in any case 
were politically voiceless and insignificant. They had nowhere to go that 
was politically significant but Golkar, the vehicle of a regime that was itself 
‘greening’, with the bureaucracy, the military and even the Soeharto family 
burnishing their Islamic credentials.
We have tried to trace the deeper social transformation in Javanese 
society here, necessarily working with evidence that is not always as complete 
or convincing as one would like. But the general trend of the New Order 
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period at grass-roots level seems clear: Javanese society was being more 
deeply Islamised. The opponents to that process who were such a prominent 
element of the pre-Soeharto story hardly mattered any more. I may offer 
an anecdotal footnote to this which may be suggestive, even though it is 
unsupported by any hard evidence and may be contrary to the impressions 
of others who have also spent 40 years doing research in and about Java. 
When we first lived in Central Java in 1969, young Javanese had both 
indigenous Javanese and Arabic names — the former commonly found 
among abangan and the latter among santri. The most common seemed to 
be names of the abangan style: boys with names starting in Su …, or Joko, 
Sigit and Bambang; girls with names like Siti, Nini, Ratih and Yati. Some 
abangan boys were named Slamet, an Arabic-derived name, but I doubt 
that abangan knew of that etymology or thought of the name as particularly 
Islamic, any more than they regarded the slametan as such.148 Thirty years 
later, it seemed that Arabic names were in the majority: now Javanese boys 
were likely to be called Muhammad, Abdul, Hussein or Ibrahim, while girls 
were commonly named Nur, Ayisya, Lina or Fatimah. If this impression is 
correct, it is another indicator of the strengthening sense of Islamic identity 
across Javanese society.149
In some ways, perhaps we can say that the Islamisation of Javanese 
society had resumed a course that had been interrupted for about a 
century, from the mid-19th to the mid-20th century, by the polarisation 
and politicisation that are discussed in the previous book in this series — 
Polarising Javanese society — and in earlier chapters of this book. That century 
or so of polarisation and politicisation generated immense, deeply rooted and 
eventually bloody opposition to the deeper Islamisation of the society. That 
conflicted and tragic stage of Javanese history was now effectively over. Of 
course there were still abangan and still people who resisted Islamisation. 
Unlike in 1830, in 1998 there was a substantial Christian minority in Java 
whose presence could not be gainsaid. But the general trend in the direction 
of deeper Islamisation was probably now irreversible. 
148 On Javanese naming practices, see Uhlenbeck’s essay ‘Systematic features of 
Javanese personal names’, originally published in 1969, in E.M. Uhlenbeck, Studies 
in Javanese morphology (Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 
translation series 19; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), pp. 336–51.
149 The LKiS leader M. Jadul Maula commented also on the phenomenon of children 
of abangan being given Arab names as a part of the broader process of ‘santrinisasi’; 
interviewed by Nur Choliq Ridwan, Yogyakarta, 9 Dec. 2007.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t255   255 6/20/2012   1:21:18 PM
256 Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java
It is a token of that resumed process of Islamisation that, in the 
following Part II of this book, our discussion will have only little to say about 
resistance to Islamisation per se. Rather, the conflicts that we will observe will 
be contending views of what a more Islamic Java — and, of course, a more 
Islamic Indonesia — should look like. The contending parties will be less 
abangan and santri than defenders of conflicting interpretations of Islam.
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PART II
COMING TO FRUITION, 
c. 1998 TO THE PRESENT
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c h a p te r  7
The political and social settings
Introduction
In the following seven chapters, we will observe a major transformation 
in the social, political, religious and cultural dynamics of Java, and hence 
of Indonesia. This history is, like all histories, plagued by imperfect and 
contradictory evidence and multiple, often confusing, directions of events. 
Nevertheless, there is a dominant trend evident from the story that follows, 
which involves an important change in the direction of causation, a shift in 
the source of initiatives for change.
Throughout this book, the nature of the reigning political regime 
has been crucial to the story. Whether Java was under Dutch colonial 
rule or Japanese wartime occupation, was in the midst of its Revolution 
or experimenting with political freedom and democracy in the 1950s, the 
political regime facilitated certain developments in the spheres of religion 
and culture and inhibited others. Down to the mid-1960s religious, social, 
cultural and political polarisation gravely threatened social harmony, leading 
in the end to the horrific slaughters of 1965–6 that ushered in Soeharto’s 
regime. In the preceding two chapters, we have seen how Soeharto’s New 
Order brought an aspiring totalitarianism to Indonesia and facilitated a much 
deeper Islamisation of Javanese society, a profound social change from Java’s 
past. Even while multiple scholars, journalists and politicians, both within 
Indonesia and outside, maintained the view that the Javanese constituted 
a sort of impregnable abangan bastion against greater Islamic influence in 
Indonesian affairs — an idea resting largely on the still-influential 1950s work 
of Clifford Geertz — Javanese society was moving beyond this stereotype. 
Here we will see how in the post-Soeharto years, it became less a case 
of the political regime setting the religious agenda than the reverse: religious 
259
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dynamics shaping the political regime. In the concluding Chapter 14 of this 
book, we will investigate some of the larger issues that are involved here 
— including the question of whether politicians’ surrender of initiative to 
religious groups is necessary, given the realities of how political power works. 
Even though expressly Islamist political parties did poorly in elections, the 
Islamisation of the society from the grass roots upward persuaded politicians 
that they must make their compromises with the increasingly powerful faith 
— perhaps in many cases because Islam was increasingly powerful in their 
own lives. By the time of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–14), 
a much weakened presidency was reluctant to wield state authority against 
even the more thuggish forms of religious activism. 
Thus it was that Soeharto’s wish to make everyone act and believe 
by the standards of Pancasila — and to define what that meant — was 
superseded by the wish of religious activists to make all Muslims act and 
believe by the standards of Islam, a wish pursued with governmental 
acquiescence and sometimes direct support. But just what those standards 
actually amount to was contested, as we will see in this Part of this book. 
Soeharto could arrogate the right to say what Pancasila was, but there was no 
single voice with the power to say what Islam was. One sort of totalitarian 
aspiration was thus succeeded by another, but the religious version was 
plagued by the contested nature of religious authority that is found in 
virtually all faiths.
By the time of the Yudhoyono presidency, the policy of regional 
autonomy facilitated Islamisation and Islamist agendas in local contexts, 
despite the frequent failure of Islamists either to win power through national 
elections or to amend the national constitution to their liking (as they failed 
to do in the long process of amending the constitution in 2002). But regional 
autonomy also introduced another complication. Each region sought to find 
something to capture its particular identity, often with the hope of attracting 
the attention of (mostly domestic) tourists. This turned their attention to 
local art forms, which in many cases were of pre-Islamic origin or at least in 
a style unwelcome to more puritan forms of Islam.1 Thus the homogenising 
aspirations of Islamic reformers now faced another trend in the opposite 
direction: the frequently heterogenising agenda of regional autonomy.
1 A similar observation is made in Hatley, Javanese performances, p. 199. Kebatinan 
figures also expressed the view that regional autonomy provided a good opportunity 
for kebatinan to revive after Soeharto’s attempt to impose a homogeneous national 
culture; discussion with Drs KRAT Basuki Prawirodipuro and KRT Giarto Nagoro, 
Surabaya, 25 Nov. 2007.
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 The political setting: The second freedom experiment
Soeharto’s resignation in 1998 ushered in a period of extraordinary political 
change in Indonesia, whereby within a very few years one of the most 
centralised, authoritarian and non-democratic states was transformed into 
a decentralised democracy — rather chaotic, to be sure, but one where 
government was moved much closer to the people and elections really did 
change who were their representatives and governors.2
Soeharto’s protégé and Vice-President B.J. Habibie succeeded as 
President for just 17 months (1998–9). Pro-democracy activists feared 
the worst, but in fact Habibie laid the foundations for Indonesia’s ‘second 
freedom experiment’, as this chapter calls it. He freed political prisoners and 
arranged for free and fair national elections. Most controversially, Habibie 
allowed a United Nations-supervised referendum in East Timor in 1999 
which led to the excision of that territory (conquered by Indonesia in 1975) 
and the creation of the new nation of Timor-Leste. In the midst of ongoing 
social violence and economic crisis, Habibie achieved much more in the way 
of reform than many imagined possible.
Habibie had a reputation as a devout Muslim, as well as a promoter of 
immensely expensive, loss-making state technology projects. He followed a 
practice known among pious circles of voluntarily fasting on each Monday 
and Thursday as an additional religious discipline. His combination of 
modern technological knowledge, civilian background and Islamic piety made 
his presidency welcome to many who sought a greater role for Islam in the 
nation — notably people who had found ICMI to be a useful professional 
and religious vehicle for their own aspirations. The alliance we noted in the 
previous chapter among an increasingly ‘green’ military, Islamist groups and 
the former Soeharto regime — all of them feeling threatened by globalisation 
and various forms of liberalisation — continued to resonate under Habibie. 
One of the military men he worked closely with was Gen. Z.A. Maulani 
(1939–2005), a 1961 graduate of the Magelang Military Academy. He was 
on Habibie’s expert staff when he was Minister for Research and Technology 
and in the crisis month of May 1998 was briefly secretary to Habibie as 
Vice-President. Thereafter he became Indonesia’s intelligence chief as head 
of the State Intelligence Coordination Body (BAKIN, Badan Koordinasi 
Intelijen Negara) from 1998 to 2000. In 2002 Maulani, now retired from 
2 An overview of the period down to 2008, with references to the most important 
studies, may be found in Ricklefs, History of modern Indonesia, Chapters 24–5.
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active government service, published a book entitled Zionism: The movement 
to subjugate the world. This asserts the authenticity of the well-known forgery 
‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion’,3 writes of a Jewish conspiracy to take 
over American finance, politics and foreign affairs, to dominate the world’s 
press, the IMF and World Bank and so on.4 Another person Habibie was 
close to was Anwar Harjono, who succeeded Natsir as head of DDII when 
the latter died in 1993. We have noted above Anwar Harjono’s increasing 
antipathy towards Christianisation and other perceived threats to Islam such 
as Communism, atheism and secularism.5 Other connections between senior 
military men and Islamists also continued.
In the first post-Soeharto parliamentary elections of June 1999, there 
were 48 parties contending, several with explicitly Islamist agendas. Muham-
madiyah circulated a call to all Muslims, telling them it was ‘obligatory to 
choose one of the parties … which represents the interests of the Islamic 
ummah and genuinely fights for reform’. A call published by a group calling 
themselves the Islamic Society for Democracy quoted Qur’an 3:28 as saying 
‘Let not believers make unbelievers leaders by abandoning believers’6 and 
went on, ‘Don’t choose a party that is dominated by non-Muslim candidates’ 
— a charge frequently leveled by Islamist activists at Megawati’s PDIP party. 
This echoed advice given by MUI on 7 June, which many people reportedly 
regarded as a legal ruling (fatwa).7 In fact, the ummah was hardly united 
politically. There was great animosity particularly between Abdurrahman 
Wahid’s followers (PKB supporters) and those of Amien Rais (supporters of 
PAN). Anti-Amien demonstrations in Bangil and Pasuruan threatened such 
violence that he had to cancel a trip there in June 1999.8
3 It may be noted en passant that Henry Ford’s famously anti-Semitic book The 
international Jew, originally published in 1920 and which also published these 
‘Protocols’, has been translated into Indonesian, but I failed to note the translator or 
publisher when I saw this work on sale in an Indonesian bookshop.
4 Z.A. Maulani, Zionisme: Gerakan menaklukkan dunia ( Jakarta: Penerbit Daseta, 
2002).
5 Feener, Muslim legal thought, p. 116.
6 Abdel Haleem’s translation renders the verse rather differently: ‘The believers should 
not make the disbelievers their allies rather than other believers’; Qur’an: A new 
translation by Abdel Haleem, p. 36.
7 These two ‘calls’ (seruan) appeared side-by-side in JP, 5 June 1999, and were also no 
doubt published in many other newspapers. The MUI advice (tausiyah) is discussed in 
Moch. Nur Ichwan, ‘‘Ulamā’, state and politics: Majelis Ulama after Suharto’, Islamic 
law and society vol. 12 (2005), no. 1, pp. 55–8.
8 Kmps, 15 June 1998.
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Despite such efforts, even in this first election very many Indonesians 
proved unwilling to accept the political advice of religious leaders and 
responded positively to Megawati’s image as the daughter of Sukarno and the 
foremost representative of anti-New Order politics. The specifically Islamist 
PPP had a modest level of support, with 10.7 per cent of the national vote. 
PAN, led by Muhammadiyah’s former head Amien Rais but with a clearly 
secularist platform, did worse at 7.1 per cent. PKB, headed by Abdurrahman 
Wahid, gained 12.6 per cent. The big winners were two parties with no 
special claim on a self-consciously Muslim constituency: Megawati’s PDIP, 
which won fully 33.7 per cent of the national vote and — surprisingly to 
many — Golkar, which had managed to present itself as a ‘new Golkar’ and 
gained 22.4 per cent nationally.
The results in the Javanese heartlands, as given below, demonstrate the 
appeal of PDIP there, the weakness of Golkar compared to its national result 
Illustration 15 PDIP election rally, Surakarta, June 1999, 
with supporters dressed as wayang clowns
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— where ironically it became the heir to Masyumi’s position of the 1950s as 
the main representative of the outer islands — and the predictable strength 
of PKB in East Java, where NU’s popular support was always greatest (not 
least because of overwhelming support of Madurese living there) and where 
it beat PDIP into second place.
Table 17  Percentage of valid votes won by major parties in Central and 
 East Java and Yogyakarta, 19999
Region PDIP Golkar PKB PPP PAN
Central Java 30.7 9.8 11.5 7.6 5.1
Yogyakarta 16.0 6.3 7.4 2.3 8.7
East Java 23.5 8.9 24.9 3.4 3.3
Although PDIP was the largest party and Megawati had a presumptive 
claim to be elected by the national parliament (MPR) as President, astute 
manoeuvring by Abdurrahman Wahid handed him the vote for the 
presidency. He held the post for just 21 months (1999–2001). The man who 
most represented the hopes of Liberal thinkers, who had the authority of a 
Traditionalist ‘blue blood’ but insisted on a secular state, was now President 
of Indonesia. But he was very sick: he had suffered strokes and was blind, 
so to his long-standing idiosyncrasies and mystical inclinations were added 
a damaged mind and an inability to read anything himself.10 He was 
nevertheless remarkably energetic and worked to overthrow the legacies of 
Soeharto and Habibie. He supported openness in government and pluralist 
tolerance in society. But his erratic statements and impatience with critics, 
along with growing rumours of corruption among his circle and involving 
Abdurrahman himself, soon doomed his presidency. Modernist youth 
9 Calculated on the basis of figures in SPK online, 16 June 1999. These are provisional 
results, but I’ve been unable to locate official final results (which would not differ 
significantly) for these areas.
10 An example of the way his mind was working: in 2007, he told me that the 
previous year in Kediri he had met with ‘grandfather Semar’ (the most powerful of 
the god-clowns of the wayang), who was born 700 years before. If Abdurrahman 
called Semar, he would come to him every day; discussion with Ky. H. Abdurrahman 
Wahid, Jakarta, 7 June 2007. There were many publications exploring Abdurrahman’s 
conduct and thought. For example, see Khoirul Rosyadi, Mistik politik Gus Dur 
(Yogyakarta: Jendela, 2004).
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organisations associated with Muhammadiyah, PAN and other parties were 
prominent in denouncing Abdurrahman and demanding that he be removed 
from office.11 NU’s youth activists in Ansor were prepared to defend their 
kyai with physical force if necessary and attacked Muhammadiyah and 
Golkar properties in East Java.12
Illustration 16 Abdurrahman Wahid, Ciganjur, October 2009
11 For example, JktP online, 15 Jan. 2001.
12 TempoI, 7 Feb. 2001, 29 May 2001; JktP online, 27 May 2001; KmpsO, 9 Feb. 
2001.
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Abdurrahman acted to free the press from Soeharto-era constraints. 
This fostered some good journalism, as exemplified in several Jakarta-based 
newspapers, the leading papers of Yogyakarta and the Surabaya-based Jawa 
Pos, but it also allowed the publication of much Revivalist, Dakwahist, and 
Islamist literature — including extremist forms of these. The latter was 
exemplified by magazines such as Sabili (the most influential of these),13 al-
Wa’ie, Risalah Mujahidin, Suara Hidayatullah and others, as well as very many 
books. Extremists loathed Abdurrahman. One of the many inflammatory 
anti-Abdurrahman books published during his presidency was written by 
Dr Sidik Jatmika of the Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, published 
by Wihdah Press — a publishing enterprise of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia (about which, more below)14 — and entitled A Zionist 
movement with a Malay face, featuring on its cover Abdurrahman’s head with 
a star of David superimposed.15 
With crisis and controversy on all sides, at the end Abdurrahman was 
ready to abandon his own principles and overturn Indonesia’s democracy 
by declaring a state of emergency. The relevant minister (Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, later to be president himself ), however, refused to do so. 
Abdurrahman was impeached by the MPR in mid-2001, whereupon his 
Vice-President Megawati was elevated to the presidency (2001–4).
Megawati’s presidency was notable for a restoration of the dignity of 
her office but little else. She had little competence for discharging the duties 
of a president and, it seemed, still less interest in anything but the status 
that came with it. Two fundamental developments took place during her 
presidency. The first was the decentralisation of the nation. A law passed in 
1999 and implemented from 2001 introduced regional autonomy. Because of 
the fear of the nation breaking up, authority and budgets were not devolved 
to the level of provinces and special districts (of which there were 33) but 
rather to the level of regencies and cities, of which there were over 400 at 
the time, a figure that grew to 530 by 2009. Religion — along with defence, 
13 A useful history of Sabili is in Miftahul Anam, ‘Fatwa sesat “Media umat”, 
MaJEMUK no. 26 (Mei-Juni 2007), pp. 6–17. For an authoritative account of 
publishers associated with JI, see International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah 
Islamiyah’s publishing industry (Asia report no. 147. Jakarta/Brussels: International 
Crisis Group, 28 Feb. 2008).
14 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s publishing industry, p. 2.
15 Sidik Jatmika, Gerakan Zionis berwajah Melayu (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, AH 
1422/2001).
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t266   266 6/20/2012   1:21:24 PM
The Political and Social Settings 267
foreign relations, justice and monetary affairs — was one of the areas reserved 
for national-level determination, but (as we shall see) in fact much in the way 
of religious affairs came to be determined locally, especially with a national 
government unwilling to exercise its prerogatives in this area. From one of 
the world’s most tightly controlled and centralised nations, Indonesia was 
now one of the most decentralised.
The second major development followed upon the al-Qaeda attacks 
in the United States in September 2001 and the subsequent American-
led invasion of Afghanistan. Suddenly there were major demonstrations 
protesting the impending invasion in Indonesia’s towns and cities, often led 
by Indonesians who had military experience in the earlier anti-Soviet jihad 
in Afghanistan. Down to this time, the contending understandings of Islam 
by Modernists and Traditionalists and political differences between them had 
frequently produced disagreement, tension and conflict. Now both of those 
schools of thought — represented above all by Muhamadiyah and NU, who 
were quick to label themselves ‘mainstream’ and ‘moderate’ — realised that 
they faced a common threat in more extremist versions of Islam, and began 
to cooperate with each other more than to bicker. Thus, animosities that went 
back to the founding of Modernist movements in Indonesia in the first years 
of the 20th century at last declined into a shared tolerance and opposition to 
extremism. Muhammadiyah and NU leaders were soon jointly declaring their 
opposition to imposing shari‘a law in Indonesia and to the use of violence 
for religious purposes, and emphasising their commitment to the Indonesian 
national state (rather than the idea of a universal caliphate), in opposition to 
the demands of more extremist groups.16
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became president in 2004, the first 
president in Indonesian history to be directly elected by the people. He was 
reelected in 2009 for a further five years. With that direct election mandate, 
he might seem to have been in a strong position to provide leadership at na-
tional level, but decentralisation meant that the presidency’s prerogatives were 
sharply restricted and much of Indonesian politics had become local politics. 
There were times when SBY (as he was commonly known) — who was 
not a man ever noted for decisive action — seemed nearly paralysed by the 
political constraints of his position. We will see below the rather remarkable 
extent to which he was prepared to surrender political initiative to religious 
leaders and unwilling to stand against religiously inspired violence.
16 For example, JktP online, 1 Jan. 2003. Other leading scholars also expressed such 
views.
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Throughout these years, violent and extremist religious movements 
grew within Indonesia, as did the opposition to them.17 There was bloody 
Muslim-Christian fighting in Maluku (eastern Indonesia) which cost 
over a thousand lives in 1999. Churches were bombed in 11 cities across 
Indonesia on Christmas Eve in December 2000, including several in East 
Java, leaving 19 dead: this was the first significant attack by the terrorist 
group Jemaah Islamiyah ( JI), although it was not yet identified as such by 
the authorities at that stage. The 2002 JI bombs in Bali were the deadliest, 
killing 202 people, most of them foreign tourists. In the wake of this 
violence, eventually even sceptics were obliged to accept that Indonesia 
had an Islamic terrorist problem. Extremists and their sympathisers 
continued to deny that this was so and preferred absurd ideas such as the 
Bali bombs having been secret CIA ‘mini-nuclear’ devices. A special police 
anti-terrorism task force known as Densus 88 (from Detasemen Khusus 
88, Special Detachment 88) was formed with American and Australian 
support, and soon proved itself highly competent at detecting, disrupting, 
capturing and/or killing domestic terrorists. While these developments 
grabbed headlines both domestically and internationally, such terrorist 
violence remained a marginal phenomenon in the context of the larger 
society. It is that larger topic of the broader changes in Javanese society to 
which we now turn.
The santri-abangan balance
Just as we did before considering the history of aliran politics in the 1950s 
and early 1960s, we will try here to assess the balance of numbers between 
the two sides of Javanese society, after the Islamising transformations 
of Soeharto’s New Order. It must be said at the outset that, despite the 
introduction of social surveys done to international standards in Indonesia, 
the information we have on this issue in the early 21st century is hardly 
any better than half-a-century before. Over the past four decades I asked 
many people in Indonesia — and in the research for this Part of this book 
over the years 2003–11, I asked nearly everyone I spoke with — what they 
estimated the balance between santri and abangan to be. In recent years, such 
17 A valuable brief overview is to be found in Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Reformasi, religious 
diversity and Islamic radicalism after Suharto’, Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and 
Humanities vol. 1 (2008), pp. 23–51.
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estimates were complicated by changing terminology. Abangan have become 
more likely to call themselves kejawen ( Javanese, or Javanist, implying truly 
authentic Javanese identity), probably because of the implication that those 
called abangan were people without religion, whereas kejawen claim to have 
a coherent, but truly Javanese, set of beliefs. For the santri side, abangan or 
kejawen is sometimes taken to mean just followers of kebatinan sects rather 
than a broader social category. In the midst of these confusions, many had 
the impression that abangan were declining as a proportion of the Javanese 
population, but there were just as many shrewd observers who thought 
abangan had become a minority as who thought that they still constituted a 
majority. The term santri, too, seems to be changing — probably reflecting a 
growing view of Javanese society as more uniformly Muslim, so that santri 
is less important as a broad social category — and seems now to be used 
more frequently in its original meaning of a student at an Islamic school (a 
pesantren, the place of the santri).
Social surveys can shed some light on this issue but they are 
problematic. Colleagues at the State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta 
supported my research by adding specific questions to their annual social 
surveys over three years (2006, 2008, 2010).18 Comparison of these surveys 
suggests that the samples were not entirely consistent or as representative 
as one would wish, the number of respondents was small and they were 
probably influenced by knowing that questions were being put by people 
from an Islamic university.19 
Nevertheless, it is useful to note that responses reflected a generally 
high level of self-identification and reported practice as observant Muslims. 
To avoid a spurious impression of accuracy, figures in the tables below are 
rounded to the nearest whole percentage.
18 The surveys were conducted by PPIM (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat, 
Centre for the Study of Islam and Society) at UIN Jakarta, at the direction of Prof. 
Jamhari Makruf.
19 As a control, in the 2006 and 2008 surveys, respondents were asked what party 
they had voted for in the national parliamentary election of 2004. The results showed 
inconsistencies between the samples. For example, in Central Java 18.1 per cent of 
the 2006 sample said that they had voted for Golkar and 6.5 per cent that they had 
voted for the Democrat Party; in 2008 these answers were given by, respectively, 
7.4 and 26.4 per cent. In a national survey of some 1200 respondents, the numbers 
for the Javanese heartland were necessarily small, e.g., a total of around 600 across 
Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java in the 2010 survey.
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Table 18  Self-identification as santri, abangan or other, as rounded   
 percentages, 2006 survey20
Santri Abangan or kejawen Other
 57 23 20
Table 19  Frequency of observation of the five daily prayers, as rounded  
 percentages, 2006 and 2010 surveys21
 Always/Routinely/Often enough Rarely
2006 90 9
2010 89 9
Table 20  Frequency of fasting during Ramadan, as rounded percentages, 2006  
 and 2010 surveys22
 Always/Routinely/Often enough Rarely
2006 93 6
2010 94 5
20 Survey conducted by PPIM (see note 18) in March 2006, with 398 respondents 
across Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java. The ‘other’ category seems to reflect 
people who were unsure of, or rejected, the terminology being used, rather than the 
kebatinan affiliation which such a category indicated in Tables 8 and 9 above, for 
a kebatinan follower could have identified him- or herself as kejawen in 2006; Cf. 
table 22 below.
21 Surveys conducted by PPIM (see note 18) in March 2006 and August 2010, with 
398 and 584 respondents respectively across Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java. 
The categories used here bring together those who answered selalu/rutin/sering/cukup 
sering and jarang.
22 See the preceding note.
A less formally sampled telephone survey by research colleagues in 
the regency of Kediri produced results which are consistent with the tables 
above.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t270   270 6/20/2012   1:21:24 PM
The Political and Social Settings 271
In another survey of 500 respondents in Jekulo (Kudus area) in 
2004, 81 per cent of respondents said that they carried out the five daily 
prayers.24 
We can draw at least one reasonably sound conclusion from this 
survey data. Given the problematic nature of all social surveys regarding 
sensitive topics such as religion — where respondents may tell you what 
they believe and do, what they want you to think they believe and do, what 
they believe you want them to believe and do, what they believe the society 
regards as acceptable belief and behaviour, or combinations of these — we 
can conclude that even if the data above is not convincing in detail about 
actual levels of religious observance, it does tell us about the dominance of 
religious paradigms and expectations in Javanese society generally in the 
post-Soeharto era. As Micklethwait and Wooldridge put it when addressing 
the issue of ambiguities in religious statistics, ‘Would you confess to atheism 
in Texas, let alone Jeddah?’25
The Kediri telephone survey provided another insight into the 
weakening significance of santri-abangan/kejawen distinctions, as can be 
seen in Table 22. Respondents were asked to self-identify along such lines. A 
Table 21  Frequency of observation of the five daily prayers and fasting during  
 Ramadan, as rounded percentages, 2007 telephone survey, Kediri23
 Always/Very often/Often enough Rarely/Very rarely
5 daily prayers 92 4
Ramadan fast 95 1
23 The survey was conducted by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi in February–April 
2007, with valid responses from 287 respondents over the age of 17, 93.3 per cent of 
whom identified as ethnically Javanese. Suhadi Cholil was identified as a member of 
staff of Gadjah Mada University and Imam Subawi as a senior journalist at Radar 
Kediri, so no connection with an Islamic university was presented to respondents, 
unlike in the PPIM surveys cited in previous tables. The categories used here bring 
together those who answered selalu/sangat sering/cukup sering and jarang/sangat 
jarang.
24 Achmad Ta’yuddin, ‘Masyarakat toleran: Budaya demokrasi dan partisipasi politik 
(Studi kasus perilaku politik umat Islam Jekulo Kudus pasca orde Baru)’ (Magister 
Agama thesis, Program Studi Agama dan Lintas Budaya, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 
2005), p. 51.
25 Micklethwait and Wooldridge, God is back, p. 26.
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majority called themselves santri, but about a quarter rejected the distinction 
and another 13 per cent declined to answer at all. Those who said that they 
were ‘other’ gave themselves descriptions such as ‘national’, ‘neutral’, ‘ordinary’, 
‘common’ or ‘general’ Muslims. That is, they responded that they thought of 
themselves as Muslims but refused to be situated in the old dichotomy.
Earlier in this book, we have taken the number of Javanese going 
on the hajj to Mecca as another indication of the depth of Islamisation. 
That indicator for the post-Soeharto years is consistent with the other 
evidence for a dramatically deeper Javanese commitment to Islam, but 
the figures themselves are subject to a major constraint. That is, the Saudi 
Arabian government imposes a quota of 0.1 per cent of the domestic 
Muslim population for pilgrims from any country each year. For Indonesia, 
that means some 200,000, well below the number of aspirant hajis in an 
increasingly pious nation with more people able to afford the trip. So there 
has developed a years-long waiting list. By 2008, East Java’s quota (33,935 
per year) was already taken up down to 2012 and in 2009 it looked like the 
years down to 2015 would be booked out.27 In 2008, Yogyakarta’s quota for 
2011 was already filling28 and by 2011 it was filled until 2018.29 In 2010, 
Central Java’s quota was just 29,435 but there was already a waiting list 
beyond that of nearly 80,000 people. As a consequence, there would be no 
Table 22  Self-identification as santri, abangan or other, as rounded   
 percentages, 2007 telephone survey, Kediri26 
Santri Abangan or  Other (national, neutral,  No answer
 kejawen ordinary, common, general) 
52 7 24 13
26 Survey conducted by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi, February–April 2007, with 
valid responses from 287 respondents over the age of 17, 93.3 per cent of whom 
identified as ethnically Javanese. The Indonesian terms used for ‘other’ were nasional, 
netral, biasa, awam and umum.
27 Republika online, 17 June 2009. Note that waiting lists were real, for they consisted 
of people who had already made bank deposits towards their costs. In 2004, each 
pilgrim had to pay about USD2,768 for a ‘full board and transport package’; JktP, 
16 Dec. 2004.
28 Republika online, 16 Oct. 2008.
29 According to email from Arif Maftuhin, 2 June 2011, based on published Yogya-
karta Department of Religion data.
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further vacancies for pilgrims from Central Java until 2013.30 Such figures 
make for a dramatic comparison with those in Tables 5 (showing 3,889 
departures in 1956) and 14 (with 4,024 departures in 1974) above.
The pilgrimage data is persuasive, and whatever our lingering 
uncertainties about how robust survey data can be, it is reasonable to 
conclude that by the early 21st century, a strong sense of Islamic identity 
and widespread orthopraxy characterised much of Javanese society. Even if 
people who responded to the surveys exaggerated their Muslimness, their 
doing so would reflect the dominance of an Islamised identity and discourse 
in Javanese society. In the 1950s, abangan had no hesitation to express their 
lack of interest in prayer or fasting or the pilgrimage, even to show contempt 
for santri practice and belief; sixty years later, such views — where still held 
— were more likely to be concealed. Certainly those spending their money 
on the hajj may be regarded as responding to a much more dominant Islam. 
The next chapter explores further how dominant this Islamised identity and 
discourse have become in Javanese society.
30 Ibid., 1 March 2010.
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c h a p te r  8
An Islamising society
Quite unlike Javanese life in the 1930s to mid-1960s, in the post-Soeharto 
era, from politics to government to culture to social practices to literature 
to academic life, Islam is prominent. Forty years ago an academic seminar 
began with the presenter saying selamat pagi or selamat sore (good morning, 
good afternoon) but by the turn of the 21st century, a seminar must begin 
274
Illustration 17 Interior of the Great Mosque (Masjid Al-Akbar) of 
Surabaya, begun in 1995 and opened in 2000
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with assalaamu’alaikum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuh (peace be with you, and 
God’s mercy and blessing) or a similar pious phrase. Indonesian academic 
theses once opened with thanks to the author’s family and supervisors; now 
they are more likely to begin with thanks and praise to God.
Politics and government
Islamic symbols and Islamic concepts are prominent in political affairs. 
Just as religious leaders are expected to comment on public matters in the 
United States, so also are they in Indonesia. Indonesian Islamic organisations 
were prominent in the demonstrations against the American invasion of 
Afghanistan in late 2001. MUI also took a prominent stand and thus lent 
a semi-official legitimacy to the demonstrations. In late September 2001 it 
called upon Muslims to wage Holy War (jihad fi sabilillah) if the United 
States and its allies should invade Afghanistan, while also condemning the 
al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September as a violation of Islamic values. MUI’s 
head Din Syamsuddin, however, denied that jihad necessarily meant war. 
The MUI statement was criticised by the head of the Jakarta IAIN, Prof. 
Azyumardi Azra. NU and Muhammadiyah leaders condemned the American 
action (as did the Catholic bishop of Semarang) but urged people not to 
attack foreigners in Indonesia.1 
Anti-Americanism was (and remains) a staple in Indonesian public 
commentary, encouraged not least by United States military actions in 
majority-Muslim countries and the United States’ own public religiosity. 
Masdar Hilmy observes that,
when uttered by ostensibly respectable mainstream politicians, anti-
American sentiments are afforded a degree of social legitimacy. This in 
turn creates a space for militant and terrorist groups whose agendas rest 
on the belief that the United States poses a direct threat to Muslims in 
general and to Indonesian Muslims in particular.2 
The 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq provided more fuel to 
this particular religious fire. Sabili magazine announced that there was a 
‘Crusader-Davidian’ (i.e., Christian-Jewish) conspiracy at work here. George 
1 JktP, 26 Sept. 2001, 27 Sept. 2001, 9 Oct. 2001. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir opened a 
registry for mujahidin who wished to go to Afghanistan, but the government banned 
any volunteers going there; JktP, 5 Oct. 2001, 9 Oct. 2001.
2 Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and democracy in Indonesia: Piety and pragmatism (Singa-
pore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), p. 146.
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W. Bush’s prominent Christian religiosity, use of words like ‘crusades’ and 
practice of holding prayers at the start of meetings was exploited. Citing 
the spoof website www.whitehouse.org (the real Whitehouse website is 
www.whitehouse.gov) as its source — and no doubt persuading many of its 
readers that the information was thereby authentic — Sabili reported that on 
Sunday 23 March (just three days after the invasion began) Bush assembled 
his ‘Prayer Team’ of leading evangelists, greeted them as ‘brothers in Christ’ 
and went on to say ‘Our mission in provoking a crusade against the Islamic 
ummah is now at an important juncture …. Let us take this moment to rise 
up and grasp this victory of Jesus!’3 MUI, Revivalist groups such as LDII 
and Islamist organisation such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, discussed 
below) were prominent in anti-American demonstrations, but so were 
thousands of followers of NU and Muhammadiyah.4
Even political parties that have sometimes been depicted as ‘secular’ or 
‘nationalist’ rather than religious — above all PDIP — have adopted religious 
symbols, either out of expediency or conviction. Megawati Sukarnoputri’s 
campaign posters and banners typically depicted her wearing a diaphanous 
kerudung headscarf (but not a jilbab). The PDIP in Kudus in 2004 was 
recruiting kyais and santris, and its village branches were said to be frequently 
involved in running local mosques.5 In 2005 the PDIP-supported candidate 
for Bupati of Kediri (Ir. H. Sutrisno) and his PKB running mate distributed 
3 Sabili cyber-news edisi 20, 22 Apr. 2003. I cannot rule out the possibility that 
the editors of Sabili themselves thought www.whitehouse.org to be the official 
Whitehouse website. In 2005 Sabili reported that American soldiers had thrown the 
Qur’an down a toilet, referring to a report published in Newsweek, after the latter 
had already admitted that the original report was wrong; Sabili cyber-news yr. 12 
no. 23, 25 May 2005.
4 For example, TempoI, 25 Jan. 2003, 26 Jan. 2003; KmpsO, 7 Apr. 2003. Indonesian 
ideas on this issue were not so different from some Americans’ beliefs. A survey of 
32,800 adult Americans in 2008 revealed that 32 per cent of Republicans agreed 
that ‘George W. Bush was chosen by God to lead the United States in a global war 
on terrorism’ and another 21 per cent said they were not sure, which was interpreted 
as most often meaning ‘maybe’, while 46 per cent said no; 4 per cent of Democrats 
answered yes, 7 per cent said maybe, and 89 per cent said no; Gary C. Jacobson, ‘A 
tale of two wars: Public opinion on the U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan 
and Iraq’, Presidential Studies Quarterly vol. 40, no. 4 (Dec. 2010), p. 598.
5 Discussion with Noer Hartoyo (PDIP leader), Kudus, 28 March 2004. The leaders 
of the Islamist party PPP Himmatul Fu’ad, Masarah Bahtiyar and Noor Aziz 
commented that abangan no longer mattered in politics; discussions in Kudus, 28 
March 2004.
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prayer clothing to village women in the context of ‘Ritual Prayer Study and 
Guidance Activities’ (Kegiatan Bimbingan Belajar Salat) and distributed 
funds to mosque committees, village pengajian groups and suchlike, as well 
as to soccer clubs and other non-religious groups.6 PDIP announced in 
2006 that it was establishing an Islamic proselytisation branch, which was 
welcomed by MUI, Muhammadiyah and NU leaders.7 PDIP in Kediri held 
a Qur’an study session (pengajian akbar) for 800 party cadres in 2007 and 
said that it hoped to be able to change the image of PDIP as a party of the 
abangan.8 PDIP’s repositioning was of course a process, and the idea that 
it was really abangan-inclined remained in many minds. Nevertheless, it 
sought to be seen as ‘wise, religious and nationalist’ — as a PDIP candidate’s 
2009 banner in Yogyakarta claimed of himself. Such examples could be 
multiplied manyfold across PDIP, Golkar and other parties. The Islamist 
PPP (like other parties depicting themselves as Islamic in inspiration and 
aspirations) continued to present itself as religious, with banners saying, 
‘Bismillah — choose the ka‘ba’ (the party’s symbol on the ballot paper) — yet 
it consistently did poorly in elections.
There was no revival of aliran politics in the post-Soeharto period. It 
was routine for candidates for office from all political parties to pay court to 
kyais, to make gifts to their pesantrens and to seek opportunities to be seen 
— and if possible endorsed — by major Islamic leaders of all persuasions. 
When Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s new Democrat Party appeared in the 
2004 election campaign, some competitors sought to paint it as un-Islamic, 
but the party insisted that it was both ‘nationalist and religious’ (nasionalis 
dan agamais). In a social setting in which most Muslim Javanese and all 
political parties were more self-consciously religious, devout Muslims needed 
no longer to vote for parties that labeled themselves piously Islamic, with 
the consequence that such parties fared badly at the polls. That did not 
mean — as some political analysts have claimed — that the political system 
was now secular.9 Rather, it reflected the fact that politics — mirroring the 
society more generally — was more uniformly religious.
6 Email from Suhadi Cholil, 6 Aug. 2005.
7 TempoI, 15 Nov. 2006.
8 RK, 30 Apr. 2007.
9 Struggling with this problem, Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle classify 
Indonesia’s main parties as ‘secular’ (including Golkar, PDIP and Democrat), ‘Islamist’ 
(PKS and PPP) and ‘secular parties linked to … Islamic mass organizations’, NU 
and Muhammadiyah (PKB and PAN). They argue that there is a ‘trend to secularism’ 
and conclude that ‘secular political parties and secular politicians now dominate 
Indonesian politics’; see their article ‘Muslim Indonesia’s secular democracy’, Asian 
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Survey vol. 49, no. 4 ( July/Aug. 2009), pp. 575–90. Similar categories are used 
in Bernhard Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the emerging democracy 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). These are fine studies, but I 
remain unpersuaded that the analytical categories are helpful. For example, treating 
a party such as PKB, led by kyais of NU, as ‘secular’ seems to me highly problematic 
and the efforts of other parties (described above) to be seen as favourable to Islam 
seem to me something other than ‘secular’ politicking. In a ‘postscript’, Platzdasch 
observes (p. 333) that ‘while previously “secular” parties have become more pro-Islam 
in recent years, Islamist parties have further downgraded their Islamism’.
Illustration 18 PPP election rally, Kudus, March 2004; the youth’s headband reads, 
‘In the name of God (Bismillah), I and my family vote for PPP’.
A revealing survey of people who regarded themselves as being of the 
Traditionalist ‘NU family’ (warga NU) was conducted in the election year 
2009. They were asked whether their electoral choices were influenced by 
religion. Some 40 per cent said no, 24 per cent that they were influenced 
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to some degree, 12 per cent said they were influenced ‘enough’, 9 per cent 
responded that they were greatly influenced, and 9 per cent said not much.10 
Asked about their party preferences in the national legislative elections of 
that year, these ‘NU family’ members divided as in the following table with 
regard to the parties with the largest followings among them and the two 
parties particularly closely associated with NU leaders.








Thus, among a group who regarded themselves as NU and of whom 45 
per cent said that they were influenced, influenced enough, or very influenced 
by religion in their preferences,12 only 7 per cent preferred PPP, with its 
Islamist agenda. Still fewer preferred PKB, the party born from NU and 
led by Abdurrahman Wahid, and even less supported PKNU, another NU-
born party led by kyais in opposition to Abdurrahman. This does not, in my 
opinion, show that electoral politics was secularised, but rather that religious 
positioning and politicking was so ubiquitous that santris could comfortably 
choose from across the party spectrum. No party wished to seem unreligious. 
This also reflects both a generally individualistic voting pattern that is seen 
across Indonesia and the limited ability of supposedly ‘traditional’ leaders to 
influence how their followers vote — a matter to which we will return below 
when we consider the declining influence of Traditionalist kyais.
10 Figures are rounded to the nearest whole number; source as in the following note. 
The original terms used here were tidak, berpengaruh, cukup, sangat and kurang.
11 Figures rounded to the nearest whole number. The survey was conducted by the 
research arm of Kompas newspaper (Litbang Kompas) in February–March 2009 and 
reported in Kmps, 1 Apr. 2009. There were 3,000 respondents across 33 provinces.
12 Grouping together those who answered that Islam was berpengaruh (24%), cukup 
(12%) or sangat (9%) influential.
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The more religious style of Javanese life was visible also in the ongoing 
connections between governmental institutions and Islam. Such links had 
been promoted during the Soeharto era and continued in the post-Soeharto 
period. Religious education continued to be compulsory in state and private 
schools. A new law of 2003 required schools to recruit teachers of religion 
and to provide places of worship according to the students’ religious faiths. 
This was opposed particularly by non-Muslims as well as by former President 
Abdurrahman Wahid, who did so on the grounds that religion and the 
state should be separated, an idea with little traction in this Islamising 
environment. President Megawati signed the bill into law in July 2003.13
Government officials saw the promotion of Islamic piety as a proper 
task. This was notable in Kediri regency. We have referred above to the ‘Ritual 
Prayer Study and Guidance Activities’ in East Java promoted by Sutrisno. 
He set up local Ritual Prayer Study and Guidance Groups (Kelompok 
Bimbingan Belajar Sholat) while he was Bupati of Kediri regency (2000–10) 
to promote proper observation of Islamic prayer at grass-roots level. Many 
Illustration 19 PKNU election banner in Kediri, 2009, 
emphasising the support of senior NU kyais
13 JktP online, 20 March 2003, 17 July 2003.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t280   280 6/20/2012   1:21:36 PM
An Islamising Society 281
of these groups had become inactive by 2006, which was said to be because 
by then they had mastered the way to pray.14 In that year, at Sutrisno’s 
urging, the members of the Regional Executive Conference (Muspida) of 
Kediri — the senior level of administration — spent a month in optional 
nighttime prayer sessions from 0200 until the dawn prayer at the Kediri 
regency headquarters. Lesser officials and the surrounding populace were 
urged to join in.15 It was reported that these activities and a great growth in 
the number of mosques and prayer-halls had nearly eliminated more mystical 
forms of spirituality in the region.16
A link between police forces and Islamisation grew stronger in the 
wake of the JI bombing campaigns and other terrorist acts. Such a link, 
it was believed, would make it harder for extremists to paint the police 
as anti-Islamic, while promoting acceptable forms of the faith would 
create something of a barrier against extremist ideas. Moreover, the more 
that police personnel knew of Islam, the easier it would be for them to 
gather intelligence from and infiltrate extremist circles. The last point was 
emphasised by the head of the Surakarta police in 2005 when he declared 
that all his police personnel who were Muslim must learn how to recite 
the Qur’an. To that end, he arranged Qur’anic recitation instruction at 
Surakarta police headquarters each morning during Ramadan.17 In Surabaya, 
in 2009 the East Java police chief advised all Muslim female officers to 
dress in Islamic style (i.e., to wear the style of uniform incorporating the 
jilbab), told Christian women personnel to say a prayer on starting work, 
and every broadcast announcement was to begin with the Islamic greeting 
and invocation of blessing assalaamu’alaikum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuh. 
This constituted a previously unprecedented religionising of the East Java 
police.18 The Yogyakarta police chief organised an inter-religious meeting 
in 2008, where he emphasised that in Western nations religion might be 
a private matter (a common stereotype, of course), but that was not true 
in Indonesia. In Indonesia, he said, religious issues were shared issues. He 
ordered his personnel to meet with religious leaders at least twice a week.19 
The Yogyakarta police also arranged an all-day Qur’an study gathering 
14 MmK, 3 Dec. 2006.
15 MmK, 11 Aug. 2006.
16 Email from Suhadi Cholil.
17 JktP, 16 Oct. 2005.
18 Email from Masdar Hilmy, 23 March 2009.
19 KR, 16 Apr. 2008.
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for all police personnel, which was also attended by senior Yogyakarta 
administrators. All Muslim policemen and women were ordered to know 
and be inspired by the Qur’an in their work and life.20 The head of the police 
anti-terrorist unit Densus 88 could be found among the dignitaries giving 
religious lessons during Ramadan.21 Religious promotion was found in the 
military as well. During a ‘Mental Cultivation’ session for the Central Java 
Diponegoro Division of the army, soldiers were admonished to take the 
Prophet Muhammad as their model; soldiers needed ‘spiritual ablution’ in 
these difficult times, they were told.22
Even though the Indonesian constitution clearly reserves religious 
matters for national-level determination, devolved local governments some-
times introduced regional ordinances (peraturan daerah or perda) that looked 
like an attempt to introduce Islamic law (shari‘a) at their level, it having 
been an utter failure at national level. Returning to the point above about 
the ‘secular/nationalist’ vs ‘Islamic’ political party distinction being moot, 
it is worth noting en passant that, as Robin Bush has shown, many such 
regulations across the nation were approved by Bupatis from the supposedly 
secular or nationalist parties such as Golkar or PDIP.23 Only few such 
regulations were passed in Central and East Java or Yogyakarta. Most were 
in areas where the Darul Islam rebellion had been strong, which did not 
include the Javanese-speaking heartland. It is reasonable to guess that local 
politicians believed a wish for shari‘a to be so much a part of local identity 
in former Darul Islam regions that supporting it was a way to win votes. The 
wave of such local regulations peaked in 2003 and declined thereafter.24
In Javanese-speaking areas, governmental efforts to promote Islamisa-
tion exist, but they rarely take the form of local legislation. Moreover, where 
there are local ordinances, they are more likely to be of the nature of anti-
vice rules, which gain the support of many non-Muslims as well as Muslims. 
Practicing Christians, Buddhists and Hindus are just as likely as Muslims 
to support the suppression of drunkenness, gambling, prostitution and the 
like. As we know, however, in the Javanese context this also amounts to a 
campaign against the ma-lima — gambling, opium (or marijuana) smoking, 
20 KR, 15 Apr. 2008.
21 Bernas, 10 Oct. 2007.
22 KR, 12 June 2008.
23 Robin Bush, ‘Regional sharia regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or symptom?’ 
in Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds), Expressing Islam: Religious life and politics in 
Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), p. 188.
24 Ibid., pp. 179, 183.
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thievery, womanizing and drinking alcohol — the entertainments regarded 
as characteristic of the abangan. When Bantul regency (south of Yogyakarta) 
introduced anti-prostitution regulations in 2007 at the urging of ‘Bantul 
people who are religious’ (as the head of the Social Department put it), 
it undermined a thriving trade at south coast beach sites. Raids followed, 
flimsy local huts were broken up and women were arrested, not all of them 
prostitutes, it seems. Protests followed about the damage to local tourism, 
which in other circumstances governments are always anxious to support. 
Business fell off not only for the prostitutes but also for all the others, from 
pimps to food-stall traders, who depended on the local sex-tourist traffic. 
The Bantul government — which was dominated by PDIP and PAN — was 
accused of marginalising women, but it denied this and stood firm.25
University student politics — so crucial a matter in Indonesia — was 
to a large extent Islamic student politics after 1998. Some senior figures 
claimed that younger people had become less interested in religion. The 
preacher and lecturer at UIN Yogyakarta Abu Suhud, complained that in 
his pengajian sessions, most attendees were either older people or women for 
whom it was a social activity that took them out of the house.26 Nevertheless 
student politics in the university town of Yogyakarta (like elsewhere) was 
largely dominated by organisations defining themselves in terms of their 
Islamic identities, some of them linked to NU, some to Muhammadiyah, 
some to PKS, some with ideas like those of HTI, and so on. The GMNI 
(Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Student 
Movement) was the main exception to this pattern, with its commitment to 
Sukarnoist (vaguely leftist) ideology and links to PDIP.27 The chair of the 
GMNI presidium for Yogyakarta, however, commented on the priority that 
must nevertheless be given to religion, for ‘in Indonesia, religion cannot be 
relegated to second place’.28 A 2007 study of 100 campus mosque activists 
aged 18–23 in five universities in Yogyakarta suggested that their social and 
intellectual inspiration was largely from Revivalist, Islamist and Dakwahist 
sources. The Book of the Unity of God (Kitab al-Tawhid) by Wahhabism’s 
founder Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab and the thinking of the medieval 
25 KR, 6 Oct. 2007, 8 Oct. 2007, 9 Oct. 2007,1 Feb. 2008, 2 Feb. 2008; Bernas, 8 
Oct. 2007.
26 Arif Maftuhin interview of Abu Suhud, Yogyakarta, 29 March 2008.
27 This pattern was clear in interviews conducted by M. Irfan Zamzami with ten 
activists from student organisations at UIN Yogyakarta and Gadjah Mada University 
during August–September 2008.
28 M. Irfan Zamzami interview of Andi Rahmat, Yogyakarta, 1 Sept. 2008.
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scholar Ibn Taimiyya were the most prominent sources on theology used 
in these circles. Among admired figures few mentioned thinkers such as 
Abdurrahman Wahid or Nurcholish Madjid; far more popular were Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir, some of the prominent Muslim televangelists and, predictably, 
Habiburrahman El Shirazy (the author of the popular novel Ayat ayat cinta, 
discussed below).29
MUI and the state
The most notable semi-governmental institution supporting deeper Islamisa-
tion of the society is the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Islamic 
Scholars’ Council), which has appeared several times above. We noted that 
it was created in 1975 as part of the Soeharto government’s agenda to direct 
Islam, using religion as a form of social control. In the post-Soeharto period, 
it developed into a means for generally conservative — and sometimes quite 
radical Islamist and Dakwahist — views to influence the government. In the 
next chapter, we will see MUI playing a particularly active role in attempts 
to impose conformity on local Islam through its fatwas.
Before discussing MUI’s role, however, it would be wise to remind 
readers of the meaning of a fatwa, which can be misunderstood. It is some-
times thought to be a kind of binding edict, but it is nothing more than an 
opinion on a matter of Islamic law, given by a qualified legal interpreter (a 
mufti).30 Islam, like other religions — as Masdar Hilmy usefully reminds us 
— ‘is a wide and open text; its manifestations are as diverse as its adherents’ 
readings of the text’.31 Since there is a plurality of understandings of Islam, 
there is an equally wide range of interpreters, so that fatwas on the same 
point may dissent from one another. This gives rise to what has been called 
‘fatwa shopping’, as people seeking guidance turn from mufti to mufti in 
search of a congenial ruling.32 In Indonesia, it has become conventional for 
29 Hilman Latief, ‘Youth, mosques and Islamic activism: Islamic source books in 
university-based halaqah’, Kultur: The Indonesian Journal for Muslim Cultures vol. 5 
(2010), no. 1, pp. 63–88.
30 See E. Tyan and J.R. Walsh, ‘Fatwā’ in P. Bearman et al., Encyclopaedia of Islam 
(2nd ed.), vol. 2, p. 866.
31 Hilmy, Islamism and democracy, p. 30.
32 See Nadirsyah Hosen, ‘Online fatwa in Indonesia: From fatwa shopping to 
Googling a kiai’ in Fealy and White, Expressing Islam, pp. 159–73. Fatwa shopping 
is, of course, a practice as old as fatwas themselves, which arose very early in the 
history of Islam.
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fatwas from MUI and the large organisations Muhammadiyah and NU to 
be thought particularly authoritative, although many other organisations 
and individuals also dispense fatwas. An example of the degree of dissent 
that can exist between fatwas was the profound disagreement between 
Muhammadiyah — which issued a fatwa declaring smoking to be forbidden 
on the grounds that it was tantamount to suicide, which is forbidden in 
Islam — and NU, which rejected this interpretation, and whose kyais seem 
to be almost universally addicted to tobacco and frequently rely on financial 
support from tobacco companies (notably in tobacco towns like Kudus, 
Kediri and Mojosongo). NU pointed out that tobacco was unknown in 
the time of the Prophet so that there is nothing on the subject at all in the 
Qur’an and Hadith.33 
A fatwa can only have an element of compulsion if individuals, groups 
or organisations with compulsory capacity lend their powers of enforcement, 
and here we see a remarkable development in Indonesia. Particularly during 
the decade of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s presidency (2004–14), MUI 
— which nota bene has no constitutional standing — has been treated almost 
as if it were a legislative body. In opening MUI’s national congress in 2005, 
Yudhoyono made the following extraordinary statement:
We open our hearts and minds to receiving the thoughts, recommen-
dations and fatwas from the MUI and ulamas at any time, either directly 
to me or to the Minister of Religious Affairs or to other branches of 
government. We want to place MUI in a central role in matters regarding 
the Islamic faith, so that it becomes clear what the difference is between 
areas that are the preserve of the state and areas where the government 
or state should heed the fatwas from the MUI and ulamas.34 
In principle and in law, of course, there should be no ‘areas where the 
government or state should heed the fatwas from the MUI and ulama’, for 
33 There is much coverage of this in Indonesian newspapers of March 2010, e.g., 
Republika online, 15 March 2010; TempoI, 16 March 2010; KmpsO, 16 March 2010. 
The Minister for Religious Affairs also criticised Muhamadiyah for this fatwa; JktP 
online, 17 March 2010. Kediri and Kudus appear often in this book. On the mutually 
beneficial cooperation between kyais and a cigarette company that dominates the local 
economy in Mojosongo, see Suhadi, ‘Kiai pondok dan cukong rokok di Modjosongo: 
Dilema institusi agama dalam ruang capital’, Antropologi Indonesia no. 1 ( Jan.–Apr. 
2010), pp. 1–13.
34 http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2005/07/26/370.html, cited also 
in International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah decree (Asia 
briefing no. 78. Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 7 July 2008), p. 8.
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these have no legislative standing. The national head of the police was also 
at the MUI congress, as Yudhoyono added, 
I am happy that the head of police is with us. The task entrusted by 
the ulamas to the government that I lead is not just to wipe out evil, 
but to fight all forms of evil and immorality. God willing and with the 
blessing and support of the ulamas — the various forms of wickedness 
and immorality, whether it is narcotics, gambling, pornography or 
pornographic actions, and other things connected thereto, we’ll have to 
face up to firmly in order to save our future, to save our generation.35
As we will see further below, this approach means that MUI fatwas 
have been upheld as if they had the force of law, not because they do, but 
because governments at the national and indeed lower levels (where there are 
also MUI local branches) have decided to treat them so. We may speculate 
why this is so — whether it arises from political calculation (that is, as a 
means to winning support in an increasingly Islamised society) or from 
personal piety, but we can hardly doubt that its implications are significant.36 
For MUI fatwas came to be regarded by local authorities, police, and 
vigilantes as rulings requiring and legitimising their enforcement. Among 
the general populace there is a widespread but mistaken belief that MUI is 
legally an arm of government.37
MUI sought to encompass a broad range of Islamic opinions in its 
deliberations, with the result that it made itself open to influence not only 
by respected Traditionalist and Modernist muftis but also by figures locally 
dubbed ‘hard-liners’, in the terms used in this book meaning the more 
extreme versions of Revivalists, Dahwahists and Islamists. Some of these 
were MUI members and others attended its sessions and influenced its 
deliberations. A few members of MUI are regarded as supporters of HTI, 
with its agenda of seeking a global caliphate and the imposition of shari‘a 
35 http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2005/07/26/370.html. 
36 The general issue of the relationship between governmental and religious authority 
is explored further in M.C. Ricklefs, ‘Religious elites and the state in Indonesia and 
elsewhere: Why take-overs are so difficult and usually don’t work’, in Hui Yew-Foong 
(ed.), Encountering Islam: the politics of religious identities in Southeast Asia (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, forthcoming). We will return briefly to this 
issue in Chapter 14.
37 Arif Maftuhin noted this in a report covering Yogyakarta from January to March 
2009. I am confident that this misapprehension can be found virtually everywhere 
in Java at the level of the general populace.
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law. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s MMI was able to influence discussions, as also were 
DDII and its Saudi-sponsored ally the Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami (Muslim 
World League).38
A Constitutional Court decision of April 2010 confirmed the con-
stitutionality of the state’s integration with religiosity. Chapter 5 above 
referred to the Jakarta Charter, a form of words historically associated with 
the drafting of the 1945 Constitution that seemed (in the eyes of some) to 
oblige the state to impose Islamic law on all who professed to be Muslims. 
The 1945 Constitution continued in the post-Soeharto era in amended form, 
but Islamists failed in attempts to get the Jakarta Charter or something like 
it incorporated into the text of the Constitution itself. The Constitutional 
Court, while not asserting a state role in imposing shari‘a law, did in some 
respects go beyond even the Jakarta Charter in its decision. The Indonesian 
law against blasphemy was being used to criminalise divergent sects of Islam 
and to validate the actions of Islamic vigilante groups, as we will see below. 
Human rights and pro-pluralism groups petitioned the Constitutional Court 
in October 2009, arguing that this law was inconsistent with constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of religion. MUI argued before the court in favour 
of the existing law, which was also supported by groups such as HTI 
and, predictably volubly, by FPI members who attempted to shout down 
those whose testimony they disliked. The Constitutional Court upheld the 
blasphemy law in April 2010, with one dissenting opinion.39 Its reasoning 
included the following: 
The state — consistent with the mandate of the Constitution — also 
has a responsibility to upgrade piety and noble character. The religious 
domain is a consequence of the acceptance of Pancasila ideology. In the 
Pancasila state there may be no activities that cause estrangement from 
religious standards and religiosity. Thus the state may not provide an 
opportunity to disgrace another religion.40 
38 Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Reformasi, religious diversity and Islamic radicalism’, p. 44; 
discussion with Prof. Azyumardi Azra, Jakarta, 4 Feb. 2008; ditto with Ky. H. Imam 
Ghazali Said, pesantren An-Nur, Wonocolo, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.
39 By Prof. Maria Farida Indrati, the Court’s only female (and Christian) justice.
40 The Constitutional Court ruling is reported at http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.
go.id/index.php?page=website.BeritaInternalLengkap&id=3941. The original 
phrases translated above are, ‘Negara sesuai amanat konstitusi juga turut bertanggung 
jawab meningkatkan ketakwaan dan akhlaq mulia. Domain agama adalah konsekuensi 
penerimaan ideologi Pancasila. Dalam negara Pancasila tidak boleh diadakan kegiatan 
yang menjauhkan nilai religiusitas dan keagamaan. Jadi negara tidak memberikan peluang 
untuk menodai agama lain.’
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The Constitutional Court’s decision thus seems to have sealed the 
integration of the state — implicitly at all its levels and in all its agencies — 
with religion. Now government was said to bear a responsibility to ‘upgrade 
piety’ and to prevent activities ‘that cause estrangement from religious 
standards and religiosity’ in general, that is to say, among the adherents 
of all religions, whereas the Jakarta Charter referred only to Muslims. 
That responsibility was not restrained by principles of freedom of religion. 
Moreover, since in the case of Islam it is only religious authorities — above 
all those in MUI — who can tell the government what Islam is, the court’s 
decision seems to confirm that the state should act as the servant of religious 
authorities more than the other way around. At the time of this writing, 
the longer-term implications of this ruling are not yet clear. It need hardly 
be said that supporters of pluralism, freedom of religion and human rights 
more generally were dissatisfied with the ruling,41 but there is no appeal from 
decisions of the Constitutional Court. Nor, however, does the Court have its 
own powers of enforcement.
Women
As is true in most religious traditions when undergoing intensification, the 
position, rights, responsibilities and freedoms of women became a central 
issue.42 Javanese society was one of those where this was particularly acute, 
since Javanese women historically enjoyed greater freedom than in some 
other Islamic societies, inherited equally with males (contrary to Islamic 
inheritance law) and, if wearing traditional non-santri or indeed modern 
dress displayed more of their body (e.g., hair, neck, shoulders, arms, and their 
figure generally) than thought proper by many Dakwahists and Islamists. As 
we saw in the census data of 1930, polygamy (polygyny) had been historically 
at low levels among Javanese. As Islamisation progressed, these historical 
patterns became contested matters. The very idea of gender equality was 
unacceptable to many Dakwahists and Islamists. A speaker at a Ramadan 
meeting of HTI women in Yogyakarta denounced gender equality as a 
41 For example, see JktP online, 20 Apr. 2010.
42 Valuable essays on contemporary Islamic women’s issues may be found in Susan 
Blackburn, Bianca J. Smith and Siti Syamsiyatun (eds), Indonesian Islam in a new 
era: How women negotiate their Muslim identities (Clayton, Vic: Monash University 
Press, 2008).
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Western secularist plot to undermine Islam and to destroy Islamic families 
(including polygyny), indeed a part of so-called ‘Jewish protocols’.43 A 
Javanese restaurateur named Puspowardoyo was a prominent promoter of 
polygyny, with four wives himself (the maximum allowed by Islamic law). 
His restaurants, called ‘Wong Solo’ (Solonese, i.e., Surakarta, people), had 
dishes coyly named to promote the joys of polygamous marriage (e.g., juice 
poligami), served by jilbab-wearing waitresses.
Opponents to gender equality and supporters of polygyny did not, 
however, monopolise public discourse. In 1998 an MUI fatwa declared that 
a woman could not be elected president. NU had issued a fatwa the previous 
year saying that there was no barrier in Islamic law to a female president, and 
NU activists and leaders quickly denied the authority of the MUI ruling.44 
But NU (typically) was not of one mind on the question. Kyais addressed 
the issue again in 1999, were sharply split over the matter and ended up with 
a complicated decision on the qualities required by shari‘a for a president 
that simply avoided mentioning gender at all. Because all candidates for 
the presidency had shortcomings, they said, the candidate with the least of 
these should be picked and would then be regarded as a leader ‘in emergency 
circumstances with de facto authority’.45 
Prof. Siti Chamamah Suratno, the dynamic head of ‘Aisyiyah, the 
Muhammadiyah-affiliated women’s organisation, rejects polygyny and 
patriarchal interpretations of the Qur’an in general.46 Islamic law allows 
polygyny with up to four wives on certain conditions, including the fair 
treatment of them all. But ‘Aisyiyah generally opposes polygyny, relying 
on Qur’an 4:129: ‘You will never be able to treat your wives with equal 
fairness, however much you may desire to do so.’47 On the grounds of this 
and a previous verse in the same sura of the Qur’an (4:3) that says, ‘if you 
fear that you cannot be equitable [to your wives], then marry only one’,48 
the Indonesian Minister of Religious Affairs Maftuh Basyuni declared that 
43 Bernas, 10 Sept. 2009.
44 Bush, Nahdlatul Ulama and the struggle for power, p. 128.
45 Ali Maschan Moesa, Nasionalisme kyai: Konstruksi sosial berbasis agama (Yogyakarta: 
IAIN Sunan Ampel Pres and LKiS, 2007), pp. 154–7.
46 Discussion with Prof. Siti Chamamah Suratno, Yogyakarta, 21 March 2008. See 
also Feillard, ‘Indonesia’s emerging Muslim feminism’.
47 Qur’an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem, p. 63.
48 Ibid., p. 50.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t289   289 6/20/2012   1:21:37 PM
290 Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java
the government regarded Islam as essentially monogamous. It banned civil 
servants (in theory, at least) from practicing polygyny.49
On the Traditionalist side, the rights of women have been championed 
by the Cirebon-based organisation Rahima: Pusat Pendidikan dan Informasi 
Islam dan Hak-Hak Perempuan (Centre for Education and Information 
on Islam and Women’s Rights) led by Ky. H. Husein Muhammad. He is a 
Traditionalist kyai with command of the classical works of Islam, which he 
cites in support of women’s rights. With regard to the wearing of the jilbab, 
for instance, he points out that this was originally a means to distinguish free 
women from slaves. Since there are no longer any slaves, there is no longer 
an obligation upon free women to wear the jilbab, although it is of course 
permitted to do so. Rahima seeks to empower women, including their role 
in the public realm.50 Given that that is so, it is not surprising that Rahima 
has had to face hostility and even threats of violence from extremist quarters. 
Many other organisations are also active. Universitas Islam Indonesia in 
Yogyakarta, for example, held training sessions in 2008 for religious leaders 
(of all faiths) in order ‘to create agents of change … to ground (membumikan) 
values of gender justice within families’.51
Feminism has considerable support among Javanese women and 
seems to be particularly strong among younger and middle-aged women of 
Traditionalist background.52 Interviews of a few younger women in Kediri in 
2008 showed that most supported the idea of gender equality and opposed 
polygyny. Several said that they would seek divorce if their husband wished 
to take a second wife.53 In fact, divorce rates rose ten-fold across Indonesia 
from 1998 to 2009, which a senior Ministry of Religious Affairs official 
ascribed to women being more aware of their rights. Another factor, he 
49 JktP online, 28 June 2007. These statements were made in a hearing of the 
Constitutional Court. Muhamad Maftuh Basyuni was Minister 2004–9. He was 
born in Rembang in 1939 and is a graduate of Gontor and the Islamic University 
of Medina.
50 See the Rahima website at http://www.rahima.or.id.
51 KR, 18 Apr. 2008.
52 Smith-Hefner, ‘Javanese women and the veil’, p. 403, makes the same observation.
53 Interviews by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi with Ratna M. (single 21-year-old 
student president at STAIN Kediri), 15 June 2008; Wahyu Eka Nugraha (single 23-
year-old village teacher), 18 June 2008; Irma Lusiana Apriliani (single 21-year-old 
deputy head of NU students’ organisation), 30 June 2008; Insiyah (married 46-year-
old mother and deputy head of a village NU branch), 2 July 2008.
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said, was cross-religious marriages often ending in divorce. But the most 
frequently cited reason for divorce in Islamic religious courts was polygyny.54 
This may, of course, reflect a rise in polygyny and/or an increase in women’s 
rejections of it. The topic continues to be hotly debated.
Popular culture promoted Islamisation and, for those opposing poly-
gyny, a particular problem was caused by a runaway best-selling novel 
entitled Ayat ayat cinta (‘the love verses’) published in 2004. This is by 
Habiburrahman El Shirazy, who was born in Semarang in 1976 and who, 
to the best of my knowledge, has only one wife himself. He studied in a 
pesantren in Demak, a madrasah in Surakarta and then at Islamic institutions 
in Cairo.55 The novel charts the travails of a pious young Javanese, Fahry, who 
has been taught to be terrified of women. He goes to Cairo to study, where 
his great piety and other virtues make him attractive to several irresistible, 
emotional women. This is a sort of Mills-and-Boon style romantic novel, all 
weeping hero and swooning heroines, layered with saccharine piety. Fahry 
enters polygynous marriages with women who cannot resist him. Polygyny 
is justified on the grounds of the uncontrollable sexual appetites of men 
and the permissiveness of women, and is contrasted with the less acceptable 
practices of the West: 
In the West, the matter of polygamy in Islam is questioned. They regard 
polygamy as degrading women. They prefer their daughters to have 
extra-marital relations and cohabit outside marriage with hundreds [sic] 
of males — even those who are already married — instead of living 
within a family officially polygamous. According to them, a whore 
who freely satisfies biological lusts with anyone at all whom she likes 
54 JktP online, 2 March 2009. It may also be relevant that age at first marriage is 
rising for both men and women; Smith-Hefner, ‘Javanese women and the veil’, pp. 
411–2. Divorces constitute the main business before the Islamic religious courts in 
Indonesia. Their competence encompasses matters of family law and pious endow-
ments (wakaf). For further information on these courts, see R. Michael Feener and 
Mark E. Cammack (eds), Islamic law in contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and institutions 
(Cambridge, MA: Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 2007), esp. 
Mark E. Cammack, ‘The Indonesian Islamic judiciary’ on pp. 146–69; Tim Lindsey 
(ed.), Islamic law and society (2nd ed. Annandale, NSW: Federation Press [2008]), esp. 
section IV on ‘Islam and the law’; and M.B. Hooker, Indonesian syariah: Defining a 
national school of Islamic law (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 
esp. pp. 9–17.
55 Information taken from the online Tokoh Indonesia: http://www.tokohindonesia.
com/daftar-tokoh/article/157-daftar-tokoh/2463-habiburrahman-el-shirazy.
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is better and more respectable than a woman who lives properly in a 
polygamous way.56
Ayat ayat cinta was so popular that it beat out Harry Potter stories 
(pitched at a similar readership level) for citation as the most favorite novel 
in a Muslim women’s magazine.57 Habiburrahman was propelled to national 
fame and his book was made into a wildly popular film. He followed with 
further novels on similar themes uniting Islamic piety and love, which also 
proved to be material for television soap operas.
The Islamic literary world was not, however, without its challenges for 
those who supported polygyny, even from within Dakwahist circles. Ust. 
Cahyadi Takariawan is from Surakarta, a prolific writer and a member of 
the Advisory Council (Majelis Syuro) of the quasi-Islamist and Dakwahist 
party PKS, several of whose leaders are polygynists. Among Cahyadi’s books 
is Bahagiakan diri dengan satu istri (‘Make yourself happy with one wife’, 
2007), which promotes monogamy. This produced considerable controversy, 
particularly within PKS circles themselves both in Indonesia and among 
PKS’s overseas branches, which are strong among Indonesian students.58 
Novels by the prominent woman writer Abidah El Khalieqy (b. Jombang, 
1965, now based in Yogyakarta) promote anti-patriarchal views of women’s 
roles within an Islamic frame of reference, even depicting sexual relations 
candidly, including homosexuality, pre-marital sex and women’s pleasure in 
sex. One of her novels has been made into a controversial film, but her work 
cannot challenge the popularity of Ayat ayat cinta.59
There is an important point to be made about this debate concerning 
the rights of women, and particularly polygyny: it is an Islamic debate. The 
proponents of polygyny base their views on interpretations of Islam. The 
opponents to polygyny are Islamic women’s organisations and prominent 
Muslims who based their views on contending interpretations of Islam. There 
are no secularist voices in this debate — at least none of significance known 
to me. There is no audible voice saying that Islam is wrong, or irrelevant, or 
56 Habiburrahman El Shirazy, Ayat ayat cinta ( Jakarta: Penerbit Republika; Sema-
rang: Pesantren Basmala Indonesia, 2004), p. 151.
57 Majalah Muslimah Jan. 2006, according to the dust jacket of Ayat ayat cinta.
58 Arif Maftuhin interview with Ust. Cahyadi Takariawan, Yogyakarta, 15 Sept. 
2007. The PKS leaders Anis Matta, Tifatul Sembiring and Zulkieflimansyah are 
polygynists, but the practice is not widespread in PKS circles.
59 Tineke Hellwig, ‘Abidah El Khalieqy’s novels: Challenging patriarchal Islam’, BKI 
vol. 167 (2011), no. 1, pp. 16–30.
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should be ignored on issues of gender equality. The terms of the debate itself 
are thus consistent with the depiction in this book of Javanese society as one 
that is now suffused with Islamic discourse.
Women’s dress naturally becomes an issue in such a context. Those 
who demand that women wear the jilbab and other forms of Islamic dress 
based their views on the Qur’an, particularly 24:31 and 33:59. The former 
passage reads,
Tell believing women that they should lower their glances, guard their 
private parts, and not display their charms beyond what [it is acceptable] 
to reveal; they should let their headscarves fall to cover their necklines. 
… They should not stamp their feet so as to draw attention to any 
hidden charms.60
The second reads, ‘Prophet, tell your wives, your daughters, and women 
believers to make their outer garments hang low over them, so as to be 
recognised and not insulted.’61
Chapter 6 reported, based on Nancy Smith-Hefner’s work, that in the 
1990s the jilbab became a symbol both of Islamic identity and piety and of 
protest against Soeharto’s New Order. Whereas in the 1970s, less than 3 per 
cent of female students at Gadjah Mada University wore the jilbab, by the 
turn of the century over 60 per cent did so.62 Muhammadiyah universities, 
UINs and IAINs required female staff to wear the jilbab and urged students 
to do so.63
In the post-Soeharto age, however, in the midst of the general wave 
of Islamisation, the jilbab and other forms of ‘Islamic’ dress also became 
fashion items, particularly in the sophisticated environment of Jakarta and 
Yogyakarta, but not only there. Designers competed to bring out clothing 
that was Islamic yet still fashionable, trendy and alluring.64 Models, media 
stars and musicians adopted more ‘Islamic’ styles.65 There were ‘jilbab creation’ 
60 Qur’an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem, p. 222; see also Abdel Haleem’s notes on 
that page regarding the ambiguities in this passage and the Hadith traditions under-
stood to mean that a woman should show only her face and hands to strangers.
61 Ibid., p. 271.
62 Smith-Hefner, ‘Javanese women and the veil’, pp. 390, 397. This paper is the most 
authoritative study available of the jilbab issue.
63 For example, Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta; Solopos, 27 Aug. 2003.
64 For example, KR, 16 July 2007; Bernas, 29 July 2007, 7 Oct. 2007; Surya, 3 July 
2009; KR, 26 July 2009.
65 For example, the fashion models Okky Asoka (KR, 18 Sept. 2007) and Arzeti 
Bilbina (JktP online, 9 Aug. 2008).
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competitions during Ramadan.66 At Islamic fashion shows, attractive models 
demonstrated that one could wear Islamic styles including the jilbab yet 
remain beautiful in appearance. Different styles of wearing the jilbab were 
demonstrated and discussed, including something improbably called a ‘sexy’ 
jilbab (jilbab seksi).67 There was a ‘Miss Jilbab of East Java’ competition in 
2007 and in Yogyakarta a ‘Top Model Muslimah’ competition in 2007.68
All of this was, of course, rather contradictory to the purpose of 
dressing modestly, so that women did not ‘draw attention to any hidden 
charms’, as the Qur’an has it. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s MMI denounced these 
departures from Islamic modesty.69 Muhammadiyah University Yogyakarta 
took steps from 2006 to standardise female clothing, including jilbabs, worn 
on campus.70 But fashion can have a logic of its own. It became possible to 
see young jilbab-wearing women in tight T-shirts and jeans, even sometimes 
bare midriffs, and even at Islamic universities. A campus dakwah group in 
Yogyakarta went out one Ramadan to give out complimentary jilbabs so that 
women would have the right sort to wear, but evidently found that they had 
too few takers, so also passed them out to the male drivers of pedicabs and 
parking attendants (presumably to take home to their wives).71 Nevertheless, 
there can be no doubt that the jilbab was winning as a more Islamic form 
of female dress. The loose, diaphanous kerudung, which one might allow 
alluringly to fall from the hair and then replace with elegant aplomb, was 
now found rarely, and mostly among the older generation.72
We should note, however, that Java’s historical and spiritual traditions 
could still interfere with this particular aspect of Islamic formalism. An 
Islamic activist and founder of a pesantren in Yogyakarta, Ky. H. Zulfi 
Fuad Tamyis, joined a group pilgrimage (ziarah) to the grave of Java’s 
greatest king, the 17th-century Sultan Agung. They were escorted by one 
Ky. Amir, who claimed the ability to communicate with Agung’s spirit. 
Among the group was a woman wearing a jilbab, whom the spirit of Agung 
66 For example, KR, 6 July 2007, 5 Aug. 2007.
67 KR, 18 Sept. 2007, 9 Sept. 2008.
68 Jawa Pos, 21 Sept. 2007; KR, 3 Sept. 2007.
69 Smith-Hefner, ‘Javanese women and the veil’, p. 414.
70 Bernas, 23 Feb. 2008, 9 June 2008; KR, 24 June 2008.
71 Bernas, 5 Sept. 2008.
72 Prof. Siti Chamamah Suratno, head of ‘Aisyiyah, has even found herself criticised 
by younger women for still preferring a kerudung, which she wears closely under 
the chin but which does not qualify as a jilbab; discussion with her, Yogyakarta, 21 
March 2008.
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reprimanded for her attire. Angrily, Agung demanded, ‘Where did you 
become a Muslim? If the rule here is to wear the kemben, then you have to 
wear the kemben’ — referring to the breast-cloth historically worn by women 
in a Javanese court, which leaves the shoulders and arms bare and the hair 
exposed, contrary to Qur’anic requirements. Zulfi Fuad accepted this on the 
grounds that there are different levels or stations of spiritual advancement 
(what Sufism calls differential maqams). ‘So, according to me,’ he said, ‘for 
persons at the level of Sultan Agung, culture and tradition are just external 
appearances and what is more important to measure Islamness is what is 
inside the heart.’73 
A more widespread clash between older Javanese traditions and 
Islamisation arose over proposals for a new law to ban pornography and 
‘porno-actions’, the latter including improper public exposure of the body 
and such activities as kissing in public. A clash with Javanese traditions was 
inevitable, for older forms of women’s attire often left neck, arms, shoulders, 
and hair exposed, and the Javanese kain and kebaya could be very revealing 
of the female body form. This was particularly an issue with regard to dress 
worn in older forms of dance and drama in Java (as in Bali), including the 
most sacred sorts, such as the bedhaya, as well as less elevated art forms 
such as tayuban and the burlesque kethoprak. When this national law was 
first proposed in 2006, many performers of Javanese arts and those involved 
in modern theatre protested mightily. So also did various activist NGOs 
and those of generally liberal persuasions.74 The bill was equally volubly 
supported by demonstrators — many of them women — from Islamist and 
Dakwahist organisations. MUI and other Islamic organisations supported 
it. Prof. Chamamah Suratno of Muhammadiyah’s ‘Aisyiyah was among the 
prominent persons endorsing the bill.75
The anti-pornography bill thus became a cause célèbre and was stuck 
for some time in a parliamentary committee while opponents tried to kill 
it. Eventually it emerged in much reduced form and became law in 2008. 
It was still widely seen as a legislative assault on artistic freedom, women’s 
rights and traditional arts. The law defines pornography sweepingly as 
73 Arif Maftuhin interview of Ky. H. Zulfi Fuad Tamyis, Yogyakarta, 12 Jan. 2008.
74 MmK, 6 March 2006, 26 March 2006; JktP online, 16 March 2006, 17 March 
2006; Hatley, Javanese performances, p. 281.
75 Suara Muhammadiyah online, 17 May 2006. Opponents of the bill, she said, were 
acting on behalf of the ‘capitalist interests that dominate the entertainment industry 
in Indonesia’.
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‘pictures, sketches, illustrations, photos, speech, sounds, moving images, 
animations, cartoons, talk, bodily movements or other messages … which 
contain obscenity or sexual exploitation which offend the moral norms of 
the society’. Among the law’s declared purposes is to ‘respect, protect and 
conserve artistic and cultural standards, customs and traditions, and religious 
rituals of Indonesian society which is pluralistic’, which has been understood 
as an exemption for indigenous cultural traditions such as those of Java. But 
its paragraph 20 declares that ‘The society may play a part in preventing 
the creation, spreading or use of pornography’ and this seems to constitute 
a license for vigilantism by religious zealots, the sorts of people whom we 
will consider in Chapter 12.76 In 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected 
appeals against the constitutionality of the law, but upheld the exemption for 
indigenous cultural traditions, literature, sports or scientific knowledge.77
Popular culture
Islamisation activists have achieved considerable success in making religiosity 
trendy among the young. We noted above how, in the Soeharto period, 
Islamisation had become associated with progress and modernity; in the 
post-Soeharto period it was sometimes associated also with trendy fashion 
and youth culture. The fashionable jilbabs discussed above were symptoms of 
this. In a discussion about politics at the Jogokariyan mosque in Yogyakarta 
in 2009, a young man’s T-shirt had the Javanese slogan, ‘Want to be more 
trendy? — hey, get with ngaji!’ (referring to Qur’an studies).
A good deal of this trendy Islam is associated with Sufism, which is 
experiencing a significant revival in Java and the rest of Indonesia, including 
in urban areas.78 In 2008, ‘Mahajava Production’ put on a monthly ‘Ashabul 
Cafe’79 in Yogyakarta, which would provide a ‘Momentum Romantic 
Spiritual Talktainment’ (sic in English) with 72-year-old Prof. Amin Azis, 
76 The text of the law is available at http://www.bpkp.go.id/unit/hukum/uu/2008/44-
08.
77 detikNews online, 25 March 2010.
78 See Julia Day Howell, ‘Modernity and Islamic spirituality in Indonesia’s new 
Sufi networks’, in Martin van Bruinessen and Julia Day Howell (eds), Sufism and 
the ‘modern’ in Islam (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 232–40; idem, 
‘Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic revival’.
79 The name comes from the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus, the Men of the Cave (ashab 
al-kahf) found in Qur’an 18:9–25.
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the author of a book entitled The power of Al Fatihah.80 Others would join 
him in a discussion of Sufism, accompanied by love poetry and songs.81 Sufi 
pop music was also a speciality of the Surabaya group Dewa which claimed 
inspiration from the medieval Sufi masters Al-Hallaj (d. 922) and Jalal 
al-Din Rumi (d. 1273).82 The band Ungu was another promoting piously 
Islamic music, its new album for Ramadan 2008 entitled I and my God (Aku 
dan Tuhanku) being more influenced, so said the bass player, by the style of 
the British rock band Black Sabbath (one cannot avoid a certain sense of 
irony here).83 Emha Ainun Najib, whose theatrical and musical creations 
of Islamic inspiration were discussed in the Chapter 6, developed a Sufi-
Illustration 20 Qur’an study as trendy: T-shirt in Yogyakarta, 2009
80 Published by Pinbuk Press, Jakarta, 2008. The Fatihah is the first brief verse of 
the Qur’an and part of the obligatory daily prayers, praising God and asking for his 
blessing and guidance.
81 KR, 26 Apr. 2008. Amin Azis was born in Aceh and gained a PhD in agricultural 
economics from Iowa State University; KR, 4 May 2008.
82 Suara Muhammadiyah online, 28 Apr. 2005.
83 TempoI, 23 Aug. 2008.
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style movement called Maiyah. This runs popular religious study sessions 
across Java and elsewhere in Indonesia, accompanied by Emha’s musical 
group Kiai Kanjeng, with its combination of Javanese gamelan, other folk 
instruments and modern instruments. Timothy Daniels describes Emha 
opening Maiyah events ‘with prayer, Qur’anic recitation, and short talks on 
a variety of religious topics, delivered with a great amount of wit and humor 
which often has those present bursting into laughter’. He leads the audience 
in slawatan and dhikr.84
The popular music world of dangdut split in the post-Soeharto era on 
lines of piety vs impiety. We noted in Chapter 6 how Rhoma Irama led the 
development of Islamised dangdut. In 2003 there burst onto the scene a lady 
from Pasuruan called Inul Daratista, whose raunchy dancing, prominently 
featuring ‘drilling’ movements of her hips that seemed anatomically im-
probable, was very far from Islamic modesty. Emha defended her with the 
memorable comment that ‘Inul’s bottom is the face of all of us’. Rhoma 
Irama, however, was scandalised and the East Java MUI declared her 
performance to be pornographic. This episode was among those that inspired 
Islamising activists to press for the anti-pornography law described above.85 
Another young dangdut singer and actor, Dewi Persik — also from East Java, 
in this case Jember — was accused of being pornography in the flesh. It was 
reported that two mayors of West Java cities and the regency of Probolinggo 
banned her from performing — a suppression of artistic freedom that led to 
a critical editorial in the Jakarta Post. In 2008 she gave in, apologised to the 
whole country, and promised to mend her ways.86
The drive for deeper Islamisation was targeted not only at those young 
people who might be too enticed by modern styles — particularly among 
city dwellers –— but of course also at the rural villagers still committed to 
abangan ways. In Gunung Kidul, Ann Dunham studied the village of Kajar 
84 Timothy Daniels, Islamic spectrum in Java (Farnham, Surrey, and Burlington VT: 
Ashgate, 2009), p. 138. Daniels’s extensive account of Maiyah is on pp. 134–55. On 
p. 147, Daniels — who writes very sympathetically of this movement — compares it 
to ‘liberation theology’ movements in Latin America and the Philippines.
85 Jennifer Lindsay, ‘Pomp, piety and performance: Pilkada in Yogyakarta 2005’ in 
Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (eds), Deepening democracy in Indonesia? 
Direct elections for local leaders (Pilkada) (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2009), pp. 219–20; Daniels, Islamic spectrum, pp. 88–92; Hatley, Javanese 
performances, p. 250.
86 JktP, 16 Apr. 2008.
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over 1977–91, which she found to be ‘a strongly abangan cultural area’ and 
where there was ‘no village mosque’.87 When Robert Hefner went to a nearby 
village in Gunung Kidul in 2003, however, he saw ‘a full-blown Islamic re-
surgence’ which was the fruit partly of government activities, especially the 
provision of religious education in schools, but above all the consequence 
of Islamisation efforts led by NU and Muhammadiyah.88 Newspapers from 
Java are full of reports of religious activities at local level, particularly dur-
ing Ramadan — pengajian, mujahadah, dhikr, observations at sacred graves, 
Qur’an-reading competitions, breaking of the fast together, and much more, 
led by kyais or other religiously educated persons. In rural villages, these are 
overwhelmingly of the Traditionalist style and often Sufi in style and content. 
The engagement of the local community makes these activities markers and 
welders of village harmony and thus powerful agents supporting conformity 
of belief and practice. As we will see when considering remaining abangan-
style and kebatinan activities in Chapter 11, such Islamic activities do not 
have a monopoly at village level, but they are powerful, ubiquitous and (in 
my view) constantly winning ground.
Business
Banking and other forms of commerce also grew more obviously Islamic 
in style. We have already discussed the fashion industry above. Banking 
according to Islamic rules — which means essentially the banning of interest 
— began to grow in the early years of the 21st century.89 Bank Muamalat 
Indonesia (Indonesian Commercial Transactions Bank) was the pioneer, 
having been established in 1991. It was followed in the new century by 
shari‘a-compliant branches of established conventional banks. The collection 
of zakat also increased, with several governmental and private organisations 
being active in receiving the donations, among them the PKS-linked PKPU 
(Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat, Post of Justice and Care for the ummah). In 
2001 the government made zakat contributions tax-deductible (in a country 
87 Dunham, Surviving against the odds, pp. 116–7.
88 Robert Hefner, ‘Afterword: Ann Dunham, Indonesia and anthropology — a 
generation on’ in ibid., pp. 340–1.
89 For example, KR, 2 Aug. 2008, reported that shari‘a-compliant banking in 
Yogyakarta had grown over 40 per cent over 2001–7, and as a consequence such bank 
branches were facing staff shortages.
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where, however, collection of personal taxes is notoriously lax, inefficient 
and corrupt).90
Businesses sought to use Islam as a promotional tool. A few examples 
will suffice here.91 During its nation-wide Ramadan ‘roadshow’ in 2007, 
Astra Motors came to Semarang and Yogyakarta and offered a new Honda 
car model at a special price. The ‘roadshow’ also encompassed religious 
advice from the popular young ustadz H. Jefri Al Bukhori (b. 1973), also 
known as UJE, as well as presenting television soap-opera stars, the singing 
of devotional songs (nasyid) and local bands.92 In a similar vein, the mobile 
phone company Telkomsel promoted its phone-cards during the 2007–8 
hajj season. Anyone who used these cards while on the pilgrimage in Saudi 
Arabia entered a draw to cover their hajj costs. Twelve winners received 
USD5,000 each.93 Companies themselves frequently honoured Islamic 
obligations. Kediri’s giant tobacco company Gudang Garam — the financial 
pillar of local kyais — organises pengajian during Ramadan for its employees 
who, however, have to keep working while the lessons are delivered. The 
company also distributes symbolic zakat alms at the end of Ramadan to 
several thousand poor locals, each of whom gets IDR10,000 (about USD1, 
hardly enough to transform their circumstances significantly).94
Publishing blossomed in the new atmosphere of freedom, and religious 
publications — of all world faiths as well as ‘new age’ spirituality and multiple 
‘secret-to-success’ manuals — occupied prominent sections in book stores, 
but publishers and booksellers also found themselves the target of Islamically 
inspired vigilantism. The police were only rarely prepared to confront such 
actions. One example of such vigilantism was a campaign by organisations 
such as MMI against the new Indonesian version of Playboy magazine carried 
out by ‘sweeping’, i.e., invading bookshops to remove and destroy copies, but 
often finding that no bookshop dared to stock it.95 In 2008 was published 
90 On zakat, see especially Amelia Fauzia, ‘Faith and the state: A history of Islamic 
philanthropy in Indonesia’ (PhD thesis, University of Melbourne, 2008), which will 
appear as a book in the near future.
91 Several papers in Fealy and White, Expressing Islam, analyse the post-Soeharto 
commercialisation of Islam.
92 KR, 7 Oct. 2007.
93 KR, ‘Semarang Plus’ section, 22 March 2008.
94 RK, 13 Nov. 2003, 23 Nov. 2003.
95 Photos in the Indonesian version of Playboy were more modest than in the Ameri-
can edition, but that did not inhibit vigilantes. The editor was eventually arrested 
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Soemarsono’s book Revolusi Agustus about the 1948 Madiun uprising, written 
with the aim of defending the PKI’s interpretation of that critical episode, 
as noted in Chapter 3 above. Soemarsono’s account was serialised in August 
2009 in the newspaper Jawa Pos, whose Surabaya headquarters then became 
the target of a demonstration of 200 people calling themselves the Anti-
Communist Front. This Front consisted of the East Java FPI, East Java MUI 
and other Islamic activist groups, a veterans’ group and others. Soemarsono’s 
book was burned — and quickly thereafter became difficult to find in 
bookshops. The chief editor of Jawa Pos thanked the demonstrators for their 
visit and for their ‘correction’.96 Many devout Muslims indeed continue to 
regard Communism as an ever-present threat to Indonesia and to Islam, and 
can be mobilised by anti-Communist appeals.
This atmosphere promoted self-censorship by publishers and distrib-
utors regarding publications that were regarded either as leftist or anti-
Islamic. In 2001, the leading publisher and bookseller Gramedia, with a large 
chain of bookshops across the country, removed books by Pramoedya Ananta 
Toer in the face of threats from the Gerakan Pemuda Islam (Islamic Youth 
Movement).97 Yogyakarta police conducted a pre-emptive confiscation of 
leftist books — all of them perfectly legal publications — from shops and 
street-stalls around the same time so that anti-Communist groups couldn’t 
destroy them in ‘sweeping’ raids. The police even suggested that private 
citizens who owned such books should hand them to the police for safe-
keeping. They did not, however, explain why they were not protecting the 
book sellers instead.98
While English-language versions of some of the major atheist 
books of the age could be found in a few outlets in Indonesia — those 
by Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens and others — big publishers 
were not prepared to publish Indonesian-language translations. Quite apart 
from the risk of attacks by vigilantes, this must have been at least partly a 
commercial judgment, for anti-religious books are unlikely to sell well in 
in 2010 and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for publishing pornography. He 
was acquitted of all charges by the Supreme Court and released in 2011. For some 
examples of coverage, see RK, 31 Jan. 2006; TempoI, 8 Apr. 2006; KmpsO, 9 Oct. 
2010; JktP online, 24 June 2011.
96 JP, 3 Sept. 2009.
97 JP online, 3 May 2001. Gerakan Pemuda Islam had its origins as an affiliate of 
Masyumi in the 1950s, but has carried on without specific party affiliation since.
98 JP online, 11 May 2001.
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such a thoroughly religionised society,99 where even the Constitution declares 
that the first foundation of the state is Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (‘belief 
in the one God’, the first principle of the Pancasila). Gramedia thought 
about translating Dawkins’ The God Delusion but decided that it would be 
too provocative. The smaller publisher Serambi, which has rather specialised 
in religious books, also decided that Indonesia was not yet ready for The 
God Delusion. The small Yogyakarta press Pustaka Pelajar took the risk of 
publishing an Indonesian-language version of Sam Harris’s The end of faith 
but it attracted little attention. Certainly this and the few such works from 
other small publishers could not compare commercially with Ayat ayat cinta 
or, as the Jakarta Post pointed out, with Laksmi Pamuntjak’s Jakarta Good 
Food Guide.100 It was probably possible for a very few atheistic, anti-religious 
or specifically anti-Islamic works to be published by small presses in small 
print runs only because most religious zealots who would like to burn such 
books did not know of them, for they read nothing much other than Islamic 
devotional literature and magazines like Sabili.
Lack of interest on the part of many Islamic activists for older Javanese 
culture — and probably their weak command of the Javanese language 
— surely explains their failure to erupt furiously at the republication of 
three anti-Islamic Javanese books originally written in the 19th century.101 
The original versions of these works seem all to have been composed in the 
Kediri area, and depict the Islamisation of the Javanese as a catastrophic 
civilisational mistake. Babad Kedhiri, written in 1873, presented a supposedly 
secret history of the triumph of Islam in Java, which is said to have relied on 
the grossly anti-filial treachery of the first Sultan of Demak and the walis 
who surrounded him. Here appears one Sabda Palon, the advisor of the 
king of Majapahit, who urges him to persevere in his Buda faith, and who 
is revealed to be in fact the god-clown Semar, the supernatural protector 
of all Javanese. Suluk Gatholoco — frankly rude, obscene and hilarious 
— was written by 1872 at the latest. It mocks Islam in many ways, even 
99 There are a few, very low-profile, atheists in Indonesia, keeping in touch with each 
other mainly via the Internet and avoiding attention as much as possible. See JktG 
online, 24 Sept. 2010.
100 JP, 29 May 2008.
101 The original books are described in Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese society, pp. 
181–211. Their republication is also discussed in idem, ‘Religion, politics and 
social dynamics in Java: Historical and contemporary rhymes’ in Fealy and White, 
Expressing Islam, pp. 132–3.
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reinterpreting the Confession of Faith as a metaphor for sexual intercourse. 
The third book, Serat Dermagandhul, combined Babad Kedhiri’s revisionism 
and Gatholoco’s obscene hilarity. It prophesied that after 400 years (i.e., in the 
1870s) Javanese would devote themselves to modern learning and become 
truly Javanese again, and would convert to Christianity.
These extraordinary books could still be found during the Sukarno 
era,102 but were banned during the New Order. In 2005 and 2006, however, 
Dermagandhul was republished in Surakarta and Yogyakarta by ostensibly 
different authors,103 in both cases noms de plume of a single writer who 
prefers anonymity, fearing that the legal ban on publication might still be in 
place. The book’s original prophecy that after 400 years Islam would cease to 
Illustration 21 Reprinted versions of Suluk Gatholoco, 2005–7
102 I do not know the full publication history of these books, but do have copies of 
Taṇḍanagara, Darmaganḍul: Tjaritané adege negara Islam ing Demak beḍahé negara 
Madjapahit kang salaguné wiwité wong Djawa ninggal agama Buddha bandjur salin 
agama Islam: gantjaran basa Djawa ngoko (7th printing; Solo: Penerbit “Sadu-Budi”, 
1961); and Prawirataruna, Balsafah Gaṭolotjo: Ngemot balsafah kawruh kawaskiṭan 
(Solo: Penerbit S. Mulija [1958]).
103 Nurul Huda, Tokoh antagonis Darmo Gandhul: Tragedi sosial historis dan keagamaan 
di penghujung kekuasaan Majapahi (Yogyakarta: Pura Pustaka, 2005); Sigit Hardi-
yanto, Ramalan ghaib Sabdo Palon Noyo Genggong (Solo: Kuntul Press, 2006).
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claim the loyalty of Javanese was changed by the publisher to 500 years104 
(which means c. 1978, thus leaving the predicted conversion away from 
Islam still behind schedule as well as utterly nonsensical). Suluk Gatholoco 
was republished at least three times in 2005 and 2007.105 The Siti Maziyah 
version in Indonesian omits the most offensive passages. The Joko Su’ud 
Sukahar version offers a summary in Indonesian, including the offensive 
passages. It also has a series of comments by various luminaries who generally 
say that this is a book best reserved for reading by scholars and the culturally 
sophisticated. The Wawan Susetya version is a light-weight, historically 
confused Indonesian-language account, with the really offensive sections 
explained — utterly bizarrely — as a form of dakwah; this silliness leads to 
the most objectionable parts of Gatholoco, such as the sexual interpretation 
of the Confession of Faith, being published. In 2006, Babad Kedhiri was 
also reprinted in Kediri by collaboration between the original publisher’s 
descendants and the local government, the Javanese text being accompanied 
by a high-quality Indonesian translation.106 We may be confident that no 
one in the government had read this account of the walis’ perfidious conduct 
in Islamising Java. The most important thing to note about the republication 
of these anti-Islamic books is that no one from the more zealous end of 
Islamic activists took any notice at all. There was simply no reaction. The 
first printing of Babad Kediri of 2,000 copies is said to have sold out107 
— probably collected by good citizens of Kediri who put it on their shelves 
without reading much of it. I do not know about the commercial fate of the 
others, which were undoubtedly brought out in small print runs.
Superstitions and ‘science’
Javanese culture has long been rich in superstitions, and even these seem to 
have become more Islamised. Islam, like other faiths, does not doubt that 
there are miracles that reveal God’s powers in the world. As with any other 
104 Discussion with the writer, who requested anonymity, Yogyakarta, 12 June 2007.
105 Siti Maziyah, Kontroversi Serat Gatholoco: Perdebatan teologis penganut kejawen 
dengan paham puritan (Yogyakarta: Warta Pustaka, 2005); Joko Su’ud Sukahar, Tafsir 
Gatolotjo (Yogyakarta: Narasi, 2007); Wawan Susetya, Kontroversi ajaran kebatinan 
(Yogyakarta: Narasi, 2007).
106 Purbawidjaja and Mangunwidjaja, Serat Babad Kadhiri: Kisah berdirinya sebuah 
kejayaan ([transl. Siti Halimah Soeparno]; pengantar Edi Sedyawati; Kediri: 
Boekhandel Tan Khoen Swie, 2006).
107 Discussion with Pak Kusharsono, Kediri, 28 Nov. 2007.
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religion, however, the authenticity or orthodoxy of a particular phenomenon 
may be debated. We will see below that many of the historically important 
art forms of Java that were thought to have spiritual powers are losing 
those spiritual meanings in the modern world and being degraded to mere 
entertainment, where they face tough competition from more modern 
diversions. So it is possible that for many Javanese something of a spiritual 
or superstitious vacuum opens up in these circumstances, which Islam 
offers to fill. This is not a case of superstitions disappearing, but rather of 
them becoming more Islamised. This is particularly true of Muslims of 
Traditionalist background.
In Yogyakarta, abstract paintings by Ky. H. Muhammad Fuad Riyadi 
were displayed one Ramadan. He explained that he painted when, having 
done dhikr, he achieved a spiritual state in which he wished to spread love 
to all of God’s creatures. His paintings consequently bore spiritual energies 
that inhered in them and which could spread blessings to others. Indeed 
the owner of one of his paintings might be ‘protected from black magic’ 
by this power. It was difficult for people to perceive this power, he said, but 
— reflecting some of the ecumenical style of much Javanese thought — if 
the Dalai Lama were to see one of his paintings he would ‘surely feel the 
aura’. If his paintings were transported from one place to another, they had to 
be tightly wrapped and prayed over so as not to be struck by ‘evil frequencies’ 
en route.108 Natural calamities — of which Java, like the rest of Indonesia, 
has a surfeit — and illness were readily interpreted as God’s judgment on 
humankind, requiring moral improvement and mass pengajian.109 In Cirebon, 
locals spotted what they thought to be a meteorite hitting the ground. 
Remarkably, when this object landed, smelling of sulphur, it melted in the 
shape of the word ‘Allah’ in Arabic script. The object turned out, however, to 
be not a meteorite but probably waste from a nearby sulphur factory.110
More remarkable than the persistence of Islamised superstitions is the 
spread of Islamised versions of science. We noted in discussing the 1970s 
how Modernists such as Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Osman Raliby 
depicted Islam as fundamentally rational and expressed the view that it 
108 KR, 14 Sept. 2009. Fuad Riyadi was the 38-year-old head of a pesantren in Pleret, 
Bantul.
109 For example, KR, 13 Feb. 2008.
110 TempoI, 19 Aug. 2010; JktP online, 23 Aug. 2010. Other reports from around 
the Islamic world of such supposed signatures of God (lafaz Allah) are found on the 
Internet. Miracles from all faiths may be found there, of course.
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should be understood in ways consistent with science. Osman and Sjafruddin 
accepted that scientific knowledge could elucidate the eternal truths of the 
Qur’an,111 but by the late 20th and early 21st centuries it was becoming 
more common to think the other way around, to understand science in ways 
consistent with Islam.
A prominent proponent of Islamised science (or perhaps ‘sciencised’ 
Islam) is Agus Mustofa. He was born in 1963 in Malang, where his father 
was a Sufi teacher of the Naqshabandiyya-Khalidiyya, and did a degree 
in nuclear physics at Gadjah Mada University. Thereafter he worked as a 
journalist with Jawa Pos for 14 years. Because of his journalistic networks, 
he probably gets more press attention than would otherwise be the case. He 
left his newspaper job and became a writer on Islamic subjects, hoping to 
meld mysticism and modern scientific ideas. He employs ideas from physics, 
astronomy, medicine or any other discipline to approach the Qur’an, which 
is, he believes, the source of all knowledge. He churns out an endless stream 
of books, which he publishes himself. He also conducts individual therapy 
sessions at his (rather grand) house.
His ideas are controversial and attract opposition from other Muslims. 
‘Hard liners’, he said, sometimes demand that his books be withdrawn or 
object to his titles. One of his books is entitled Bersatu dengan Tuhan (To 
become one with God), which raises questions of orthodoxy, for union with 
a transcendent God who does not enter into his creation is not an acceptable 
idea to most orthodox thinkers. For Agus Mustofa, this can be explained and 
proved by mathematics. All of being is one and that is God, he says. ‘We 
are a part of Allah … Everything exists within God.’ We are the number 
1, or 1,000, or any other number, but God is infinity. Any number divided 
by infinity results in zero, which shows that without God we are nothing, 
111 Similar views were set out in Suryadi W.S. ‘Prestasi kaum Muslimin dalam 
sejarah perkembangan wayang’, in Jabrohim and Saudi Berlian (eds), Islam dan 
kesenian ([Yogyakarta:] Majelis Kebudayaan Muhammadiyah, Universitas Ahmad 
Dahlan, Lembaga Litbang PP Muhammadiyah, 1995), pp. 148–9, where he says that 
Qur’an 52 on there being fire below the earth (in fact a description of the fires of 
Hell) could now be understood as describing oil and natural gas, and 57:25 on ‘iron 
with its mighty strength’ was an account of magnetism, which produced electricity. 
Suryadi says that it is ironic that natural gas and electricity were discovered by 
non-Muslims even though Muslims were told of them in the Qur’an 1,400 years 
ago. Olivier Roy, The failure of political Islam (transl. Carol Volk; Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1994), pp. 102–3, notes comparable views more widely 
in the Islamic world.
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he says. As proof of anything this is nonsense. He uses a Kirlian camera112 
to photograph people’s auras. Only Muslims can achieve a white aura, he 
believes, because only they believe in the absolute oneness of God. All of this, 
he claims, is empirical and rational — although less gullible observers might 
speculate about the balance among science, piety and salesmanship. When 
pressed by my colleague Masdar Hilmy, Agus Mustofa agreed that in order 
to be persuaded by this kind of thinking one must already believe in it.113 
It is not difficult to find others who claim that the source of all 
knowledge and all technology is the Qur’an, even that it offers scientifically 
demonstrable medical benefits. Dr Muhammad Usman, a Surabaya HTI 
leader from the Pharmacy Department of Airlangga University’s medical 
school and former head of the Surabaya Muhammadiyah Hospital, and Joko 
Sarsetyoto who teaches at the Surabaya Institute of Technology and the Navy 
Technology College, and no doubt many another scientist, medical expert 
and technologist, shared the view that all knowledge is found in the Qur’an 
and that all the technology and scientific knowledge in the world comes 
from just one source, the ways of God (sunna Allah).114 
Prof. H. Muhammad Fanani of the Medical Faculty of Sebelas Maret 
University in Surakarta reported computerised (and thus authoritative, 
it is implied) evidence that listening to recitations of the Qur’an reduced 
muscle tension in patients more effectively than hearing non-Qur’anic 
materials, even if the patient did not understand the Arabic. Hence, Islamic 
psychiatry should be developed.115 There were indeed efforts under way in 
Indonesia to define an Islamic school of psychology, building upon passages 
in the Qur’an and Hadith, and distinguished from Western psychological 
paradigms that were seen as implicitly atheistic.116 A medical colleague of 
Fanani’s (a graduate of the medical school at Airlangga) said in his inaugural 
address as Professor that his research confirmed that carrying out religious 
112 A device that is claimed to photograph auras, invented by the Russian Semyon 
Davidovich Kirlian in the 1930s.
113 Discussion with Agus Mustofa, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008. See also the interview 
with him published in JktP, 16 Sept. 2007.
114 Discussion with Ky. H. Dr Muhammad Usman, Surabaya, 24 Nov. 2007; Suhadi 
and Imam Subawi interview with Joko Sarsetyoto, Kediri, 17 July 2007.
115 KR, 4 Jan. 2009.
116 See Nur Hamim, ‘Religious anthropocentrism: The discourse of Islamic 
psychology among Indonesian Muslim intellectuals’, Journal of Indonesian Islam vol. 
4, no. 2 (Dec. 2010), pp. 341-57. Readers should be warned that, unfortunately, this 
interesting paper is marred by errors in the English language.
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obligations reduced the risk of heart attack. There was, he said, a ‘mystery 
of the heart’ that was still beyond science to understand.117 At the State 
University of Yogyakarta, the Islamic Medication Study Center hosted 
‘Prophetic Medicine Training’, urging people to return to treatments taught 
by the Prophet as the best way to deal with various illnesses. These included 
the use of honey, cumin, Zamzam water, fruit vinegar, dates, bloodletting 
and Qur’anic readings.118 It is, of course, entirely possible — even probable 
— that religious activity (perhaps like placebos in drug trials) can stimulate 
brain phenomenon with beneficial therapeutic effects.119 But the practitioners 
cited here were making different sorts of claims. On the evidence of these 
newspaper reports and interviews, it is hard to think that this is anything 
other than religiously inflected ‘junk science’ and ‘junk thought’, something 
that is, it must be noted, probably even more pervasive in the United States 
than in Indonesia.120 
For their part, Traditionalists had long-established ideas of religious 
phrases, powerful persons and sacred objects having healing powers, for 
which no modern scientific proof was felt necessary. Such ideas carried on. 
A ‘weekend pesantren’ aimed at abangan in the Yogyakarta region taught, 
inter alia, a ‘health dhikr’, consisting of repetition of the 99 ‘beautiful names 
of God’ (Asma al-Husna) and ending with a prayer for good health.121 
Ruqya also continued to be practiced, consisting of healing by pronouncing 
magic formulae or applying sacred amulets (jimat) bearing such formulae 
to exorcise evil spirits and black magic.122 These Traditionalist versions of 
Islam-as-medication were subject to denunciation from non-Traditionalist 
117 TempoI, 10 Nov. 2007.
118 KR, 8 March 2008. Zamzam water is from the sacred Zamzam well near the 
ka‘ba in Mecca.
119 There is growing literature on this. For example, see the research mentioned in 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge, God is back, pp. 146–7.
120 A valuable account of contemporary American ‘junk science’ and ‘junk thought’ 
is in Susan Jacoby, The age of American unreason (rev. ed.; New York: Vintage Books, 
2009), Chapter 9. This is not just an Indonesian or American phenomenon, of course. 
For a fine example of spiritualist nonsense pretending to be science by a British 
professor, see David Fontana’s Life beyond death: What should we expect?
121 KR, 6 Dec. 2007.
122 For example, a Ruqya session at Kediri’s main mosque was advertised in RK, 13 
Sept. 2006. For further information on this practice, see T. Fahd, ‘Ruḳya (a.)’ in P. 
Bearman et al., Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed.), vol. 8, p. 600. Useful accounts of 
spiritual healing practices observed in Yogyakarta in 2003–4 are found in Daniels, 
Islamic spectrum, pp. 67–80.
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organisations such as the puritan Persatuan Islam.123 Natural phenomena 
could also be explained by Traditionalists from religious sources. In 2000, an 
organisation of NU-recognised Sufi brotherhoods explained on the basis of 
the opinions of ‘the majority of the ulama’ that lightning was the result of 
‘the movement of angels under instruction from God’.124
The role of educational institutions
We have noted how, under Soeharto, state schools introduced compulsory 
religious education. The rather controversial law of 2003 entrenched that 
role still deeper by requiring schools to recruit teachers of religion and to 
provide places of worship according to the students’ religious faiths. This law 
was resisted by pro-pluralists among Muslims such as Abdurrahman Wahid 
and by non-Muslim interests, but was signed into law by Megawati. As the 
population of Java has continued to grow, the demand for education has kept 
pace, which has produced both a demand for more state education and an 
opportunity for private providers.
The degree of Javanese society’s commitment to religious and general 
education may be exemplified by the village of Karangtengah in the 
Yogyakarta Special District. In 2008 the village decreed that there would be 
a compulsory study time from 6 to 9 in the evening. No one in the village 
would be allowed to turn on their television during this time. From the 
time for the maghrib prayer (just after sunset, i.e., about 6pm) until time 
for the isha prayer (when complete darkness has descended) children were 
to be taught religion. Thereafter it was time for school studies until 9pm. If 
villagers failed to conform, they would be admonished the first time, their 
television would be confiscated the second time, and if there was a third 
refusal, said the village head, ‘we are going to chase them away from our 
area’.125 
123 Persatuan Islam (Persis) issued a fatwa in 2005 declaring ruqya using amulets or 
magic formulae to be polytheism (syirik, Arabic shirk), but other forms of protecting 
oneself through prayer were accepted. This is a complicated matter since the Prophet 
himself exemplified such practices. The Indonesian text of the Persis fatwa may be 
found at http://pemudapersis-ck.blogspot.com/2009/05/bersiyasah-dalam-wawasan-
jamiyah-jeje.html and other locations on the Web.
124 Michael F. Laffan, ‘Lightning, angels and prayers for the nation: Reading the 
fatwas of the Jam‘iyah Ahlith Thoriqoh’, in Feener and Cammack, Islamic law in 
contemporary Indonesia, p. 67.
125 KR, 23 Jan. 2008.
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The state schools’ provision of religious education — although undoubt-
edly playing a major role in Islamisation of the young — was nevertheless 
thought too little by some. In primary schools this was only three hours 
per week and at higher levels just two, so there was a demand for extra-
curricular religious education.126 This demand created an opportunity for new 
schools to be established called Sekolah Islam Terpadu (Integrated Islamic 
Schools), which combined the national curriculum with Islamic studies in 
an all-day school. Because they engaged the pupils for the full day, they 
were particularly attractive to young urban couples where both partners were 
working, as a safe place to put their children.
Integrated Islamic Schools were pioneered by the Lukmanul Hakin 
school established in Bandung in 1995. These schools were particularly a 
project of the activists who also created the Dakwahist political party PKS. 
Their inspiration generally came from the writings of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood figure Hassan al-Banna, who had been a school teacher himself. 
These PKS-affiliated schools blossomed after 1998 until there were hundreds 
of them in Java and elsewhere, keeping in communication with each other 
through a network called JSIT ( Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu, Integrated 
Islamic Schools Network). JSIT has established its own teacher training 
college in Yogyakarta. Religious studies of course play an important part 
in the schools, and the books used reflect the ideology of PKS, including 
Kitab al-Tawhid (The Book of the Unity of God), the strict monotheistic 
interpretations of Islam by Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of 
Wahhabism. The schools come under the purview of the Department of 
National Education and attain a high academic standard which enhances 
their appeal to middle-class parents.127
Not all such schools are the creations of PKS activists. The extremist 
(and notoriously anti-Christian and anti-Jewish) Hidayatullah organisation 
has such schools, as do HTI activists. Integrated Islamic schools have also 
been established by Gadjah Mada University mosque activists, by Amien 
Rais and by Muhammadiyah.128 These are not encompassed within JSIT. 
This is because, says a prominent HTI leader, JSIT is ‘exclusive’.129 Such 
126 Such observations were made by the Director General of Islamic Education in 
the Department of Religious Affairs, Prof. H.M. Muhammad Ali; Bernas, 29 July 
2008.
127 Hasan, ‘Islamizing formal education’, pp. 1–2, 6–25.
128 Ibid., pp. 13–4.
129 Email from Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, 26 June 2007.
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exclusivity is, of course, a common feature of movements of all persuasions 
that operate near, or beyond, the boundaries of doctrinaire ideologies.
Muhammadiyah has been working hard to create such integrated 
schools and has opened a ‘Muhammadiyah Boarding School’ — in other 
words, Modernist-style pesantren — in Prambanan, near Yogyakarta. Its 
aim is to ‘to cultivate faith, knowledge and character’, with Arabic taught 
as the language of religion and English as the international language. We 
may note en passant that the Javanese language seems not to be taught there. 
Fees are charged but scholarships are available for high achievers, poor 
students and orphans.130 Such schools are held in high regard, but their 
standing has attracted some criticism. Younger Muhammadiyah activists 
accuse them of becoming too elite and too expensive, so that they are 
beyond the reach even of most Muhammadiyah followers. In Sidoarjo, for 
example, only about one-third of the pupils in Muhammadiyah schools are 
from Muhammadiyah families and in Gresik the proportion is still lower.131 
Whatever the truth of that complaint, there can be no doubting the decisive 
role that Muhammadiyah education plays in the deeper Islamisation of 
Javanese society.
Other Islamic primary- and secondary-education institutions are also 
important. Several thousand Traditionalist pesantrens continue to provide 
religious education across Java. A reliable total number is not available, but 
figures of 11,000 to 17,000 have been reported.132 NU collaborates with 
government in developing the general knowledge part of pesantren curricula, 
so that graduates are on a par with those from state schools.133 The famous 
school at Gontor continues to produce highly qualified graduates, although it 
is not difficult to find Gontor graduates who believe that the institution has 
drifted in more conservative directions in recent years. The Persatuan Islam 
(Persis) pesantren at Bangil remains important as well, and has a reputation 
for producing rather illiberal Wahhabi-influenced graduates. These include 
many Muhammadiyah leaders in East Java, who set the more conservative 
130 KR, 16 Jan. 2008. Information on the boarding school is available at http://
muhammadiyahboarding.blogspot.com/2010/01/profil-mbs.html.
131 Discussion with Prof. Syafiq Mughni, Sidoarjo, 23 June 2007.
132 Based on 2001 Department of Religious Affairs data, Riyadi, Dekonstruksi tradisi, 
p. 55 n1, reports 11,312 pesantrens, nearly 80 per cent of them in rural villages; RK, 
24 Nov. 2005, quotes the figure of 17,000 from Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar.
133 JktG, 26 Oct. 2010.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t311   311 6/20/2012   1:21:42 PM
312 Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java
style for which East Java Muhammadiyah has a reputation. The Persis 
magazine al-Muslimun also exercises such an influence.134
Muhammadiyah is prominent in higher education as well, with uni-
versities in major towns across Java that are held in high regard. Some of 
these — particularly the Muhammadiyah University in Surakarta — have 
been accused of housing extremist ideologies, but most have not.135 The scale 
of Muhammadiyah’s contribution may be gauged from its role in Yogyakarta, 
where it is headquartered. There nearly 34,000 students are in Muhammadi-
yah institutions of higher education: Ahmad Dahlan University (some 13,000 
students), Muhammadiyah University Yogyakarta (some 13,000), ‘Aisyiyah 
Health Sciences College (some 6,000), the Muhammadiyah Polytechnic 
(around 800) and the teacher training college (around 1,600).136 
Another group of Muslim reformers also turned to education as a 
means of promoting their understanding of Islam, but with somewhat 
Illustration 22 Muhammadiyah University, Yogyakarta, 2007
134 Discussion with Prof. Syafiq Mughni (then deputy head of Muhammadiyah 
in East Java and himself a graduate of the Persis pesantren at Bangil), Sidoarjo, 23 
June 2007.
135 The Rektor of the Surakarta university denied that there was truth in these 
accusations; discussion with Prof. Bambang Setiaji, Surakarta, 4 Aug. 2006.
136 Discussion with Drs Agung Danarto, Head of the Muhammadiyah regional 
leadership for the Yogyakarta Special District, Kota Gede, 31 March 2009.
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mixed success. From the late 1980s and 1990s there began to return to 
Indonesia graduates of the Saudi-funded LIPIA school who had gone 
to Afghanistan and fought in the anti-Soviet jihad. These were mainly 
Revivalists in epistemology and Islamists and Dakwahists in their agendas, 
and were known as Salafis in Indonesia (referring to the pious ancestors of 
early Islam, the Salaf al-Salih). They had a degree of social recognition for 
their command of Islam and Arabic, and for their demonstrated commitment 
to the struggle of Islam. Many set up schools that attracted poor students 
of abangan background and promoted more orthodox Islamic ideas among 
them. There were many of these in the Yogyakarta area, most of whose 
leaders were loyal to Ja‘far Umar Thalib (the founder of Laskar Jihad, about 
which more below). In the wake of the 11 September 2001 al-Qaeda attacks 
in the United States, however, these schools came under more active police 
and intelligence surveillance and student numbers fell. Noorhaidi Hasan 
believes that these Salafi schools declined in appeal thereafter.137
The nation-wide system of State Islamic Universities (UIN), State 
Institutes for Islamic Studies (IAIN) and State Colleges of Islamic Studies 
(STAIN) has continued to play a major role. The leading institutions — the 
UINs in Yogyakarta and Jakarta — have been particularly notable for the 
promotion of high intellectual standards and commitment to a democratic 
and pluralistic Indonesia. As noted above, they promote what has been 
described as ‘enlightened’ or ‘liberal’ Islam.138 It is not only the top levels 
of this structure that operate in this way. For example, the small STAIN in 
Kediri grew from a mere 408 students in 2000–1 to 2,622 in 2009–10.139 
In 2005 it held a seminar to which national-level figures (both Muslim and 
Christian) were invited on the theme of ‘religion as social criticism: an effort 
to defend the weak and oppressed’.140 There are, however, some question 
marks over recent developments at the UINs. In order to make the transition 
from an ‘institute’ as an IAIN to a ‘university’ as a UIN it is necessary for 
faculties such as medicine, engineering and exact sciences to be added. As 
we will see below when we consider minority activist groups, it is just among 
students with such educational backgrounds that illiberal ideologies tend to 
137 Hasan, ‘Salafi madrasas of Indonesia’, pp. 251–2, 254, 257–65, 269–70.
138 ‘Enlightened’ and ‘liberal’ are the terms used by, among others, Assyaukanie in 
Islam and the secular state, pp. 143–6.
139 http://www.stainkediri.ac.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
30&Itemid=29
140 RK, 7 Sept. 2005.
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find support. Illiberal groups themselves tend to denounce the UIN-IAIN-
STAIN system as a source of corrupting liberal and secular influences, and 
researchers from this system sometimes find it difficult to gain access to 
Revivalist groups.141 In 2000, members of FPI’s Yogyakarta branch in turbans 
and waving swords and machetes physically attacked the offices of student 
newspapers at the local IAIN, destroying computers and other equipment, 
obliging students there to admit that they were pro-Communist or be beaten 
up, and wounding two.142
The increasing presence of Islam in education was seen even in 
the Taman Siswa schools, which historically sought to combine modern 
Western-style education with Javanese high culture. Taman Siswa was in 
effect a sort of Javanist priyayi answer to Muhammadiyah’s educational 
initiatives before World War II. From the 1990s, the leadership of Taman 
Siswa began to show more sympathy to Islamic sentiments. Prof. Ki 
Supriyoko — himself from a Yogyakarta Muhammadiyah family and with no 
Taman Siswa background — was one of the leaders and eventually became 
head of the organisation until ill health required him to step down in 2007. 
He reported that some Taman Siswa people were unhappy when he built 
a mosque within a Taman Siswa school. After he stepped down, some in 
the leadership who supported his seemingly more Islamic agenda lost their 
positions and the issue evidently remains controversial within Taman Siswa 
circles. Ki Supriyoko himself established a pesantren that uses the national 
curriculum, but students must be able to read the Qur’an and memorise the 
40 short suras.143
Javanese society is religiously plural, if overwhelmingly Muslim — with 
about 2.9 per cent of the population of Yogyakarta and Central and East Java 
being Christian.144 Christian organisations have been particularly prominent 
as providers of education, particularly in larger towns and cities, where also 
the Christian percentage of the population is much higher, as we have seen. 
141 See Masdar Hilmy’s comments in his Islamism and democracy, p. 12; and Kholil 
Ridwan’s and others’ denunciations of IAIN and those who go from there to do 
higher degrees in Western universities in Sabili cyber-news, 11 May 2003.
142 TempoI, 21 Aug. 2000.
143 Discussion with Prof. Ki Supriyoko, pesantren ‘Insan Cendekia’, Donokerto, 
Sleman, Yogyakarta, 22 March 2008.
144 Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, Indonesia’s population: 
Ethnicity and religion in a changing political landscape (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 109, 115, give a 2000 total for these three areas 
of 66,553,512 Muslims and 1,918,583 Christians.
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This Christian presence in education has produced considerable disquiet 
among Muslims. Indeed, part of the original inspiration for the creation of 
Muhammadiyah in 1912 was to counter Christian influence in education. 
Such a spirit of competition has continued in the midst of more intensive 
Islamisation. A 2010 survey of about 500 teachers of Islam in state and 
private schools in Java revealed significant levels of opposition to having a 
non-Muslim as school head (69 per cent of respondents) and even to having 
non-Muslim teachers at their schools (34 per cent). Fully 87 per cent told 
their pupils not to study other religions and 75 per cent urged their Muslim 
students to encourage non-Muslim teachers to convert to Islam.145
The attendance of Muslim pupils at Christian-affiliated schools became 
a cause célèbre in Yogyakarta. In 2001 banners and posters demanded that 
Muslim parents withdraw their children from such schools. A large banner 
across one of Yogyakarta’s main roads proclaimed, ‘It is forbidden (haram) 
for the Islamic ummah to study at schools of Protestant and Catholic 
foundations’. This statement was a reiteration of an MUI fatwa of 1994 
that ruled, ‘It is forbidden in law to send Muslim children to Protestant or 
Catholic schools’.146 Another banner read, ‘Do not sacrifice your children’s 
faith just because you choose the wrong school’. In the wake of these 
banners, the Yogyakarta government and police announced a prohibition on 
provocative banners that touched on religious or similar matters.147 In 2003 
Din Syamsuddin, as Secretary General of MUI, declared that 1300 Muslim 
students had been converted to Christianity in Yogyakarta because they were 
educated in Catholic schools — an inflammatory claim for which he could 
cite no evidence.148
H. Sunardi Sahuri — Yogyakarta native, supermarket entrepreneur, 
popular preacher and activist, and prominent in PKS — was among those 
most concerned about the threat of Muslim children being converted by 
145 JktP online, 9 Dec. 2010. The survey was conducted by the Centre for the 
Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) of UIN Jakarta; 45 per cent of those surveyed 
identified themselves as followers of NU and 24 per cent said that they followed 
Muhammadiyah.
146 The text of the fatwa is widely available on the Web, including at http://media-
islam.or.id/2008/04/16/fatwa-mui-tentang-hukum-menyekolahkan-anak-anak-
muslim-di-sekolah-sekolah-kristen/
147 Kompas, 29 June 2001.
148 Gatra.com, 17 June 2003. On the anti-Chrisian schools campaign of 2001–3, 
see Imam Subkhan, Hiruk pikuk wacana pluralisme di Yogya (Yogyakarta: Penerbit 
Kanisius and Impulse, 2007), pp. 108–30.
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attending Christian schools. He became a leader in a campaign to stop 
Muslims sending their children to such schools and claimed that success 
had been achieved. Over the period c. 2003–8, he said, many more Islamic 
schools had been created in Yogyakarta, Christian schools had lost students 
and some had even had to close.149
Yet the education story in Yogyakarta was in fact more complex than 
Sunardi Sahuri suggested.150 There was certainly a decline in Muslim 
students at Christian schools, but specifically religious issues seem to explain 
little of that. The number of Muslim students in Christian (Protestant and 
Catholic) primary schools in the city of Yogyakarta declined by nearly 12 
per cent over 2001–7, and two Christian primary schools that had previously 
had a majority of Muslim students actually closed. At junior high level, 
the number of Muslim students in Christian schools was halved over this 
period, from 1,098 in 2001 to 562 in 2007. At high school level, however, the 
decline was of the insignificant order of 3 per cent. Some of these changes 
are more likely to be explained by the decline in student numbers generally as 
a result of a falling birth rate, given that dozens of state primary schools had 
to be closed over the same period. At high school level, whereas Christian 
schools saw a decline in their total enrolments of around 3 per cent, other 
private schools in Yogyakarta faced a decline of over 20 per cent. Among 
private providers, Muhammadiyah remained dominant. Its junior high 
school enrolments grew by 15 per cent over 2001–7, while its high school 
enrolments fell by 23 per cent. During that time, the total number of all high 
school students in Yogyakarta fell by 25 per cent. Meanwhile, Integrated 
Islamic Schools were growing in Yogyakarta and, for the reasons set out 
above, were attractive to many parents, but statistics are not available to 
measure their impact in detail. Given the complexity of changing enrolment 
figures and the fact that the percentage of Muslim pupils in Christian 
schools in the city of Yogyakarta was never more than about 5 per cent of 
the total number of Muslim pupils in the city, the fear that Christian schools 
were a powerful agent of conversion seems to have been exaggerated. In fact, 
the whole fear of large-scale conversions to Christianity in Yogyakarta was 
somewhat exaggerated, as we shall see in Chapter 12.
The susceptibility of the young to religious persuasion made education 
at all levels a priority for Islamisers. Hence the spread of kindergartens that 
149 Discussion with Drs H. Sunardi Sahuri, Yogyakarta, 14 Sept. 2008.
150 The following discussion of enrolments rests entirely on research done by Arif 
Maftuhin and emailed to me on 5 January 2009.
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teach four- to six-year-olds to read the Qur’an (Taman Kanak-kanak al-
Qu’ran). Religious education was proposed not only for those of an age to 
attend school, but also for infants just capable of communication. A senior 
official of the Yogyakarta government, who was also a Professor at the 
Universitas Islam Indonesia, observed when visiting an Islamic play group 
that it was extremely important to plant faith in the young from the earliest 
age. ‘Children between the ages of 0 and 4 are like a white page with no 
mark on it,’ he observed, who must be given ‘a foundation and basis which is 
strong for shaping human character so as to become pious persons.’151 
151 KR, 7 May 2008. This was Prof. H. Dahlan Thaib.
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c h a p te r  9
Efforts to impose conformity of 
Islamic belief
Javanese society has historically hosted a wide variety of ideas about the 
supernatural, and at certain times pious reformers sought to eliminate 
local idiosyncrasies. The first major wave of reform in modern times began 
in the mid-19th century and contributed to the polarisation of Javanese 
society. In the wave of deeper Islamisation in the later 20th and early 21st 
centuries, local varieties of Islam again constituted a challenge to Islamisers. 
But now, in a post-colonial age, harmonising reform efforts were backed 
by large-scale organisations and institutions, including governmental 
and semi-governmental structures. Among them, MUI was particularly 
significant.1 Thus began a serious attempt to force local understandings of 
Islam to conform to what reformers believed the correct version of Islam to 
be. Needless to say, they frequently differed among themselves as to what 
that was.
At a national level, the greatest controversy concerned the Ahmadiyya 
movement, although its impact within Javanese communities was limited. 
As already noted, Ahmadiyya is to orthodox Islam rather as Mormonism 
is to orthodox Christianity, in that both claim to have received new divine 
318
1 MUI also had other concerns, such as whether Yogyakarta mosques correctly 
indicated the kiblat (Arabic qibla, the direction of Mecca, towards which prayers must 
be directed in order to be valid). On investigation, fully 77 per cent were found to 
be 5–10 degrees out. A Yogyakarta Department of Religious Affairs official pointed 
out that an error of only 1 degree would mean that ‘our prayers will veer 145.67 km 
from the ka‘ba’. KR, 15 May 2008, 25 May 2008.
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revelations and have suffered discrimination and violence at the hands of 
more conventional believers as a result. Ahmadiyya exists in two branches, 
both represented in Indonesia. The Lahore branch regards its Punjabi 
founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, as a renewer of Islam rather than a new 
prophet. The Qadian branch, however, sees him as a new prophet, a clearly 
heretical idea to orthodox Muslims. MUI issued a fatwa in 1980 that 
declared Ahmadiyya to be a deviant sect that was outside Islam.2 Nothing 
of significance followed from this fatwa; MUI was still seen as a tool of 
government in those days of the New Order and the regime was not going 
to tolerate internecine social violence. In the post-Soeharto era, however, as 
government was coming to be a tool of the MUI, things changed.
In July 2005 MUI again issued a fatwa declaring Ahmadiyya to be 
deviant and its adherents to be apostates. This time around, under the 
leadership of Din Syamsuddin, MUI recommended to President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono and the government more generally that both 
branches of Ahmadiyya be banned.3 The Ahmadiyya is particularly strong 
in predominantly Sundanese West Java, where — unfortunately for them 
— some extreme groups are also strong, notably the violent FPI. Violence 
soon followed, with the police being conspicuously reluctant to protect 
Ahmadis from attack or to arrest the perpetrators of violence. In Central 
and East Java and Yogyakarta, reactions were more restrained. Led by Ky. 
H. Idris Marzuqi (b. 1940), kyais gathered at Lirboyo pesantren in Kediri 
and denounced the Ahmadis in no uncertain terms. But the Ahmadis there 
were very few and they carried on their lives quietly as before.4 Similarly, 
in the major cities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta (where there was an anti-
Ahmadiyya demonstration of thousands of people in August 2008),5 
2 Iskandar Zulkarnain, Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia, p. 292.
3 There is a vast amount of press coverage of this issue from 2005 to 2010. A good 
overview down to the time of its publication is in Gatra, 1 Aug. 2005. The best 
single source on the Ahmadiyya issue is International Crisis Group, Indonesia: 
Implications of the Ahmadiyah decree. While the conventional Islamic interpretation 
is that apostates may be murdered, there was no proposal to kill all Ahmadis in 
Indonesia.
4 RK, 22 July 2005, 25 July 2005, 2 Aug. 2005, 5 Aug. 2005; Mengislamkan kembali 
Qadiyani dan Lahore (Kediri: Lajnah Bahtsul Masa-il Pondok Pesantren Lirboyo, 
Madrasah Hidayatul Mubtadi-ien, n.d. [2005]); discussion with Miji Purwanto (head 
of the local Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, i.e., from the Qadian branch, in Kediri), 
Kediri, 26 Oct. 2008.
5 JktP online, 4 Aug. 2008.
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Ahmadis kept a low profile — in Yogyakarta taking the sign down from 
their headquarters — but they were not attacked.6 The Ahmadis had a rather 
large mosque and 200 members at Tawangmangu on the slopes of Mount 
Lawu southeast of Surakarta, but had never had trouble with others. The 
MUI branch with responsibility for Tawangmangu did not ask the police to 
shut down the Ahmadis there but rather sought to make them aware of the 
‘error’ of their beliefs.7 In Kudus also there was no trouble for the 40 or so 
Ahmadis there.8 Some NU kyais and younger activists publicly supported 
the Ahmadis’ right to freedom of belief 9 and NU’s Garda Bangsa militia 
even guarded an Ahmadiyya mosque in Surabaya lest it be attacked by 
MMI.10 Emha Ainun Najib commented that the MUI fatwa had no power 
to bind anyone.11
Given the perception that government should — or at least could 
— act to enforce MUI fatwas, there were persistent calls from activists for 
Ahmadiyya to be made illegal.12 A gathering of 37 NU kyais from across 
Java and Madura objected to the idea that the government should act solely 
on the basis of fatwas from MUI, ignoring the views of other organisations, 
but nonetheless concurred with the fatwa against Ahmadiyya.13 Human 
rights and freedom-of-religion activists criticised the MUI fatwa and 
opposed any suggestion of making Ahmadiyya illegal. The violence associated 
with this issue culminated in an attack by FPI and other extremists on 
a demonstration of Ahmadis and human rights activists at the national 
6 MIO, 30 July 2005; RS online, 7 Aug. 2005, 8 Aug. 2005. The Bupati of Sleman 
regency reported no problems for the Ahmadis there; they did not have a mosque 
but did have educational activities; KR, 15 June 2008. Sultan Hamengkubuwana X 
and the government of Yogyakarta said that they were prepared to protect Ahmadi 
properties if they were threatened; KR, 11 June 2008.
7 TempoI, 6 Aug. 2005.
8 TempoI, 11 June 2008.
9 Discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said (who defended the Ahmadis), 
pesantren An-Nur, Wonocolo, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008; detikNews online, 7 May 
2008.
10 DetikSurabaya, 7 Aug. 2005.
11 RK, 21 Aug. 2005.
12 A list of the groups in the anti-Ahmadi ‘Forum Umat Islam’ is given in 
International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah decree, p. 3. FPI 
and HTI were prominent, along with MMI, KISDI, DDII, ICMI, PKS, PPP and 
others, but Muhammadiyah and NU were also represented.
13 MmK, 5 Aug. 2005.
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monument in Jakarta on 1 June 2008, where several prominent Liberal 
Muslim leaders were injured.
Under continuing pressure from hard-line groups and fearing wide-
spread anarchic violence, on 9 June 2008 the government issued a joint 
decree by the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Minister of the Interior 
and the Attorney General. This decree ordered the Jemaat Ahmadiyah 
Indonesia — which is to say, the local version of the Qadian branch — to 
cease all activities ‘inconsistent with interpretations of Islam in general, such 
as the recognition of a prophet after the Prophet Muhammad’. Anyone 
who failed to do this was subject to ‘sanctions according to law’. Every 
regional government was ordered to ‘carry out guidance with regard to this 
decision’.14 The decree did not apply to the local organisation of the Lahore 
branch — the Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia — but this distinction made 
no difference to anti-Ahmadi activists. We should note that Ahmadiyya was 
not banned by this decree. Rather, Ahmadis were allowed to believe what 
they believed but were not to spread these beliefs.
The government decree of 2008 was not satisfactory to Ahmadiyya’s 
enemies, who still insisted that the government must act to make it illegal.15 
Attacks on Ahmadis and their properties continued, particularly in West 
Java. By 2010 the national government was reviewing the 2008 decree in 
search of a more permanent solution, which could have only one meaning, 
since the government and its police forces remained reluctant to confront 
violent anti-Ahmadi groups like FPI. The Minister for Religious Affairs, the 
PPP politician Suryadharma Ali,16 simply said that Ahmadiyya had to be 
disbanded, since its followers continued to spread their beliefs in violation of 
the joint ministerial decree and were in fact not Muslims, as they claimed to 
be.17 In February 2011 the anti-Ahmadiyya campaign grew murderous, when 
a mob of 1,500 people attacked and destroyed an Ahmadi site in West Java, 
killing three Ahmadis in the course of the attack. The Minister for Justice 
and Human Rights, the PAN politician Patrialis Akbar, made it clear that 
14 The text is available in multiple locations on the Web, including http://www.bbc.
co.uk/indonesian/news/story/2008/06/080609_ahmadiyah.shtml. The decree was 
published in local newspapers, e.g., KR, 10 June 2008.
15 Such demands were made across the Javanese heartland as well. For example, see 
KR, 9 June 2008, 17 June 2008.
16 Suryadharma Ali is a graduate of IAIN Jakarta, and General Secretary of PPP 
for 2007–12.
17 JktP online, 31 Aug. 2010.
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the government was close to making it illegal for the Ahmadiyya to exist in 
Indonesia if its followers continued to claim that they were Muslims.18 In 
East Java, where the Ahmadis were next-to-invisible and had experienced no 
significant difficulty, puritanical groups still pressed for action. In February 
2011 the governor of East Java, Dr H. Soekarwo, gave in and declared that 
all Ahmadiyya activity was banned in East Java. Ahmadis could not even 
display the name Ahmadiyya on their mosques, but were allowed to carry 
on their rituals in private. As the governor announced this, he was flanked 
by the head of police, the Brawijaya Division commander, the head public 
prosecutor of East Java, the speaker of the East Java legislature and the head 
of the local MUI.19
Ahmadiyya was, however, a rather small sect and therefore relatively 
easy for its enemies to attack;20 this was not so in the case of LDII. We 
saw above that the problem with LDII was that the claim of its founder, 
Nurhasan Ubaidah Lubis, to have the uniquely correct manhaj (way of 
knowing) Islam, so that all other Islamic movements were wrong, indeed 
not even true Muslims. Consequently, LDII followers should not even pray 
together with non-LDII people. MUI declared the organisation to be deviant 
on more than one occasion, the last fatwa being in 1994.21 The organisation 
had survived multiple attempts to have it declared illegal by attaching itself 
to Golkar in 1972, but in the post-Soeharto age widespread condemnation of 
LDII revived. By then, however, it was an organisation with branches across 
18 TempoI, 7 Feb. 2011. Twelve people accused of the murders of the Ahmadis were 
given trivial sentences of three to six months in July 2011; JktP online, 29 July 2011. 
Patrialis Akbar has generally been thought to be a poor performer as a minister, and 
it was clear that his view of justice and human rights did not include the idea of the 
Ahmadiyya continuing to profess its version of Islam.
19 TempoI, 28 Feb. 2011. The governors of West Java and South Sulawesi similarly 
issued bans on Ahmadiyya.
20 Another idiosyncratic faith to be condemned by MUI was called Salamullah, 
whose leader, Lia Aminuddin (b. 1947 in Surabaya) claimed to be the incarnation of 
the angel Gabriel. She was twice convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to prison, in 
2006 (for two years) and 2009 (for 2.5 years). This faith is centred in the Jakarta area 
and is not of significance in the Javanese-speaking heartland.
21 The text may be found in Hartono Ahmad Jaiz (ed.), Bahaya Islam Jama’ah-
LEMKARI-LDII ( Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam, 1419H/ 
1998M), pp. 247–8. A 1979 MUI fatwa in the same terms is in ibid., pp. 94–5; 
another copy of that, but undated and with different signatures at the end, is at 
http://www.mui.or.id/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=84&limitstart=5 
(under ‘Islam Jama’ah’).
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the length and breadth of Java (and elsewhere in Indonesia) and at least 
claimed to have millions of adherents, although not everyone believed that 
this was so.22 In Kediri, where it was founded, LDII was a major presence, 
with its 99-metre-tall, gold-tipped minaret (the highest in all of East Java), 
called the Menara Asmaul Husna — the ‘minaret of the 99 beautiful names 
of God’. This was no easy target for its enemies to tackle.
Illustration 23 Sign for a rural branch of LDII, Karanganyar, 2008
22 The PKS leader and the then-speaker of the national MPR (People’s Consultative 
Assembly), Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid, said that he doubted that LDII followers were 
actually very large in number; discussion of 7 June 2007, Jakarta. In the previous 
chapter, I noted that I am unable to confirm LDII’s claim to have millions of 
adherents.
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LDII was still growing in the post-1998 years, attracting new followers 
from other versions of Islam and generating conflict in some places. A 
dakwah activist in the Yogyakarta area intervened in a village where a 
conversion to LDII had taken place, provided anti-LDII literature and 
thereby stopped this process. After receiving his information, the villagers 
gathered and decided that there would be no more LDII pengajian in their 
village and, if the LDII convert did attempt this, he would have to leave.23 
Lirboyo’s senior figure Ky. H. Idris Marzuqi declared LDII to be ‘greatly in 
conflict with us’.24
Among the foremost critics of LDII was Drs H. Hartono Ahmad 
Jaiz. He was from Central Java, born in Boyolali near Surakarta in 1953, 
educated in Surakarta and Yogyakarta in both Traditionalist style and at 
IAIN Yogyakarta, a writer on Islamic subjects and prominent in DDII 
circles. In 1998 he published an anti-LDII book on the ‘dangers’ of LDII, 
which contained ‘confessions of former leaders of LDII’.25 This presented 
a critical history of LDII, set out its ideological deviations and described 
the various decisions taken against it over time. Needless to say, LDII was 
angry at this. Hartono Ahmad Jaiz continued his criticisms of deviance 
and in 2002 published another book entitled Deviant sects and concepts in 
Indonesia.26 In March 2006 he was a speaker at a mosque gathering near 
Surakarta organised by the ‘Mosque Activists Communication Forum’, 
a network established in Surakarta in 1998 and led by one of the city’s 
foremost radicals, Mohammed Kalono.27 The meeting was attacked by LDII 
supporters, who reportedly arrived in some 20 trucks and 50 other vehicles. 
23 Arif Maftuhin interview with Drs Moh. Abu Suhud, Yogyakarta, 29 March 
2008.
24 Discussion with Ky. H.A. Idris Marzuqi, Lirboyo, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007.
25 Hartono Ahmad Jaiz (ed.), Bahaya Islam Jama’ah-LEMKARI-LDII. The biographi-
cal information on Hartono is taken from one of his other polemical works, an attack 
on Sufism, entitled Tasawuf belitan Iblis ( Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1422H/2001M), pp. 
173–5.
26 Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, Aliran dan paham sesat di Indonesia ( Jakarta: Pustaka Al-
Kautsar, 2002).
27 This is FKAM: Forum Komunikasi Aktivis Masjid. See International Crisis 
Group, Indonesia: Noordin Top’s support base (Update briefing, Asia briefing no. 95. 
Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 27 Aug. 2009), p. 7. This report notes 
that ‘Many radical discussion groups from Jakarta to Lombok take place in the name 
of FKAM. In Sragen, its website (http://addakwah-fkamsragen.blogspot.com) has 
links to a number of jihadi sites. … It has sponsored book launches of JI books and 
protest actions against “deviant” groups and suspected places of vice.’
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They entered the mosque and attempted to attack Hartono. He was protected 
by police who quickly arrived, but four others were injured. Stones were 
thrown at the vehicle taking Hartono to safety at the police station. There the 
stand-off continued, with the LDII side demanding a public apology from 
Hartono. Eventually both sides agreed to end the matter. LDII’s actions were 
subsequently denounced by the head of MUI as criminal. Hartono was also 
pursued by LDII people when he addressed a gathering in Jakarta. Bambang 
Irawan Hafiluddin, one of the ‘former leaders of LDII’ whose ‘confessions’ 
were published in Hartono’s The danger of Islam Jama’ah-LEMKARI-LDII, 
was also subject to LDII intimidation, as were other critics. Such, at least, 
was the detailed report in Sabili. On the other side, a senior LDII leader 
denounced Hartono and claimed that his rejections of LDII teachings 
referred to ideas that they had changed since the death of their founder 
Nurhasan Ubaidah Lubis. Further articles in this issue of Sabili nevertheless 
continued the denunciations of LDII.28 It is important to note, however, that 
while LDII was denounced in terms similar to those applied to Ahmadiyya, 
and while MUI declared both to be deviant, at no level of government was 
anyone prepared to act against LDII, as they did against Ahmadiyya. This 
time the target was just too large, so that the cost in social violence would 
have been much greater.
Since 2006, there has been more evidence of LDII attempting to 
mend its fences — and they have indeed been formidable self-erected 
barriers — with other versions of Islam. They stopped calling other Muslims 
kafirs, reported Kediri Muhammadiyah figures, although they believed that 
LDII was not really changing its beliefs.29 Ky. H. Idris Marzuqi thought 
that LDII was changing some of its ideas, but offered no examples of 
this.30 Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said — himself an activist in inter-religious 
relations — regarded LDII as more moderate than in the past, but still 
exclusive.31 In Yogyakarta, LDII met with the local MUI and Department 
of Religious Affairs. The MUI officer said that ‘LDII should continue to 
spread information about itself to other mass organisations so that the wider 
society will know more about LDII’s programs’.32 LDII held a seminar in a 
28 Sabili vol. 13, no. 21 (6 Rabi’ulakhir 1427/4 May 2006), pp. 17–31.
29 Discussion with Abdul Haris, Triyono and Hari Widasmoro, Kediri, 29 Nov. 
2007.
30 Discussion with Ky. H.A. Idris Marzuqi, Lirboyo, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007.
31 Discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, pesantren An-Nur, Wonocolo, 
Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.
32 KR, 12 March 2008.
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mosque in Sleman to discuss violence and criminality among youths, which 
was blamed on inadequate religious instruction beyond the level of Qur’an 
kindergartens. So LDII set up a dakwah and religious education programmes 
for 5- to 9-year-olds and 10- to 15-year-olds. The secretary of the local MUI 
was one of the speakers at the seminar.33 Meanwhile, on the slopes of Mount 
Kelud near Kediri, a group of some 45 LDII members live in the village of 
Manggis, which has a population of perhaps 800 people. Most of the village 
is Muslim, although there is a substantial Hindu community (perhaps 
30 per cent of the village). The LDII people give priority to harmonious 
relations. They do not attend the twice-weekly NU pengajian or take part in 
Traditionalist tahlilan. But if they are invited to attend when, for example, 
there has been a death among the NU community, they do so. They even 
attend the annual village cleansing (bersih desa) ceremony, regarding it as 
Illustration 24 Bersih desa (village cleansing) at Manggis village, Kediri, 2006 
(photo by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi)
33 KR, 6 Dec. 2008.
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local custom and ignoring the belief in spiritual powers that other villagers 
still hold.34
Wahidiyah — also based in Kediri — is another Islamic movement 
that is rather disliked by its critics but protected both by its size and by its 
proximity to Traditionalist practices.35 It originated in a divine instruction 
that the head of the pesantren at Kedunglo, Kediri, named Ky. H. Abdoel 
Madjid Ma’roef, said he received in 1959. This consisted of a special form of 
dhikr — which was elaborated over time — known as Sholawat Wahidiyah, 
which could bring good fortune both in this life and in the hereafter. 
Indeed, it is claimed that if it is recited just once it can deliver 500 of the 
Illustration 25 Villagers gathered at the bersih desa, Manggis village, Kediri, 2006 
(photo by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi)
34 Discussion with Pak Sri Woko (the head of the local LDII group), Manggis, 3 
March 2006.
35 An important study of Wahidiyah and similar groups based in Kediri is to be 
found in Arif Zamhari, Rituals of Islamic spirituality. He covers Wahidiyah on pp. 
76–7, 95–164.
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dead from eternal torture.36 The dhikr consisted both of recitation of specific 
phrases and much weeping.37 Others dismiss this as ignorant nonsense. The 
senior kyai of Lirboyo, Ky. H. Indris Marzuqi, said of Wahidiyah that ‘their 
knowledge is insufficient’.38 Although its practices are in the Sufi mode, NU 
does not regard Wahidiyah as a proper, respected (muktabarah) tarekat.39 
Muhammadiyah figures in Kediri said that, like LDII, Wahadiyah just takes 
advantage of ignorance.40
Wahidiyah is now led by the founder’s son Ky. H. Abdul Latif Madjid 
(Gus Latif ), whose teachings are idiosyncratic in a recognisably Javanese 
style.41 He says, for example, that all religions are the same: they proceed 
from scripture to intellectualisation to rasa — a deeply meaningful term in 
Javanese mysticism, conveying (amidst multiple complexities) a sense of the 
unmediated presence in humanity of the divine principle.42 In the end the 
objective is makrifat — gnosis — and, he says, Wahidiyah offers the most 
effective of all means to that end. Wahidiyah’s doctrines are like those of 
‘no self ’ in Buddhism, says Gus Latif. The central activity is what is called 
mujahadah — ‘striving’, a common Sufi term — which in Wahidiyah means 
above all a great effort to battle and subdue lust and physical desires so as to 
become aware of one’s return to God.43 Gus Latif is not concerned that NU 
does not recognise Wahidiyah as a proper Sufi tarekat because it isn’t one, he 
36 See the organisation’s website at http://sholawat-wahidiyah.com/id/.
37 Ritual weeping is also found in the version of Sufism promoted by the popular 
(until he took a second wife in 2006 and lost his devoted female following) TV 
evangelist Aa Gym (Abdullah Gymnastiar), but Howell is wrong to describe this 
as unique to his version, as the Wahidiyah case shows; Howell, ‘Sufism and the 
Indonesian Islamic revival’, p. 719.
38 Discussion with Ky. H. Idris Marzuqi, Lirboyo, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007
39 It is omitted from the list of accepted Sufi orders in Sri Mulyati et al., Mengenal 
dan memahami tarekat-tarekat muktabarah.
40 Discussion with Abdul Haris, Triyono and Hari Widasmoro, Kediri, 29 Nov. 
2007.
41 The following discussion rests upon my talk with Ky. H. Abdul Latif Madjid, 
Kedunglo, Kediri, 2 March 2006.
42 For the most authoritative analysis available, see P.J. Zoetmulder, Pantheism and 
monism in Javanese suluk literature: Islamic and Indian mysticism in an Indonesian setting 
(ed. and transl. M.C. Ricklefs; KITLV Translation Series 24; Leiden: KITLV Press, 
1995), esp. pp. 182–4; other references may be pursued via the index.
43 A description from one of the many Wahidiyah publications given to me when 
I visited Kedunglo on 2 March 2006: Didalam Wahidiyah yang dimaksud adalah 
bersungguh-sungguh memerangi dan menundukkan hawa nafsu untuk diarahkan kepada 
kesadaran Fafirruu — Ilallah wa Rasulihi Shallallaahu ‘alaihi wa sallam.
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says, for there is no swearing of an oath (bayat, Arabic bay‘a) to accept the 
authority of the murshid, as in a tarekat. Gus Latif is intimate with a world of 
spirits: the dead send him greetings from the grave and many nearby spirits 
(jin) communicate with him. He heals the sick by visiting them in their 
dreams. The long-recognised local spirit forces of Java — including Ratu 
Kidul and Sunan Lawu — are genuine creations of God, he says.
The scale of the Wahidiyah movement is considerable. Gus Latif 
has some 1,500 students at Kedunglo from kindergarten to tertiary level. 
Arabic, English and Chinese are taught, with Javanese taught in the primary 
school. The studies include practical business skills and students are expected 
to set up their own small businesses. The pesantren includes a College of 
Economic Sciences, including departments of accounting and management.44 
Wahidiyah has many other branches in Java, elsewhere in Indonesia and in 
some places abroad. It holds great mujahadah sessions with group dhikr and 
weeping over several days at its various branches and, twice a year, on a grand 
scale at Kedunglo itself. Then reportedly 75,000 to 150,000 devotees attend 
at Kedunglo, much to the profit of local food-stall owners.45
Kediri is also the home base of Dhikr al-Ghafilin, another idiosyncratic 
dhikr movement. This dhikr was developed by three charismatic Traditionalist 
kyais who were thought to be particularly supernaturally endowed: the 
controversial Ky. H. Hamim Jazuli (Gus Mik) from Kediri, Ky. H. Ahmad 
Siddiq from Jember and Ky. H. ‘Abd al-Hamid from Pasuruan. Dhikr al-
Ghafilin is not institutionalised to the degree that Wahidiyah is. When it 
is about to meet, word travels by informal means and upwards of 20,000 
followers gather to join its lengthy dhikr sessions at the pesantren Al Falah 
at Ploso, housed in tents erected along the road. Several sacred graves in the 
Kediri area are also used as locations for these dhikr sessions.46 A similar group 
44 MmK, 29 Aug. 2005.
45 For reports on such sessions, see e.g., MmK, 7 March 2005, 26 July 2005, 26 Aug. 
2005, 29 Aug. 2005, 12 Aug. 2006; RK, 29 Aug. 2005, 18 Feb. 2006, 13 Aug. 2006. 
For a report on a Wahidiyah session in Yogyakarta, see KR, 9 June 2008.
46 Zamhari, Rituals of Islamic spirituality, pp. 207–44; MmK, 15 Oct. 2003, 19 Oct. 
2003, 29 Sept. 2003, 16 Oct. 2004; RK, 15 Oct. 2003; email from Imam Subawi, 
18 Dec. 2008. One of the sites routinely used by this group is the grave of Syech 
(Shaykh) Wasil, the reputed wali who brought Islam to Kediri, but the actual identity 
and history of this character is obscure; see RK, 10 Feb. 2009. The grave of Gus Mik 
(d. 1993) at Mojoroto, Kediri, is itself a major pilgrimage site; see the account of 
observances there in MmK, 11 Oct. 2005. On Gus Mik, see further Muhammad 
Nurul Ibad, Perjalanan dan ajaran Gus Miek (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pesantren, 2007).
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calling itself Dhikr ar-Rahmah meets at the grave of Sunan Geseng in Kediri 
on the eve of Fridays, when it recites the Fatihah one hundred times.47 
A group called Ihsaniyyat is another Kediri-based dhikr movement also 
covered in Arif Zamhari’s fine study.48 Its leader — also named Ky. H. Abdul 
Latif, not to be confused with the Wahidiyah leader — is open to local arts 
usually thought of as typically abangan. He works among jaranan performers, 
for example. When he does mass exorcisms (ruwatan) he does not use 
wayang but that is only because it has become so expensive. He believes that 
krisses have power — ‘there is a creature (makhluk) there’, he says — but has 
no fear of them. In Banyuwangi, he was criticised by NU kyais for opening a 
jaranan performance, but he retorted that this was in the style of the dakwah 
of the wali sanga who brought Islam to Java.49 
Arif Zamhari makes an important point about the contribution of these 
dhikr groups in bringing abangan to more pious Islam:
These groups have attracted followers from a wide social base to their 
practices, hence contributing significantly to the improvement of 
religious practice among Indonesian Muslims who were not strict in their 
daily observance of Islamic practice. Based on their understanding of the 
teachings of tasawuf [Sufism], instead of rejecting nominal Muslims, 
these Majlis Dhikr groups have shown respect for and accommodation 
to all kinds of cultural symbols used by these Muslim groups. In doing 
so, the presence of these Majlis Dhikr … has contributed to narrowing 
the gap between santri Muslims and nominal Muslims, who have long 
been ideologically opposed to one another.50
Because such groups are so close to Traditionalist practices — whatever 
their idiosyncrasies and however low the regard in which they are held by 
the more sophisticated — and because they can mobilise followings in the 
tens of thousands, they have escaped anathematisation by MUI or vigilante 
organisations, the latter being in any case still weak in Kediri. But one cannot 
be confident that that will always be so.
47 RK, 5 Oct. 2006. There is also a grave of Sunan Geseng in Piyungan, Yogyakarta. 
It is not remarkable in Java to find holy figures reputedly buried in more than one 
place; devotees are likely to ascribe this to the supernatural powers of those persons 
or simply to the unknowable.
48 Zamhari, Rituals of Islamic spirituality, pp. 165–206.
49 Discussion with Ky. H. Abdul Latif, pesantren al-Ihsan Jampes, Kediri, 16 March 
2005. Arif Zamhari notes (Rituals of Islamic spirituality, p. 176) that when Ihsaniyyat 
spread to Banyuwangi, it became a threat to the standing of local kyais and thus 
generated rivalries within the Traditionalist side of Islam.
50 Arif Zamhari, Rituals of spirituality, p. 3.
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Other idiosyncratic and smaller Islamic movements and sects did 
not fare so well, as the suppression of ‘deviant sects’ (aliran sesat) became 
something of an obsession on the part of MUI, other major organisations, 
the police and public prosecutors, vigilantes and, in many cases, even local 
communities and individuals. In this respect, the social circumstances of 
Javanese villages in the early 21st century were not so different from those 
of 16th- and 17th-century England, as analysed in Keith Thomas’s classic 
study of Religion and the decline of magic in that period:
Indeed if the records of Tudor and Stuart village life leave any single 
impression, it is that of the tyranny of local opinion and the lack of 
tolerance displayed towards nonconformity or social deviation. Rural 
society lacked much of the modern concept of privacy and private life. 
The customs of the countryside required joys and sorrows, weddings and 
funerals, to be shared with other members of the community …. Nor 
was there any challenge to the view that a man’s most personal affairs 
were the legitimate concern of the whole community. On the contrary, 
everyone had a right to know what everyone else was doing.51
The chairman of the Yogyakarta Special District MUI said in January 
2008 that, in order to prevent the emergence of deviant sects, the local MUI 
was going to coordinate the various Islamic mass organisations so as to guide 
the members of society in this regard, in order to maintain their faith and 
piety. MUI’s coordination would also encompass the heads of local police and 
the provincial public prosecutor,52 again confirming MUI’s view of itself as a 
body that could turn to the police and courts to implement its determinations, 
a view shared by government, as we have seen. The chairman of the Yogyakarta 
city branch of MUI expressed the hope that the policy and public prosecutors 
would ‘act resolutely’ in this respect.53 A member of Muhammadiyah’s Majelis 
Tabligh dan Dakwah Khusus (Sermons and Special Proselytisation Council) 
said that the presence of such deviant sects was part of an international con-
spiracy to destroy the Islamic faith, which even threatened Muhammadiyah’s 
educational institutions themselves.54 The head of the Institute for the Study 
and Implementation of Islam at Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta felt 
51 Keith Thomas, Religion and the decline of magic: Studies in popular beliefs in sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century England (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 629.
52 KR, 8 Jan. 2008. KR, 3 Nov. 2007, published the national MUI’s prohibition of 
nine ‘deviant sects’; this included Ahmadiyya, already discussed here. Others were 
also represented in the Yogyakarta area and will be discussed below.
53 KR, 17 March 2008.
54 KR, 14 Feb. 2008.
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that Muslim leaders, Islamic organisations and the government must stand 
firm against deviant groups, whose emergence was facilitated by ‘the euphoria 
or intoxication with freedom in this age of reform’.55
A movement called Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah had followers scattered 
in multiple places across Java and attracted much attention over 2006–8. 
Their leader was a retired Jakarta public servant living in Bogor (West 
Java) named Abussalam alias Ahmad Mushaddeq. After 40 days of ascetic 
practice, in July 2006 he claimed to have had a divine revelation that he 
was a new prophet. He called himself Al-Masih Al-Maw‘ud — the messiah 
promised by Islam at the end of days (a claim also made by Ahmadiyya’s 
founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in his time). Ahmad Mushaddeq’s followers 
reportedly denied the Prophet’s night journey to heaven (isra’ and mir‘aj) and 
did not pray five times a day or fast. MUI declared the group heretical and 
its followers apostates, and recommended that government declare it illegal 
to spread Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah teachings and ban its publications. The 
head of NU, Ky. H. Hasyim Muzadi, also called for the arrest and trial of 
Ahmad Mushaddeq.56 The police reported that by late 2007 he had 41,000 
followers across the whole of Indonesia, with 8,972 followers in Jakarta, 511 
in Tegal, 5,114 in Yogyakarta, 2,610 in Surabaya, similar numbers in some 
places outside Java and many very small groups elsewhere. Some 60 per cent 
of these followers were reportedly university students.57
The government suppressed Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah in late 2007. 
The Attorney General acted on the MUI’s fatwas, with the advice of 
BAKORPAKEM (a body charged with oversight of kebatinan movements)58 
and the President’s agreement. The Attorney General decreed the movement 
to be illegal and banned all its publications. The police were searching for 
Ahmad Mushaddeq in order to charge him with blasphemy, punishable with 
up to five years’ imprisonment. He finally surrendered to the police in Jakarta, 
where they paraded him in handcuffs before journalists. His meditation 
site in Bogor was attacked and destroyed by hundreds of activists calling 
themselves Gerakan Umat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Ummah 
55 KR, 10 Nov. 2007, quoting Drs Muhsin Hariyanto, head of the Lembaga 
Pengkajian dan Pengamalan Islam at the university.
56 KR, 4 Oct. 2007, 25 Oct. 2007, 31 Oct. 2007.
57 KR, 31 Oct. 2007.
58 Badan Koordinasi Penganut Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat, a successor to the 
PAKEM (Peninjauan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat, Observation of People’s Belief 
Streams) mentioned earlier in this book, under the Attorney General’s department 
since 1960.
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Movement). The Department of Religious Affairs announced that it would 
attempt through dakwah to bring followers of such deviant sects back to the 
true Islam but if they refused to repent, legal action would be taken against 
them.59 At a meeting in Yogyakarta of the Special District’s provincial 
public prosecutor, the intelligence branch of the police, head of military 
intelligence and the head of the District MUI, this ban was officially declared 
in Yogyakarta as well.60 The same action was taken in other jurisdictions. 
Reflecting the standing of MUI fatwas in the eyes of the police, a senior 
policeman in Bantul (south of Yogyakarta) said that the legal basis for police 
acting in this matter was ‘the decision of the Attorney General and the fatwa 
of MUI’.61
Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah quickly collapsed under the weight of MUI, 
police and activist pressure. In Yogyakarta, the local public prosecutors and 
police had begun interrogating sect members from at least September 2007. 
Adherents presented themselves to police stations and there both sought 
protection from assault and offered their repentance. It is worth noting 
that such acts of repentance were done in police stations, not in mosques, 
in almost all the cases known to me. Where this was done in a mosque or 
at the local Religious Affairs Office, local officials, police and frequently the 
military were present.62 In at least one case MMI members were in the office 
of the Yogyakarta Special District Attorney to witness two sect members 
reciting the Shahadah.63 A group called Forum Masyarakat Islam (Islamic 
People’s Forum) rounded up Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah members in Sleman 
and obliged them to repent publicly.64 In Klaten, locals threatened a sect 
follower and his pregnant wife when they refused to recant and punched the 
husband. The police took them under protection and then escorted them to 
a meeting where they repented.65
The police arrested the sect’s leader in Kediri and then the local heads 
of police, public prosecutor’s office, Department of Religious Affairs and 
59 KR, 26 Oct. 2007, 31 Oct. 2007.
60 KR, 3 Nov. 2007.
61 Bernas, 16 Nov. 2007.
62 For example, KR, 10 Oct. 2007, 2 Nov. 2007, 7 Nov. 2007, 10 Nov. 2007; Bernas, 
21 Sept. 2007, 9 Oct. 2007,10 Oct. 2007, 3 Nov. 2007, 9 Nov. 2007, 10 Nov. 2007, 
15 Nov. 2007; RK, 3 Nov. 2007; MmK, 6 Nov. 2007.
63 Bernas, 2 Nov. 2007. I suspect that the MMI activists took the sect members there 
for this purpose, but the newspaper report does not confirm this.
64 KR, 3 Nov. 2007.
65 KR, 16 Nov. 2007; Bernas, 16 Nov. 2007.
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MUI gave his followers a religious lecture. Several of them refused to repent, 
however, and some who repented in a mosque withdrew their repentance 
the following day and accused the police of having no authority to act. So 
legal action was taken against them.66 In Bantul it was the deputy head of 
the anti-terrorism police squad Densus 88 who lectured sect followers on 
the error of their beliefs. Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah had not grown into a 
terrorist organisation, but had it not been banned that might have happened, 
he claimed.67 A grand repentance session of around a thousand followers of 
Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah took place at the mosque within the Yogyakarta 
Special District police headquarters in late November 2007. It was led by the 
leader of the sect in Yogyakarta and witnessed by the heads of local police, 
public prosecutor’s office and MUI, as well as senior officers of the navy 
and air force, religious leaders and other prominent figures. The sect leader 
praised the Yogyakarta police for not having arrested any sect followers, as 
had happened in other jurisdictions.68
In Jakarta, the sect leader Ahmad Mushaddeq recanted, but the justices 
of the South Jakarta District Court (a civil, not a religious, court) did not 
believe him. He was convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to four years in 
prison. FPI members and others present shouted Allahu akbar (God is great) 
although they had wished for a death sentence — which cannot, however, 
be applied under the Indonesian blasphemy law.69 This was among the 
cases that led to the petition to the Constitutional Court in October 2009 
seeking that it overthrow the blasphemy law, which (as we have seen above) 
it refused to do.
A small sect arose in the mountains of Gunung Kidul calling itself 
Laku Dumadi Anggayuh Titi Tentrem (ways to strive towards peacefulness), 
but it brought little peace to its adherents. Among its ‘deviant’ teachings 
was that, if ablution water was not available for cleaning oneself before 
the evening prayer, then earth or sand could be used.70 Followers should 
not eat pumpkin, which is called waluh in Javanese, for that was said to 
be an abbreviation of wali Allah (a saint of God). Other similar ideas were 
66 DetikSurabaya online, 6 Nov. 2007.
67 KR, 16 Nov. 2007; Bernas, 16 Nov. 2007.
68 KR, 24 Nov. 2007; Bernas, 24 Nov. 2007.
69 JktP online, 24 Apr. 2008.
70 This practice is known as tayamum (Arabic tayammum) but I am not clear why this 
was declared deviant, since it is allowed in certain circumstances; see A.J. Wensinck 
— [A.K. Reinhart], ‘Tayammum (a.)’, in P. Bearman et al. (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam 
(2nd ed.), vol. 10, p. 399.
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also taught. An unnamed person from Magelang is said to have been the 
originator of these ideas, but it was a group of 30 from Gunung Kidul who 
recanted and prayed in the conventional fashion, under the watchful eye of 
the head and deputy head of Gunung Kidul MUI, police officers and local 
government officers.71
Reports of locals taking action against religious activities thought to 
be deviant are not uncommon. Hundreds of villagers in Gurah (near Kediri) 
physically attacked the small hut used by a group whose guru was one 
Supriyono. He seemed odd: frequently wearing Indian-style clothing and an 
ear-stud and failing to report his presence to village officers. His followers 
— who numbered between three and something over ten — purified 
themselves with water holding seven kinds of flowers. On the grounds of 
such suspicious, presumed deviant, conduct not only was his hut destroyed 
but he was arrested and interrogated by the police.72 Villagers in Grogol 
(Kediri) objected to a small dhikr group that moved into their area. This so-
called Dzikru Syahadatain consisted of both men and women who carried 
out their dhikr together in a closed room. Villagers claimed that this was a 
deviant sect that was not observed to fast during Ramadan and that failed 
to mix with locals. The practitioners of this dhikr denied these allegations. 
So the police stepped in and ordered the group to cease their activities in the 
name of keeping the peace.73 One Miftahul Huda set up an Islamic school 
in Malang but was accused by local people of heretical teachings called 
Jamaah Safaatus Shalawat. These teachings were said to include praying 
without ritual purification with water beforehand and forbidding visits to 
graves. The local authorities ordered Miftahul Huda to cease his activities by 
22 December 2007 but he ignored this. So local people attacked the school 
five days later and burned four buildings. The police stepped in to secure the 
area.74 In Sidoarjo some 200 villagers broke up a group of up to 100 people 
who had been doing dhikr together for a year or so. It was claimed that they 
did not do ritual prayer, just the dhikr late in the night — an accusation that 
the leader of the group denied. Meetings with local religious leaders had 
been chaotic and nearly ended in conflict. So the villagers took the matter 
into their own hands.75
71 KR, 31 Dec. 2007.
72 RK, 1 Dec. 2005.
73 RK, 17 July 2007, 26 July 2007.
74 JktP online, 28 Dec. 2007; AntaraNews.com, 27 Dec. 2007. I do not know what 
happened to this Miftahul Huda thereafter.
75 TempoI, 11 Nov. 2009. The group called itself Yayasan Karisma Usada Mustika.
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Sometimes just an individual acted. One Joko Sembung of Nganjuk, 
who claimed to be a devout orthodox Muslim, was accused of blasphemy on 
the evidence of a single neighbour. The accuser claimed that, while they were 
in a vehicle together, Joko Sembung had called the Prophet Muhammad a 
great deceiver. He was said also to have influenced his family with other 
deviant teachings. He was reported to the police, denied all accusations, but 
was nevertheless held by the police for three months pending trial and then 
sentenced to three years in jail.76
It was not only the law against blasphemy that was used to pursue 
deviance. Yusman Roy was a convert to Islam from Christianity and a former 
boxer. At the pesantren he set up in Malang, he and his followers performed 
the daily prayers in Arabic, followed by Indonesian or Javanese translations, 
on the principle that people should understand what they were saying in 
their prayers. MUI promptly denounced this as heretical and many others 
agreed with this view, including NU’s Said Agil Siradj, who said that among 
the non-negotiable things in Islam are the rituals of prayer. Unsurprisingly, 
the police acted on the MUI fatwa and arrested Yusman Roy. There was, 
however, public opposition to the police action. Ahmad Syafii Maarif of 
Muhammadiyah said that Yusman Roy may have been in error, but he had 
not committed a crime. The prominent kyais Ali Maschan Moesa and Imam 
Ghazali Said of NU also objected to the arrest. Ulil Abshar Abdalla of the 
Liberal Islamic Network ( JIL, Jaringan Islam Liberal, about which more 
below) argued that MUI was in error to condemn Yusman Roy. He was tried 
but not found guilty on the charge of blasphemy. Rather, another law against 
distributing a leaflet expressing opposition to or humiliating another group 
was used to sentence him to two years in jail.77
Continuing this pursuit of deviance in East Java, the local MUI in 
Probolinggo decreed that teachings being used in an alternative drug-
addiction and cancer rehabilitation centre were heretical. This centre had 
been established in 1991 and had dealt with thousands of clients for 15 
years. Now, however, MUI took notice of what was in a book of guidelines 
76 TempoI, 4 Sept. 2002.
77 JktP online, 10 May 2005, 19 Aug. 2005; discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali 
Said, pesantren An-Nur, Wonocolo, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008; Assyaukanie, Islam and the 
secular state, p. 211. An editorial in Tempo, 12 Sept. 2005, supported the conviction of 
Yusman Roy, but said that two years was too heavy a sentence. There are circumstances 
in which bilingual prayers are allowed; see Arskal Salim, Challenging the secular state: 
The Islamization of law in modern Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 
2008), p. 111; Arif Zamhari, Rituals of Islamic spirituality, pp. 174, 185.
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distributed among clients. This reputedly advocated free sex and the belief 
that Satan served God. A mob of hundreds of people attacked the clinic; the 
police stopped them and then charged the centre’s seven counsellors with 
causing a disturbance. They were subsequently charged and convicted of 
blasphemy, and received sentences of three to five years’ imprisonment.78
Not all idiosyncratic versions of Islam have yet been denounced. Near 
Yogyakarta, a movement calling itself Islam Tauhid79 grew, until today it 
can claim some 200 mosques, with its main strength in Kulonprogo. It was 
founded there in 1954 by one Widarso, who was reputed to have supernatural 
abilities and had a background in Muhammadiyah and the Masyumi party. 
Islam Tauhid is exclusivist: one must offer oaths of loyalty (bayat) to progress 
up its ladder of understanding, which has 72 levels. It interprets Islam 
through Javanese concepts, but nonetheless rejects most Javanese cultural 
traditions. For example, it teaches that God is to his creation as the puppeteer 
(dalang) is to the wayang, but its followers are not allowed to attend wayang 
performances. Followers sing songs in Javanese but do not employ gamelan. 
They reject many abangan and Traditionalist practices such as slametans, 
tahlilan and visits to holy graves. They observe the five pillars of Islam (the 
confession of faith, five daily prayers, giving of alms, fasting in Ramadan 
and the pilgrimage to Mecca for those who were able) but, most remarkably, 
Islam Tauhid teaches that in the end prayer is undesirable, for it implies 
that humans can give orders to God. Its opponents accuse it of practising 
black arts and hypnotism and say its people are ‘Javanese who won’t Javanise’ 
(wong Jawa kok ora njawani). During Soeharto’s time, Islam Tauhid was 
suspected of being behind some sort of Masyumi plot, yet it survived and 
now eschews party politics. It is notable that women play a prominent role in 
Islam Tauhid. When prayer takes place, men and women stand in the same 
line, rather than the women being behind the men. 
78 JktP, 23 Sept. 2005. Free sex is an accusation frequently leveled at deviant groups 
across the world in all religions, so it is hard to know when to take the claim 
seriously. I have not seen the evidence on which the MUI made these accusations. 
Given the police enthusiasm for seeking out heresy and the frequent association of 
heresy with sex, it is not surprising that when the well-known guru Anand Krishna 
was accused of sexual harassment, the Jakarta police interrogated him also about the 
contents of his many books; JktP online, 6 Apr. 2010.
79 The following discussion rests upon Ahmad Salehudin, Satu dusun tiga masjid: 
Anomali ideologisasi agama dalam agama (Pengantar M.C. Ricklefs; Yogyakarta: Pilar 
Media, 2007); discussion with Ahmad Salehudin, Yogyakarta, 5 Aug. 2006; emails 
from Ahmad Salehudin, 1 Sept. 2007 and 4 Feb. 2011.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t337   337 6/20/2012   1:21:48 PM
338 Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java
In 1987, after the death of Islam Tauhid’s founder, a female successor 
named Ibu Maimunah introduced the sect into the village of Gunung Sari, 
in the mountains south of Prambanan. This brought conflict and polarisation 
to this hamlet of only some 840 people, who split along lines of religious 
identity. Before 1987, Gunung Sari had a prayer house but no mosque. 
Suddenly it found itself with three, becoming what Ahmad Salehudin 
describes as ‘one hamlet with three mosques’ — one each for Islam Tauhid 
(built in 1987), NU and Muhammadiyah, the latter two having been begun 
in 1988. One would think that a version of Islam such as Islam Tauhid 
would attract a fatwa from MUI, but that has not happened down to the 
time of this writing. In 2007 it was reported that Islamic leaders were aware 
of a rather strange sect in Kulonprogo (and we may guess that this was a 
reference to Islam Tauhid) which had its own pengajian and refused to join 
in the pengajian of other Muslims, but its teachings were judged not yet to 
be in conflict with Islam.80
Leaflets distributed in Mojokerto as Ramadan drew to a close in 2010 
also failed to produce MUI denunciation. These reportedly claimed that there 
was another prophet after Muhammad and criticised usual forms of dhikr 
and Qur’an reading. A PKB politician demanded police action and said that 
if they did not act, NU’s ‘mass organisations’ would be mobilised. But, oddly 
— albeit consistent with the immense variety of what goes on in Java — the 
local MUI was inclined to dismiss the leaflets as insignificant sensation-
chasing and to take no action unless some sinister organisation was found 
to be behind them.81
MUI and DDII leaders sometimes displayed tolerance towards 
indigenous, non- or semi-Islamic practices. The head of DDII’s Education 
Bureau in Surakarta said that activists should not go about ‘chorusing 
here is bid‘a, there is bid‘a; here is shirk, there is shirk ’. Islam exists in many 
cultural forms, he said, and to suggest that being Muslim and being Javanese 
involved a contradiction was an Orientalist idea. The kratons of Surakarta 
and Yogyakarta just ‘want to maintain acculturation of their culture that is 
syncretic’.82 Reaching even further into the Javanese world of the occult, the 
head of Bantul MUI spoke at an arts festival taking place at Parangtritis 
80 Bernas, 21 Nov. 2007.
81 TempoI, 7 Sept. 2010.
82 Arif Wibowo, quoted in Solopos, 19 Dec. 2008. Bid‘a means unlawful innovations 
in Islam and shirk is polytheism.
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on the south coast, the area most exposed to the occult powers of Ratu 
Kidul, the Goddess of the Southern Ocean. Without mentioning that 
powerful spiritual being, he said that not all art forms were to be regarded 
as contaminated by shirk. ‘Because of that,’ he went on, ‘all the activities 
performed at Parangtritis represent enlightenment for the populace of Bantul 
specifically, and for other members of the public.’83
There were some voices raised against the targeting of ‘deviant sects’, 
but they were few and could not alter the tide of events. We noted above 
the criticisms of MUI’s fatwa against the Ahmadiyya that came from 
religious freedom and human rights activists. A demonstration in 2008 
of some fifty young activists in the ‘Yogyakarta Alliance for a Peaceful 
Indonesia’ protested MUI’s judging of groups as deviant. They displayed 
slogans such as ‘Indonesia is not a religious state’ and ‘fatwa deviant: no 
— fatwa justice: yes’. The coordinator said that ‘it is as if the police and 
prosecutors don’t act on the basis of the constitution and law, but rather 
pressure from a particular group’.84 At a seminar at UIN Yogyakarta, most 
speakers regretted the government’s action against groups such as the 
Ahmadis and said that it was the task of government to protect its citizens, 
including minorities. The NU leader Masdar F. Mas’udi said that it was 
up to God to decide what was deviant.85 But many NU figures were fully 
behind the campaign against deviance, as we have seen above. Speaking at 
a commemoration of the founding of NU 82 years before, Ky. H. Malik 
Madany said that there were threats to the faith of NU followers, notably 
fundamentalism, liberalism and deviant sects. NU people should develop 
the principle of the middle way, moderate in the style of NU,86 but in his 
mind this moderation evidently did not extend to those three threats that 
he named. 
There were many highly combative, uncompromising figures involved 
in sniffing out and denouncing ‘deviance’. They were characters whom people 
of all stripes readily described as coarse, harsh, narrow-minded (kasar, keras, 
sempit) and suchlike, thinking of the young Adian Husaini (b. Bojonegoro, 
83 Ky. H. Zahid Ridwan, reported in KR, 28 Nov. 2007. A report on the ‘religious arts’ 
and ‘spiritual dances’ performed at this Festival is in KR, 22 Dec. 2007.
84 Bernas, 9 Jan. 2008; KR, 11 Jan. 2008. This Aliansi Jogja untuk Indonesia Damai 
brought together both Islamic and Christian interfaith and student groups and 
NGOs. 
85 KR, 25 March 2008.
86 KR, 11 Feb. 2008.
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1965)87 of DDII, the older-generation Ky. H. Kholil Ridwan (b. Jakarta 
1947) of DDII and MUI and many another fervent reformer. We have noted 
above the anti-deviance fervor of Hartono Ahmad Jaiz, who also attacked 
Traditionalist Sufism as being ‘the tendrils of the Devil’.88 The atmosphere, 
observed Ahmad Syafii Maarif, had become very nasty.89
87 For examples of his combative (to put it generously) style, here mobilised against 
Liberal thought, see the collection of his essays in Adian Husaini, Membendung arus 
liberalism di Indonesia: Kumpulan catatan akhir pekan ( Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 
2009). He graduated in veterinary science from the Bogor Agricultural Institute, 
followed by a doctorate from the International Islamic University Malaysia.
88 In his book Tasawuf belitan Iblis published in 2001, which (to quote p. 160) 
describes ‘the dangers of bid‘a and … the various rotten ulcers of Sufis or Sufi 
teachings’. See also Arif Zamhari, Rituals of Islamic spirituality, p. 29.
89 Discussion with Prof. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Yogyakarta, 14 Sept. 2008.
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c h a p te r  10
Large-scale Modernist and 
Traditionalist movements 
on the defensive
While there are many individuals and agencies involved in the deepening 
influence of Islam in Javanese society, the largest players are unquestion-
ably Muhammadiyah and NU. The precise numbers of their followers 
c. 2011 are not known, but it is conventional to say that NU has some 
40 million followers and Muhammadiyah something of the order of 30 
million. Muhammadiyah tends to dominate Islamic activities in cities and 
larger towns, while NU is dominant in the countryside. With their educa-
tional institutions (discussed in Chapter 8), mosques, multiple subsidiary 
organisations and health and welfare services, they play a prominent role 
in society.
 It is common for both NU and Muhammadiyah leaders, as well as 
other observers, to describe these organisations as ‘moderate’, to distinguish 
them from Islamist and violent groups, but the term is of limited analytical 
use. Masdar Hilmy’s caveat in this regard is salutary:
We cannot define a clear fault line dividing peaceful Islamism from 
radical and violent Islamism. … In reality, Islamism is on a borderless 
continuum where the boundary between it and so-called ‘moderate 
Islam’ is blurred. In other words, Islamist ideas are contiguous with 
‘moderate’ ones on particular grounds and can gain broad resonance 
within some mainstream Islamic organisations such as Muhammadiyah 
and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Despite their wide reputation as being 
‘moderate’ organisations, some segments of these organisations are 
surprisingly sympathetic to key points of the Islamists’ agenda. That 
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is why their rhetoric can at times be remarkably similar to that of 
Islamist groups.1
It is important to note that, in facing more radical groups like those 
covered in Chapter 12 below, NU and Muhammadiyah have found them-
selves in an essentially defensive position. This is, however, a new experience 
for neither of them. Muhammadiyah’s founding a century ago was to a 
large degree defensive, seeking to defend the ummah against the threat of 
Christian missions. But it also sought to reform Islam, and within Muslim 
circles it held the initiative as it sought to change the way that Islam 
was understood and practiced. Traditionalism has in a sense always been 
defensive. NU was set up in 1926 to defend Sunni orthodoxy and Sufism 
from the Modernist assault, which Traditionalists saw as puritanical and 
which they labeled ‘Wahhabi’. They both sought to defend themselves 
against the threat of Communism in the 1950s and 1960s and against the 
totalitarian aspirations of Soeharto’s New Order in subsequent decades. As 
the 21st century opened, both NU and Muhammadiyah found themselves 
defending their ideas against new, more radical and even extreme ideas and 
agendas in the Muslim community.
Facing a common threat tended to bring NU and Muhammadiyah 
closer together. In 2002, the heads of the two organisations, Hasyim Muzadi 
and Syafii Maarif respectively, along with other leaders, held a closed-door 
meeting in Jakarta. At the subsequent news conference, they expressed 
concern about the rise of more radical voices, and said that in the past 
conflicts between them had distracted attention from concern for minority 
faiths. Now they were determined to work more closely together to resist 
radicalism and to promote inter-religious harmony.2 Such closer cooperation 
was indeed visible as the years passed.3 
1 Hilmy, Islamism and democracy, p. 101. Here Hilmy also cites a similar view put by 
Greg Fealy.
2 JktP online, 3 Jan. 2002. In the wake of the Bali bombings of October 2002, the 
head of UIN Jakarta and prominent Islamic intellectual Prof. Azyumardi Azra urged 
‘moderate Muslim leaders’ to address the issue of radicalism head-on and reject ‘literal 
interpretation of Islam’; JktP, 11 Dec. 2002.
3 For example, the Muhammadiyah leader Ky. H. Kusnin Basri of Kudus said that 
there had been many village-level conflicts between Muhammadiyah and NU in the 
past, but now the relationship was a cooperative one; discussion of 27 March 2004, 
Kudus. The senior NU leader there, Ky. H. Chusnan, claimed that Muhammadiyah 
no longer opposed local culture and that they engaged in joint dakwah; discussion 
of 27 March 2004, Kudus. In 2004, the Muhammadiyah University in Malang 
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NU remains a Traditionalist network led by kyais, with its legal 
thinking rooted in the four orthodox schools of Sunni Islam and its style 
much influenced by Sufism and the long history of Islam in Javanese cultural 
contexts. Consequently, as we have noted several times in this book, its 
ideas could overlap with abangan traditions, such that NU has sometimes 
functioned as a sort of bridge across the santri-abangan divide.4 NU’s kyais 
are still believed to have supernatural capacities, such as communicating 
with the dead. Such communication is an important idea in Sufism, which 
is of central importance within Traditionalism, but it is an idea that divides 
NU thinking profoundly from that of Muhammadiyah, whose Modernist 
rationalism cannot make sense of such a belief. Kyais are also expected to 
know secret sciences such as invulnerability. Such supernaturally powerful 
figures and hidden forces are accepted among Traditionalists and make sense 
to many of abangan culture.
Four criteria to be regarded as a kyai (for there are no formal proce-
dures to do this) were set out by the head of NU in East Java, Ky. H. Ali 
Maschan Moesa:
• ability to read the kitab kuning (the ‘yellow books’ that constitute 
the classic works of Traditionalist Islam),
• popularity as a pengajian leader,
• ability to lead ritual prayer, and
• ability to nyuwuk (a magical blowing of the breath to cure the 
sick).5
A fifth criterion that commonly applies, not mentioned by Ali Maschan 
Moesa, is descent from or authorisation by a preceding kyai.
published a volume of essays from both sides, most of them originally published 
in newspapers over 1999–2003, emphasising the importance of Muhammadiyah-
NU cooperation, with introductions by Muhammadiyah’s Syafii Maarif and NU’s 
Salahuddin Wahid (Abdurrahman’s brother): Ma’mun Murod Al-Barbasy et al. 
(eds), Muhammadiyah-NU: Mendayung ukhuwah di tengah perbedaan (intro. A. Syafi’i 
Ma’arif and Salahuddin Wahid; Malang: UMM Press, 2004).
4 Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said observed that the threat of the Revialist ‘New Salafis’ 
faced both by Traditionalists and followers of kebatinan were bringing the latter two 
together. Discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, pesantren An-Nur, Wonocolo, 
Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.
5 RK, 27 Feb. 2004. In Banyuwangi, nyuwuk is reportedly known only as a black 
magic practice; see Nicholas Herriman, ‘A din of whispers: Community, state control 
and violence in Indonesia’ (PhD thesis, University of Western Australia, 2007), pp. 
101–2.
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Kyais often enjoy high esteem from their communities although, as 
Pieternella van Doorn-Harder reminds us, ‘In real life, it must be admitted, 
there are many not-so-holy kyai.’6 The truth of that observation notwith-
standing, when a kyai or group of kyais hold a major public event, hundreds 
of people from surrounding areas are likely to attend. Such was the case with 
the group ‘struggle’ of Sufi spiritual exercises (mujahadah) led by 15 kyais in 
Yogyakarta in early 2009.7 Or again, when several kyais in Kediri led com-
munal ‘great dhikr’ in commemoration of ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166), 
the founder of the Qadiriyya Sufi order, and of the approach of Ramadan, 
some 7,000 people packed the grounds of the government office where it 
was held.8 
NU continues to be organisational home to charismatic kyais, among 
whom Gus Mus (Ky. H. Mustofa Bisri, b. 1944) of Rembang is a prominent 
example.9 His father and grandfather were respected Traditionalist leaders 
as well. Gus Mus studied in pesantrens in Java and at Al-Azhar University in 
Cairo, where he was a friend of Abdurrahman Wahid and, like him, displayed 
little interest in his studies. He returned to Indonesia in the 1970s. He is 
known for his idiosyncrasies, independence, creativity and lack of pomposity. 
He is also a noted poet and artist. During the national controversy over the 
raunchy ‘drilling’ style of Inul Daratista, which the East Java MUI declared 
to be pornographic, Gus Mus painted a picture of Inul dancing in the midst 
of a gathering of kyais including himself, which he provocatively entitled 
‘dhikr with Inul’. He displays a lack of interest in administrative or political 
roles — having several times declined requests to become head of NU 
— and although he served as a PPP member of the provincial and national 
parliaments for a time in the Soeharto era he found this unrewarding and 
stepped down.10 He has in fact expressed some reservations about democracy 
6 Van Doorn-Harder, Women shaping Islam, p. 170.
7 KR, 8 Jan. 2009; this was an observation of the date of 10 Sura (Muharram), when 
the commended (but not obligatory) fast of Ashura is carried out by pious Sunnis.
8 RK, 11 Oct. 2004.
9 The following rests upon the rather hagiographic but nevertheless useful account in 
[Abu Asma Anshari, Abdullah Zaim and Naibul Umam ES,] Ngetan-ngulon ketemu 
Gus Mus: Refleksi 61 tahun K.H.A. Mustofa Bisri (Semarang: HMT Foundation, 
2005), esp. pp. 65–8, 76, 90,142–8, 202–3, 220, 223–4.
10 He is, however, on the advisory board of the Libforall foundation, founded in 2003 
by Abdurrahman Wahid with the American C. Holland Taylor. Its principle aim is 
to ‘support moderate and progressive Muslims’ in working for ‘peaceful, tolerant and 
free societies’. See the foundation’s website at http://www.libforall.org/.
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handing all power to the people. He is opposed to state imposition of shari‘a. 
He is bluntly critical of MUI and its denunciations of deviant sects, and of 
vigilante violence. He observed, 
If I can make an analogy, if we have a food stall and then there is another 
food stall that is like ours and clearly some or many of our customers 
switch to that stall, what do we have to do? According to me, we have to 
look at ourselves, then upgrade our management, service and the quality 
of the food. … Or at most inform our customers that the other stall is 
not a branch of ours. It is not for us to call the police to shut that stall, 
let alone burn it.11
Another charismatic kyai was Gus Maksum (Ky. H. Maksum Djauhari) 
of Kediri, who died in 2003 at the age of 57. He was famed for his super-
natural capacities and was a striking figure with his long hair, wispy beard 
and simple dress. He was a master of indigenous martial arts (pencak silat) 
and was leader of NU’s martial arts organisation Pagar Nusa. Gus Maksum 
Illustration 26 Ky. H. Mustofa Bisri (Gus Mus) with his painting 
‘dhikr with Inul’, Rembang, 2005 (photo by Virginia Hooker)
11 [Abu Asma Anshari, Abdullah Zaim and Naibul Umam ES,] Ngetan-ngulon 
ketemu Gus Mus, p. 144, quoting comments by Gus Mus published in Suara Merdeka, 
24 Aug. 2005.
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also was believed to be a master of the secret sciences of invulnerability (ilmu 
kanuragan), particularly invulnerability to sharp weapons (ilmu kebal bacok). 
‘That was very useful when the ninja issue erupted in 1998,’ he said (we will 
discuss these ninjas shortly). Tens of his students lived in his house with him 
and were treated as if they were his own children. He also cared for children 
who were the victims of communal violence in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, 
and was a defender of the environment. By the application of coconut water 
and (supernaturally powerful) rituals, he cured drug addicts. When he died, 
it was estimated that more than 10,000 people attended his burial.12
In the orthodoxy-enforcing atmosphere created by MUI and others, 
NU ideas about the occult were at some risk of denunciation. When MUI 
denounced Ahmadiyya, it also issued a fatwa against people believing 
in prophesies (peramalan or Arabic kahana) and supernatural healing 
(perdukunan or Arabic irafa).13 The venerable Ky. H. Idris Marzuki of 
Lirboyo pesantren supported the judgment against the Ahmadis but, he said, 
‘With regard to perdukunan, hang on a minute. If it isn’t in conflict with 
Islamic shari‘a it’s not a problem. The same is true regarding prophesying, 
for prophesying is after all a custom, just so long as you don’t believe in 
it completely.’14 Such beliefs carried on among NU followers despite the 
criticism of non-Traditionalists and MUI. One example is the practice of 
sumpah pocong (shrouded oath), where one swears to one’s innocence while 
wrapped in a shroud and lying in a coffin in a mosque, a practice that may be 
demanded by villagers whether or not police have resolved on the innocence 
of someone. This is done in the belief that, if the person has lied, God will 
subject him or her to torments in the grave.15
The presumed-to-be supernaturally potent and gnomic style of 
some kyais is nicely illustrated by Ky. H. Salman Dahlawi, the head of the 
Naqshabandiyya tarekat (Khalidiyah branch) headquartered at his small 
pesantren Al-Manshur at Popongan, near Klaten in Central Java. When, 
12 RK, 23 Dec. 2003. See further Tim Pengelola Majalah Misykat, Gus Maksum: 
Sosok & kiprahnya.
13 The MUI fatwa of July 2005 may be found at http://www.mui.or.id/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=95:perdukunan-kahanah-dan-
peramalan-irafah&catid=25:fatwa-majelis-ulama-indonesia. For a discussion of 
these general issues in Islam, see Gabriel Mandel Khān, ‘Magic’, in Jane Dammen 
McAuliffe (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān (6 vols; Leiden: Brill, 2001–6), vol. 3, 
p. 245.
14 Quoted in MmK, 2 Aug. 2005.
15 Such a case is reported from Jombang in TempoI, 8 March 2010.
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with others, I visited him in 2006, his room was full of a stream of visitors, 
mostly male but some women, seeking his blessing, advice, supernatural 
intervention, and so on. Ky. Salman was venerable and elderly — he said 
that he was 74 — and conveyed an aura of great sanctity. Everyone calling 
upon him kissed his hand and whispered in his presence. His responses were 
almost inaudible. One visitor opened two bottles of water for Ky. Salman to 
breathe prayers into. On departure, most pressed money into his hand while 
holding and kissing it. Our discussion — such as it was — consisted of very 
few words (partly in Indonesian, partly in Javanese). Why, I asked, is Sufism 
growing in our time, when some people claim that mysticism is inconsistent 
with modernity? Ky. Salman’s answer was ‘watak ’ (character) — possibly 
meaning the ‘character’ of Sufism, or of modern people, or of our times or of 
something else. Afterwards one of his followers said that he did not know 
what the kyai meant, either. The visit left an impression of the influence, 
sanctity and supernatural prowess ascribed to a figure such as Ky. Salman, but 
Illustration 27 Ky. H. Salman Dahlawi, Popongan, 2006
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t347   347 6/20/2012   1:21:52 PM
348 Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java
it was also a useful reminder that the most holy are not necessarily the most 
informative.16 The same is true of the venerable Ky. H. Muslim Imampura 
(Mbah Lim), recognised by some as a waliullah — a saint who stands close 
to God. He is elderly — probably in his 80s — toothless, idiosyncratic, with 
very slurred speech, conveying a welcoming air of conviviality and sanctity 
Illustration 28 Ky. H. Muslim Imampura (Mbah Lim), Karang Anom, 2006
16 Visit to Ky. H.M. Salman Dahlawi, pesantren Al-Manshur, Popongan, Klaten, 5 
Nov. 2006.
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all at once. In other words, a very Javanese sort of kyai.17 He suffered some 
illness in the distant past and since then has been unable to speak clearly. So 
someone close to him acts as a ‘translator’ when he meets people. But, it is 
claimed, when he recites the Qur’an he can do so clearly.
Kyais are frequently called upon to deal with what people think 
are supernatural threats. They may be asked to cure suspected cases of 
individual spirit possession or to exorcise school girls caught up in mass 
hysteria — although in at least one case to no effect.18 The greatest call upon 
their supernatural powers occurred when, in 1998–9, so-called ninjas were 
spotted, particularly in the Banyuwangi area.19 These were reputedly black-
clad villains who could leap over buildings and perform other feats, which 
multiple witnesses were prepared to attest to. Practitioners of black magic 
(dukun santet) were also believed to be at work. Multiple — some claimed 
over a hundred — Traditionalist kyais lost their lives. People mobilised to 
defend themselves and perhaps up to 200 suspected ninjas and dukun santen 
were murdered by villagers. Many of those killed turned out to be innocent 
people who were mentally ill. Such outbreaks occurred in West Java, too, and 
reportedly claimed up to 300 lives.20
In response to the wave of ninja and dukun santet deaths, the prominent 
NU leader Said Agil Siradj told Jawa Pos that black magic was always 
present everywhere, and Banyuwangi was particularly famous for sorcery, 
but it was forbidden by Islam. Black magicians usually inherited their power 
from their ancestors, he said, and had to use it if they were to avoid disaster, 
so they always had to seek human victims. To protect themselves, Muslims 
should read the Qur’an frequently, particularly the ‘throne verse’ (Ayat al-
17 Discussion with Ky. H. Muslim Imampura (Mbah Lim), pesantren Al-Muttaqien 
Pancasila Sakti, Karang Anom, Klaten, 27 March 2006.
18 TempoI, 11 Feb. 2009, reporting a case in Jember, where two kyais and three 
‘paranormals’ had been summoned.
19 The most comprehensive study of these episodes is to be found in Herriman, ‘Din 
of whispers’. See also Nicholas Herriman, ‘The great rumor mill: Gossip, mass media, 
and the ninja fear’, Journal of Asian Studies vol. 69, no. 3 (Aug. 2010), pp. 723–48; 
Arif Zamhari, Ritual of Islamic spirituality, pp. 168–70. Detailed reports of various 
cases and of the various — often dubious — kinds of information available at or just 
after the time may also be found in Abdul Manan, Imam Sumaatmadja and Veven 
Sp Wardhana, Geger santet Banyuwangi ([ Jakarta:] Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 
2001). There were also episodes in Malang, Probolinggo, Lumajang and Lamongan; 
SP online, 20 Oct. 1998; KmpsO, 21 Oct. 1998.
20 JP online, 20 Apr. 1999.
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Kursi, Qur’an 2:255, which speaks of the throne of God extending over the 
heavens and the earth, of God’s omnipotence and omniscience). Any member 
of the family struck by black magic should be taken to a kyai to be cured, for 
many kyais could do this, Said Agil said.21
Again, Keith Thomas’s work on 16th- and 17th-century England 
should remind us that ideas such as these are neither uniquely Islamic nor 
particularly Javanese. Traditionalist Islam in Java was in a position rather 
like Thomas’s description of the medieval Catholic Church: ‘In the Mass, 
the healing power of saints and relics, and the exorcism of the possessed, the 
Catholic Church had a magical repertoire …. It was precisely because the 
Church had its own magic that it frowned on that of others.’ He ends his 
book by observing appositely, ‘If magic is to be defined as the employment of 
ineffective techniques to allay anxiety when effective ones are not available, 
then we must recognize that no society will ever be free from it.’22 
Kyais who convey sanctity and have supernatural reputations are highly 
regarded in a society so steeped in ideas of the occult, but kyais are not just 
other-worldly figures, as we have seen. In Kediri, where they are so promi-
nent, they have been involved in encouraging and facilitating communica-
tions between the giant Gudang Garam tobacco factory and its employees 
when there are industrial disputes. In 2002, for example, the NU leaders 
issued advice (taushiah) supporting the action of the union in defending the 
rights of workers, urging the management to be more receptive and prudent, 
asking both sides to restrain themselves and security authorities not to be 
repressive, and advising all to be wary of provocations.23
Since the time of the Japanese occupation, kyais have been political 
actors. In contemporary Indonesia, NU has adopted a position that rejects 
ideas of an Islamic state, the introduction of shari‘a law or HTI-style 
demands for a caliphate, and instead regards the Indonesian national state, 
governed by the amended 1945 constitution, to be final. We have seen NU as 
an effective employer of violence, particularly during the Revolution and the 
21 JP, 26 Oct. 1998. Said Agil also said that the killings in Banyuwangi had the 
smell of politics about them — as everything did in those days just after the fall of 
Soeharto. On the ‘Throne verse’, see Jamal Elias, ‘Throne of God’, in Jane Dammen 
McAuliffe (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān (6 vols; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001–6), vol. 
5, p. 276.
22 Thomas, Religion and the decline of magic, pp. 326, 800.
23 Taushiah Pengurus Cabang NU Kabupaten dan Kota Kediri, Kediri, 18 Apr. 2002. 
Other examples of such disputes at Gudang Garam are reported in Kmps, 12 Apr. 
2000; KmpsO, 14 Apr. 2000, 14 June 2002; Republika online, 30 Jan. 2003.
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mid-1960s, but in contemporary Indonesia it rejects the use of violence.24 Its 
Banser paramilitaries turn out to guard churches when it looks like trouble 
is looming25 and, it need hardly be said, protected kyais and pesantrens from 
attacks when it was thought that ninjas or black magicians were about.
As we pointed out in Chapter 3 regarding the Japanese occupation of 
Java, there has long been an important difference between Modernist and 
Traditionalist leadership with regard to political involvement. The mainly 
urban Modernists have never had any problems with being engaged in 
political activity, if that could promote their cause. Traditionalist leadership, 
however, consists of kyais whose social and religious standing and influence 
rest upon from their evidently other-worldly gifts and aims. The more they 
become involved in the inevitably rather grubby, compromise-filled world 
of politics, the more others doubt just how other-worldly and pious, how 
close to God, they really are. Entering the world of politics makes kyais seem 
ordinary — the one thing that no kyai should be. And the more ordinary 
they seem, the less people think their advice to be free of self- or party 
interest. Thus, from the Japanese occupation to the present, Traditionalist 
kyais have had to face a dilemmatic relationship between their socio-religious 
standing and their political activism.
It is clear that the involvement of Traditionalist religious leaders in 
politics since the fall of Soeharto has diminished their standing in the eyes 
of the community. The PKB party had its roots in NU and was led by one of 
the most charismatic and idiosyncratic of all kyais, Abdurrahman Wahid. We 
noted in Chapter 7 that his brief time as President of Indonesia (1999–2001) 
was far from a success. His erratic yet domineering leadership style alienated 
many kyais (among many others), so that PKB itself split into factions and 
then in 2007 spawned a competing kyai-led party, PKNU, which, however, 
won only 1.5 per cent of the national vote in 2009 and therefore failed to 
gain a single seat in the national parliament. Even while some kyais were 
getting involved in party politics, other NU leaders protested that this was 
24 NU leaders have made multiple statements to this effect. For example, see Hasyim 
Muzadi quoted in JktP online, 29 Dec. 2002; Said Agil Siradj quoted in JktP online, 
17 July 2010. Of course, no organisation is perfect or in complete control of its 
constituents, especially when they number some 40 million. When hundreds of 
members of NU’s martial arts body Pagar Nusa were on their way to a gathering in 
East Java, they beat up people along the road and put three victims into hospital; 
AntaraNews.com, 15 Jan. 2010.
25 For example, on Christmas eve 2005, Banser mobilised 13,000 members to guard 
churches in East Java and 3,500 in Central Java; TempoI, 24 Dec. 2005.
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inconsistent with their fundamentally moral and religious calling, that it 
caused damaging splits among them and diminished their standing.26 Their 
compromises did sometimes lack obvious holiness. This was notably so in 
Kediri, where PKB accepted the support of one Heri Baung, the boss of 
illegal gambling, alcohol and prostitution and leader of several thousand 
assistants of doubtful piety. He said that he had given up his worst activities 
and went on the hajj in 2003, but not everyone was convinced of this change 
of character.27
One NU leader near Yogyakarta said that NU followers had adopted 
the adage, ‘for studying the Qur’an follow the kyai, for politics follow 
yourselves’.28 Four hundred people surveyed in Jekulo (Kudus) were 
Table 24  Reasons given for supporting political parties in Jekulo, 2004  
 parliamentary election29
Reason given  % of respondents
Felt close to the candidate 40
Party connection with a mass organisation 22
Followed kyai or social leader 13
Attracted to party vision and mission 12
Because of leading figure of party 7
Religious emotion 2
No reply 4
26 For instance, there are such reports in JktP online, 19 May 2007 (quoting the 
Minister of Religious Affairs Maftuh Basyuni and NU’s Ky. H. Masdar F. Mas’udi); 
Kmps, 24 July 2007; Tempo, 29 Sept. 2008 (quoting the top NU leader and head 
of MUI Ky. H. Sahal Mahfudh); Surya, 9 July 2009, 10 July 2009, 14 July 2009. 
Similar judgments were expressed by Ky. H. Malik Madani (discussion, Yogyakarta, 
21 May 2008). My colleagues in situ commented frequently on the declining social 
standing of kyais. Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, however, dissented from this general 
view (discussion of 23 Oct. 2008, Wonocolo, Surabaya), as did Ky. H. Idris Marzuqi 
(discussion of 29 Nov. 2007, Lirboyo, Kediri).
27 There are multiple reports on this, e.g., MmK, 29 March 2004; RK, 1 Apr. 2004. 
Heri Baung’s full name is Ahmad Heri Subagyo. The alliance with him was a flop, 
for most of his followers still voted for PDIP, which led to physical conflict; MmK, 
13 Apr. 2004, 21 Apr. 2004.
28 Yen ngaji nderek kyai, yen politik pribadi-pribadi; said by Drs H. Suharto Djuwaini, 
chair of the Bantul NU and a senior figure in the Department of Religious Affairs, 
Yogyakarta, 15 Apr. 2008 (interviewed by Arif Maftuhin).
29 Achmad Ta’yuddin, ‘Masyarakat toleran’, p. 73. Ibid., p. 111, tells us that of those 
who voted for PKB, 23 per cent said they did so because they were following their 
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asked on what grounds they had made their political choices in the 2004 
parliamentary election. They responded as seen in Table 24, confirming how 
little influence was wielded by either kyais or the national figures leading 
political parties, and how free voters felt to choose whatever local candidate 
they most trusted.
It is a token of the declining influence of kyais that election candi-
dates endorsed by them often failed to win elections. In August 2004, 25 
leading kyais of East Java — led by Iris Marzuqi of Lirboyo — issued a 
call which, they said, rested on ‘spiritual advice from the great ulamas of 
the Hijaz’, that people should vote for the combination of Megawati and 
Hasyim Muzadi for President and Vice-President of Indonesia in the second 
round of the presidential election of that year.30 This was followed by more 
such advice from the leading kyais of Lirboyo and Ploso in September.31 
When the election was held in September, a majority at polling booths 
located at pesantrens voted for Megawati and Hasyim Muzadi,32 but that 
was the end of the kyais’ influence. Overall, 59.7 per cent of voters in East 
Java chose instead the combination of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and 
Yusuf Kalla.33 
Another dramatic example was the 2008 election for mayor and deputy 
mayor of Kediri — a town that is commonly thought of as dominated by 
Traditionalist kyais. They split among themselves in supporting various 
pairs of candidates, all of whom did poorly. The newly elected mayor and 
deputy were ‘cleanskins’ — people without previous party political identities 
— and, even more remarkably, Dr Samsul Ashar (who won as mayor) had 
a Muhammadiyah background and his deputy, Abdullah Abu Bakar, had 
Arab ancestry. The new team immediately showed itself to share the general 
view repeatedly illustrated in this book that as heads of local government 
their responsibilities extended to religious life, for Dr Samsul expressed the 
kyai, 20 per cent because PKB was the party of NU, 46 per cent because they were 
close to the PKB candidate, and only 4 per cent because it was led by Abdurrahman 
Wahid.
30 Seruan ulama pengasuh pondok pesantren, Madinah Al-Munawaroh, 11 Aug. 2004 
(seen in the NU museum, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008).
31 Taushiyah Masyayikh Lirboyo dan Ploso, Kediri, 4 Sept. 2004.
32 This was true at Lirboyo, Ploso, the LDII pesantren and other such venues; RK, 
21 Sept. 2004.
33 Calculated from Tabulasi Nasional Pemilu — Pemilihan Presiden Putaran II at 
http://tnp.kpu.go.id. The percentages voting for SBY and Kalla were 51.7 in Central 
Java and 59.7 in Yogyakarta.
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Illustration 29 Published advice by senior kyais of Kediri for 
NU followers to vote for Megawati Sukarnoputri and 
Hasyim Muzadi in 2004
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hope that the people of Kediri would draw closer to God and become more 
diligent in observing their daily prayers together in mosques.34
In 2009, Radar Kediri editorialised that the public believed ‘that 
many kyais more and more forget about the people. They are distracted by 
worldly wealth and a warehouse-full of ambition for power or office.’35 The 
prominent NU leader Ky. H. Ali Maschan Moesa said that the status of 
being a kyai had become such that there was even a growing tendency for 
the sons of kyais no longer to wish to follow in their fathers’ footsteps.36 A 
group calling themselves ‘The Younger Generation of NU’ (Generasi Muda 
NU) gathered on the town square of Kediri in 2004, performed both an 
exorcism (ruwatan) and tahlilan, and called upon all NU leaders to withdraw 
from party politics.37 In 2007, a Jawa Pos survey of 486 students at 13 major 
pesantrens in East Java revealed that 47 per cent said that they would not 
follow the political choice of their kyais in the upcoming provincial election.38 
The national-level leadership elected at NU’s national congress in 2010 for 
the next five years was led by Said Agil Siradj, who pledged to keep NU out 
of politics.39
Involvement in party politics was not the only issue that made some 
younger people of Traditionalist background dissatisfied with their elders, for 
even kyais’ interpretations of Islam were coming under challenge. We noted 
in Chapter 6 above how, in the 1980s and early 1990s, younger NU activists 
set up organisations such as P3M (Association for Pesantren and Community 
Development, established in 1983), Lakpesdam (Committee for the Study 
and Development of Human Resources, 1985) and LKiS (Centre for the 
Study of Islam and Social Transformations, 1992). These promoted more 
exploratory, Liberal versions of Islam and supported the socially engaged 
activism that followed from them. Thus, Islamic Traditionalist epistemology 
was giving birth to Liberal Islamic agendas, particularly (but not only) among 
younger thinkers. Of the multiple groups encouraging more Liberal thought, 
one of the most prominent was JIL ( Jaringan Islam Liberal, Liberal Islamic 
34 The occasion was an observation simultaneously of the supposed 1,130th anni-
versary of the city’s foundation and of the Prophet’s night journey to heaven (isra’ 
and mir‘aj), where Emha Ainun Najib and his group Kiai Kanjeng performed; RK, 
26 July 2009.
35 RK, 22 May 2009.
36 Discussion with Ky. H. Ali Maschan Musa, Surabaya, 22 June 2007.
37 RK, 20 June 2004.
38 JP, 9 Aug. 2007.
39 TempoI, 27 March 2010, 1 Apr. 2010.
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Illustration 30 Cover of the JIL volume 
The face of Liberal Islam in Indonesia, 2002
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Network), established formally in 2001 but with roots in earlier discussions 
and networks. Jawa Pos became the principle platform for columns written 
by JIL thinkers and activists, led particularly by Ulil Abshar Abdalla (b. Pati 
1967 and son-in-law to Ky. H. Mustofa Bisri [Gus Mus]).
The revolutionary character of JIL can be gauged from the following 
passage, written by Luthfi Assyaukanie (b. Jakarta, 1967), one of its leaders, 
in a book that republished many of the columns originally in Jawa Pos. 
This passage challenges some of the most cherished views among Sunnis 
regarding the Qur’an:
Islam is not a religion that existed with all its concepts in complete 
form at the moment it happened. The religion evolved. … The Qur’an 
is not a book that already existed that was handed down by Gabriel 
to Muhammad and then it was just left to the Prophet’s companions 
to carry it out. The Qur’an was ‘created’ by the place, by the time and 
by the interaction between the Prophet and Arab society. This explains 
why there are many verses which begin with the phrase ‘they asked 
me’. Such verses indicate how much the Qur’an is not a command that 
descended from the skies without consideration of the social context 
and circumstances.40
This was a direct challenge to the view of the medieval Ash‘ari theologians 
that the Qur’an was eternal, which has remained Sunni orthodoxy down 
to the present, in opposition to the Mu‘tazili rationalists’ doctrine of the 
createdness of the Qur’an.41
Ulil Abhar Abdalla also challenged deeply cherished beliefs about the 
Qur’anic verse (33:40) that proclaims Muhammad to be the ‘seal of the 
prophets’, conventionally taken to mean that he was the final prophet sent 
by God. Ulil wrote,
I wish to make a new interpretation of the Qur’anic statement, ‘Muham-
mad is not the father of any one of you men; he is God’s Messenger 
40 Luthfi Assyaukanie (ed.), Wajah liberal Islam di Indonesia ( Jakarta: Jaringan Islam 
Liberal, Teater Utan Kayu, 2002), p. xix. The book had a provocative cover design, 
featuring multiple clocks marking the passing of time and a spotlighted time-bomb. 
By this time, Assyaukanie held undergraduate degrees from the University of 
Jordan in philosophy and Islamic law and a master’s degree in philosophy from the 
International Islamic University Malaysia. His earlier education was in the pesantren 
Attaqwa in Bekasi and he later completed a PhD at the University of Melbourne.
41 On this issue, see Richard C. Martin, ‘Createdness of the Qur’ān’ in Jane Dammen 
McAuliffe (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān (6 vols; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001–6), vol. 
1, p. 467.
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and the seal of the prophets’.42 In traditional interpretation, this verse is 
seen as an argument that Muhammad was the final Prophet. The idea 
of Muhammad as the final Prophet can make it seem as if the Islamic 
revelation is not progressive, as if the history of Islam is not progressive, 
because everything goes back to the Prophet. After all, there is no 
prophet after Muhammad. That is just one possible interpretation.
 This verse, in the standard recitation of the Qur’an, can be read in 
two possible ways. … Khatim means the closing of the prophets, but it 
can also be read as khatam meaning a ring [bearing a seal]. I prefer the 
second reading. Thereby, the Prophet is like a finger among other fingers, 
but this one ‘finger’ is so extraordinary because it wears an esteemed ring. 
Do I thereby believe that the history of prophethood did not end after 
the death of the Prophet [Muhammmad]? I say, yes! That is why I once 
said that all individual Muslims are ‘little Muhammads’ who bear the 
burden of prophetic history just like Muhammad in the past.43
Such revolutionary, iconoclastic rethinking enthused many younger 
Muslims and won attention and respect from both Indonesian and foreign 
scholars of Indonesian affairs; it also attracted support from some kyais, 
but produced storms of outrage from more conservative religious circles. 
In November 2002 a group of 80 religious scholars gathered in Bandung 
(West Java), including Traditionalist ulamas and kyais from various pesantrens 
across Java, as well as people from Persatuan Islam, Muhammadiyah, Partai 
Keadilan (which would shortly become PKS) and others. The meeting 
considered three main issues before them — the recent arrest of Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir in the wake of the Bali bombings, a new anti-terrorism bill and 
an article by Ulil in Kompas of 18 November (perhaps implying that these 
three were of comparable significance). These ulamas issued a fatwa declaring 
that those who insulted Islam should be put to death and called upon the 
police to heed their decision, but they claimed that this was not just aimed 
at Ulil. The police should also break up ‘all networks and activities … that 
insult Islam, God and God’s Messenger’, for there were strong indications 
that an anti-Islamic conspiracy was afoot.44 JIL was obviously what they 
had in mind. Seeking to calm the atmosphere, Masdar F. Mas’udi issued a 
statement on behalf of NU’s advisory board (Syuriyah) making four points: 
42 As translated in Qur’an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem, p. 269.
43 In Assyaukanie, Wajah liberal Islam, 77. Ulil Abshar Abdalla was educated in 
pesantrens on Java’s north coast and then completed a first degree at LIPIA in Jakarta. 
He later did an MA at Boston University.
44 Hidayatullah.com, 4 Dec. 2002; TempoI, 19 Dec. 2002.
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(1) that Ulil’s views were not motivated by a wish to insult Islam, God or 
the Prophet, (2) that physical threats against a person merely because of his 
opinions must be rejected, (3) that in order to avoid misunderstandings Ulil 
should elaborate his ideas and (4) that ‘because there are no human ideas that 
are absolutely true’ the right of others to object to Ulil’s thoughts must be 
respected, no matter how strongly they might wish to put those objections, 
so long as this was done without threats and in a polite way.45 There was, 
however, little politesse noticeable among Ulil’s enemies.
No one tried to murder Ulil at that stage, although he was one of the 
targets of several mail bombs in Jakarta in early 2011 (but was unhurt).46 
In August 2005, a gathering of NU kyais from across Java and Madura at 
Lirboyo pesantren in Kediri issued advice (taushiyah) that JIL should be 
banned.47 This followed upon MUI fatwas of July 2005 declaring liberalism, 
pluralism and secularism haram, decreeing that Muslims should not marry 
non-Muslims,48 rejecting joint prayers with non-Muslims and (as we have 
seen above) renewing an older fatwa declaring Ahmadiyya a deviant sect. 
In these fatwas, liberalism was defined as interpretations of the Qur’an and 
Hadiths ‘using free reasoning, and only accepting religious doctrines which are 
consistent just with reasoning’.49 JIL was unmistakably the principal target.
Traditionalist leaders’ responses to these younger Islamic Liberals were 
mixed, but for the more conservative and hostile among them, this challenge 
came just as they themselves were moving towards more doctrinaire versions 
of their faith. Increasing conservatism and even Wahhabi influence among 
kyais was noted in some quarters, the latter attributed to the experiences 
kyais had while studying and undertaking the pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia.50 
45 The text of the statement of 27 December 2002 may be found in Riyadi, De-
konstruksi tradisi, pp. 181–3.
46 The main perpetrator of this bombing campaign was convicted under Indonesia’s 
terrorism law and sentenced to 18 years in prison in March 2012. Several accomplices 
received shorter sentences. JktP online 6 March 2012.
47 Hidayatullah.com, 8 Aug. 2005.
48 We may note that this ruling was in spite of specific Qur’anic approval for a 
Muslim man to marry a pious Jewish or Christian woman, as indeed had the Prophet 
Muhammad himself.
49 The fatwa texts may be found at http://www.mui.or.id/index.php?option=com_
docman&task=cat_view&gid=65&Itemid=73.
50 This view was expressed in discussion by Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, Surabaya, 23 
Oct. 2008; and by A. Rubaidi and Mashuri, leaders of the Inter-Religious Forum 
(Forum Lintas Agama) in Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008, with reference particularly to the 
kyais of East Java.
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The 1999 national conference of NU passed several decisions that seemed 
narrow in their religious understandings and a rejection of the Liberal 
positions associated with Abdurrahman Wahid. These included forbidding 
inter-religious prayer (not an unusual practice in Indonesia) and declaring 
it unlawful for a non-Muslim to be a political leader. Reversing the 1984 
decision to accept Pancasila as its foundation, the conference declared that 
NU was returning to Islam as its sole foundation.51 This trend continued 
in later meetings, such as the national conference of 2010, which decreed 
(despite the minimum age requirements for marriage in the national law) that 
in shari‘a law there was no minimum age for marriage. It was also decreed 
that Muslims should not be buried together with non-Muslims52 — a greater 
separation in death, we may note, than Indonesians commonly experience 
in life. In the election for NU leadership for the coming five years — in the 
end won by Said Agil Siradj as general secretary and Sahal Mahfudh as head 
(rois aam) of NU’s advisory board (Syuriyah) — the conference rules banned 
anyone with Liberal views from standing. Nevertheless Ulil Abshar Abdalla 
quixotically did so and gained a few votes in the first round.53
We noted at the start of this chapter that NU was a defensive organi-
sation for Traditionalism from the start, and by the early 21st century it was 
perhaps more so than ever. It need hardly be said that a significant decline 
in the standing and influence of Traditionalist kyais as we have noted here 
facilitated challenges to their understandings of Islam. These came from 
Liberal interpretations of Islam, but not only from that direction. Among 
others, the Modernist challenge remained significant, not least because of 
the extraordinary organisational reach and resources of Muhammadiyah. 
As we turn to Muhammadiyah in post-Soeharto Indonesia, let us note that 
the contest for authority that we have been discussing — like almost every-
thing else discussed in these post-1998 chapters — represents a debate 
within an Islamic frame of reference. These are hotly contested arguments 
about what Islam is. All sides, however, accept the dominance that Islam 
should have in the lives of Muslims — which, for Liberals, means essentially 
dominance in their private lives but which, for others, is a much broader 
view seeking conformity both in what people think and in what they do. 
Within Javanese society, there had long since ceased to be any significant 
voice disputing the dominance of Islam. Not even the Christian minority 
51 Bush, Nahdlatul Ulama and the struggle for power, pp. 166–7.
52 JktP online, 27 March 2010.
53 JktP online, 28 March 2010.
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could credibly deny that, however much it might hope to win some Muslims 
to Christian beliefs.
Muhammadiyah remains the foremost Islamic Modernist organisation 
throughout Indonesia, but the tensions inherent in Modernism have created 
problems for it. Islamic Modernism rested from its beginnings on two 
potentially divergent aspirations. The first was to return to the Qur’an and 
Hadith as the foundation for knowing what Islam is. To this end, Modernism 
employed human reason and was committed to modern educational innova-
tions to enhance the capacity of reason. Hence Muhammadiyah’s massive 
presence in the realm of modern education. The second aspiration was for a 
more general Islamic renewal or modernisation (tajdid — a ubiquitous term 
in Muhammadiyah discourse), better preparing Muslims for their encounter 
with modernity. The first aspiration can give rise to puritan literalism in 
the name of rejecting medieval innovations, while the second can lead to 
potentially contradictory openness to innovative ideas of the modern age.
We noted in Chapter 6 that from 1995 onwards, a quite flexible and 
progressive leadership group dominated Muhammadiyah at national level. 
These were people such as Amien Rais, Syafii Maarif, Amin Abdullah, 
Moeslim Abdurrahman and Abdul Munir Mulkhan. When Amien Rais 
entered party politics as the leader of PAN in 1999, Syafii Maarif succeeded 
him as chairman of Muhammadiyah, and was reelected to that position for 
a new five-year term in 2000. Under such leadership, for about a decade 
Muhammadiyah emphasised what was called dakwah kultural (cultural pros-
elytism), which was largely an attempt to bring the Modernist understanding 
of Islam to abangan villagers, a social realm where deeper Islamisation had 
been mainly a Traditionalist enterprise.
A major landmark of Muhammadiyah’s ‘cultural dakwah’ was Munir 
Mulkhan’s Gadjah Mada University doctoral thesis on ‘pure Islam in peasant 
society’, published in 2000.54 Munir Mulkhan posited that there were 
four kinds of Muhammadiyah people, one of whom he described as being 
squarely in the tradition of the founder Ky. H. Ahmad Dahlan in being 
tolerant towards abangan spiritual ideas and practices. For Munir Mulkhan, 
the issue was how Muhammadiyah should adapt its reforming and purifying 
aspirations to the reality of Javanese peasant society. In his view, ‘the spread 
of Muhammadiyah to rural villages is not evidence of Islamisation, but of 
the indigenisation of pure Islam in a special way, consistent with peasant 
54 Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Islam murni dalam masyarakat petani (intro. Kuntowijoyo; 
Yogyakarta: Bentang, 2000).
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tradition, which signifies the emergence of “peasant theology”.’55 ‘What is 
needed,’ he said, was ‘a “new road” of Islam in developing social integration 
in a society that is increasingly open, democratic and plural.’56 He argued 
for the need to rethink what shari‘a is and to return to the ideas of Ahmad 
Dahlan in adopting a more flexible approach to peasant society.
Prominent figures such as Nurcholish Madjid and the Muhammadiyah 
thinker Dawam Rahardjo declared that Muhammadiyah thought had stag-
nated and compared poorly with the innovation seen from Traditionalists.57 
Nurcholish saw mysticism as an important part of Islam and so did some 
of those within Muhammadiyah who found its ideas rather narrow-minded. 
Thus at around this time it was possible to note within Muhammadiyah an 
increasing openness to Sufism of the type promoted by Hamka six decades 
before, that is, ‘Modern Mysticism’, mysticism without a tarekat or obedience 
to a spiritual master (a shaykh or murshid).58 This greater sympathy towards 
mysticism also facilitated greater sympathy towards Traditionalist and 
abangan ideas.
As had been the case in NU, many younger Muhammadiyah 
activists responded positively to this sort of rethinking, but a good many 
— particularly from older generations — did not. A group of younger 
Muhammadiyah researchers studied the local reality in the relationship 
between Muhammadiyah and indigenous cultural practices in Lamongan 
on Java’s north coast, Muhammadiyah’s strongest centre in East Java and 
where it is generally regarded as quite puritanical.59 For the previous 50 years, 
Muhammadiyah had been growing in this predominantly Traditionalist area 
where many local practices of a far-from-pious sort continued. Lamongan’s 
Muhammadiyah leaders were generally opposed to characteristically 
Javanese arts: to wayang, martial arts, village crop-cycle rituals, local dance 
performances and — it need hardly be said — slametans. Local traditions that 
NU followers regard as piously Islamic, such as songs in praise of the Prophet 
(slawatan), were also condemned by the Lamongan Muhammadiyah people. 
On gender issues, they were also at the more puritan end of discussion, 
some even insisting that the parts that a woman should not reveal in public 
— the aurat — include her voice. For their part, NU people regarded 
55 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
56 Ibid., pp. 356–7.
57 JktP online, 2 Dec. 2001.
58 Discussion with Prof. Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Kota Gede, 10 March 2005. There 
were many other indications of this greater openness to ‘Modern Mysticism’.
59 Discussion with Prof. Syafiq Mughni, Sidoarjo, 23 June 2007.
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Muhammadiyah as being culturally ‘dry’ and socially rather exclusive and 
disruptive.60 In his study of another north-coastal area, Mudjahirin Thohir 
commented that ‘when NU and Muhammadiyah … figures gather in one 
room, it is as if they are tolerant, but when they return to their respective 
followings, on the contrary they reinforce the importance of a fanatical 
attitude’.61 Their activities, in other words, were sometimes pursued in a 
highly competitive style, but we should note that both of these north-coast 
studies were done before the post-2001 increase in Muhammadiyah-NU 
cooperation could have significant grass-roots impact.
Some younger Muhammadiyah figures emulated JIL in forming their 
own group, called Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah ( JIMM, 
Muhammadiyah Young Intellectuals’ Network), in 2003. They regarded 
themselves as protégés of Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Amin Abdullah, Moeslim 
Abdurrahman and other leading reformers within Muhammadiyah, but were 
criticised by other Muhammadiyah figures. They held workshops to debate 
how to rethink their faith and reinvigorate Muhammadiyah as a reforming 
(tajdid) organisation, returning to the vision of Ahmad Dahlan. They also 
sought more effective social activism in place of religious formalism and 
criticised others — depicted mainly as graduates of the Persatuan Islam 
pesantren at Bangil and Middle Eastern institutions — who were implacably 
opposed to local culture.62 JIMM has never become as prominent or 
influential as JIL, but it precipitated conflict within Muhammadiyah. When 
JIMM sought to hold a workshop in Kartasura in January 2005, it was 
physically threatened by a group calling themselves the Muhammadiyah 
Youth Generation Preparedness Command (Komando Kesiapsiagaan 
60 Published as Asykuri Ibn Chamim, Syamsul Hidayat, Muhammad Sayuti and Fajar 
Riza Ul Haq, Purifikasi dan reproduksi budaya di pantai utara Jawa: Muhammadiyah 
dan seni lokal (ed. Zakiyuddin Baidhawy; intro. Abdul Munir Mulkhan; Kartasura: 
Penerbit Pusat Studi Budaya dan Perubahan Sosial, Universitas Muhammadiyah 
Surakarta, 2003).
61 Mudjahirin Thohir, Orang Islam Jawa pesisiran, p. 284.
62 Discussion with JIMM group, Yogyakarta, 10 March 2005. Valuable works 
presenting the views of these innovators include Moeslim Abdurrahman (ed.), 
Muhammadiyah sebagai tenda kultural ( Jakarta: Ideo Press and Maarif Institute, 
2003); Deni al Asy’ari et al., Pemberontakan kaum muda Muhammadiyah (intro. Syafi’i 
Ma’arif; Yogyakarta: Resist Book, 2005); Nakamura Mitsuo et al., Muhammadiyah 
menjemput perubahan: Tafsir baru gerakan sosial-ekonomi-politik (ed. Mukhaer 
Pakkanna and Nur Achmad; foreword Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif; Jakarta: P3STIE 
Ahmad Dahlan and Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2005).
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Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah), ostensibly on the grounds that the 
meeting was being held in a Christian foundation-owned building (which 
JIMM had merely rented for the occasion). The meeting was forced to 
relocate to a pesantren.63 Syafii Maarif was sympathetic to these younger 
activists — ‘young Muhammadiyah thinkers whom I always pushed and to 
whom I lent a protective umbrella’ — but he also warned them that ‘what had 
to be defended is the organisation as an institution’.64 That organisation was 
becoming subject to serious strains along the lines of innovators vs puritans. 
While supporters regarded these young intellectuals as the continuation and 
developers of Muhammadiyah’s vision, their opponents denounced them as 
destroyers of Muhammadiyah.65
The more Liberally inclined Muhammadiyah leadership was challenged 
not only by grass-roots realities where more puritan views were strong, but 
also by a returning cohort of younger Modernists who had been educated 
in the Middle East. From c. 2000 these began to consider how they might 
take over Muhammadiyah and save it from what was beginning to be 
called the ‘Liberal virus’. This anti-Liberal group had many prominent 
Muhammadiyah members in its ranks. Prof. Din Syamsuddin, life-long 
Muhammadiyah activist and head of MUI, was offering himself as their 
candidate for Muhammadiyah leadership.66 In early 2005 Din was a 
leading figure at a Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta seminar on the 
theme ‘Muhammadiyah thought: Response to Islamic liberalisation’, and 
subsequently wrote the introduction to the published papers. He wrote of 
Muhammadiyah taking a central position between extremes, but the volume 
was a straightforward rejection of JIL, JIMM and Liberalism in general. The 
younger generation who were attracted by Liberalism, wrote Din, included 
63 TempoI, 1 Jan. 2005.
64 Syafii Maarif, Titik-titik kisar di perjalananku, pp. 349–50.
65 Discussion with Prof. Syafiq Mughni, Sidoarjo, 23 June 2007. He continued to 
give JIMM facilities at Universitas Muhammadiyah Sidoarjo for their monthly 
meetings. In his important study of Bangsri on the north coast, Mudjahirin Thohir 
reports a strong local impression that ‘Muhammadiyah is firm in its organisation but 
brittle in its understanding of faith and shari‘a’ whereas NU is ‘strong in building 
the foundations of its religious understanding but weak in institution building’; 
Mudjahirin Thohir, Orang Islam Jawa pesisiran, p. 282.
66 Din Syamsuddin’s educational background is rather unusual for people on the 
more puritan side of Muhammadiyah: Gontor, followed by a first degree from IAIN 
Jakarta and then MA and PhD degrees in political science from UCLA (1982, 
1996). His opponents depict him as an opportunist prepared to adopt any ideological 
position that suits his interest, which he would no doubt deny.
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some who had ideas so extreme that they wanted to change Muhammadiyah 
into a social activist organisation that was neutral in religious questions. 
Indeed, they thought that ‘Christianisation should no longer be an issue 
for Muhammadiyah’, Din claimed. Syamsul Hidayat of the Universitas 
Muhammadiyah Surakarta wrote of these young Liberals — especially 
‘newcomers’ in Muhammadiyah, he said — having an inferiority complex 
in the face of Western civilisation, so that non-Islamic ideas like liberalism, 
secularism and pluralism could easily infiltrate their thinking. Liberals 
used Islamic concepts and terminology ‘to spread viruses of thought that 
endangered Islamic faith and conviction’. ‘Finally, the structure of Islamic 
thought will collapse’, he wrote.67 Adian Husaini contributed to this volume, 
but also brought out his own collection of columns entitled ‘To dam the 
Liberal current in Indonesia’.68
In 2005 a new Muhammadiyah leadership was elected, headed by Din 
Syamsuddin. Noted progressives were dropped from the central leadership, 
Liberalism became clearly taboo at the top and ‘cultural dakwah’ disappeared 
from the agenda, leaving an embittered faction of intellectuals without 
influence within the organisation.69 One of the leadership figures regarded as 
conservative, Dr Yunahar Ilyas, simply said that ‘cultural dakwah’ hadn’t much 
worked. All the Javanese superstitions would still be strong in a century, 
he believed.70 The more sympathetically inclined Prof. Syafiq Mughni also 
commented on ‘cultural dakwah’ being, by 2007, ‘not so functional’.71 Younger 
67 Din Syamsuddin et al., Pemikiran Muhammadiyah: Respons terhadap liberalisasi Islam 
(ed. Syamsul Hidayat and Sudarno Shobron; Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University 
Press, 2005), pp. xi, xiii, xiv, xvii.
68 Adian Husaini, Membendung arus liberalism de Indonesia.
69 I have heard (somewhat differing) accounts of the 2005 meeting from Prof. Abdul 
Munir Mulkhan (Kota Gede, 22 Oct. 2005 and 13 June 2007), Prof. H.M. Amin 
Abdullah (Yogyakarta, 22 Oct. 2005), Dr M. Hidayat Nur Wahid ( Jakarta, 7 June 
2007), Prof. Yunahar Ilyas (Yogyakarta, 11 June 2007), Prof. Syafiq Mughni (Sidoarjo, 
23 June 2007), Prof. Ahmad Syafii Maarif (Yogyakarta, 14 Sept. 2008) and others.
70 Discussion with Dr Yunahar Ilyas, Yogyakarta, 11 June 2007. He was born in 
Bukittingi (Sumatra) in 1956, gained his first degree in the faculty of theology at 
Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh, followed by postgraduate degrees 
in philosophy and gender studies at IAIN Yogyakarta.
71 Discussion Sidoarjo, 23 June 2007. A post-2005 Muhammadiyah leadership 
depiction of ‘cultural dakwah’ — unrecognizable in Munir Mulkhan’s terms — may 
be found in Imam Muchlas, Landasan dakwah kultural (membaca respon Al-Qur’an 
terhadap adat kebiasaan Arab jahiliyah) (intro. Din Syamsuddin; ed. Deni al Asy’ari 
and Hasanudin; Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2006).
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activists and more progressive thinkers were dismayed at the outcome, so 
much so that it sometimes seemed that Muhammadiyah could fracture along 
the lines of innovators vs puritans.
Despite such internal strains, a commitment to keeping the organisa-
tion together prevailed, Din Syamsuddin moderated his own positions over 
time, and when he was reelected as head of the organisation in 2010, along 
with him was elected a more balanced central leadership board. This was 
partly because the organisation had been brought to the brink of destructive 
polarisation by the conflict precipitated by Liberalism, so that all sides with-
drew from open confrontation, but perhaps more because Muhammadiyah 
and NU both found themselves threatened by distinctly non-Liberal threats 
to themselves at grass-roots level. They had to accept that they were not the 
only ones interested in pursuing an active Islamisation agenda.
In Chapter 12 we will look in greater detail at the origins and 
aspirations of smaller Islamist and Dakwahist movements at work among 
the Javanese, notably those who are Revivalists in epistemology. Pending that 
discussion, here we will see how their wish to spread their interpretations of 
Islam led them to challenge the much larger-scale movements of NU and 
Muhammadiyah by infiltrating them, requiring the latter to take defensive 
measures. By the opening years of the 21st century, suspicions were growing 
that organisations such as Partai Keadilan (shortly to become PKS) with its 
barely concealed aspirations for a greater role of Islam in the state, HTI with 
its aspirations for a global caliphate and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s MMI with 
its aspirations for the full implementation of shari‘a law, were successfully 
undermining the organisational and ideological integrity of Muhammadiyah 
and NU.
At the 2005 Muhammadiyah meeting that elected the more conserva-
tive national leadership, it appeared that Muhammadiyah people who were 
also in HTI, MMI, MTA and even LDII were influencing the direction of 
discussion. It was also becoming clear to some Muhammadiyah leaders that 
they were losing control of some of the organisation’s assets. Muhammadiyah 
mosques, prayer-houses, schools, universities and health institutions, they 
believed, were falling into the hands of activists particularly associated 
with PKS, and Muhammadiyah cadres were drifting towards PKS’s more 
uncompromising versions of Islam. Evidently what was taken over in some 
cases were mosques or prayer-houses that had fallen into disuse or disrepair, 
or were damaged in Yogyakarta’s terrible earthquake of 2006, where PKS 
activists volunteered to fix them up and then — unsurprisingly — conducted 
pengajian and gave sermons promoting their views. Such circumstances did 
not, however, explain the spread of PKS influence in Muhammadiyah health 
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institutions or universities (as well as in state universities, where PKS’s main 
strength was to be found).72
In 2006 the Muhammadiyah leader Haidar Nashir published an 
analysis of the ‘tarbiyah movement’ — the campus cadre-formation circles 
modeled on those of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood — which gave 
rise to PKS. This was a closely argued case for Muhammadiyah to guard 
itself against infiltration by PKS’s ‘puritan and militant Islamic ideology’.73 
The organisation’s publication Suara Muhammadiyah also expressed this 
view repeatedly.74 PKS publicly and privately denied that there was any 
plot afoot to infiltrate or take over Muhammadiyah assets. Nevertheless, 
Muhammadiyah felt threatened.
The external threat posed by ‘other ideologies’ — as it was often put 
in Muhammadiyah discourse, represented above all by PKS — reunited 
the contending wings of Muhammadiyah in defence of the organisation. 
In December 2006 its central leadership, led by Din Syamsuddin, issued a 
‘letter of decision’ that constituted an instruction, in principle binding on 
all organs and levels of Muhammadiyah, to strengthen their discipline and 
reassert Muhammadiyah ideology. It declared that Muhammadiyah must 
protect itself from 
interests of other sides which, either directly or indirectly, openly or sur-
reptitiously, can damage and destroy the Muhammadiyah organisation. 
… All members of Muhammadiyah must be conscious of, understand 
and regard critically that all political parties in this nation, including 
parties that claim themselves to be, or develop wings/activities, for 
dakwah such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) are really political 
parties. Every political party is oriented towards winning power.
72 Discussions with Prof. H.M. Amin Abdullah, Yogyakarta, 22 Oct. 2005 and 13 
June 2007; with Prof. Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Kota Gede, 22 Oct. 2005 and 13 June 
2007; with Abdul Mukti, Jakarta, 8 June 2007; with Prof. Syafiq Mughni, Sidoarjo, 
23 June 2007; with Abdul Haris, Triyono and Hari Widasmoro, Kediri, 29 Nov. 
2007; with Prof. Siti Chamamah Suratno, Yogyakarta, 21 March 2008; with Prof. 
A. Syafii Maarif, Yogyakarta, 14 Sept. 2008; and with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, 
Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008. Also Arif Maftuhin interviews in Yogyakarta of Muslih K.S., 
11 Sept. 2007; Muhsin Hariyanto, 20 Aug. 2007; Abidah Muflihati, 24 Jan. 2008; 
and H. Abdul Salim, 2 March 2008.
73 Haedar Nashir, Manifestasi gerakan tarbiyah: Bagaimana sikap Muhammadiyah? 
(Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2006); quotation from p. 59. Indonesian 
tarbiyah (Arabic tarbiya) means education or training.
74 For example, Suara Muhammadiyah, 15–31 Oct. 2005, 15 Nov. 2006, 30 Nov. 
2006.
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Hence, it was declared, PKS or similar organisations were not to have access 
to Muhammadiyah facilities anywhere for any activities, including ‘activities 
that call themselves or use symbols of religion or dakwah such as pengajian 
and guidance of the ummah’.75 It was hard to deny — although some did76 
— that PKS was the principal (indeed the only specifically named) target 
of this instruction.
Stopping PKS infiltration, however, was unlikely to be achieved merely 
by issuing an instruction.77 One PKS activist reported that the trend for 
Muhammadiyah cadres to go over to PKS was significant and would be still 
greater if PKS had not instructed them to remain within Muhammadiyah, 
thereby avoiding the collapse of the latter78 — and also, we may note, thereby 
maintaining clandestine PKS influence within it. The Yogyakarta PKS activist 
Ilyas Sunnah spoke of people who just happened to be PKS cadres taking 
on roles in local mosques, but denied that there was any takeover plot. He 
said that PKS supplied people to give mosque sermons, but it was impressed 
upon the local mosque organisers that these speakers should not be identified 
as being from PKS. The Muhammadiyah instruction of December 2006 was, 
he said, a warning to PKS to be careful.79 And, we may say, his comments 
indicated that PKS’s influence might not always be visible on the surface.
While Muhammadiyah was acting to defend its widespread educational 
and social service activities from PKS, NU found it necessary to defend itself 
from infiltration by HTI. This was a somewhat surprising direction for a 
threat to come from. Whereas both Muhammadiyah and PKS had roots in 
75 Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, Surat keputusan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 
nomor: 149/KEP/1.0/B/2006 tentang: Kebijakan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 
mengenai konsolidasi organisasi dan amal usaha Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta 10 
Zulqa’dah 1427 H / 01 Desember 2006 M).
76 In discussion of 11 June 2007 in Yogyakarta, Yunahar Ilyas said that PKS was 
just mentioned as an example in the Surat keputusan and that Muhammadiyah was 
neither pro- nor anti-PKS.
77 PKS denied the infiltration (and other) accusations against it in Risalah untuk 
mengokohkan Ukhuwah dan Ishlah, signed by PKS President Ir. H. Tifatul Sembiring 
and Ketua Dewan Syariah KH Dr Surahman Hidayat, dated Jakarta 15 Ramadan 
1428 / 27 Sept. 2007, published in KR, 9 Oct. 2007 (and elsewhere). The Yogyakarta 
PKS leader Kholil Mahmud said that PKS strives to reduce conflicts, that what 
appeared to be conflict was only at the level of the elite, and there was no issue at 
grass-roots level, but he then mentioned several such conflicts; discussionYogyakarta, 
22 March 2008.
78 Arif Maftuhin interview of Sallabi, Yogyakarta, 20 June 2008.
79 Arif Maftuhin interview of Ilyas Sunnah, Yogyakarta, 25 Aug. 2007.
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Islamic Modernism (although PKS is not purely Modernist in epistemology) 
and were largely urban-based, NU and HTI seemed to be from different 
planets. We will discuss HTI’s origins and ideas more in Chapter 12. For the 
moment, we may note that its ideology is Middle Eastern in origin, rejects 
democracy and aspires to a universal caliphate, while NU is deeply rooted in 
Javanese society and committed to the Indonesian national state. From the 
point of view of aspiring infiltrators, however, NU has the immense attraction 
of being very large and loosely organised. The extremist organisations MMI 
and FPI were also believed to be infiltrating NU circles, taking over mosques 
and prayer houses and spreading their ideas through NU pengajian sessions.80 
In fact, it seems that in many cases what was taken over were mosques and 
prayer-houses that had fallen into disuse or disrepair, as was also the case 
with Muhammadiyah facilities that fell under PKS influence.81 However it 
happened, the spread of HTI (and other) influences among NU’s grassroots 
following was a challenge for Traditionalists. NU leaders even received 
reports that at grassroots level there were people who regarded themselves as 
NU but thought that a caliphate was desirable. So leaders went to local-level 
branches to explain the differences between NU and HTI thinking. Meetings 
of around a thousand NU local figures each were held across East Java and 
Madura in 2007, where these ideological differences were made clear.82 
Further attention to maintaining NU’s ideology at grass-roots level followed. 
At least one NU leader told HTI that if they did not stop attempting to 
infiltrate, NU would respond with its ‘organs’83 (i.e., Ansor would be sent 
into action). ‘This movement has attacked us far too often; once in a while 
we need to counter-attack’, another said.84
Such threats to the coherence and integrity of their own organisations 
undoubtedly strengthened the Muhammadiyah and NU opposition to 
militant, extremist, violent or terrorist versions of Islam. This required some-
80 TempoI, 1 Apr. 2007. Also discussions with Ky. H. Dr Ali Maschan Musa (then 
head of NU in East Java), Surabaya, 22 June 2007; and with A. Rubaidi and Mashuri, 
Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.
81 Masdar Hilmy email, 16 Jan. 2008; Arif Maftuhin interview of Drs H. Suharto 
Djuwaini, Yogyakarta, 15 Apr. 2008. The HTI leader H. Dr Muhammad Usman 
insisted that HTI only became involved in NU mosques where local people asked 
them to do so (discussion Surabaya, 24 Nov. 2007).
82 Discussion with Ky. H. Dr Ali Maschan Musa, Surabaya, 22 June 2007.
83 Discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, pesantren An-Nur, Wonocolo, 
Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.
84 Ky. H. Dr Ali Maschan Musa, quoted in JktP online, 5 Nov. 2007.
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thing of a shift in position for Din Syamsuddin as head of Muhammadiyah. 
At the time of Israel’s war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in July–August 
2006, like many religious leaders in Indonesia, Din was bitterly opposed to 
Israel’s military action. Instead of Indonesians going to fight in person, he 
said, they should donate money for Hezbollah and Hamas to buy arms to 
fight Israel. He claimed that Muhammadiyah had already given millions of 
Rupiah to the Palestinian embassy in Jakarta for this purpose. ‘If needed, 
I will personally hand over the weapons to them’, he added.85 Only a few 
months earlier he had said that ‘No religion, including Islam, tolerates 
any use of violence’86 and it was in fact this latter view that became more 
characteristic of these large-scale movements. They frequently reiterated 
their joint opposition also to the implementation of shari‘a law or a universal 
caliphate.87 Such ideas not only threatened the Indonesian state and the 
harmony of its multi-religious and multi-ethnic society, but also — they had 
now learned — threatened themselves. Defending the Indonesian status quo 
thus meant also defending Muhammadiyah and NU.
85 JktP online, 14 Aug. 2006.
86 JktP online, 22 June 2006.
87 For a sample of such statements, see JktP online, 21 Nov. 2005, 3 Feb. 2006, 22 
June 2006, 29 July 2006, 19 Jan. 2007, 5 Nov. 2007, 26 March 2008, 21 June 2008.
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c h a p te r  11
Older cultural styles on the 
defensive
Defending abangan, kebatinan and related ideas and practices
Javanese society has a long history of people believing in a vast array of 
spirits, both benign and malign, who demand respect, awe and propitiation. 
One of the works of older Javanese literature is the Kidung rumeksa ing 
wengi (the song keeping guard at night), a mantra sometimes ascribed 
— pretty improbably — to the wali Sunan Kalijaga, the possession or 
reciting of which will guard one from evil spirits. We noted in Chapter 6 
that jaranan performances may end with a version of this text because of 
its potency as an amulet against evil forces. A related text is the Kidung 
lalembut (the song of the spirits), which includes what is in effect a spiritual 
geography, listing the spirits that occupy various places across Java. One 
early 19th-century version of that work ends with the chilling admonition, 
‘Honour, all (of you), the history of the spirits, at night be it remembered; it 
will become a defence for the ill. Be feared the spirits, all, none dare oppose. 
And when travelling, the spirits and the devils, none shall dare to oppose: 
in the forests savage beasts do run.’1 The long history of Islamisation among 
the Javanese is in some measure a history of the confrontation between such 
indigenous ideas of the spirit world and the different concepts about unseen 
beings that originate in Islam. The Javanese Mystic Synthesis, which had 
been a way to reconcile these different Weltanschauungen, had been under 
371
1 M.C. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi, 1749–1792: A history of the 
division of Java (London, etc.: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 403–7.
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challenge for 150 years by the time we are discussing here, and was by now 
a minority phenomenon.
In Central (but not most of East) Java, older spiritual ideas were 
associated particularly with the kratons. Their influence was a barrier to 
deeper Islamisation, said the senior nyai of Krapyak pesantren in Yogyakarta, 
for kraton influence supported ideas about black magic which made it 
difficult to lead people to God.2 Java’s rulers were widely believed to have 
intimate connections with the Goddess of the Southern Ocean (Ratu Kidul) 
and the spirits of Mount Merapi and Mount Lawu, to be the only persons 
whose supernatural capacities were such that they dared keep the royal 
pusakas without harm to themselves or to the balance of the universe, and 
so on. These ideas remained strong after independence in Yogyakarta, where 
Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX had supported the Revolution and remained 
in office thereafter as the head of the Special District of Yogyakarta (unlike 
Surakarta, where the Revolution ended the Susuhunan’s administrative 
authority outside the court). Hamengkubuwana IX was believed to 
commune with the Goddess and to command other spiritual powers like his 
ancestors, and was widely respected both for such occult capacities and for 
his role as a temporal leader. After his death in 1988, his son succeeded him 
as Sultan Hamengkubuwana X. We noted in Chapter 5 above that he went 
on the hajj to Mecca shortly after his accession and that Embah Wali, the 
leader of the dancing cult of Tugurejo, announced to his followers that the 
Ratu Adil was no more. For believers in older forms of Javanese occultism, 
this was indeed a momentous event. Never before in the entire history of 
Javanese monarchy had a king undertaken the pilgrimage to Mecca. Embah 
Wali was not the only one to think that Hamengkubuwana X’s more Islamic 
persona ended a spiritual tradition in Java and created a cultural issue of 
significance.3
It is my impression that the present Sultan of Yogyakarta identifies 
strongly as a Muslim, carries out Islam’s ritual obligations but also accepts 
local spiritual phenomena, that is, that his ideas are consistent with the 
2 Discussion with Ny. Hj. Ida Fatimah, pesantren Krapyak, Yogyakarta, 27 March 
2009.
3 For example, Nur Choliq Ridwan’s interviews in Yogyakarta with Listya Thohari 
(inter-religious activist and daughter of a prominent Indonesian writer, Ky. H. 
Ahmad Tohari, 27 Nov. 2007), Prapto Darmo (follower of kejawen rituals, 6 Dec. 
2007), Ari Budi (kebatinan activist, 8 Dec. 2007), M. Jadul Maula (LKiS leader, 9 
Dec. 2007). A dissenting view is mentioned in the following note.
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three pillars of the old Mystic Synthesis.4 The Yogyakarta kraton continued 
to carry out traditional rituals under Hamengkubuwana X’s authority. The 
royal pusakas were ritually ‘bathed’ at the start of each year in the Javanese 
calendar. Those that were washed in public — such as the royal carriages — 
attracted crowds who collected the used water in the belief that it contained 
supernatural powers to heal illness.5 Similarly, at the royal graves at Imogiri, 
south of Yogyakarta, there are four pusaka water-containers, each with a male 
or female name as nyai or kyai, which are believed to have specific powers to 
get a husband, bring commercial success, cure chronic illnesses, and so on. 
These are drained and cleaned at fixed times in the Javanese calendar in the 
nguras enceh (draining the water-pots) ritual, which begins with tahlilan and 
a slametan and is carried out by officials of the royal kratons. Hundreds attend 
to gather the water and thus share in the beneficent spiritual powers released 
on the occasion.6 The annual labuhan ritual, when offerings are thrown into 
the water at Parangkusumo on the south coast, the domain of Ratu Kidul, is 
carried out by the kratons of both Yogyakarta and Surakarta. This is also done 
at the summits of Mounts Lawu and Merapi and other sacred locations.7 
In 2000 the Sultan and his wife joined President Abdurrahman Wahid and 
his wife Sinta Nuriyah, the national police chief, various other ministers 
and dignitaries in overseeing a national exorcism (ruwatan nasional) with a 
wayang performance at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, to invoke 
supernatural assistance in facing the nation’s challenges. ‘Our people are sick, 
or motherland is full of sorrow, her tears trickling down,’ said the Sultan, 
explaining the need for ‘spiritual measures’.8
It remained the case, however, that there were doubts as to whether a 
Sultan who was more Islamic in style really commanded Java’s indigenous 
spiritual powers. In February 2005, not long after the horrific December 
4 The view that the Sultan adhered to Islam as taught by the walis and respected both 
Islam and Javanese royal traditions was put by one interviewee: Andi Suryowitono 
(locally born, unaffiliated Muslim, interviewed by Nur Choliq Ridwan, 5 Dec. 
2007).
5 For example, KR, 3 Jan. 2009.
6 For example, KR, 19 Jan. 2008, 20 Jan. 2008
7 For example, TempoI, 9 Feb. 2005; KR, 25 Jan. 2008, 27 Jan. 2008, 3 Aug. 2008, 
23 July 2009; Bernas, 22 Jan. 2008, 4 Aug. 2008. In 2009 the subsidiary Pakualaman 
principality of Yogyakarta revived its labuhan ceremony after a 10-year gap; KR, 8 Jan. 
2009. On Surakarta’s offerings to the goddess Durga in the forest of Krendawahana, 
see Headley, Durga’s mosque, esp. pp. 227–30.
8 TempoI, 19 Aug. 2000.
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2004 earthquake and tsunami that devastated Aceh, there was a rumour 
that a major tsunami was about to hit the south coast areas of Yogyakarta. 
Fisherman would not put to sea and people in general were fearful. To ward 
off this danger, the Sultan ordered people to prepare soup (sayur lodeh) 
with particular vegetables and to make an offering of a 100 Rupiah coin 
(equivalent to about 1 US cent) with a depiction of a mountain on it, to be 
buried in their front garden. Mosques also held group dhikr and recitation 
of the Qur’an seven times; water used on these occasions was then taken by 
the populace as amulets against misfortune. There was, in fact, no tsunami.9 
If the Sultan’s powers seemed to work on this occasion, however, they were 
seriously called into question by a devastating earthquake that hit Yogyakarta 
and surrounding areas in May 2006, killing over 6,000 people, destroying 
large amounts of property and rendering some 1.5 million people homeless. 
Meanwhile, to the north of Yogyakarta, Mount Merapi threatened to erupt. 
Various tales were told to explain these natural events, among them that the 
Goddess of the Southern Ocean was angry because Hamengkubuwana X 
refused to marry her, as all previous Sultans of Yogyakarta had done, and/or 
that she was angry about the proposed anti-pornography legislation (which 
we discussed above).10
Mount Merapi, at just under 3,000 metres, looms over Yogyakarta, 
steadily produces emissions and erupts with sufficiently regularity and force 
that it is easy to understand why local people regard it with respect and 
awe, even believing it to have supernatural power. During Soeharto’s last 
days before his death in January 2008, the shape of Merapi’s clouds was 
interpreted by local spiritual experts as prophesying his death.11 When an 
eruption threatened in 2006, Merapi’s spiritual keeper (juru kunci), Mbah 
Marijan, led various rituals to placate the mountain, which he said was 
angry because of sand-mining that was destroying its surroundings.12 He 
refused to evacuate despite being told by the Sultan to do so, and survived 
the eruption that followed shortly thereafter. The 80-year-old subsequently 
9 A useful analysis of this episode by Imam Subkhan was published in Kmps (edisi 
Jogja), 10 March 2005.
10 This is a brief summary of tales told me by various friends and colleagues during 
a visit to Yogyakarta in August 2006.
11 TempoI, 13 Jan. 2008. The cover story of Tempo vol. 8, no. 20 (15–21 Jan. 2008) was 
about Soeharto’s final illness and Javanese spiritualists’ explanations of what needed 
to be done so that he could depart peacefully.
12 TempoI, 18 May 2006; JktP online, 18 May 2006, 20 May 2006. For other ritual 
activities around Merapi, see TempoI, 19 Apr. 2006.
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Illustration 32 Mount Merapi, with Yogyakarta in the foreground, 2007
became something of a celebrity and was used in the advertising campaign 
of an energy drink. In 2010 his spiritual powers were, however, inadequate 
to control the massive eruption of that year and Mbah Marijan died in his 
house on the mountainside. His body was found kneeling with his forehead 
on the floor, in the position for prayer.13
Kediri lacks a kraton, Sultan or tradition of large-scale offerings to 
spirits, but the city and regency fathers decided that they should have 
something of the sort in order to encourage tourism. From at least 2003, 
efforts were made by the Kediri city Tourism Service to revive local traditions 
that were ‘Kediri specialities’, although in fact most have analogues elsewhere 
in Javanese society.14 Among folk performances, jaranan remains the most 
popular and widespread, with a large number of performing troupes and the 
continuing support of the police force, which itself has several performing 
13 JktP online, 28 Oct. 2010.
14 MmK, 9 Sept. 2003.
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groups.15 Since jaranan usually involves trance and spirit possession, some 
reject it as shirk, but even those who were concerned about this sometimes 
accept jaranan if it was regarded as ‘just culture’.16 A student in a state 
Islamic senior high school (Madrasah Aliyah Negeri) wrote a paper on 
jaranan that included photos of performers in trance. His teachers thought 
this contrary to Islam and forbade him to enter his essay in an Islamic 
student competition. But then the head of the school thought this might 
embarrass the school, so the paper was submitted, whereupon it won the 
local competition and went on to a national-level competition.17 Jaranan 
has the advantage of being cheap to perform, whereas wayang is expensive 
and thus difficult to put on. Consequently, there are few wayang performers 
remaining in Kediri regency.18 One of the tasks of the Kediri city secretary, 
Drs H.M. Zaini, was to offer guidance and encouragement to local jaranan 
troupes and to clean up the art’s less salubrious aspects such as gang fights 
and drunkenness.19 A curious local performance in Kediri that still attracts 
audiences is tiban, which requires both physical and spiritual preparations, 
such as no sexual relations for three days before a performance, fasting and 
recitations of mantras. Performers whack each other up to five times with 
fearsome whips made of palm leaf ribs, with serrations from middle to 
tip. Tiban is usually performed during the dry season and the consequent 
drawing of blood is said to bring rain.20 (This is not, perhaps, the most 
sophisticated of folk performances to be found in Java.)
Kediri already had local holy sites and sacred graves that attracted 
pilgrims, as are found across Java, but they were not on a sufficient scale 
for local government’s needs, it seems. Kediri did, however, have the great 
15 MmK, 4 July 2005, 11 Aug. 2005.
16 Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi asked several female interviewees in Kediri about 
this matter in June 2008, with mixed outcomes. Their main informants were the 
President of the Kediri STAIN student body Ratna M. (18 June 2008), the head of 
a village NU branch Inisiyah (2 July 2008), and a teacher at an Islamic school Wahyu 
Eka Nugraha (18 June 2008).
17 RK, 27 July 2007.
18 Discussion with Suradi, the head of the Arts and Culture section of Kabupaten 
Kediri, 16 March 2005.
19 Discussion with Drs H.M. Zaini, Kediri, 26 Nov. 2007. Zaini later sought to 
mobilise jaranan groups to win support for his 2008 bid to be elected mayor, which 
failed.
20 There are accounts of tiban performances in RK, 23 May 2004; MmK, 22 Nov. 
2004, 17 March 2005, 10 Nov. 2005.
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Brantas River and Mount Kelud, just over 3,200 metres high and with a 
destructive history, so these became the focus for newly invented ‘sacred’ 
traditions. From 2002 the popular mayor of Kediri, H.A. Maschut, led 
an annual ‘throwing of offerings’ (larung sesaji) into the Brantas River 
— prominent among them the head of a water buffalo — in a rather pale 
imitation of the kratons’ labuhan ceremonies.21 Mount Kelud had its own 
spiritual guardian — Mbah Ronggo — but there were no particular rituals 
associated with the mountain. Indeed there were spirits there, he said, along 
with certain prohibitions from the ancestors (e.g., one should not applaud), 
as well as a source of sacred water at some distance from the crater, but 
there were no sacred sites near the crater itself.22 So from 2005 a new larung 
sesaji tradition had to be invented at the mountain, led by Bupati Sutrisno 
of Kediri regency (whom we have met before as a promoter of grass-roots 
Islamisation) and other regency-level luminaries. Sutrisno was himself a 
successful entrepreneur and even suggested that Kediri’s local attractions 
could be marketed overseas for the purposes of tourism; this is how Bali 
started, he observed.23 This new larung sesaji at Kelud attracted crowds of 
several thousand and was thus thought to be a success from the tourism 
point of view. To invent this new — and obviously not Islamic — ritual for 
propitiating local spirits, the Hindus of Kediri were asked to officiate, and 
Mbah Ronggo was also involved.24 The Gudang Garam tobacco company 
in Kediri also had its own larung sesaji ritual, going to the south coast and 
taking offerings out to sea in a boat — a risky enterprise on that coast. In 
2004, the boat was rolled by a 5-metre wave, but all were saved. This was 
proof, said the oversight committee, of the power of the company’s team 
of meditators. Memo Kediri reported the incident with a headline (perhaps 
not entirely tongue-in-cheek) proclaiming, ‘Gudang Garam subdues the 
Southern Ocean’.25
21 RK, 23 July 2004; this ceremony at the Brantas is reported annually thereafter in 
Kediri newspapers. Kediri also invented a manusuk sima (stabbing the free domain) 
ritual; on at least one occasion this involved a procession with Mayor Maschut 
playing the role of the ancient king Rakai Kayuwangi; MmK, 28 July 2005.
22 Discussion with Mbah Ronggo, Sugihwaras, 3 March 2006.
23 MmK, 21 Nov. 2005.
24 RK, 17 May 2005, 18 Sept. 2006, 10 Nov. 2008.
25 MmK, 26 June 2004; see also RK, 25 June 2004. A similar ‘mystical incident’ 
surrounding a labuhan on the coast south of Yogyakarta is reported in Bernas, 30 
Oct. 2007.
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The small HTI and PKS groups in Kediri objected to these new 
ceremonies that smacked of polytheism (shirk),26 but the need for symbols 
of local identity and tourism were evidently overriding considerations for the 
local governments promoting them. So far as I am aware, the kyais of Kediri 
did not comment on these new ‘traditions’, at least in public. Mount Kelud 
itself, however, seem dissatisfied, for the deep lake previously found in the 
crater disappeared as a new lava cone arose in its place and the mountain 
seemed close to eruption. A local kebatinan figure explained that this was 
all because the ritual was wrongly done there, so she was taking propitiatory 
ritual steps herself.27 Kebatinan believers may conclude that those measures 
worked, for there has been no eruption to the time of this writing.
Illustration 33 Larung sesaji (throwing of offerings) at Mount Kelud, 
Kediri, by Hindu officiants, 2008, a ‘tradition’ invented in 2005 
(photo by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi)
26 Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi interviews with Sulistyo Budi (chairman of PKS 
for Kabupaten Kediri), Kediri, 19 Oct. 2006; and with Khutub Amrullah (chair of 
HTI Kediri), Kediri, 1 Nov. 2006. PKS was, however, prepared to accept that these 
ceremonies were ‘folk culture’ — even though they had in fact been newly invented.
27 Discussion with Ibu Sudarmi, Kediri, 27 Nov. 2007.
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In Karanganyar regency, just southeast of Surakarta, another tradition 
was invented in 2005 and also attracted objections from Islamic purists. This 
was called Garebeg Lawu (Lawu festival), a programme of activities over 
several weeks on Mount Lawu — a site long associated with indigenous 
spiritual forces28 and where Hindu communities still exist. The activities 
attracted those with an interest in both the natural world and the realm 
of unseen spirits. Sufi dancing and dhikr were performed, but also people 
from kebatinan and Hindu backgrounds undertook rituals at the 15th-
century Hindu temple Candhi Sukuh and did ascetic exercises at the top of 
the mountain. There was ritualised planting of trees in celebration of links 
with nature, a pusaka kris from the Mangkunagaran palace in Surakarta was 
ritually ‘bathed’, a ceremony was carried out at Parangkusumo (Parangtritis) 
on the south coast, and so on. A leading figure was Suprapto Suryadarmo, 
who believed that Javanese should rediscover ‘the way of Majapahit’ and the 
‘mystical sciences’ (ngelmu) of that way — the sort of idea that infuriates 
Revivalists. Muhammadiyah and PKS were reportedly unhappy about this. 
The Bupati of Karanganyar — Hj. Rina Iriani, one of Java’s female Bupatis 
— had to deflect stronger objections from LDII, MMI, Mohammed Kalono 
and the frequently violent FPIS (discussed in Chapter 12). Nevertheless, she 
continued to support the festival in the interest of tourism.29
Large-scale public exorcisms (ruwatan) were performed quite often, 
reflecting a widespread sense that Indonesia was plagued by an unusually 
high level of natural disasters in the early 21st century. These were often 
funded by local governments and involved local dignitaries.30 Unlike 
the new ‘traditions’ of Kediri and Karanganyar, we may accept that these 
exorcisms were done less for any tourism considerations than as response 
to genuine beliefs that some malign supernatural powers were behind 
the deadly earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions and land-slips that 
seemed so common, and which devastated so many lives. Puppeteers who 
performed such ruwatans still had to meet stringent personal requirements 
28 Solopos, 10 Oct. 2000, contains a discussion of Lawu as the centre of Javanese 
supernatural forces.
29 Discussions with Hj. Rina Iriani Sri Ratnaningsih et al., Karanganyar, 20 Oct. 
2005; with Suprapto Suryadarmo, Karanganyar, 12 and 14 March 2005; and with 
Slamet Gundono, Surakarta, 1 Oct. 2005.
30 For example, TempoI, 19 Aug. 2000 (on the ruwatan nasional in Yogyakarta, 
described above); Kmps, 23 March 2005 (Blora); Kmps ( Jawa Timur), 7 March 2005 
(Surabaya).
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and undertake spiritual preparations for their task.31 At village level, too, 
exorcisms might still be performed for genuine purposes of spiritual healing, 
as in a village near Yogyakarta where a ruwatan and mass spiritual exercises 
were undertaken after a series of suicides.32
Among the many spirits of Java, the foremost remains Ratu Kidul, 
the Goddess of the Southern Ocean. She has already appeared several 
times in this book. Islamic reformers are likely to regard her as the Javanese 
superstition that most stands in the way of a truly Islamic society, but many 
people believe her really to exist. It is quite common to encounter people 
who say that, according to the Qur’an, God created both humans and 
spiritual creatures, and Ratu Kidul is among the latter. That view was, for 
example, accepted by the head of the Surakarta branch of the Department of 
Religious Affairs, who also said that there are people who can communicate 
with spirits.33 One writer who publishes particularly on mystical matters 
produced an entire book on ‘Her Highness Ratu Kidul in the perspective of 
Javanese Islam’. He argues that belief in the Goddess represents ‘awareness 
that there is another life behind the life of the physical realm …. Therefore, 
belief in her existence and position as one of the creatures “chosen” by God 
(because she takes on a special task) is not among the kinds of beliefs that 
are forbidden.’34 Ki Supriyoko, criticised in some circles for increasing the 
influence of Islam within Taman Siswa schools and who established his own 
pesantren, also assured me of the reality of Java’s spirits. In his pesantren, the 
gamelan instruments play by themselves on some evenings, which he has 
heard himself. And spirits have been seen at the school, he said.35
Below the level of kraton- or local government-supported rituals, village 
observances carry on, in many cases with little influence from any reformed 
version of Islam. The annual village cleansing (bersih desa) ceremonies are 
still observed in many places, although they have also died out in others. 
Such observances are now sometimes a more Islamised mix of Traditionalist 
Islamic with abangan practices: beginning with tahlilan, slawatan and/or 
dhikr, proceeding to tayuban dancers and all-night wayang kulit if it can be 
31 KR, 15 June 2008, discusses these requirements on the basis of information from 
the 82-year-old dhalang Ki Cipto Subali.
32 This was at Kelurahan Gading, Kecamatan Playen; KR, 20 Dec. 2008.
33 Discussion with Drs Hasan Kamal, Surakarta, 19 Oct. 2005.
34 Muhammad Sholikhin, Kangjeng Ratu Kidul dalam perspektif Islam Jawa (Yogya-
karta: Narasi, 2009); quote from pp. 286–7.
35 Discussion with Prof. Ki Supriyoko, pesantren ‘Insan Cendekia’, Donokerto, 
Sleman, Yogyakarta, 22 March 2008.
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Illustration 34 Hindu statue (Durga Mahiśasuramardini) discovered in Kediri, 
with offerings, 2007 (photo by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi)
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afforded.36 In some cases, people may think this to be ‘just culture’, but no 
doubt many villagers still believe — or at least dare not disbelieve — in the 
spiritual forces associated with such practices. It is not surprising in this 
context that when some very beautiful Hindu statues were unearthed in 
Kediri, locals at first thought them to be ‘empty’. But Hindu Balinese visitors 
declared the spirits of these statues to be ‘alive’, whereupon local people 
began placing offerings for them.37 In another case, when an ancient temple 
was discovered in a rice field, people came to lay offerings in the hope of 
getting winning lottery numbers in return.38
In Sleman, Ky. H. Masrur Ahmad is an NU leader who has con-
siderable influence, even though his own pesantren is relatively small. He 
does supernatural healing, mass circumcisions and pengajian from village 
to village. Like the Ihsaniyyat leader Ky. H. Abdul Latif in Kediri, he has 
supported abangan-style arts, including jaranan (jathilan), to attract abangan 
to his teaching. He interprets the jaranan performers’ trance as a kind of 
dhikr, which in Sufi thought can lead to fana’ (mystic loss of self ). In his 
view, one must care for all creatures, including spirits such as Sunan Lawu 
and Ratu Kidul. Such ideas of course attract criticism from others, above all 
from Modernists.39
The fate of kebatinan movements40 since the fall of Soeharto has been 
mixed. One can find as many people who think that they are reviving as 
think that they are declining, and the evidence gathered for this book is 
36 Reports on such observances are found regularly, especially around the beginning 
of the year in the Javanese calendar. For example, Kmps, 1 Apr. 2009; Bernas, 12 July 
2008; KR, 29 Oct. 2007, 11 July 2008, 5 May 2009, 12 May 2009, 6 June 2009, 14 
June 2009,15 June 2009, 30 June 2009. Tempo, 17 Apr. 2005, carried an extensive 
description of village rituals in the month of Sapar in Central Java and Yogyakarta.
37 Email from Suhadi Cholil, 11 Feb. 2007.
38 RK, 5 Aug. 2004.
39 Information from Muhammad Hanif, Yogyakarta, 20 Oct. 2005, who had 
completed a postgraduate thesis on Ky. Masrur. On fana’, see F. Rahman, ‘Baḳā’wa-
Fanā’’ in P. Bearman et al. (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed.), vol. 1, p. 951, which 
defines this as ‘(1) the passing-away from the consciousness of the mystic of all 
things, including himself, and even the absence of the consciousness of this passing-
away and its replacement by a pure consciousness of God, and (2) the annihilation 
of the imperfect attributes (as distinguished from the substance) of the creature and 
their replacement by the perfect attributes bestowed by God.’
40 Kebatinan groups now prefer to call themselves kejawen ( Javanese — implying 
that they are authentically Javanese) or penghayat (instillers — i.e., instillers of their 
beliefs), but we will retain the older term here to avoid confusion.
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inconclusive. Whether they are growing or not, their numbers seem small in 
comparison with pre-Soeharto days. Surakarta is an interesting case in this 
regard. It is part of the social polarisation there that both reforming religious 
movements such as MTA, the Assalaam school and the Revivalism of Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir should co-exist in uncomfortable tension (and sometimes 
conflict) with abangan, kebatinan and Christian Javanese. In the early post-
Soeharto years, the PDIP leadership in Surakarta was inclined to the view 
that there were more abangan than devout Muslims in the city, with the 
former stronger in north Surakarta and the latter in the south, and that 
abangan represented PDIP’s core political constituency.41 There was some 
evidence to support this, but by the time of the 2004 election such aliran-
type voting patterns were hardly visible any longer42 and, as we have seen 
above, PDIP was taking steps to accommodate devout Muslims. Certainly 
kebatinan groups — the largest among them being Sumarah and Pangestu 
— exist in Surakarta, but it is doubtful that their following is anywhere   near 
the scale known before 1965. In the more radical and polarised environment 
of Surakarta, the ‘paranormal’ Soetiyono Tjokroharsoyo is a one-man anti-
Islamic protest movement. He has a strong line in anti-Islamic jokes and 
proudly wears a shirt that proclaims, ‘My ancestry is Majapahit and my 
guardian is Sabda Palon’,43 thus invoking the anti-Islamic figure of Babad 
Kedhiri and the other works originally written in the 1870s, described above.
In Surabaya, too, people speak of kebatinan being strong,44 but its 
strength is limited and leading kebatinan exponents are concerned about the 
tendency for the government and police to shut down groups described as 
deviant.45 In Kediri, Ki Bagus Ponari, a Sapta Darma figure and head of an 
organisation of kebatinan groups, said that there were about 120 kebatinan 
followers in the town and about 6,000 in the regency.46 Another leader 
41 Discussions with F.X. Hadi Rudyatmo (PDIP Chairman), Surakarta, 25 Aug. 
2003; Ky. H. Dian Nafi, Surakarta, 30 March 2004.
42 Discussion with Surakarta Electoral Commission members, 12 March 2005.
43 Discussion with Soetiyono Tjokroharsoyo, Surakarta and Klaten, 2 Nov. 2006.
44 Discussion with the Protestant (Gereja Kristen Indonesia) pastor Simon Philan-
tropha, Surabaya, 24 Nov. 2007.
45 Discussion with Drs KRAT Basuki Prawirodipuro and KRT Giarto Nagoro, 
Surabaya, 25 Nov. 2007. Similar comments were made by another kebatinan figure, 
Drs Sulistyo Tirtokusumo, at a seminar in Yogyakarta; KR, 27 March 2008.
46 Comments by Ki Bagus Ponari, at seminar at Institute Agama Islam Tribakti 
(IAIT), Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007. IAIT was founded in 1966 by Ky. H. Mahrus Aly. 
It now has some 2,500 students and is, in effect, pesantren Lirboyo’s tertiary-level 
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said that Sapta Darma has been growing again since 1998 in Kediri and by 
2004 claimed 25 places of worship (sanggar) and perhaps 2,000 followers 
in the area.47 Across the whole of Indonesia, Sapta Darma claimed to have 
about four million followers in 2008. In the Special District of Yogyakarta 
there were then 15 sanggars and about 3,000 followers.48 Such numbers are 
of significance, but they are not particularly impressive when set against 
the scale of Java’s population. The appeal of kebatinan seems to be limited 
not just by the process of Islamisation. Another kebatinan practitioner in 
Illustration 35 Soetiyono Tjokroharsoyo’s one-man anti-Islamic shirt protest: 
‘My ancestry is Majapahit and my guardian is Sabda Palon’, Surakarta, 2006
institution. Ki Bagus Ponari is not to be confused with a faith-healer named Ponari; 
see KR, 23 Feb. 2009, 3 March 2009. A list of kebatinan organisations in the city 
and Kabupaten of Kediri names Sapta Darma and 20 other such groups, but without 
any indication of the size of their followings; Dewan Pengurus Daerah, Badan 
Kerjasama Organisasi Kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa (B.K.O.K.), 
Kota/Kabupaten Kediri, 15 Jan. 2008.
47 Suhadi Cholil’s interview with Pak Sarjan, Papar, 4 May 2004.
48 KmpsO, 14 Oct. 2008.
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Kediri, Ibu Sudarmi — who is said to be an avatar of a female spirit called 
Ratu Diah Pithaloka — lamented that the young were distracted from the 
beliefs of the ancestors by foreign culture, television soap operas and their 
mobile phones.49
Local-level kebatinan movements exist without the larger-scale organi-
sation or identity of movements such as Pangestu, Sumarah, Sapta Darma or 
Subud. One such group near Klaten call themselves wong kere (the beggars), 
having been founded by a man they revere as Ki Kere — reminiscent of 
Chapter 5’s Embah Wali of Tugurejo, who was regarded by his followers 
as kerene ratu, the ‘king’s beggar’. Symbolising their rejection of normal 
conventions, the wong kere do things in reverse. They shake hands with the 
left hand and their leader, who is an ordinary peasant farmer, has a wall 
clock whose hands rotate counter-clockwise. They recognise and honour 
God and deny that there are any other spiritual creatures, but reject Islam’s 
practices. Each day they pay obeisance to God, then to the earth (for ‘it 
is the earth that brings existence to life’) and then pay honour to the four 
cardinal directions. They regard Pancasila as their spiritual guide and reject 
all forms of organisation. This includes supporting no political party.50 
Although they have no written work of scripture, they did keep a typescript 
copy of Dermagandhul dating from 2001, taken from the Tan Khoen Swie 
publication of 1921.
In the very village where Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s school is found there 
is also a kebatinan group. They have neither gurus nor disciples, but merely 
gather together to discuss the visions they receive in meditation. These 
visions have, they claim, predicted major national events such as the tsunami 
of December 2004 and the outcome of elections. Their aim is direct contact 
with God and, although they say that their doctrines are secret, they accept 
a description of their ideas as ilmu kasampurnan (the mystical sciences of 
perfection) — a venerable term in Javanese mysticism. ‘Javanese culture is 
more pure than religion’, they say. Their prayer is a nine-line recitation that 
reflects the diverse religious upbringings of the group, invoking God, then 
Jesus, then the secret of God: ya Allah (x3), ya Yesus (x3), sir Allah (x3).51 A 
similar group meets in Kedungtungkul (north Surakarta), some of them of 
Christian background and some Muslim. They fast according to the Javanese 
49 Discussion with Ibu Sudarmi, Kediri, 27 Nov. 2007.
50 Discussion with Warno Sawito, Jonggrangan, Klaten, 2 Nov. 2006.
51 Discussion with Bu Amin, Pak Pardi and others of this group, Cemani, Ngruki, 
11 March 2005.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t386   386 6/20/2012   1:22:03 PM
Older Cultural Styles on the Defensive 387
35-day cycle and regard that as superior to Islamic fasting; they take their 
mystical knowledge (ngelmu) from Islam or any other source. The head of 
their local mosque (the modin) is, they say, a kejawen paranormal who knows 
the local spirits and has never been known to pray in the orthodox Muslim 
fashion. ‘Do not seek pleasure, rather seek tranquility’, they say, and ‘do not 
seek wealth, rather seek to have enough’.52 On the slopes of Mount Lawu is 
a group calling themselves Parabu, from Pangudi Rahayuning Budi (Striving 
for Virtue). They engage in ascetic practices such as pilgrimages to mountain 
sites and meditating while submerged in rivers up to their necks (kungkum). 
They have had encounters with Sunan Lawu and are able to meet Ratu 
Kidul, we are told.53 In Gunung Kidul, many people reportedly engage in 
kungkum at night during the first month of the Javanese year and visit holy 
graves in the hope of receiving supernatural inspiration.54
Near Tegal is a group with Buddhist-like teachings that they say are 
handed down from the time of Majapahit.55 Despite the New Order’s bloody 
suppression of what seems to have been a version of the older Saminist 
movement in Blora and Ngawi in 1966 (discussed in Chapter 5 above), 
Saminist communities survive, with their rejection of outside authority and 
emphasis upon sexuality, agricultural labour and passive resistance.56 In 
the Magelang area, near the Borobudur temple, is found a kebatinan group 
calling themselves Kawruh Urip Sejati (True Knowledge of Life) with some 
3,000 followers.57 Similar movements can be found in other places, but so 
far as I am aware none are of any great size.
The limited influence and prospects of kebatinan movements is a 
function of their nature as much as their size. The organisations of Islamic 
activists and zealots of the kind that we will discuss below and characterise 
as the protagonists in our drama, in many cases would be no larger than 
some of these kebatinan movements. But kebatinan has been on the defensive 
for over 40 years and has got used to keeping a low profile in a game in 
which the recognised world religions seem to be the only legitimate players. 
52 Discussion with a group of the villagers of Kedungtungkul, Jebres, Surakarta, 31 
March 2004.
53 Discussion with the Parabu leader Sularto Hardipartono, Ngargoyoso, Kemuning, 
Karanganyar, 11 Sept. 2008.
54 KR, 9 Jan. 2009.
55 This group is called Maneges; email from Suhadi Cholil, 27 Apr. 2008.
56 There is lengthy reporting about Saminists in Bojonegoro in Kmps, 4 March 
2005.
57 Bernas, 18 Jan. 2008.
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Moreover, as we have just noted, it is common for such movements to 
reject outside authority, to seek to live within a limited village community 
insulated as far as possible from outside interference, and to seek both the 
social and personal harmony that such insulation can bring. Unlike in the 
days of aliran politics, no political party can be called the party for kebatinan 
adherents. It is rare for such movements to proclaim any political allegiance 
(although two ‘paranormals’ did claim to have mobilised their powers to 
give strength to Amien Rais as a presidential candidate in 2004).58 It is 
precisely this antipathy to organisation, this rejection of institutionalisation 
that makes such movements vulnerable to influence (indeed, to threats) from 
better-organised religious organisations. Add to that the impact of religious 
education in schools, the widespread dakwah activities we have frequently 
noted, Ibu Sudarmi’s lament (quoted above) about the young being distracted 
by foreign culture, television soap operas and their mobile phones, and the 
wish of many movements principally to be left alone to seek harmony — and 
it is hard to imagine that kebatinan’s prospects can be very rosy in Java.
Among kebatinan people, some claim to be at the same time practicing 
Muslims who carry out the five pillars of orthopraxy59 but others have been 
attacked by religious zealots on a charge of deviancy. One movement that 
has suffered in this way is called Tri Tunggal (Three-in-One); this is a term 
also used in Indonesian Christian circles for the concept of the Trinity, and 
no doubt makes Tri Tunggal a particular target for angry Islamic zealots. 
In this case, however, the trinity that is meant is the three-in-one in the 
human being of body, ‘thinking-spirit’ (jiwa pikiran) and soul. While it is 
rooted in Javanese kebatinan-style rituals, which it has performed publicly 
on a large scale, it also seeks to act as a bridge across religious traditions in 
the interest of promoting harmony. The founder was one Sapto Rahardjo 
(later called Sat Guru Sabdo Langit IV, the ‘heaven-speaking guru’), 
who — like some other leaders of the movement — is a Catholic, but 
one steeped in indigenous Javanese traditions. He was born in 1974 in 
Yogyakarta to priyayi parents, his father a military officer. With parental 
encouragement, the young man undertook various ascetic exercises, which 
58 Paguyuban Sukmo Suminar, Amien Rais: Satriya linuwih; Kajian supranatural 
tokoh-tokoh nasional [Surakarta: c. 2003–4]. This pamphlet described Amien’s descent 
from the last king of Majapahit Brawijaya V and his receipt of a princely (Pangeran) 
rank from the Surakarta kraton.
59 For example, Ki Bagus Ponari, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007 (Sapta Darma); TempoI, 2 
Sept. 2008 (on Aboge or Islam Aboge, in Malang and Banyumas Regencies).
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included encounters with a number of spirits, until, in 1995, in the midst of 
meditation he received a spiritual command: ‘Fear not! Carry on! Your place 
is just as far as your belief.’ On the basis of this (not-entirely-transparent, 
it must be said) inspiration, he founded the Tri Tunggal Association 
(Paguyuban Tri Tunggal). This Association was active in spiritual healing 
and teaching meditation and mystical doctrines. It became well known for 
its conduct of exorcisms (ruwatan) and other such spiritualist rituals. For 
followers of Tri Tunggal, kungkum (meditating while submerged in water 
up to the neck) is an almost daily practice and ruwatan exorcisms are done 
weekly and on important dates. The ultimate aim of these practices is the 
unity of self with God, of servant with master (manunggaling kawula-gusti) 
— a long-established aim of Javanese mysticism but one that easily gives 
rise to accusations of polytheism (shirk). There is also a Tri Tunggal music 
group called Adiluhung Tak that is rather like Emha Ainun Najib’s Kiai 
Kanjeng group in combining Javanese gamelan and other folk instruments 
with modern sounds. But instead of pious Islamic music, Adiluhung Tak 
presents Javanese religious songs composed by Sapto Rahardjo and inspired 
by pre-Islamic Old Javanese literature or works such as Mangkunagara IV’s 
Wulangreh. Tri Tunggal can be followed by people of any religion, but Sapto 
Rahardjo is of the view that all the world religions have ‘colonised’ Java and 
acted to destroy its indigenous faith and culture.60 
Given such ideas and the Catholic background of its leadership, it is 
hardly surprising that Tri Tunggal (and other such movements) attracted 
criticism and threats from some Islamic circles. Tri Tunggal had a branch at 
Cemani, Ngruki, where Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s Al-Mukmin school is located. 
In 2006, a group of zealots there denounced Tri Tunggal as a deviant sect 
promoting Christianisation and forced the branch to close.61 In Yogyakarta 
60 This discussion rests upon the valuable study of Tri Tunggal in Burhan Ali, 
‘Kebatinan dan keberagamaan dalam paguyuban Tri Tunggal Yogyakarta’ (MA thesis, 
Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies, Gadjah Mada University, 2006), esp. pp. 6–7, 
32–9, 50–3, 61–70, 78–84, 112–3, 127–8, 132–3, 164–9.
61 Ibid., p. 57, identifies the attacking group as ‘Front Pembela Islam (FPI) Surakarta’, 
almost surely meaning the FPIS (Surakarta Islamic Youth Front). Laskar Umat 
Islam Surakarta (LUIS, Surakarta Islamic Ummah Militia, est. December 2000, 
which included FPIS) was named as the attackers by Eko Sriyanto Sapta Wijaya of 
the rather idiosyncratic Gerakan Moral Rekonsiliasi Indonesia (Moral Movement 
for Indonesian Reconciliation, founded in Surakarta by Abdurrahman Wahid, 
Pakubuwana XII and others, according to the founding notarial document of 18 
March 2003); discussion, Surakarta, 26 March 2007.
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and elsewhere, Tri Tunggal carried on with its activities,62 although its 
leaders expressed concern about Muslim groups who were prepared to 
denounce such movements as unbelievers (kafirs) or polytheists (musyrik).63 
Sapta Darma came under attack in a small village near Yogyakarta, where 
there had been a Sapta Darma centre (sanggar) since 1984. In 2008, some 50 
FPI thugs attacked the sanggar late at night, smashed the place up, punched 
one of the adherents and seized publications which proved, they said, that 
this was a ‘deviant sect’ because its followers prayed facing east rather than 
towards Mecca, and demanded that it be disbanded. The Sapta Darma 
people said they did face east, but this was just one of the Javanese ways of 
paying obeisance to God. The FPI mob intended to carry on to attack a Tri 
Tunggal branch nearby, but were dissuaded by the police. The latter brought 
the two sides together to ‘straighten out perceptions on each side’. The Sapta 
Darma group ceased their activities for a time until the atmosphere cooled, 
they said. Evidently no one was arrested.64 Shortly thereafter, in Brebes, 
near the north coast, thousands of local people forcibly closed a Sapta 
Darma building where a small number of adherents met, denouncing the 
movement as ‘deviant’ because its followers pray facing east and there was 
a picture of the clown-god Semar on the wall. The police prevented them 
from burning the building. Other Sapta Darma sites in the region were 
also threatened. The police again arrested no one but sought to mediate, 
62 KR, 25 Jan. 2008 reports Tri Tunggal activities in Yogyakarta, Semarang, Purwo-
kerto, Den Pasar and elsewhere. KR, 16 Apr. 2008 reports on Tri Tunggal’s public 
performances including wayang, translation projects, ‘holistic healing’ and other 
activities to mark the observation of ‘National Awakening Day’, a century after the 
founding of Budi Utomo.
63 Zayyin Alfijihad interview with Mas Jeje (one of the top Tri Tunggal leaders), 
Yogyakarta, 3 Dec. 2007. A report on Tri Tunggal’s rituals at the south coast and 
Candhi Cetha is in Bernas, 27 Oct. 2007.
64 KR, 12 Oct. 2008; Kmps, 13 Oct. 2008. There is also a report in [Zainal Abidin 
Bagir, Suhadi Cholil, Budi Ashari and Musaghfiroh Rahayu,] Laporan tahunan: 
Kehidupan beragama di Indonesia tahun 2008 (Yogyakarta: Program Studi Agama 
dan Lintas Budaya, Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies, Sekolah 
Pascasarjana, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2008), pp. 23–4. The head of FPI was 
reported to the police for beating up a person in the same village, but this seems to 
be a separate case; KR, 16 Oct. 2008. FPI was sometimes on the receiving end, e.g., 
NU activists attacked the FPI headquarters in Yogyakarta in June 2008, following 
the violence at the national monument in Jakarta on 1 June; email from Noorhaidi 
Hasan, 9 June 2008.
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achieving an agreement whereby the Sapta Darma adherents should either 
cease to call themselves Muslims or repent and recite the Shahada, thereby 
returning to Islam.65
Such conflicts led some Javanese to feel that certain elements of Islam 
had become a disruptive force, a threat to that tranquility which older forms 
of Javanese mysticism and abangan villagers generally sought. A Yogyakarta 
kraton servant and guardian of the grave of the Mataram dynasty’s founder, 
Panembahan Senapati, commented (romanticising Javanese history as he 
did so), 
Make no mistake: since early times, Javanese people have sought to live 
in peaceful tranquility, with good order and good fortune, and that was 
not because of religion but because of the roots of Javanese tradition 
which always emphasised empathy for others and polite conduct. It was 
not at all because of religion! [But nowadays] Islam in fact seems to 
bring misfortune; I see on television people who often shout Allahu akbar 
and wear Muslim-style clothes (baju koko), even cudgeling and punching 
people — it’s unheard-of!66 
While some who were committed to abangan, kebatinan and related 
ideas and practices thus lamented the presence of violence in the name of 
Islam (as did many devout Muslims), there was also a positive response to 
the prevailing atmosphere of deepening religiosity — a response consistent 
with the general process of Islamisation seen in this book. In the Kediri area 
the annual bersih desa (village cleansing) rituals still include older Javanese 
performances such as wayang or tayuban, but it is now common for them 
also to have religious teachings (pengajian) led by the local kyai.67 A village in 
the Kulonprogo area revived its bersih desa ceremony after having abandoned 
the tradition for 20 years. The day before there was Sufi spiritual ‘striving’ 
(mujahadah). On the day itself, the ritual consisted of the recitation of several 
passages of the Qur’an, followed by the Traditionalist devotional practices 
of slawatan and tahlilan, and prayers for well-being. Then it culminated in 
a wayang performance.68 In the Sleman area, another village instituted the 
bersih desa ritual where there had been none before in the hope of attracting 
65 Email from Suhadi Cholil, 6 Jan. 2009. The Brebes incident is also reported in 
[Zainal Abidin Bagir et al.,] Laporan tahunan, p. 24.
66 Mas Bekel Hastono Wiyono, 4 Dec. 2007 (interviewed in Kota Gede by Zayyin 
Alfijihad).
67 Email from Imam Subawi, 2 Feb. 2009.
68 KR, 12 Jan. 2009.
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tourists. Prominent among the reinvented ‘tradition’ were ‘songs of an Islamic 
flavour’ sung to various forms of instrumentation.69
As we have seen throughout this book, abangan, kebatinan and related 
ideas and practices were intimately involved in many of the art forms found 
in Javanese society, for those arts often invoked supernatural powers. For that 
reason, they, too, have been affected by efforts to make Javanese society more 
perfectly Islamic. It is to those arts that we now turn.
Older arts and performance styles in a more Islamic society
In this age of deeper Islamisation of Javanese society, the fate of older art 
forms has been rather like that of abangan, kebatinan and related practices 
in general. While there are occasionally optimistic reports about the survival 
or revival of such arts and while there can be no reasonable doubt that 
there are still Javanese who believe in the spiritual forces associated with 
them, it does seem that they have declined in frequency and popularity, 
have been in large measure denatured culturally by a decline in the number 
who believe in their older spiritual aspects, have sometimes become more 
Islamised like the rest of local culture, and have survived best where local 
authorities support them for the purposes of tourism or reinforcing senses 
of local identity. The last is of particular significance in the post-2001 age 
of regional autonomy. In the early 21st century we can see a pattern that is 
over a century old, as Islamic reformers seek to rid Javanese society of older 
superstitions, which frequently means a wish to abolish the associated art 
forms altogether. The only major religious actor that takes a different position 
is the Catholic Church, with its policy of ‘inculturation’ (a matter to which 
we will return below). But we must remember that, even if there were no 
religious reformers, modernisation and globalisation of entertainment would 
kill off many older art forms anyway.
The head of the Yogyakarta Special District, Sultan Hamengkubu-
wana X, and his government put special effort into supporting older art 
forms. From 2005, villages were selected for support and guidance from 
the Tourism, Art and Culture Service to maintain and develop ‘traditional 
culture’ such as jaranan (called jathilan there) and ande-ande lumut of 
the more abangan style, courtly gamelan (karawitan), plus Traditionalist 
performances including slawatan and kasidah (religious chanting to 
percussion instruments, but also done in the modern form called kasidah 
69 KmpsO, 28 Sept. 2009.
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pop or kasidah modern), along with music of colonial-era vintage such as 
kroncong (ballads sung to accompaniment of the guitar and other modern 
instruments). Performance festivals and competitions were to encourage 
these arts.70 The Yogyakarta Tourism Service had a task to develop these arts, 
said its head, because tourism represented ‘the locomotive of the economy’.71 
Nevertheless Yogyakarta observers continued to report that some types of 
performance seemed to survive while others languished. Spiritual aspects 
continued to be reported in some circumstances. To mark 1,000 days 
since the Yogyakarta earthquake of May 2006, a village in Bantul put on a 
gamelan performance in the dark of the night with no lights, ‘but the players 
experienced no difficulties in playing the gamelan because, so they say, they 
received guidance from spirits’.72
Even long-established religious practices could become little more than 
tourist attractions. To observe the ‘Night of Power’ (Arabic laylat al-qadr) 
during the month of Ramadan, when God is believed to have sent down the 
Qur’an, about a thousand tourism promoters, agents, workers and people 
running ‘tourism villages’ gathered to do a ‘cultural performance of Islamic 
religious arts’, such as slawatan, which are ‘rarely performed nowadays, 
under pressure from modern entertainment’.73 Similarly, a celebration of the 
Prophet’s birthday on the slopes of Mount Wilis, near Kediri, was described 
as a way to promote tourism, although the local people thought it could 
fend off calamities.74 Such dual understandings and purposes are probably 
widespread, with local people (perhaps just the older generation) taking part 
in rituals because they believe in the power of spirits, and local governments 
supporting them because they believe in the power of tourism. Over time, 
asserted the leader of an annual ritual at a holy grave in Gunung Kidul, the 
people would become more aware that such rituals are only symbolic.75
70 TempoI, 23 Feb. 2005, reports 35 villages were picked; Kmps (Gunung Kidul), 
11 June 2009, reports 32 being selected in Gunung Kidul. Other reports on such 
activities are in KR, 30 Oct. 2007; Kmps, 8 Oct. 2008.
71 KR, 2 March 2008.
72 KR, 23 Feb. 2009.
73 Kmps, 11 Sept. 2009. Other reports on older art forms being sustained for the 
purposes of tourism may be found in Bernas, 21 July 2008; KR, 28 July 2008.
74 RK online, 27 Apr. 2005.
75 KR, 4 May 2008. This was Sumarwanto, a local leader at Sodo, the site of the 
reputed grave of Ki Ageng Giring III, a founding figure from the obscure 16th-
century history of the Mataram dynasty.
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Kraton-style performances tend to be expensive and, on the whole, the 
spiritual ideas associated with them do not seem to have fared well in recent 
years. Sultan Hamengkubuwana X himself choreographed a new bedhaya 
dance, but the newspaper report of its performance, at least, did not mention 
a connection with the Goddess of the Southern Ocean, but rather said that 
this ‘sacral dance … symbolised the spirit of patriotism and the philosophy of 
leadership’.76 A local aficionado regretted that the bedhaya was increasingly 
seen as an ‘ordinary dance’ rather than one that is ‘sacral’.77 The main royal-
sponsored Habirandha school for wayang puppeteers in Yogyakarta, founded 
in 1925, has a diminishing number of students who begin their studies and 
even fewer who finish.78 The burlesque kethoprak also experienced varying 
fortunes. The leading performer Bondan Nusantara bemoaned its decline 
in popularity in Yogyakarta to Barbara Hatley,79 a view shared by others.80 
Evidently kethoprak in Yogyakarta was, however, at least surviving better than 
wayang kulit (shadow play with parchment puppets) and wayang wong (dance 
drama).81 Nevertheless, in 2007 there were just 32 kethoprak troupes in the 
whole Yogyakarta Special District, whereas there had been 95 in Gunung 
Kidul alone seven years before.82
In Surakarta, too, there was little in the way of folk performances in 
the city. Wayang wong was still performed at its famous Sriwedari theatre, 
but to tiny audiences.83 There still seemed to be popular interest in kethoprak 
in the countryside. A leading exponent, Hanindyawan, performed simplified 
kethoprak in villages with a small troupe. On one occasion, however, plans 
for a performance had to be cancelled because the local people thought it 
to be irreconcilable with Islam.84 Kethoprak was nearly dead in Kediri; only 
one troupe remained there, performing some nights to no audience, under 
76 Bernas, 2 Apr. 2008.
77 KRT Sunaryadi Maharsiwara, quoted in KR, 8 Jan. 2008.
78 JktP online, 6 Apr. 2010.
79 The comment was made c. 2003–4; Hatley, Javanese performances, p. 197. He 
repeated these concerns in Kmps, 18 Oct. 2008.
80 For example Kmps, 1 Aug. 2009.
81 KR, 15 July 2008.
82 Kmps, 18 Oct. 2008.
83 KR, 14 Nov. 2007, citing the well-known wayang wong dancer Darsi Pudyorini 
(then 74 years old).
84 Discussion with Hanindyawan, Surakarta, 18 Oct. 2005. The failed performance 
was to be at Tegalsari. According to Hanindyawan, kethoprak continued to be popular 
in Pati.
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a roof that leaked if it rained.85 In that region, kethoprak performers earned 
hardly enough to live, while their poverty and constant travel from place to 
place to perform meant that their children were unable to attend schools, 
according to one report.86
The village of Tutup Ngisor, on the slopes of Mount Merapi, continued 
its tradition of artistic performances by villagers without government support. 
Illustration 36 Wayang wong performance in the Yogyakarta kraton, 1969
85 RK, 15 Apr. 2005; MmK, 16 Sept. 2005.
86 RK, 26 July 2009.
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Wayang wong, jaranan, gamelan and much else remained part of the daily life 
of this small village, with its population of about 200. In 2005, the leading 
figure there, Sitras Anjilin, along with others announced an ‘Academy 
of Mountain Culture’ (Akademi Budaya Gunung) which put on a ‘Five 
Mountain Festival’ (Festival Lima Gunung). This presented performances 
from the five mountains Merapi, Merbabu, Sumbing, Menoreh and Andung, 
but also invited performers from Surakarta, Yogyakarta, Bali and elsewhere. 
The performances preserved older supernatural ideas, with mantras being 
recited and other spiritual preparations, although Sitras Anjilin’s brother 
commented that some of these spiritual traditions had died and only the 
performance remained. Traditionalist Islamic observances and performances 
were also included, such as Maulid Nabi to commemorate the birth of the 
Prophet, observance of the end of the fasting month (Idul fitri) and wayang 
Menak (with stories about the Prophet’s uncle Amir Hamza).87
Such traditional arts were subject to the influences of modernisation, 
with unclear effects on their popularity. A group near Yogyakarta began 
teaching jaranan to youngsters without trance, emphasising this as an art 
form of music and dance alone.88 Indeed, said the LKiS leader Jadul Maula, 
jaranan was now just entertainment.89 At the Yogyakarta Gamelan Festival 
in 2008, the Women’s Studies Centre at Universitas Gadjah Mada was the 
moving force for wayang performed by three female dalangs (one of them 
a Japanese visitor), with scripts about female heroes.90 Gam Rock has even 
been born, with gamelan instrumentation augmented by electric guitars, 
bass guitar, drum and organ,91 as have forms sometimes called gamelan 
gaul (mixed gamelan) which add saxophone, flute, guitar, bass and/or 
keyboard to the orchestra and are reportedly popular among school pupils 
in Yogyakarta.92 
Sometimes NU has endorsed Javanese artistic forms that Modernists 
and Revivalists regard as legacies of the pre-Islamic age of ignorance, above 
all the kris, but this is done in a way consistent with NU’s ultimate aim of 
purifying local culture. Ansor in Kediri promoted ‘kris folk culture’, but in a 
87 Discussion with Bambang Tri Santoso (the elder brother of Sitras Anjilin), Tutup 
Ngisor, 21 Oct. 2005; Kmps, 24 Sept. 2005; JktP online, 15 Jan. 2011.
88 KR, 19 Oct. 2007.
89 M. Jadul Maula (interviewed by Nur Choliq Ridwan), Yogyakarta, 9 Dec. 2007.
90 Bernas, 12 July 2008; KR, 16 July 2008.
91 KR, 15 Apr. 2008.
92 KR, 15 May 2008, 23 Oct. 2008; Kmps, 30 Oct. 2008.
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despiritualised form, as a part of ‘dakwah and struggle in a cultural way’. Said 
the Ansor leader Abu Muslich,
With the ever more intense internalisation of religion, for the past 
several decades the fate of the kris has gone through a gloomy period. It 
has been accused of being a source of polytheism (shirk) and the bearer 
of deviance and superstition. The kris is regarded as a thing of black 
magic, which has its own evil spirit … So now it’s time to place the kris 
in its proper place, as an ancient object and cultural object left to us by 
history, which bears high esthetic and artistic standards.93
Kediri’s kyais were unhappy with the promotion of jaranan as a char-
acteristically Kediri art form. They had successfully blocked an earlier idea 
that tayuban — with all its lascivious associations — should be picked as 
the special art form reflecting Kediri’s identity.94 But it was harder to resist 
jaranan, evidently. The city secretary Zaini said that a PKB member of the 
local parliament came to him to say that kyais had contacted him to express 
their concern that their students were enjoying jaranan. Zaini felt that he 
must proceed slowly in this matter but believed that more moderate kyais 
were coming around to his view and, indeed, many pesantren students were 
watching jaranan. The kyais of course did not approve of trance — seeing it 
as possession by evil spirits — but in Zaini’s view trance was just being faked 
anyway. To encourage a change of opinions about jaranan, Zaini — himself 
the son of a kyai from Nganjuk — began a dakwah section within the local 
jaranan association that he had formed, with the aim of having pengajian by 
a local kyai once every three months.95
Surabaya, like Kediri, lacked the kraton culture that was so important 
in Central Java, and thus struggled to find what it was that, in a cultural 
sense, made Surabaya special. The answer might have been the burlesque 
ludruk theatre — bawdy, raunchy, vulgar and iconoclastic that it was. But as 
well as being in bad taste it had been anti-elite, anti-santri, and particularly 
93 Quoted in RK, 29 Apr. 2007. Similar views were put by the promoter of a display 
of krisses at a Toyota showroom in Kediri; RK, 27 Dec. 2007. The artistic and esthetic 
standards of krisses, as well as the technical processes involved in making them, are 
set out with wonderful illustrations in Isaäc Groneman, The Javanese kris (preface and 
intro. David van Duuren [transl. Peter Richardus and Timothy D. Rogers]; Leiden: 
C. Zwartenkot Art Books and KITLV Press, 2009).
94 Discussion with Suradi, head of the Arts and Culture section of Kabupaten Kediri, 
Kediri, 16 March 2005.
95 Discussion with Drs H.M. Zaini, Kediri, 26 Nov. 2007; MmK, 5 Nov. 2007.
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associated with PKI in Sukarno’s days — none of which recommended it for 
government support. In 2005 the Surabaya government proposed a one-year 
attempt to modernise the management of ludruk and clean it up, making it 
more ‘artistic’ and satirical rather than simply vulgar.96 But two years later the 
four theatres that had existed in Surabaya around the year 2000 had dwindled 
to just one survivor, operating in a slum with poor attendance. A problem 
for ludruk has been that its performers are predominantly impoverished gays, 
transsexuals and transvestites, living on the margins of society and respected 
by only a few human rights activists. Their art was not a target of Islamic 
activists’ hostility — it was just dying from neglect and lack of public interest. 
Ludruk performers were obliged to search for other sources of income on the 
legal and moral margins of society to survive.97
NU continued to promote its own Traditionalist art forms which are 
at the same time spiritual practices, but of a kind seen as bearing acceptably 
Muslim spirituality. The performances that we have often encountered above 
— slawatan, tahlilan, rebana, nasyid and all the rest — carried on in the 
post-Soeharto years. Traditionalists’ belief in supernatural forces continued 
also in the semi-performance and semi-spiritual world of martial arts, where 
belief in invulnerability (ilmu kanuragan) was publicly advertised as a skill 
that could be taught by a ‘Maestro of Banser in Central Java’.98 Another 
form of martial arts, reputedly handed down from the wali Sunan Bonang 
and consisting of bodily positions based on Arabic letters, was said to convey 
both invulnerability and healing.99 Yet another form attributed to Sunan 
Kalijaga called Ilmu Banyu Mataram (the mystical science of Mataram water) 
rested on orthodox Sufi roots, said its leader, although it had recently suffered 
from deviations.100 
NU was prepared to embrace some innovation in its arts. At a Festival 
Bedug dan Selawatan Rebana (mosque-drum and slawatan with tambourine 
96 Kmps (edisi Jawa Timur), 7 March 2005.
97 Discussion with Pak Sapari at the ludruk theatre Irama Budaya, Pulo, Wonokromo, 
Surabaya, 26 Nov. 2007. See also Tempo, 25 Dec. 2005, reporting on the dying of 
ludruk, when in the whole of East Java there were only about 30 groups surviving.
98 Hairus Salim, Kelompok paramiliter NU, p. 108, referring to an advertisement 
in Warta NU of Dec. 2001. This ‘Maestro’ was Abah H.M. Suyuthi al-Ghozali of 
Cepu.
99 This was called Ilmu Sujud (KR, 4 May 2008).
100 KR, 9 Sept. 2008. In Javanese historical legends, Sunan Kalijaga had a special 
connection with the Mataram dynasty (Mataram being today’s Yogyakarta region); 
see Ricklefs, Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi, p. 75.
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festival) in Pare, audiences were attracted by the religious pop star Opick, 
along with others performing devotional songs (nasyid and kasidah), the 
whole occasion being sponsored by Yamaha.101 Kyais were, however, mostly 
unenthusiastic about television and often hostile to the Internet, which 
was seen as a source of pornography and other forms of immorality.102 In 
Yogyakarta in 2008–9, Jadul Maula and others revived Lesbumi as a modern 
sort of organisation to promote the artistic side of Traditionalism and defend 
it from globalisation’s challenges. Festivals were to promote slawatan and 
other performances of a Traditionalist kind.103 At a festival in Yogyakarta 
in 2008, Lesbumi introduce a new sort of wayang, with puppets made of 
translucent mica and accompanied by modern stringed instruments and 
drum, called wayang Mika-EL, the name taken from the angel Michael 
(Mikael). The story, however, was based on that of Dewa Ruci, telling of the 
spiritual searching of Bima (a figure from the Bratayuda epic).104 
Traditionalist artistic-cum-spiritual practices represent a barrier to 
the reforming aspirations of Revivalists, and came under formidable attack 
from that quarter. From its inception, Islamic Modernism has been at 
least unenthusiastic about such practices and at times downright hostile, 
but in Indonesia’s post-2001 atmosphere of ‘moderates’ collaborating, 
Muhammadiyah’s objections were moderated. So it was left to Revivalist 
quarters to denounce Traditionalist observances as heresy. Ky. H. Mahrus 
Ali (not to be confused with Ky. H. Mahrus Aly of pesantren Lirboyo) was 
born in a village near Gresik in 1957, studied and taught in pesantrens, 
eventually becoming a teacher at the YAPI105 pesantren in Bangil, one of 
Java’s very few Shi‘ite institutions, then led by its founder Ust. Husein al-
Habsyi. Under the latter’s influence, Mahrus Ali began to see the error of 
some Traditionalist ways, he said. He then lived and studied in Saudi Arabia 
for seven years, returning to Indonesia in 1987. In 2007 he published two 
books in which he identified himself as a ‘former kyai of NU’. These works 
denounced NU practices such as tahlilan, slawatan, dhikr, pilgrimages to the 
101 RK, 5 May 2007.
102 There was no Internet allowed at Lirboyo in 2007 and pupils were not allowed to 
watch television, but an exception was made for the World Cup soccer competition; 
discussion with Ky. H.A. Idris Marzuqi, Lirboyo, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007. Getting the 
Internet into pesantrens has been a considerable challenge for modernisers.
103 KR, 18 Apr. 2008, 1 July 2009, 10 Sept. 2009.
104 KR, 21 Oct. 2008.
105 Yayasan Pesantren Islam, Islamic pesantren Foundation. Its website is at http://
www.yapibangil.org. The Bangil pesantren was established in 1973.
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graves of walis, seeking blessings from the dead, prophesying, accepting the 
religious authority of kyais and invulnerability — all on the narrowly textual 
grounds that any practice not specifically approved in the Qur’an and Hadith 
represents illegal innovation in Islam (bid‘a).106 We have noted earlier in 
this book that Modernists generally take such a view, rejecting as bid‘a what 
is not specifically allowed by those basic scriptures, while Traditionalists 
generally take the inverse position that anything can be accepted that is not 
specifically forbidden by the Qur’an and Hadith and which is good in itself. 
But Mahrus Ali’s position was an extreme form of Modernism and, resting 
solely on the Qur’an and Hadith, it is Revivalist in the analytical terminology 
we use in this book. Page after page cites those scriptures (and sometimes 
Saudi fatwas or other judgments based on them) to reject Traditionalist 
practices in uncompromising terms. Mahrus Ali also rejects democracy,107 
which both Muhammadiyah and NU support. ‘Remember,’ he says, ‘that 
Islamic shari‘a is already perfect and the Messenger of God has passed to us 
all of God’s commands …. If we add to or take away from Islamic shari‘a, it 
means that we regard Islamic shari‘a as imperfect and God’s Messenger as 
a deceiver.’108 
NU kyais were angry at this challenge. They rejected the label ‘former 
kyai of NU’, saying that a kyai could not stop being a kyai and that Mahrus 
Ali had never been active in NU. Some published a book rejecting his 
arguments and wished to report him to the police for lying to the public.109 
Others chose to ignore his claims and to explain carefully to their pesantren 
students the scriptural foundations of Traditionalist practices110 — for kyais 
are at least as adept as Mahrus Ali at citing scripture. Imam Ghazali Said 
was of the view that Mahrus Ali had been persuaded of Wahhabi theology 
while in Saudi Arabia and that his writing was funded by the Saudis. He 
106 Mahrus Ali, Mantan kiai NU menggugat sholawat & dzikir syirik (Nariyah, al-
Fatih, Mujiyat, Thibbul Qulub) (intro. KH. Mu’ammal Hamidy; rev. ed.; Surabaya: 
Laa Tasyuk! Press, 2007); idem, Mantan kiai NU menggugat tahlilan, istighosahan 
dan ziarah para wali (intro. H. Abdul Rahman; rev. ed.; Surabaya: Laa Tasyuk! Press, 
2007). Biographical information from the biographical sections of these books and 
from the first of these works, pp. ix–x. Mahrus Ali advertised a series of further books 
to prove Traditionalist practices to be heretical, but I do not have copies of those.
107 Mahrus Ali, Mantan kiai NU menggugat tahlilan, istighosahan dan ziarah para 
wali, pp. 229–32.
108 Mahrus Ali, Mantan kiai NU menggugat sholawat & dzikir syirik, p. 305.
109 Duta Masyarakat online, 27 Jan. 2008; NU Online, 24 Feb. 2008.
110 Discussion with Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar, Kediri, 26 Oct. 2008.
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viewed this as part of a general trend of increasing Wahhabi influence among 
NU kyais.111
Others who were inclined to an uncompromising puritanism also 
had objections to arts. One typical example was the leader of a small Salafi 
pesantren in Kediri which was supported with Saudi Arabian-based funding 
and had links to other Revivalist pesantrens including the Yogyakarta school 
of Ja‘far Umar Thalib, the founder of Laskar Jihad. His view was that ‘All 
local arts are human creations and … are bid‘a and forbidden in Islam. … 
[They] regard Islam as not sufficient and not complete, whereas Islamic 
teachings are already complete and final.’112 The HTI leader Ismail Yusanto 
said that it was acceptable to enjoy an art so long as the spiritual ideas 
associated with it were got rid of. If it is not possible to ‘straighten out’ such 
arts, then they will disappear. Beliefs about krisses are unacceptable, he said, as 
is the making of offerings to spirits.113 PKS has been readier to embrace local 
arts, but with appropriate amendments. It has put on wayang at its meetings, 
but with the singers wearing head-scarves (kerudung). On the other hand, 
the bedhaya dance, with its female dancers and links to the Goddess of the 
Southern Ocean, needed ‘cultural dialogue’ so as to be ‘straightened out’ in 
the view of the Yogyakarta PKS leader Kholil Mahmud.114 
More extreme attacks on older arts are rare, but not unknown. In 
Sukoharjo regency south of Surakarta — an area with a reputation for Islamic 
hard-liners, where Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s Ngruki school is found — Islamic 
extremists attacked several wayang performances in late 2010, the first 
time this is known to have happened. Waving swords, throwing rocks and 
shouting Allahu akbar, people who reportedly described themselves as Laskar 
Jihad (Holy war militia) injured several persons and forced the performances 
to stop.115 I do not know whether this group had any connection with the 
111 Discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said at pesantren An-Nur, Wonocolo, 
Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.
112 Husnul Qodim interview of Ust. Sapto Atmo Wardoyo, pesantren Ath-Thoifah 
Al-Manshuroh, Jl. Papar-Pare, Kab. Kediri, 27 Feb. 2006. Almost all of the 150 
pupils received funding from the International Islamic Relief Organisation, which 
is a Saudi Arabia-based charity whose office in Jakarta has been put on a United 
Nations list (last updated 30 Dec. 2011) of organisations associated with al-Qaeda; 
see http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/AQlist.pdf.
113 Discussion with Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, Jakarta, 8 June 2007.
114 Discussion with Kholil Mahmud, Yogyakarta, 22 March 2008. See also KR, 16 
May 2008.
115 JktG, 14 Oct. 2010.
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former Laskar Jihad organisation set up by Ja‘far Umar Thalib, which was 
disbanded in 2002 (see the following chapter).
Older art forms were sometimes subjected to conscious Islamisation, 
that being the best way to survive in more Islamised Java. We have already 
noted the likelihood nowadays that bersih desa ceremonies will include 
pengajian and/or Traditionalist devotional practices. An interesting case of 
Islamising an art form concerns the gandrung dance and singing performance 
of Banyuwangi, associated particularly with the Osing (or Using) people. In 
the 19th century, gandrung performers were boys, but in the 20th century 
women took over gandrung, attired in alluring form-fitting outfits, with bare 
arms and shoulders. They danced sensuously with male watchers in turn, and 
the performance was often associated with drinking and immoral conduct, 
as in the case of tayuban. The performance had supernatural aspects, too, and 
was thought to bring protection particularly to fishermen. In the late 1980s 
local bureaucrats sought to make gandrung the artistic symbol of the Osing, 
but pious Muslims objected. In 2000–5 the elected Bupati of Banyuwangi 
was Osing and wished to promote gandrung as a tourist attraction, including 
opening a school to train performers. Again there were objections from 
devout Muslims, although some kyais were willing to accept gandrung as 
‘just culture’. Meanwhile the dance has become slowly but progressively more 
Islamised to deal with these objections and songs have been introduced that 
promote Islamic piety. The local government runs month-long gandrung 
training sessions which include pengajian.116 So this characteristically 
abangan Osing performance is growing more Islamic, along with the rest of 
Javanese society.
Similarly, in 2009 Gadjah Mada University put on an Islamised wayang 
version of the Bratayuda to celebrate the revelation of the Qur’an (Arabic 
nuzu ‘l-Qur’an). This was dubbed wayang sambung (connection wayang) and 
was said to be about the connection between God and humankind. In this 
version there were no female singers as is customary but rather men. The 
puppets were of parchment as usual but the Pandawa puppets (in effect, the 
‘good guys’ of the drama) appeared in Islamic dress while their opponents 
the Kurawa side were traditionally depicted. The characters all had Islamised 
116 Chintya Novi Anoegrajekti, ‘Identitas dan siasat perempuan gandrung’, Srinthil: 
Media perempuan multikultural, no. 3 (Apr. 2003), pp. 64–79; Abd. Ghafur and 
Chintya Novi Anoegrajekti, ‘Gandrung demi hidup menyisir malam’, Srinthil: Media 
perempuan multikultural, no. 3 (Apr. 2003), pp. 6–28; Chintya Novi Anoegrajekti, 
‘Kesenian Using’, pp. 804–5; Bisri Effendy, ‘Pengantar’, in Kebijakan kebudayaan di 
masa orde baru, pp. 669–71; email from Novi Anoegrajekti, 4 March 2011.
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names, such as Muhammad Gathutkaca and Abdullah Gareng and the story 
was about Bima spreading Islam and creating a pesantren.117
Modernists — represented above all by Muhammadiyah — have 
mixed and contradictory views about all art, and about old-fashioned 
Javanese arts with their spiritual associations in particular. This reflects the 
potentially divergent aspirations of Modernism that we have noted above. 
Muhammadiyah’s aim to return to the Qur’an and Hadith on the one hand 
and its wish for Islamic renewal or modernisation on the other can give 
birth to a contradiction between wooden literalism and puritanism driven 
by the first aspiration and openness to innovation and modernity driven 
by the second. In Muhammadiyah’s home in Yogyakarta, this distinction is 
sometimes depicted as geographical. With the River Code as the dividing 
line, people speak of Muhammadiyah ‘west of the river’ (kulon kali), which 
means the Kauman area (seen as the base of the conservative and puritan 
side of Muhammadiyah) versus Muhammadiyah ‘east of the river’ (wetan 
kali) (which means Kota Gede, regarded as the base of the liberals and 
modernisers). The former is generally hostile to older forms of local culture 
and, in the more modern realm, regards the guitar as haram.118 The wetan kali 
people, by contrast, are reputedly more open to local and modern arts.119
Muhammadiyah’s uncertainty about local arts, even on the part of 
the supposedly more open people ‘east of the river’ in Kota Gede, was 
exemplified in 1999–2000. Kota Gede is commonly thought of as a town 
dominated by Muhammadiyah and Modernist Islam. It had put on a festival 
of folk arts and performances in the 1960s, but that came to a halt after 
1965–6, when many kethoprak (and probably other) performers were arrested. 
Like elsewhere, thereafter abangan-style arts were thought insufficiently 
Islamic and carried a whiff of Communism. In 1999 this festival was revived 
with some World Bank funding and the organising committee set a top-
down artistic agenda. When the festival was repeated in 2000, however, 
117 JktP, 22 Sept. 2009.
118 The scriptural authority for this view is probably the 14th-century Shafi‘i work 
Umdat al-salik, in which the Prophet is reported to have said that God sent him ‘to 
do away with all musical instruments, flutes, strings’ and ‘It is unlawful to use musical 
instruments … like mandolin, lute, cymbals and flute’; see r40.1 and r40.2 in Ibn al-
Naqīb al-Miṣrī, Reliance of the traveller: The classic manual of Islamic sacred law ‘Umdat 
al-salik (ed. and transl. N.H.M. Keller; rev. ed.; Beltsville, MD: Amana Publications, 
1994). I am grateful to Amelia Fauzia for locating this source.
119 Discussion with Dr Sidik Jatmika (Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta 
academic staff ), Yogyakarta, 8 March 2005.
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local people rather usurped control and programmed performances such 
as jaranan (jathilan) with their local non-Islamic spiritual aspects. This 
challenged the image of Kota Gede as a Muhammadiyah fortress and senior 
Muhammadiyah leaders were upset. One gave a Friday sermon objecting 
to a particular performance and saying that the ummah must be saved from 
such things. Muhammadiyah wrote a formal letter of objection to the festival 
organising committee, but no resolution of the disagreement was possible; 
both sides stood firm. Younger Muhammadiyah figures were, however, 
inclined to be more tolerant of these local arts. In the wake of this episode, 
there was surprise in some quarters on discovering that that Kota Gede was 
not yet as purified of older superstitions as Modernists had thought.120 
The prominent Muhammadiyah-affiliated artist Prof. Tulus Warsito, 
who is also Dean of the Faculty of Social and Political Studies at Universitas 
Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, expressed the view that Muhammadiyah was 
not as smart as NU in its use of local culture. The Islamic Studies Centre at 
his university, he said, opposed all modern sculptures even if they were not 
statues of living beings, and regarded the guitar as the sound of Satan. And 
even though Muhammadiyah in 2005, with its talk of ‘cultural dakwah’, 
seemed more open to local culture, in fact most Muhammadiyah people held 
dissenting views121 (as we saw above also with regard to the 2005 triumph of 
anti-Liberal figures in the Muhammadiyah leadership).
Muhammadiyah opinions range from qualified openness to local culture 
(with provisos, such as men and women being kept separate, prayer times 
not being disrupted and women dressing modestly) to simple opposition by 
people whom their opponents describe as ‘puritans’ and ‘confrontative’.122 
120 M. Jadul Maula, ‘The moving equilibrium: Kultur Jawa, Muhammadiyah, buruh 
gugat, dalam Festival Kotagede 2000’, in M. Jadul Maula et al. (eds), Ngesuhi desa 
sak kukuban: Lokalitas, pluralisme, modal sosial demokrasi (intro. Robert W. Hefner; 
Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2002), pp. 5–20.The particular performance that was objected to 
was jailangkung, which involves the summoning of a spirit.
121 Discussion with Prof. Tulus Warsito, Yogyakarta, 8 March 2005.
122 Discussions with the Muhammadiyah figures Ky. H. Kusnin Basri, Kudus, 27 
March 2004; Drs H. Dahlan Rais, Surakarta, 18 Oct. 2005; and Drs H. Subari, 
Surakarta, 18 Oct. 2005; and with the Department of Religious Affairs leader 
Muammal, Kediri, 17 March 2005. Further, Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi’s 
interviews of the former head of Muhammadiyah Youth (Pemuda Muhammadiyah) 
Abdul Haris, Kediri, 31 Aug. 2005; their interview of Fauzan, the Secretary of Mu-
hammadiyah in Kediri City, Kediri, 31 Aug. 2005; and their interview of the current 
head of Muhammadiyah Youth, Agus Umar, Kediri, 31 Aug. 2005; also Nur Choliq 
Ridwan’s interview of the JIMM leader Dr Zuly Qodir, Yogyakarta, 3 Dec. 2007.
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The organisation remains split on this issue. Some Muhammadiyah schools 
introduce their pupils to wayang or traditional Javanese dress,123 and 
Muhammadiyah meetings sometimes open with local cultural performances, 
as did the national meeting of 2005 which inter alia put on a Ponorogo 
reyog performance at the opening (but — we may assume — without 
trance).124 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the religious group that is most 
supportive of older forms of indigenous Javanese arts is the Catholic Church, 
which pursues its policy of ‘inculturation’, the current term for an approach 
that goes back over a century. It has its roots in the views of the Jesuit 
father Franciscus van Lith (1863–1926), who arrived in Batavia in 1896 
and promoted Catholic accommodation of Javanese culture.125 This process 
is facilitated by the fact that the hierarchy and almost all the priests are 
ethnically Javanese. There are Catholic versions of wayang, slawatan and even 
ruwatan. Gamelan is used in some churches and services are sometimes in 
Javanese rather than Indonesian. The spiritual content of these performances 
is of course Catholicised, and these arts, too, face challenges from the forces 
of modernisation and globalisation, including young people’s declining 
facility in Javanese (which we will return to below).126 This pattern of the 
Catholic Church seeking to be ‘Javanised’ while some Islamic activists seek 
cultural ‘dejavanisation’ is about a century old. Another echo of the past is 
the emergence of some puritans within Javanese Protestantism who are also 
hostile to local culture.127 Despite the latter, the generally more culturally 
receptive approach of Christianity among Javanese is a cause of worry to 
some Muslim activists, who feel that this gives Christianity an advantage in 
inter-religious competition for adherents.128 
123 For example, KR, 15 Dec. 2003, 4 May 2008 (this second report interestingly 
being in ngoko Javanese rather than Indonesian).
124 Suara Muhammadiyah, no. 15 (1–5 Aug. 2005), p. 7.
125 See Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese society, pp. 120–4.
126 Discussion with the Catholic Father Haryanto, Surabaya, 24 Nov. 2007. Ruwatan 
has been performed particularly by the Jesuit scholar of Old Javanese Dr Ignatius 
Kuntara Wiryamartana SJ. On slawatan, see Latifah, ‘Seni slawatan Katolik di paroki 
Ganjuran: Sebuah kajian inkulturasi dari perspektif religi dan budaya’ (MA thesis, 
Program Studi Ilmu Perbandingan Agama, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, 
2007).
127 Discussion with Pastor Simon Philantropha, Surabaya, 24 Nov. 2007.
128 Discussion with Imam Subkhan, an inter-religious activist of Muhammadiyah 
background, Yogyakarta, 13 Sept. 2008.
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Generally speaking, recent decades have not been good for older 
Javanese art forms, and along with their observed decline has gone increasing 
concern about loss of Javanese language skills. Command of more elevated 
forms of that hierarchical language (such as krama and krama inggil) and 
of Javanese script are both declining, continuing a process already noted in 
previous years. School students are reported to avoid studying Javanese if 
they can. It would be a very rare high school graduate today who could read 
Javanese script, for publications are in roman script. Javanese script is used for 
public signs in Yogyakarta and in 2007 the mayor of Surakarta, Joko Widodo 
(known popularly as Jokowi), ordered a similar policy in Surakarta, but the 
signs are also written in the roman alphabet and, since it is not necessary 
to read the Javanese-script version, few people do or can.129 The Yogyakarta 
government ordered its civil servants to communicate with one another in 
Javanese at certain times130 (which, given bureaucratic conventions, should 
require command of the language’s hierarchical levels), but I do not know 
whether this experiment has produced significant benefits for the language. 
Newspapers appear in the Indonesian language but some have columns in 
Javanese, and there are magazines using Javanese, but these are invariably 
in the roman alphabet and normally employ ‘low Javanese’ (ngoko). Modern 
novels have been written in Javanese in the past, but the current fate of this 
literature is unclear to me. Certainly there is no sign that it is prospering, but 
whether it is facing extinction is not clear.131
These cultural changes are driven only partly by the forces of deeper 
Islamisation. Modernisation generally, the availability of other forms of 
entertainment, education that has led to general decline in knowledge or 
129 For example, Bernas, 5 Nov. 2007, 21 May 2008; TempoI, 6 Nov. 2007; Kmps, 30 
March 2009, 1 Apr. 2009, 28 Sept. 2009.
130 Kmps, 7 Sept. 2009.
131 For an earlier stage in the writing of modern novels in Javanese, see George 
Quinn, The novel in Javanese: Aspects of its social and literary character (VKI vol. 148; 
Leiden: KITLV Press, 1992). A more comprehensive overview by Quinn of issues 
related to Javanese in recent times, in which he discerns some positive signs even 
though he writes that ‘it would be unrealistic to claim that the fall of the New Order 
has restored a healthy glow to the emaciated face that Javanese acquired under the 
New Order’, may be found (p. 68) in his chapter, ‘Emerging from dire straits: Post-
New Order developments in Javanese language and literature’, in Keith Foulcher, 
Mikihiro Moriyama and Manneke Budiman (eds), Words in motion: Language and 
discourse in post-New Order Indonesia, Singapore: National University of Singapore 
Press, 2012.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t406   406 6/20/2012   1:22:05 PM
Older Cultural Styles on the Defensive 407
sympathy regarding older views of spiritual powers and declining command 
of the Javanese language have all played their role. But certainly those 
pressing for deeper Islamisation are an important part of this story, for they 
have been championing their cause on all fronts. It is to the smaller groups of 
Islamic activists that we now turn, for it is they who, as in a classical Greek 
drama, have most often played the role of protagonist, opening the play and 
setting its plot in motion, requiring responses from others, and thus moving 
Javanese society towards something very different from what it was just half 
a century ago.
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c h a p te r  12
The protagonists and new 
totalitarians: Smaller Islamist and 
Dakwahist movements
We began the preceding chapter concerning the large-scale movements 
Muhammadiyah and NU — those usually described as ‘moderate’ — by 
citing the caveat that the label ‘moderate’ is of limited analytical value. In 
this chapter we will have less terminological difficulty, for we are turning 
to movements most of whom would be almost universally regarded as 
immoderate, hard-line, extremist or radical. Here are people and movements 
that, on the whole, may be regarded as totalitarian in the sense that in their 
ideal world there would be conformity in both what people do and what 
they believe.
In pursuing their totalitarian objective of defining both what people 
do and what they believe, several of the groups discussed in this section are 
involved (as we have already seen) in attacks on ‘deviant sects’ (what people 
believe). Here we will see them also attacking what they regard as irreligious 
conduct (what people do). The overall objective is to shut out voices, lifestyles 
and ideas other than their own, to close the public space to them and to 
prevent them winning a wider adherence. These movements include those 
whose modus operandi is to deploy violence or the threat of violence.
We must, however, observe an important distinction between ideology 
and action. We will be discussing movements whose ideology is extremist 
and which engage in extremist, violent action, but also others whose religious 
aspirations are not significantly different, yet who eschew violence and aim 
to play constructive roles in society. Some want utopia tomorrow and feel 
a need to act on its behalf. They may even engage in extremist action, 
408
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including suicide bombing, with no practical political goal in sight but to 
please God.1 Others are prepared to wait for utopia until it is delivered 
by God, or to work pragmatically and gradually towards its achievement 
— the latter being the people whom Masdar Hilmy calls meliorists.2 That 
description relates to the political party PKS, which is a complicated, partial 
exception to the patterns otherwise seen in this chapter. We will consider 
PKS below.
A preliminary comment on terrorism is needed. Indonesia has a 
terrorism problem which is rooted in Islamic religious extremism born out 
of Revivalist epistemology and Islamist and Dakwahist agendas. Indonesia 
also has a specialist anti-terrorist police force in Densus 88, which has a 
strong record of penetrating terrorist networks, breaking them up, capturing 
terrorists and/or killing them. In fact, a common criticism is that Densus 88 
kills too many of its targets, preventing use of the intelligence they might 
provide. Densus 88’s answer is that they face dangerous people who are 
prepared to kill, indeed to blow themselves up, and police officers often have 
little choice but to use deadly force in order to stop them and to protect 
themselves. In this book about the deepening Islamisation of the Javanese, 
however, terrorism is marginal. The people and movements we will discuss 
below might, in some cases, segue effortlessly from pengajian to plotting 
terrorism, but it is only their pengajian that promotes deeper Islamisation. 
Terrorist acts of violence have arguably constituted an obstacle, not a 
path, to deeper Islamisation among Javanese. Sidney Jones has suggested that 
‘the more thoughtful jihadis’ themselves accept that the suicide bombings 
carried out in Indonesia since 2002 have had little or no political impact and 
‘implicitly that the pro-Sharia civil society groups have been more effective’.3 
We already noted in the 1970s in Surakarta what seems to have been a 
dialectical relationship between energetic Islamic reform movements and 
high levels of Christianisation, so that by the 1980s a quarter of Surakarta’s 
populace was Christian. Terrorism in the early 21st century probably had 
a similar effect on some Javanese, discrediting Islamic reform in their eyes 
and possibly making Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, or kebatinan seem 
more attractive options. For the pious Javanese Muslim middle class, the JI 
1 A phenomenon observed more widely in Islamic extremism by Olivier Roy; see 
his works Failure of political Islam, pp. 65–6, 157; and Globalized Islam: The search for 
a new ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 246–8.
2 Hilmy, Islamism and democracy, esp. pp. 8, 83.
3 International Crisis Group. Indonesia: From vigilantism to terrorism in Cirebon (Asia 
briefing no. 132; Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 26 Jan. 2012), p. 10.
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bombing of Christian targets in 11 cities across Indonesia on Christmas Eve 
2000 and in Bali in 2002 were too close for comfort, but it was the 2003 
JI bombing of the Marriott hotel in Jakarta, which claimed the lives of 12 
Indonesians (including the suicide bomber, plus one European), that was the 
more direct attack on their social realm. While we cannot doubt that there 
are pious Muslims among the Javanese middle class who share the religious 
values and aspirations of Islamists and Dakwahists, terrorist violence directly 
threatens the social stability, rule of law and security of property that reassure 
middle classes that their and their children’s futures can be secure and 
predictable. It is, thus, likely to be a way to lose middle class sympathy. This 
is not a peculiarly Javanese or Indonesian pattern. Gilles Kepel has noted 
with regard to terrorism in the Islamic world more generally, that ‘resorting 
to spectacular terrorism was a high-risk gamble which … was bound to 
engender … a far greater, far deeper angst among the devout middle class, 
who feared that such explosions of violence might threaten its vital interests 
in the long run.’4 This is not particularly Islamic, either, for in the 1970s and 
1980s the aspirations of the Baader-Meinhof group, the Japanese Red Army 
Faction, the Red Army Brigades in Italy and Action Directe in France all 
claimed some middle-class sympathy, which was largely lost through their 
terrorist outrages. What may be more peculiarly Indonesian is the supposed 
involvement of shady military men with terrorists for their own purposes, 
which — in the opinion of many observers — declined or came to an end 
after the Bali bombings, as the terrorists became too dangerous to be played 
with.5 Indonesians are prone to believe such plot theories, not least because 
there have in fact been many plots.
Terrorism is thus an important subject in itself but a marginal one for 
this book about Islamisation. Readers interested to learn more about it would 
be well advised to turn to the International Crisis Group publications found 
in the bibliography of this book and to the other specific works that will be 
cited below. They should generally avoid the writing of self-labelled ‘experts 
on terrorism’, whose work has too often been characterised by superficial 
research and analysis and television sound-bites.6
4 Kepel, Jihad, p. 320.
5 Among many others, the head of PPP in Surakarta, Hasan Mulachela, believed this 
to be so; discussion of 25 Aug. 2003, Surakarta.
6 For a thorough analysis of the weaknesses of some of this literature, focusing on 
publications by Rohan Gunaratna, Zachary Abuza, Maria Ressa and others, see 
Natasha Hamilton-Hart, ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Expert analysis, myopia and 
fantasy’, The Pacific Review vol. 18, no. 3 (Sept. 2005), pp. 303–25.
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Abu Bakar Ba’asyir has already appeared multiple times in this book. 
He and his colleague Abdullah Sungkar returned to Surakarta from Malaysia 
shortly after Soeharto’s 1998 fall from power. Sungkar died in 1999, however, 
leaving Ba’asyir to carry forward their Revivalist ideas. In 2000 he created 
MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Indonesian Holy Warriors’ Council). 
In subsequent years Ba’asyir frequently said that he does not approve of 
violence and prosecutors’ attempts to connect him operationally to terrorism 
failed until, in mid-2011, he was finally convicted of supporting a terrorist 
training camp in Aceh. Even before this conviction, he clearly acted in ways 
that inspired and legitimised violence and he was generally understood to be 
the spiritual leader of the terrorist group JI.7 Ba’asyir’s speech at the opening 
congress of MMI was uncompromising and militant:
The sole intention and purpose of God (glorified and exalted is he) in 
creating men and spirits on this world is to worship him. … But in order 
to put this worship into practice the essence of this worship, Islamic 
shari‘a, must be implemented in a complete way. … Without [political] 
power, much of God’s shari‘a cannot be put into practice. … Thus, 
in order to implement Islam’s shari‘a in a complete, coordinated and 
orderly fashion, what is needed is affirmation of its position and what is 
needed is [political] power. … [What is needed] may, in broad terms, be 
summarised as dakwah and jihad.
 Because mujahidin [holy warriors] are the upholders of religion, they 
must have the capacity to carry out dakwah and jihad. … The enemies of 
Islam know that as long as the Islamic ummah, including its fighters, no 
longer has an understanding of jihad and the spirit of jihad has died, just 
so long can it easily be dominated, even if in other respects its struggle 
is spirited. Because of this there grows in the soul of the mujahidin an 
7 The best studies are International Crisis Group, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia; 
idem, Indonesia’s terrorist network: How Jemaaah Islamiyah works ( Jakarta/Brussels: 
International Crisis Group, 11 Dec. 2002); and idem, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s 
current status (Update briefing no. 63; Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 3 
May 2007). A brief and more general overview is in Greg Barton, Indonesia’s struggle: 
Jemaah Islamiyah and the soul of Islam (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004). Ba’asyir’s 
defence against the charge of terrorism can be read in Fauzan Al-Anshari, Saya 
teroris? (Sebuah “pleidoi”) ( Jakarta: Penerbit Republika, 2002). Another sympathetic 
account by a former Ngruki student is in Es Soepriyadi, Ngruki & jaringan terorisme: 
Melacak jejak Abu Bakar Ba’asyir & jaringannya dari Ngruki sampai bom Bali ( Jakarta: 
Al-Mawardi Prima, 2003). On the 2011 conviction and sentencing to 15 years’ 
imprisonment, see KmpsO, 16 June 2011; JktP online, 20 June 2011. Ba’asyir’s 
sentence was reduced on appeal to nine years (JktP online, 26 Oct. 2011) and then 
restored to 15 years by the Supreme Court (JktP online, 27 Feb. 2012).
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understanding and spirit of jihad, right to the borders of love of jihad and 
of martyrdom in jihad, [a realization] that this is the most important task 
of Islamic mass organisations in guiding their members, above all their 
mujahidin. And we are certain that without implementing war in the path 
of God (jihad fi sabilillah), the consolidation of the position of the Islamic 
faith, above all its [political] power, cannot possibly be achieved.
 Fiqh al-qital (knowledge of combat) … is the endeavour to give 
training in the tactics and strategy of combat and to practice skills in 
handling weapons. Of the companions of the Prophet, there was not one 
who could not employ weapons, although their skills were not all the 
same. Specifically to develop the sciences of jihad and qital, it would be 
best if Islamic mass organisations had their own camps.
 Pesantrens are the fortress of the Islamic ummah. … So that pesantrens 
truly represent a cauldron for the building-up of a cadre of mujahidin, 
pesantrens must be distanced from the influences of secular knowledge 
and thinking. To the contrary, they must bring to life the Qur’an and 
Hadith and the spirit of war in the path of God.8
Books that were read at Ba’asyir’s school at Ngruki indeed included a volume 
on guerilla strategy and tactics, as well as works by Osama bin Laden’s 
mentor Abdullah Azzam.9 
8 Irfan Suryahardi Awwas (ed.), Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan penegakan syariah 
Islam (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 1421H/2001M), pp. 79–90. This text (with some 
small alterations) is also available at http://www.geocities.ws/kongresmujahidin/
abubakarbasyir.html. See also Hilmy, Islamism and democracy, pp. 109–14. Other 
reports on the MMI congress are in TempoI, 5 Aug. 2000, 8 Aug. 2000. A useful 
account of MMI is in Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, Gerakan Salafi radikal di Indonesia 
( Jakarta: PT Raja Grafindo Persada, 2004), pp. 47–84.
9 Abu Fath Al Pastuni, Gerilya: Strategi, taktik & teknik ([Surakarta:] Afkar, n.d. 
[c. 2000]). The author’s name may be a pseudonym. I was given a copy of this and 
other works by the journalist Blontank Poer, who collected them at Ngruki. On 
Abdullah Azzam, see Kepel, Jihad, pp. 144–7. Other books being studied at Ngruki, 
according to Blontank Poer, included predictable texts such as an Indonesian 
translation of Abdullah Azzam’s Join the caravan (Bergabung bersama kafilah; London: 
Azzam Publications; Jakarta: Penerbit Ahad, 2001) and a collection of his speeches 
(Abdullah Azzam, Tarbiyah Jihadiyah; transl. Abdurrahman; multiple vols; Solo: 
Pustaka al-‘Alaq, 1423/2002 –). Other related works from there are Lembaga Study 
dan Penelitian Islam Pakistan, Membangun kekuatan Islam di tengah perselisihan 
ummat (intro. Usamah bin Laden; Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 1422H/2001M) and 
Abdullah Azzam, Pelita yang hilang (transl. Abdurrahman; Solo: Pustaka al-‘Alaq, 
1422H/2002M). On the Jihadist publishing industry in general, see the International 
Crisis Group report Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s publishing industry.
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Illustration 37 Ust. Abu Bakar Ba’syir, Ngruki, 2007
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t413   413 6/20/2012   1:22:06 PM
414 Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java
From being an obscure Revivalist cleric, little regarded by his fellow 
Arabs10 and absent from Indonesia for many years, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was 
quickly catapulted to the status of an international celebrity, known of and 
loathed in Washington and Canberra as much as in Jakarta, denounced as 
a terrorist leader but with no one able to prove in a court of law that this 
was so until his conviction in June 2011. It is my impression that he much 
enjoys his celebrity status and probably takes it as a sign that he is succeeding 
in God’s work. Whenever the Indonesian government tried to hold him 
responsible for terrorism, his followers denounced this as a Western plot 
and demonstrated to support him — in one case even attacking the police 
headquarters in Surakarta.11 His mid-2011 conviction will do nothing to 
diminish — indeed will almost certainly enhance — his reputation among 
Indonesian extremists.
Ba’asyir travelled to many places in Java, where he attracted large 
crowds (many of them, no doubt, simply interested to see this celebrity in 
action) and where the very simplicity of his message was persuasive to many. 
He has an effective rhetorical style, smiling, laughing, using humour,12 but 
it is all nailed down to his Revivalist conception of the Qur’an and Hadith, 
and of shari‘a (as he understands it) as the absolute determinant of how 
to live. He is discursive and articulate but has no room for subtleties on 
basic matters. Such simplicity of message is one of the advantages that 
Revivalists hold, in contrast to the legalistic complexities of Traditionalism 
or the intellectuality of Modernism.13 When he visited a small mosque 
south of Kediri in 2006 and 2007, he reportedly attracted an audience in the 
thousands. The young Muhammadiyah activist who was among his inviters 
commented that Ba’asyir’s message of returning to the shari‘a was ‘simple, 
10 This comment has been made widely. Hasan Mulachela, then head of PPP in 
Surakarta and himself of Hadhrami descent, also expressed such a view in our 
discussion of 25 Aug. 2003 in Surakarta.
11 TempoI, 2 May 2004.
12 I should add that, in his three meetings with me, he was unfailingly courteous and 
ready to discuss any issues. I did not ask about his involvement in terrorism, however, 
since no answer he might have given could be of value as evidence. In our discussion 
of 26 March 2007, Ba’asyir volunteered his view that the real terrorist in the world 
was the USA and that Osama bin Laden et al. were ‘counter-terrorists’, although, he 
said, he did not agree with their methods.
13 Similar observations were made in discussion by Prof. Azyumardi Azra ( Jakarta, 
4 Feb. 2008) and Prof. A. Syafii Maarif (Yogyakarta, 14 Sept. 2008).
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timely, practical and functional’.14 Other Muhammadiyah leaders who were 
interested in Ba’syir’s ideas invited him to a Muhammadiyah mosque in 
Kediri, and believed that this was not inconsistent with the December 2006 
Muhammadiyah ‘letter of decision’ that denied PKS or similar organisations 
access to Muhammadiyah facilities, even for ‘activities that call themselves 
or use symbols of religion or dakwah such as pengajian and guidance of the 
ummah’.15 But Ba’asyir also aroused local opposition and on more than one 
occasion local people or local Islamic leaders objected to, or even prevented, 
him speaking in their area.16
The supposedly ‘simple, timely, practical and functional’ quality of 
Ba’asyir’s ideas is debatable. The shari‘a code proposed by MMI was utopian, 
poorly drafted, emotive, inflammatory, discriminatory towards minorities 
and women and obsessed with sexual issues.17 M.B. Hooker regards it as 
having ‘no credibility in terms of either the classical [Islamic] jurispru-
dence or contemporary Indonesian circumstances’.18 Similarly quixotic was 
Ba’asyir’s support of using gold dinars and silver dirhams as legal tender, on 
the grounds that this was necessary for the full implementation of shari‘a.19 
His celebrity and consistency in his cause made it difficult for other Muslim 
leaders to ignore him and encouraged them to downplay frequent allega-
tions of him being linked to violence. Although the national-level MUI 
14 Discussion with Ashari, Ngadiluwih, 28 Nov. 2007; the originals of the translated 
words that he used were sederhana, aktual, praktis, aktif. Ba’asyir’s speech at 
Ngadiluwih is also reported in MmK, 7 Nov. 2007.
15 Discussion with Abdul Haris, Triyono and Hari Widasmoro, Kediri, 29 Nov. 
2007.
16 For instance, in Banten (JktP online, 1 Nov. 2009, 17 May 2010); the first occasion 
nearly led to a fight between his followers and opponents; on the second occasion 
it was the local MUI that objected to him coming. People in Blitar also refused his 
presence, but his admirer Ashari (discussion in Ngadiluwih, 28 Nov. 2007) said that 
this was just opposition by ex-PKI and street thugs (preman). Similar opposition 
occurred in Nganjuk in Nov. 2006, where only about 200 people attended, most of 
them policemen and military in plain clothes (MmK, 8 Nov. 2006; Suhadi Cholil 
email, 14 Feb. 2008).
17 Tim Lindsey and Jeremy Kingsley, ‘Talking in code: Legal Islamisation and the 
MMI shari‘a criminal code’, in Peri Bearman, Wolfhart Heinrichs and Bernard G. 
Weiss (eds), The law applied: Contextualising the Islamic shari‘a; A volume in honor of 
Frank E. Vogel (London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 2008), pp. 295–320.
18 Hooker, Indonesian syariah, pp. 277–81 (quote from p. 281).
19 See http://wakalanusantara.com/detilurl/Terbentuk,.Komunitas.Pengguna.Dirham.
Dinar.Solo/239.
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repeatedly denounced terrorism, when Ba’syir was arrested by Densus 88 in 
2010, MUI demanded a full explanation for the arrest of this ‘well-known 
and respected figure’.20
Surakarta was a relatively congenial base for Ba’asyir, with a history 
since the 1970s of Islamic activism by several organisations, a society 
polarised on Christian-Muslim lines, and a long and ever-permutating list 
of vigilante groups prepared to threaten or commit mayhem.21 Surakarta 
was not unique in the last respect. One list of ‘Muslim hard-line groups’ in 
Yogyakarta claimed that there were 40 of them, many linked to PPP.22 But 
stronger political leadership in Yogyakarta than in Surakarta (a general topic 
that will be addressed in the appendix on research methodology and case 
studies below) meant that there was far less violence in Yogyakarta. This did 
not mean, however, that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s Surakarta base for either jihad 
or dakwah was stable, for it is in the nature of extremist organisations to be 
brittle and easily rent by accusations of ideological deviance or hypocrisy. 
And so it was that MMI and Ba’asyir split in 2008, with the bitterest 
accusations being hurled in both directions. Thereupon Ba’asyir created his 
new organisation, Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (Congregation of the Helpers 
of Divine Unity, JAT), which was to give emphasis to dakwah activities but 
which in 2010 was accused of running a terrorist training camp in Aceh 
(the discovery of which eventually led to Ba’asyir’s conviction).23 While the 
subsequent trials continued, in April 2011 a suicide bombing in a police 
headquarters mosque in Cirebon led to the further discoveries about terrorist 
links to Ba’asyir’s JAT. Several arrests followed and in May two alleged 
terrorists were killed by Densus 88 in a shoot-out in Cemani (where Ngruki 
is found).24
20 JktP online, 9 Aug. 2010.
21 An account of these groups in Surakarta from a rather sympathetic perspective is 
in Zainuddin Fananie, Atiqa Sabardila and Dwi Purnanto, Radikalisme keagamaan 
dan perubahan sosial (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press and The Asia 
Foundation, 2002).
22 JktP, 25 June 2001.
23 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: The dark side of Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid 
( JAT) (Asia briefing no. 107; Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 6 July 
2010). 
24 JktG, 18 Apr. 2011; KR, 14 May 2001; Kmps, 14 May 2011; TempoI, 15 May 
2011. The group that was involved here was reportedly called Tauhid wal Jihad; on 
this, see also International Crisis Group, Indonesia: The dark side of Jama’ah Ansharut 
Tauhid ( JAT), pp. 3, 10. The group was said also to be involved in the murder of an 
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While Abu Bakar Ba’asyir undoubtedly has influenced some of his 
listeners to adopt a more pious way of life, his political involvements and 
links to extremism have almost certainly limited his impact, and that of his 
organisations, in actually changing Javanese society. He has made no headway 
whatsoever towards his Islamist goals. Nevertheless the educational and 
proselytising work by his followers is significant, if on a much smaller scale 
than that of NU or Muhammadiyah.
The pesantren at Ngruki — with about 1,600 pupils25 — has played a 
role in the deeper Islamisation of surrounding society since the 1970s, as we 
have seen in previous chapters, but it is also part of a wider and influential 
network of schools. This has been characterised by the International Crisis 
Group as a JI school network, consisting of something like 20 pesantrens, 
most of them in Java, particularly in the area around Surakarta.26 How this 
network operates to spread Revivalist ideas in a more Islamised society is 
illustrated by the story of the villages of Blumbang and Kalisoro, on the 
slopes of Mount Lawu.
Blumbang has an ancient holy site (pundhen) where the annual bersih 
desa takes place, funded by contributions gathered from villagers. Until 
the 1990s, the villagers are said all to have been Muslims of the abangan 
or kejawen style; neither Muhammadiyah nor NU had a presence. Then 
more pious forms of Islam began to develop there, which led to tension 
and divisions within the village. More recently — evidently c. 2000 or so 
— some young people began to style themselves as Islam kaffah (complete 
Muslims). According to their leader Edi Suwarnoto — then in his mid-20s 
and wishing to abandon a rather dissolute, aimless life — they followed 
pengajian in Surakarta. At some point, LDII also established a presence in 
the village, but Edi’s Islam kaffah group of course rejected LDII’s teachings, 
as they also rejected mysticism. Similar developments occurred in the nearby 
village of Kalisoro. In early 2006, for the observations in the first month of 
the Javanese year (Suran), Kalisoro’s villagers gathered the usual financial 
contributions, but about 20 Islam kaffah families refused to contribute to 
what they now regarded as heathenism. The same was done by Edi’s group 
in Blumbang. In Kalisoro, the village elders sought to impose a fine on the 
army officer and in church bombings, including the suicide bombing in Surakarta in 
September 2011. See further International Crisis Group, Indonesia: From vigilantism 
to terrorism in Cirebon.
25 Discussion with Ust. H. Wahyuddin, Ngruki, 26 March 2006.
26 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s current status, pp. 5–9.
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pious recalcitrants, which they refused to pay. Their friends in Blumbang 
thereupon organised support for the Islam kaffah group in Kalisoro, which 
consisted of calling up some 200 motorbikes from as far away as Surakarta, 
which rolled into the village ridden by members of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s 
MMI and others of similar views. One can imagine the intimidating effect 
of this invasion of aspirant mujahidin. Before any actual mayhem could 
occur, the matter was referred to court in Karanganyar (with an outcome 
not known to me). This episode evidently helped to solidify a connection 
between the devout groups in the mountain villages and radical groups 
from outside. The young village Islam kaffah people now go farther down 
the slopes to Karangpandan (Karanganyar) for religious guidance at the Isy 
Karima mosque and pesantren, identified by the International Crisis Group 
as part of the JI network.27
Illustration 38 Blumbang village, 2006
27 Discussion with Edi Suwarnoto, Blumbang, Karanganyar, 4 Aug. 2006. On Isy 
Karima, see International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s current status, 
p. 7. The pesantren is under the guidance of its founder Dr Tunjung S. Soeharso and 
Ngruki’s Ust. Wahyuddin (Abdullah Sungkar’s son-in-law). DDII played a role in 
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Another flamboyantly violent organisation, Laskar Jihad (Holy War 
Militia), grew from a small pesantren near Yogyakarta founded by Ja‘far Umar 
Thalib. He and his movement are the subjects of an outstanding study by 
Noorhaidi Hasan, which we follow here. Ja‘far Umar Thalib was born in 1961 
in Malang into a devout family of Arab (Hadhrami) descent. The young man 
studied at the Persatuan Islam pesantren at Bangil and then LIPIA, whence 
he proceeded in 1987 to study in Pakistan at the Mawdudi Institute. During 
his time abroad, he had experience with the Afghan mujahidin then fighting 
the Soviet occupation. He returned to Indonesia and, with others, was active 
in spreading Revivalist versions of Islam, especially among the younger 
generation. He established his own pesantren Ihyaus Sunnah in 1994 north 
of Yogyakarta. A dozen or so other such Revivalist schools were set up, 
linked to Ihyaus Sunnah, in following years. But Ihyaus Sunnah failed to 
win significant domestic or overseas funding and never spawned a network 
as large and important as that of Ngruki.
Ja‘far Umar Thalib was most influential through his capacity to mobilise 
people for street demonstrations and, above all, through his Laskar Jihad, 
which recruited several thousand fighters to do battle against Christians in 
the sectarian conflict in Maluku. In this military role in Maluku, Laskar Jihad 
seems to have acted hand-in-hand with elements of the Indonesian military. 
When Laskar Jihad tried to get involved in the conflict in Aceh, however, 
local leaders rejected it because they saw it as a tool of the military. Laskar 
Jihad also had an agenda in Java, but it provoked opposition as well. After 
a Laskar Jihad attack on ‘places of immorality’ in Ngawi during Ramadan 
2001, the group was counter-attacked by PDIP supporters. A PDIP figure 
was reportedly kidnapped and repeatedly stabbed by the Laskar Jihad 
side. The police — who raided the Laskar Jihad headquarters and found 
knives, machetes, bombs, a handgun and ammunition — arrested 80 Laskar 
members, plus another 38 coming from Surakarta, Yogyakarta and Magelang 
to join the fight.28
In 2002, after Ja‘far had managed to offend other Revivalist leaders 
and inspire distrust among his own followers by pursuing what was seen as 
his personal aggrandisement, a fatwa from a major Saudi Arabian religious 
organising the 1996 grant of land on which the mosque was erected, according to 
http://www.isykarima.com/profil/sejarah.html. The Blumbang holy site is more 
widely known and was referred to repeatedly during my discussion with Drs KRAT 
Basuki Prawirodipuro and KRT Giarto Nagoro, Surabaya, 25 Nov. 2007.
28 JktP online, 3 Dec. 2001.
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scholar declared that Laskar Jihad had deviated from its proper religious 
objectives and should be shut down. Ja‘far then disbanded it (just days after 
the Bali bombs) and most of the students at his pesantren left to study at 
other Revivalist schools.29 While undoubtedly Laskar Jihad had inspired 
several thousand younger activists to a greater militancy and willingness to 
make sacrifices for its version of the Islamic cause, and had claimed lives in 
the Maluku conflict, the small size of its pesantren network meant that it 
was always of marginal significance in the deeper Islamisation of Javanese 
society.
Other violent groups focused more on local Javanese society in the 
name of purification. The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) was created in 
Jakarta in 1998 and led by the Habib (descendant of the Prophet) Mu-
hammad Rizieq Shihab (b. 1965, Jakarta). Habib Rizieq, as he is known, 
studied at LIPIA and then took his first degree at King Saud University 
in Riyadh, followed by a master’s degree in Malaysia.30 While FPI’s main 
field of activity has been Jakarta and West Java, it also established branches 
in towns in Central and East Java. As with Laskar Jihad, so with FPI there 
have been frequent allegations that it has links with, or is manipulated by, 
elements in the military. In its early years its main activity was physically 
attacking ‘places of immorality’ (tempat maksiat) such as cafes, bars, 
discotheques, billiard halls, gambling joints, and places of prostitution. 
Probably its most spectacular success was its protest at the second Jakarta 
Biennale arts show in 2005, where the work of over 300 Indonesian and 
international artists was displayed. FPI demanded the removal of a particular 
installation displaying naked humans with their genitalia covered by small 
circular dots and featuring two television soap-opera stars. The organisers 
of the Biennale gave in to the implicit threat of violence, whereupon other 
artists covered up or withdrew their own works in protest. The curator then 
29 This account of Laskar Jihad rests on Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, 
militancy and the quest for identity in post-New Order Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Southeast 
Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2006).
30 A useful account of FPI is in Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, Gerakan Salafi radikal, 
Chapter 5. For more details on this and other organisations in Jakarta and West 
Java, see Chader S. Bamualim’s forthcoming work, tentatively entitled Islamisation 
and resistance in West Java: A study of religion, politics and social change since c. 1965. 
Valuable also is Chaider S. Bamualim et al., ‘Laporan penelitian: Radikalisme agama 
dan perubahan sosial di DKI Jakarta’ ([ Jakarta:] Tim Peneliti Pusat Bahasa dan 
Budaya IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah and Badan Perencanaaan Pembangunan Daerah 
(Bappeda) Pemerintah DKI Jakarta, 1999/2000).
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announced that there would be no more Jakarta Biennales.31 From around 
2005 or so, FPI began to put more effort into violence against ‘deviant 
sects’ (aliran sesat), several examples of which we have seen above, at least 
partly because it had been successful in mobilising the police to act against 
‘immorality’.32
Coordination between FPI and local police or military was obvious 
in several cases, and may go far to explain why the government has never 
declared FPI illegal. That is, the views and objectives of the state and its 
security apparatus at least sometimes parallel those of FPI. March 2010 
saw an Asia-wide gay and lesbian conference convened in Surabaya. The 
Forum Umat Islam (Islamic Ummah Forum) of East Java, an umbrella 
group comprising FPI, MUI, Al-Irsyad and other organisations, surrounded 
the hotel where it was being held and demanded that the conference be 
stopped. Some physical conflict occurred. Under the supervision of the South 
Surabaya police chief, the organisers agreed to cancel their conference and 
attendees left for their homes.33 In June 2010, FPI acted in cooperation 
with the military in Banyuwangi to stop a meeting intended to disseminate 
information about new health programmes, claiming that this had been cover 
for a meeting of former Communists.34 In January 2011, the Surabaya FPI 
acted jointly with the Surabaya police to shut down a discussion by human 
rights groups in a major hotel on the subject of freedom of belief, to which 
Ahmadiyya and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender groups had been 
invited. Policemen and FPI people arrived together, could not intimidate 
the activists there, but did sufficiently intimidate the hotel management to 
shut down the discussion.35 In both the Banyuwangi and Surabaya cases, 
it appears to have been the military or police who took the initial step of 
informing FPI of the meetings that were to be shut down.
31 JktP, 23 Oct. 2005.
32 In August 2010 the Jakarta governor Fauzi Bowo and the police chief Timur 
Pradopo attended FPI’s anniversary, where Habib Rizieq offered FPI’s assistance in 
enforcing a Jakarta by-law closing some places of entertainment during Ramadan; 
JktP online, 7 Aug. 2010. Roy, Failure of political Islam, pp. 80–1, comments on 
Islamic, Christian and Jewish puritans’ shared opposition to most forms of entertain-
ment and leisure.
33 AntaraNews.com, 26 March 2010. It may be noted that there is no law against gay, 
lesbian, transsexual or transvestite activity in Indonesia.
34 JktP online, 28 June 2010, 2 July 2010.
35 Based on a 13 Jan. 2011 report by Ahmad Zainul Hamdi, director of one of the 
organisations involved, provided by Masdar Hilmy (email, 28 Feb. 2011).
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FPI is somewhat unusual among violent movements in having Tradi-
tionalist aspects. It professes loyalty to the Sunni schools of law and in its 
early days the practices of the Tijaniyya Sufi order were taught as a means 
to develop members spiritually.36 Among others, the NU leader Ky. H. 
Sahal Mahfudh, however, explicitly denied that FPI could be thought of as 
anything like NU. ‘FPI was set up by Habibs,’ he said, ‘so it is not NU … 
Those FPI characters are Wahhabi.’37 FPI’s political attitudes (particularly 
opposition to Abdurrahman Wahid) and its social violence meant that it 
often found itself opposed by NU’s Ansor, which demanded that FPI be 
shut down, something the government never agreed to do.38 After the Bali 
bombings of 2002, however, FPI found it more difficult to get funding and 
tended to deteriorate into a protection racket (something the police are also 
good at) until cleaning up its ranks again.39
A local Surakarta extremist group that is sometimes confused with FPI 
is FPIS (Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta, Surakarta Islamic Youth Front). This 
is based at the exclusive Islamic Community of Gumuk ( Jamaah al-Islam 
Gumuk) in Surakarta, the subject of an important study by Fajar Riza Ul 
Haq. This community was originally founded in the 1970s, as were Ngruki, 
MTA and Assalaam. Since the late 1970s it has been led by Ust. Mudzakkir, 
a native of Surakarta and pharmacist by training, whose ideas agreed with 
those of his contemporaries Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. To 
Mudzakkir, the Qur’an is the primary source of knowledge, with the Hadith 
occupying a second rank. Pengajian and militia activity are both seen as 
ways to build up the cadres of the community. At the Gumuk pesantren, 
students are instructed in a strictly Revivalist version of Islam, but are also 
given secular lessons (although the government curriculum is not followed). 
The community dress in what they regard as an Arabic fashion and women 
are restricted to domestic roles in the Salafi (Revivalist) style, but other 
Salafis dislike Gumuk and accuse it of being Shi‘ite. Gumuk has established 
branches elsewhere and gained some thousands of followers. Like Sungkar 
and Ba’asyir, Mudzakkir regards Pancasila as haram and rejects political parties 
(including Islamic parties) on the grounds that they foster divisions in society, 
36 M. Zaki Mubarak, Geneologi Islam radikal di Indonesia: Gerakan, pemikiran dan 
prospek demokrasi (intro. M. Syafi‘i Anwar. Jakarta: LP3ES, 2008), pp. 228–9.
37 Interviewed in Tempo, 29 Sept. 2008.
38 This was particularly so after the violence at the national monument in Jakarta on 
1 June 2008 (e.g. KR, 4 June 2008; detikSurabaya online, 3 June 2008).
39 Ian Douglas Wilson, ‘“As long as it’s halal”: Islamic preman in Jakarta’, in Fealy 
and White, Expressing Islam, pp. 199–203.
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but he expects followers to maintain loyalty to him. Street politics is his 
style, including violent actions against ‘immorality’. Mudzakkir is the main 
ideologue of FPIS, which was established in 1999 and still has its base in the 
Gumuk community. It is one of the most violent groups in Surakarta.40
Such groups’ identities and memberships change, overlap, fuse into 
umbrella organisations for particular actions and then split again over 
personal or ideological differences, but nevertheless represent a constant 
presence pushing forward a violent Dakwahist and Islamist agenda. The 
month of Ramadan has been a particular focus for activity, the month 
regarded as the most holy of the year, when Muslims should be fasting 
from sunrise to sunset. Places of entertainment are attacked, patrons are 
threatened or roughed up, courting couples are hauled off to the police for 
further admonition, bottles of alcohol are smashed, prostitutes are driven 
away, and so on. Laskar this or laskar that, front this or front that, koalisi 
this or koalisi that, with their various open and clandestine links to political 
parties, the police, the military, businessmen, criminals and religious teachers, 
are a bewildering cacophony, but the general outlines of the social, political 
and religious symphony they aspire to is common. They want Javanese (and 
more widely Indonesian) society to conform to their picture of a more moral 
and more perfectly Islamic society, which is in almost all cases a Revivalist 
version. Javanese should live as nearly as possible as the Prophet and his 
companions lived, in that most perfect of times. Hence their predilection for 
wearing beards and turbans and for waving swords. Their attitude towards 
technology tends to be schizophrenic. While they may insist on wearing 
Arab-style clothes and brushing their teeth with a small wooden stick 
(miswak or siwak), as did the Prophet, they also use flush toilets, mobile 
phones and the Internet and, given a chance, would see no objection to 
exchanging their sword for an AK-47.
The violence in Surakarta reached a peak during Ramadan in December 
2000. A number of cafes refused to close during Ramadan, as demanded by 
Laskar Jihad and similar gangs. So they attacked these cafes and destroyed 
several of them, but met stiff resistance from people who protected these 
‘places of immorality’. This was the last major street battle between Islamic 
40 Fajar Riza Ul Haq, ‘Islam dan gerakan sosial: Studi kasus gerakan Jamaah al Islam 
di Gumuk Surakarta’ (S2 thesis, Progam Studi Agama dan Lintas Budaya, Program 
Pascasarjana, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, 2006); email from Fajar Riza Ul 
Haq, 11 March 2011. In this thesis, FPIS is mistakenly referred to as Front Pembela 
Islam Surakarta. The Gumuk mosque is one of those covered (pp. 247–59) in Ridwan 
al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF (eds), Benih-benih Islam radikal di masjid.
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vigilantes and abangan resisters in Surakarta. Among the laskars’ principle 
targets were Kafe 2000 which was owned by a PDIP follower and Kafe 
Skorpio which was owned by a policeman. The conflict lasted over several 
days, featuring competing convoys of motorbikes around the streets of 
Surakarta, mutual threats and reportedly considerable drunkenness on the 
abangan side. At one stage, the abangan carried their counter-attack to 
Ngruki, where their enemies when into hiding. NU’s Ansor then decided 
to intervene, calling upon the Surakarta government and police to stop the 
violence, failing which it would mobilise thousands of its own people to 
barricade Surakarta against outsiders. The conflict then calmed down, under 
the threat of NU joining the fray against the laskars.41
In the wake of this violence, the Surakarta police decided it wise to 
take measures to close entertainment venues at least at the start and end of 
Ramadan. It can hardly be doubted that this was a painful decision, since 
policemen routinely had a personal interest in such places or took a cut 
for protecting them. The local context was, however, changing. Surakarta’s 
popular new mayor Jokowi (2005–10, then reelected with 90 per cent of the 
vote for a further five-year term) brought a refreshing level of competence 
and transparency to local government. He opened lines of communication 
to the laskars and was even able to communicate with the Gumuk com-
munity, the most difficult to approach.42 In early 2006, Yotje Mende was 
appointed as the new Surakarta area local police chief (until 2009). He was 
from east Indonesia from a mixed Muslim-Christian family. Unlike his 
predecessor, who had allowed the Islamic laskars considerable freedom to 
operate, Yotje Mende was prepared to take a stand against street violence. 
He faced organisations of considerable size, with MMI alone having 
some 12,000 members, he believed. But he declared ‘sweeping’ must stop, 
and the extremists then had to become more cautious. It was agreed that 
places of entertainment would close during the first and last weeks of 
Ramadan, but could operate in the middle weeks, although sometimes they 
did not do so out of fear of attack.43 ‘Sweeping’ of entertainment sites by 
41 An account is in Zaki Mubarak, Geneologi Islam radikal di Indonesia, p. 196. Other 
details are from a long report prepared for my colleague Soedarmono by Muchus 
Budi R., who was present at the events and interviewed several of the participants, 
dated 1 Oct. 2003.
42 Discussion with Ir Joko Widodo ( Jokowi), Surakarta, 3 Nov. 2006.
43 Discussion with Kombes Pol. Drs Yotje Mende, Surakarta, 4 Nov. 2006. 
As Kapolwil his responsibilities encompassed Surakarta, Sukohardjo, Boyolali, 
Karanganyar and Klaten.
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Islamic laskars still happened from time to 
time, with some episodes of violence, but 
often they went to attack a place only to 
find it already closed, locked and empty. 
The closures of some places were rather 
tokenistic, as the extremists turned their 
attention more to suppressing ‘deviance’, 
as we have seen above. During Ramadan 
in 2006, the food court at Surakarta’s main 
shopping mall reported that the agreement 
was merely that they would open every day 
until 5pm, then close for two hours and 
reopen at 7pm.44 
There were still violent incidents. 
When a laskar attack on drinkers led to 
the death of two of them in 2008, the 
Surakarta police arrested several per-
petrators and Ba’asyir hastened to the 
police station to offer them his support.45 
Generally, however, in Surakarta the police 
themselves by then were doing most of 
what the extremists demanded, shutting 
down illegal gambling joints, publicly 
destroying bottles of alcohol, arresting 
prostitutes and shaming courting couples 
discovered in such places.46 In cities other 
than Surakarta, ‘sweeping’ against places of 
‘immorality’ and threats against restaurants 
and food stalls by FPI and others still 
continued, especially during Ramadan.47 
Illustration 39 Ir Joko Widodo ( Jokowi), 
Mayor of Surakarta, 2006
44 RS, 25 Sept. 2006.
45 KR, 22 March 2008. Also described in [Zainal Abidin Bagir et al.,] Laporan 
tahunan, p. 13.
46 For example, RS, 6 Oct. 2006; Solopos, 12 Sept. 2008.
47 For example, KR, 7 Sept. 2008.
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East Java NU criticised violent ‘sweeping’ as inconsistent with the spirit of 
Ramadan, urging that improper conduct instead be referred to the police.48 
Just as in Surakarta, local government bans and police raids on ‘places of 
immorality’ came to be regularly reported, particularly during Ramadan.49
It must be emphasised that, even though many Javanese dislike the 
violence of the laskars, the suppression of gambling, drinking, prostitution 
and the like is supported by many people (Muslims and non-Muslims) 
on moral grounds, and is welcomed when done by local government and 
the police. Rarely is there resistance. In 2001, prostitutes and workers who 
depend on prostitution (parking attendants, etc.) demonstrated against the 
closure of their business for Ramadan in Kediri, but five years later most of 
them accepted the inevitable and went home for the fasting month.50 One 
is reminded of the comment by the lighterman at Ramsgate in 1581, quoted 
by Keith Thomas: ‘It was never merry England since we were impressed to 
come to the church.’51
Not all smaller Dakwahist and Islamist groups regard violence as 
acceptable. In Surakarta, the purification movements MTA and the Assalaam 
school that began in the 1970s carry on, contributing to the deeper Islami-
sation of the society. They do so without violence, relying on education and 
pengajian and, it may reasonably be presumed, are thereby more effective in 
bringing about social change then are the sword-waving laskars. They are 
not, of course, entirely free of controversy from time to time. The leader of 
MTA Ahmad Sukina was denounced in extreme terms by an Arab Habib 
from Grobogan for overthrowing Traditionalist ideas.52 ‘We regard no 
one as enemies, even though we are treated like an enemy by others’, said 
Ahmad Sukina.53 MTA continues its opposition to spiritually embedded 
Javanese beliefs and practices such as slametans, jimats, krisses, Ratu Kidul 
and the like. At its headquarters MTA has a display of krisses and other 
jimats, with the warning, ‘Muslim men and women who still have JIMATS: 
48 JktP online, 2 Sept. 2008.
49 For example, regarding Kediri: RK, 28 Oct. 2003, 19 Nov. 2003,14 Oct. 2004, 15 
Oct. 2004, 23 Sept. 2006, 26 Sept. 2005. Regarding Yogyakarta: KR, 23 Aug. 2008, 
6 Aug. 2009, 18 Aug. 2009, 21 Aug. 2009; KmpsO, 19 Aug. 2009.
50 TempoI, 29 Nov. 2001; MmK, 14 Sept. 2006.
51 Thomas, Religion and the decline of magic, p. 179.
52 MTA-online, 12 July 2007. Habib Yahya evidently even went so far as to claim that 
MTA is a Zionist front, than which there could hardly be any worse charge.
53 ‘Kita tidak punya musuh walaupun dimusuhi’; comment by Ust. Drs Ahmad Sukina, 
Surakarta, 6 Nov. 2006.
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Illustration 40 Ust. Drs Ahmad Sukina of MTA and the 
collection of surrendered jimats, ‘a clear source of deviance’, 
Surakarta MTA headquarters, 2008
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Repent immediately, for this is an act of shirk!’, such polytheism being the 
most heinous form of disbelief in Islam. MTA leaders resist getting involved 
in politics. ‘You can’t do dakwah through politics,’ a Surabaya MTA leader 
insisted.54 Assalaam also carries on in its educational work.
There are two political parties which are to a greater or lesser degree 
Dakwahist and Islamist and which have a significant impact among the 
Javanese: HTI and PKS. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia55 is a political party 
connected to the international Hizbut Tahrir — literally the ‘Liberation 
Party’ — which is based on the ideas of the Palestinian Taqiuddin al-Nabhani 
(1909–77). The Indonesian branch was founded in 1982 and won followers 
among university students, but could operate openly only after the fall of 
Soeharto. Although Hizbut Tahrir is regarded as a terrorist organisation and 
banned on those grounds in some countries, it has not been associated with 
terrorism in Indonesia. HTI seeks to create a universal caliphate, a global 
Islamic state and society. Because it rejects democracy, however, in Indonesia 
it pursues these goals without taking part in elections. It thus exemplifies 
the strategy of taking power from below and outside state structures, but 
unlike MMI it seeks to do so peacefully. Masdar Hilmy describes HTI in 
the following terms:
HTI is one of the better organised Islamist groups in Indonesia, com-
prising mainly middle-class Muslims with a strong longing for spiritual 
assistance. The organisation offers a unique mixture of modernity and 
elements of Salafism, even though at times it is unclear whether it 
represents a version of indigenous or Arabicised Islam. … HTI tends to 
choose a moderate, intellectual stance as its means of dakwah. Most of 
its members are attracted to the ideas of HTI not because of coercive 
indoctrination, but because of the intelligibility of the narratives on 
Islam provided by its ideologues. HTI mostly deploys international 
issues affecting Islam and the Muslim world as the basis of its campaign 
towards the establishment of Khilafah Islamiyah [the Islamic caliphate], 
even though its activists are also very much concerned with domestic 
social and political issues.56 
54 Mohammad Rokib interview of Ir. Hasan Ikhwani, head of the MTA branch in 
Sukolilo, Surabaya, 4 Dec. 2008. Hasan Ikhwani added that they could get along well 
with other religions, but if non-Muslims should provoke and threaten Islam, then 
they would have to be wiped out entirely (dibumihanguskan).
55 See Hilmy, Islamism and democracy, esp. pp. 117–22; unless otherwise indicated the 
discussion here rests mainly on this source.
56 Ibid., pp. 118–9.
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HTI’s most spectacular public performance was the holding of an 
‘International Caliphate Conference’ in Jakarta in August 2007. This was 
widely reported in the Indonesian press, with estimates that over 100,000 
people attended. The Indonesian government refused entrance to a few of 
the international attendees, but many Indonesian Muslim leaders put in an 
appearance.57 At local levels, HTI activists often take part in pro-caliphate, 
anti-government, anti-Israeli and anti-American demonstrations, along with 
other Islamic organisations.58
While HTI eschews electoral politics, it is aware of the desirability of a 
larger mass base than the tertiary-educated cadres that it now has. Integrated 
Islamic Schools (Sekolah Islam Terpadu) run by its activists are both a 
source of income for themselves and a long-term project for building up a 
following and changing the society. HTI is also appearing in at least some 
high schools.59 More immediately effective strategies for winning a larger 
following may also be in hand. We saw above NU’s fears that its followers 
were being influenced, its branches infiltrated or its mosques taken over by 
HTI. The senior NU kyai Idris Marzuqi was unequivocal about HTI being 
‘our enemies’ who would destroy the nation. If necessary, he insisted, NU 
would respond with its martial arts and mystical sciences of invulnerability 
(ilmu kebal, ilmu jadhugan).60 We may be sure that such ‘sciences’ were of 
little account in the thinking of HTI’s Revivalists. If HTI’s thinking is 
not subject to Traditionalist superstitions, however, it is subject to its own 
utopian naivety. Its leading spokesman Ismail Yusanto explained that there 
were two major problems in Indonesia. The first was a problem of leader-
ship, which would be solved by having a caliph. The second was a problem 
of ‘the system’, which would be solved by implementing shari‘a.61 Another 
spokesman even suggested that if the caliphate could be first established in 
Indonesia, then Indonesia could become the centre of the Islamic world. So 
there was no reason to fear that Indonesia would disappear in the caliphate, 
57 Ibid., p. 121.
58 For example, JktP online, 12 Jan. 2003; TempoI, 25 Oct. 2004; RK, 4 June 2005, 6 
March 2006, 29 July 2006, 5 Jan. 2009; Surabaya Post, 4 Jan. 2009.
59 Febi Taufiqurrahman (17 years old, a student leader) said that HTI was present 
in his senior high school (SMAN 4) in Kediri; Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi 
interview, Kediri, 28 July 2007.
60 Discussion with Ky. H.A. Idris Marzuqi, Lirboyo, Kediri, 29 Nov. 2007.
61 Discussion with Muhammad Ismail Yusanto, Jakarta, 8 June 2007.
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he said; rather, it would grow by taking into itself other Islamic nations 
around the world.62
Unlike HTI, PKS has a non-utopian, pragmatic leadership that is 
working within Indonesia’s democratic political system to create what 
it regards as a more perfect political, social and religious order. We have 
often referred to this organisation above, and now need to look at how 
it carries out its political and dakwah aims in Javanese society. As noted 
above, this party was born out of the tarbiyah movement on university 
campuses (especially secular campuses) modeled on the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood. Its religious practices, however, are not entirely Modernist or 
Revivalist. Although many followers of the tarbiyah movement follow daily 
litanies compiled by Hassan al-Banna,63 there are also people in PKS who 
observe Traditionalist rituals such as tahlilan and yasinan.64 Upon the fall 
of Soeharto, in July 1998 the activists of this movement decided to create a 
political party to compete in the expected national parliamentary elections, 
and they called it Partai Keadilan ( Justice Party). With an Islamist platform 
for implementing shari‘a law, it did poorly in the 1999 elections, winning 
only 1.4 per cent of the national vote, which rendered it unqualified to 
stand again. So the party was refounded as PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 
Prosperous Justice Party) and deemphasised its Islamist aspirations. It still 
called itself a dakwah party, but underlined that it was ‘clean and caring’, 
emphasising above all its opposition to corruption and concern for the 
disadvantaged. Its leader Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid65 was impressive, its cadres 
maintained their discipline and exemplified the moral standards the party 
claimed, and the electorate rewarded them. In the 2004 elections, PKS won 
over 8.3 million votes nationally, amounting to 7.3 per cent of the national 
vote. This was an impressive achievement for a new party in a multiparty 
62 Arif Maftuhin interview with HTI spokesman Tindyo Prasetyo, Yogyakarta, 16 
Aug. 2007.
63 Known as the al-ma’tsurat; Arif Maftuhin interview of Cahyadi Takariawan, 
Yogyakarta, 15 Sept. 2007.
64 Including one of its founders, Ky. H. Hilmi Aminuddin; PK Sejahtera-online, 23 
July 2008. This point was also made by Dr M. Hidayat Nur Wahid in our discussion, 
Jakarta, 7 June 2007, and in a lecture he gave at the Lapangan Tambaksari, Surabaya, 
on 5 April 2009 (notes provided by Masdar Hilmy).
65 Hidayat Nur Wahid was born in Klaten in 1960, educated at Gontor, IAIN Yogya-
karta and the Islamic University of Madinah (where he gained his doctorate); he taught 
at both Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta and IAIN Jakarta. Further details at 
http://www.tokoh-indonesia.com/ensiklopedi/h/hidayat-nur-wahid/index.shtml.
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Illustration 41 PKS election banner in Kediri, 2009. 
The Javanese slogan says, ‘Come on, build the nation along with 
PKS’ and points out that the candidate is ‘original NU’.
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democracy in which the largest party (Golkar) took just 21.6 per cent of the 
vote and the NU-based PKB won only 10.6 per cent. In the simultaneous 
elections for local parliaments, PKS did similarly strongly.
This more pragmatic approach represented a compromise between those 
who were prepared to work patiently and realistically to gain political power 
and those who were more committed to quicker and purer implementation 
of Islamist goals. In the wake of the 2004 outcome, the pragmatists could 
claim that their strategy was a success. PKS aimed at winning 20 per cent 
of the vote in the 2009 elections, when it presented itself as ‘clean, caring 
and professional’. It also declared itself more pluralist, more nationalist 
and more open to new phenomena like pop music.66 Its aspirations were, 
Illustration 42 Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 2007
66 PKS leader Anis Matta quoted in Kmps, 7 Oct. 2008. Similar sentiments were 
repeated at a PKS national meeting of some 3,500 cadres held in Yogyakarta in 2011, 
which opened with performances from a ‘Five Mountain Festival’ group, traditional 
Javanese dance and a hiphop performance; JktP online, 26 Feb. 2011.
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however, unrealistic. The party’s result was little different from 2004, winning 
8.2 million or 7.9 per cent of votes, making it fourth in size but far behind 
PDIP, Golkar and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Partai Demokrat.67 Doubts 
must have grown within PKS about how successful the pragmatists’ strategy 
really was. In March 2011 internal conflict within PKS became public, with 
accusations of dishonesty being made against major leaders and signs that 
idealistic figures may have been deserting the party as early as 2003, with 
others reportedly being pushed out or sidelined.68 The public began to 
suspect that perhaps PKS was not so different from other parties after all.
PKS is a Janus-faced organisation, with different internal and external 
presentations of itself, as many have observed. While publicly advocating 
democracy, ‘internally’, Masdar Hilmy notes, ‘PKS activists must adhere to a 
rather stringent internal code of behaviour that would appear to contradict 
some basic principles of democracy’.69 PKS leaders emphasise that they are 
democrats and have no interest in creating an Islamic state. ‘We are tired of 
the polemics’ (about an Islamic caliphate), said Hidayat Nur Wahid, by then 
speaker of the national parliament (MPR), ‘and it is better to concentrate 
on carrying out the teachings of Islam’.70 He said to me that PKS wanted 
no violence, no poverty, no ignorance and no terrorism, and that such views 
were contrary to those of the Salafis, Wahhabis, HTI, MMI and so on. 
He denied that it had any Islamist ‘hidden agenda’, as many have claimed. 
Nor, he said, was there truth in the stories about PKS trying to infiltrate 
Muhammadiyah.71 
The aspirations of PKS cadres and the party’s internal representations 
are not always in line with the leaders’ public positions. The PKS office in 
Yogyakarta reflected the Janus-faced quality of the party. On the occasion 
of one of my visits, the front office displayed a banner celebrating PKS’s 
Korsad (Korps Satuan Tugas Keadilan, Corps of Duty Units for Justice), a 
sort of scouting outfit roughly comparable to NU’s Ansor. The banner bore 
quotes from the PKS leaders Tifatul Sembiring and Anis Matta, the latter 
admonishing Korsad to ‘prepare the physique so as to be fit for the jihad 
67 PKS and its electoral performance have attracted a great deal of attention from 
analysts. A good overview is in Hilmy, Islamism and democracy, pp. 123–6 et passim.
68 TempoI, 18 March 2011; JktP online, 29 March 2011.
69 Hilmy, Islamism and democracy, p. 254. See also Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, 
Joining the caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia (Lowy Institute Paper 
05; [Sydney:] Lowy Institute, 2005), pp. 72–4.
70 TempoI, 25 Oct. 2004.
71 Discussion with Dr M. Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 7 June 2007.
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caravan’, probably an allusion to Abdullah Azzam’s well-known jihadi work 
Join the caravan.72 
PKS declares itself to be a dakwah party — one that aims for deeper 
Islamisation of the society — but in addition to its Dakwahist aims, at grass-
roots level it is often Islamist. One of its leaders in Kediri, a 25-year-old 
former student activist, told Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi that he was 
not yet sure whether he supported democracy, for a caliphate was obligatory 
and better than secular democracy. So, he said, HTI was good.73 A PKS 
Ustadz told them that whether Indonesia needed a caliphate still needed to 
be discussed.74 The deputy head of PKS in Kediri town told them that both 
democracy and a caliphate were merely tools to an end.75 PKS grass-roots 
international sympathies tend to be like those of other Islamist organisations. 
Its activists and sympathisers turned out in their hundreds in Kediri in 
May 2006 to celebrate the victory of Hamas over Fatah in the Palestinian 
elections the previous January. They carried banners denouncing inter alia 
‘the wicked greed of American Zionists’.76 
Lower-level departure from what is supposed to be PKS policy was 
exemplified by a vigorous discussion about politics at the Jogokariyan mosque 
in Yogyakarta during the 2009 election campaign. If PKS has a ‘hidden 
agenda’, it was not so hidden on this occasion. This was billed as a panel 
discussion ‘for and against parliamentary dakwah’, but in fact it turned out 
that there was little disagreement on the matter among the four speakers, 
all billed as ustadz. Supposedly in favour of ‘parliamentary dakwah’ were 
two PKS figures who were elected members of local parliaments, Abdullah 
Sunono and Ahmad Khudlori. Against it were Mush’ab Abdul Ghaffar and 
the MMI luminary Abu Jibriel Abdurrahman.77 Before an audience that 
grew to about 300 (mostly young) men, the latter two denounced democracy 
72 I do not of course know whether this is a conscious allusion to Abdullah Azzam’s 
famous work, but I doubt that many would have failed to be reminded of it.
73 Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi interview of Warsono, Kediri, 16 Apr. 2007.
74 Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi interview of Imron Muzakki, Kediri, 15 Apr. 
2007.
75 Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi interview of Ahmad Salis, Kediri, 24 March 
2007.
76 RK, 1 May 2006.
77 Abu Jibriel (sometimes spelled Jibril) studied at Ngruki, was closely linked to Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir, also spent time in prison in the 1980s and fled to Malaysia in 1985, 
fought in Afghanistan, and helped to found JI and MMI. He was held in Malaysia 
under the Internal Security Act from 2002 to 2004. In 2005 Indonesian police failed 
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in uncompromising terms, labeling it an offence against God because it rests 
on sovereignty of the people, whereas only God is sovereign.Democracy is 
‘great shirk’ declared Abu Jibriel. These statements were greeted with cries of 
Allahu akbar. Mush’ab Abdul Ghaffar said that he had once been a cadre of 
PKS in the belief that it was working to implement shari‘a, but discovered 
that it was not, so he had ‘repented’ — a comment greeted with laughter. The 
PKS speakers were clearly on the defensive in this environment and adapted 
themselves to the context, whether out of principle or lack of courage I 
cannot judge. Abdullah Sunono distributed a prepared paper and spoke well 
in defence of democracy as something that existed in the early days of Islam. 
He went on, however, to say that democracy was just a vessel or tool with 
which to work towards a caliphate. Ahmad Chudori was even blunter. He 
said that he did not agree with being depicted as a defender of ‘parliamentary 
dakwah’ for he agreed with Abu Jibriel and Mush’ab Abdul Ghaffar that 
democracy conflicts with Islam. It was, however, an opportunity to be made 
use of in the name of dakwah, to make Islam central to social life. If they 
were successful (in winning power), he said, then political parties would be 
abolished.78 The whole ‘debate’ had a rather ritualistic quality, reminding one 
of the Soviet zealot depicted in Yevtushenko’s ‘Zima junction’: ‘steamed up, 
banging his bossy fist — / …. There’s iron in his eyes; and as for speeches, / 
it isn’t words to get the business done, / it’s business only there for the sake 
of words, / for smooth, obvious speeches.’79
The following day Arif Maftuhin and I took the opportunity to ask 
the deputy head of the PKS fraction in the local Yogyakarta parliament, H. 
Muh. Wajdi Rahman, about the views expressed at the mosque. We asked 
particularly about the statements by the PKS speakers that democracy 
conflicted with Islam and that, if power was achieved, political parties 
would be abolished. Wajdi Rahman responded that these were just private 
opinions, not the policy of PKS (despite the speakers being PKS members 
to lay charges against him after a bomb went off at his house, reportedly because of 
pressure from PKS and PAN politicians, including the PAN figure Patrialis Akbar, 
who later became Minister for Justice and Human Rights; JktP online, 13 March 
2010. See also International Crisis Group, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, pp. 2–3, 17, 
19, 21.
78 Based on my notes taken at the time and papers distributed at the Diskusi panel 
pro-kontra dakwah parlemen, Masjid Jogokariyan, Yogyakarta, 29 March 2009. It may 
be noted that the area was dominated by PPP election banners.
79 Yevgeny Yevtushenko, Selected poems (transl. Robin Milner-Gulland and Peter Levi; 
intro. Robin Milner-Gulland. London, etc.: Penguin Books, 2008), p. 31.
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of local parliament). PKS members were free to argue their views, he said, 
but when the central leadership adopted a policy that had to be adhered to 
by all followers (although clearly that had not applied the previous day at 
the Jogokariyan mosque). I suggested that this sounded rather like Leninist 
‘democratic centralism’, a comparison to which he did not object.80
No issue more provokes the anxiety and anger of these smaller Islamist 
and Dakwahist movements — and of Muhammadiyah, too, for that matter 
— than conversions from Islam to Christianity. We have noted above 
several cases of Muslim anger or suspicion directed at Christian activities. 
The ‘inculturation’ policy of the Catholic Church seems a particular threat 
to those Dakwahists seeking to get rid of Javanese customs which they see 
as heathen remnants of the pre-Islamic age. Javanese churches often seek to 
preserve inter-religious harmony through joint activities with Muslims, such 
as breaking the fast together during Ramadan or undertaking social welfare 
activities together. These, too, are seen as threatening by hard-line Revivalists, 
who object to anything that makes Christianity seem a normal or welcome 
part of the society.
Some Christian activity is confrontative, echoing Muslim hard-liners’ 
style and probably feeding a dialectical relationship between the two sides. 
Local Chinese are often Christians, so that anti-Christian and anti-Chinese 
feelings can reinforce each other. One Chinese-led Pentecostal movement 
was founded by Yusak Tjipto Purnomo (b. 1935 in Jepara). His son Petrus 
Agung Purnomo heads a movement called the Indonesian Christian 
Community of the Gospel of the Kingdom ( Jemaat Kristen Indonesia Injil 
Kerajaan), with a ‘Holy Stadium’ in Semarang that can seat many thousands. 
A daughter runs a branch in Cirebon and proselytises via a local radio 
station, which was attacked by FPI and others in 2006.81 In Temanggung, 
a 2010 Pentecostal revival meeting featured faith-healing and speaking in 
tongues and much display of emotion. By that time there were said to be 
40 churches in Temanggung, where there had been none 50 years before.82 
In October of that year, a Menadonese Protestant preacher in Temanggung 
was arrested for distributing leaflets that defamed Islam. When his trial 
80 Discussion with H. Muh. Wajdi Rahman, Yogyakarta, 30 March 2009.
81 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: ‘Christianisation’ and intolerance (Asia briefing 
no. 114; Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 24 Nov. 2010), p. 3n16. The 
church has a website at http://www.jkiinjilkerajaan.or.id/TSOA%202.htm. An image 
of the Holy Stadium can be seen at http://www.jkiinjilkerajaan.org/lama/index.php.
82 Hannah Beech, ‘Christianity’s surge in Indonesia’, at http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,1982223,00.html.
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took place in February 2011, the prosecutors demanded that he be given the 
maximum sentence of five years, but local Islamic activists who had packed 
the courtroom rioted. They attacked the judge, the prosecutors and the 
defendant, set motor bikes and cars on fire, burned two (some reports said 
three) churches and a Christian school and threw stones at other Christian 
properties. They had wanted the death sentence.83
Revivalist groups often mobilise in the name of protecting the Muslim 
ummah from the threat of conversion to Christianity. In 2007 in Yogyakarta, 
MMI, HTI, PKS, MUI and others objected to a healing ‘festival’ to be 
led by the Canadian evangelist Peter Youngren. They pressed the police 
to withdraw permission for it to be held (their threat of violence being 
implicit), the police gave in ‘in the interest of security considerations’ and 
the previous permission for the gathering was withdrawn.84 The magazine 
Sabili regularly depicts Indonesia as a Muslim society under constant threat 
of Christianisation — something which readers of this book might think to 
be somewhat exaggerated. It is a touch ironic that the Minister of Religious 
Affairs, Maftuh Basyuni, opened a Pentecost World Conference in Surabaya 
in July 2007, proclaiming that the conference itself demonstrated that ‘people 
of different religious creeds in this country can get along well’.85
Anti-Christian activists have relied on a law which says that a place 
of worship may not be built without official permission. In a country where 
many things are determined not by what the law says but by whether 
someone cares to enforce it, small activist groups have insisted on churches 
having such official permission and have done what they can to delay or 
prevent it being given. In Surakarta, extremists’ ‘sweeping’ of hotels with 
the ostensible aim of driving Americans out of town was, at least some of 
the time, a cover for disrupting religious services in hotels by Christians 
who lacked permission to build a church. There were also physical assaults 
on churches that militants declared to be illegal. There were such attacks 
(the attackers waving swords but not causing serious injuries or death) in 
83 The accused was named Antonius Richmond Bawengan. The police withheld 
information about which Islamic groups were involved. JktP online, 8 Feb. 2011; 
TempoI, 8 Feb. 2011, 9 Feb. 2011; Solopos online, 8 Feb. 2011; Republika online, 8 
Feb. 2011.
84 Suara Merdeka online, 30 May 2007; Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah Daerah Istimewa 
Yogyakarta, Pernyataan sikap tentang penjagaan aqidah umat dari upaya pemurtadan, 
27 May 2007. See also Imam Subkhan, Hiruk pikuk wacana pluralisme di Yogya, pp. 
115–8.
85 JktP online, 18 July 2007.
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September, October, November and December 2006 and on three Sundays in 
February 2007. According to the Protestant pastor Bambang Mulyatno, the 
attack of 14 October 2006 was on a church which in fact had permission to 
build, but then someone else wanted to buy the land and organised militants 
in an organisation called LUIS (Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta, Surakarta 
Islamic ummah militia) to attack. A church that was meeting in Solo Grand 
Mall escaped such violence by paying protection money to LUIS, pastor 
Bambang said.86 In 2005, the police accompanied hundreds of members of 
MMI and a militia called Laskar Hisbullah to seal a private house suspected 
of being used as a church in Sukoharjo.
Anti-Christian violence has not been uncommon. A few examples will 
suffice here. In Yogyakarta, between November 1997 and October 2006, local 
people attacked and burned or otherwise destroyed two churches, the Islamic 
Ummah Forum (Forum Umat Islam) protested about the construction of four 
others, stones were thrown at two and one was fire-bombed. During this 
time a mosque in the Kauman of Yogyakarta was also set afire and a bomb 
was found there, but I am aware of no evidence that was done by Christians 
in retaliation — an unlikely act for the underdogs in such a competition in 
any case.87 During the first days of December 2010, police defused bombs 
at two churches in Klaten, Molotov cocktails were thrown at a church in 
Sukoharjo and a shot was fired at another in Surakarta.88 A suicide bomber 
killed himself and a parishioner, and injured several others, at a church in 
Surakarta in September 2011.89 On the slopes of Mount Wilis, in a village 
where inter-religious relationships were amicable, a Catholic church began 
to be built in 2004 with approval from local people but without having yet 
obtained official permission for construction. It was destroyed by attackers 
who, however, were not from the smaller extremist groups but rather from 
NU’s Ansor. The Ansor leadership quickly expressed regret at the incident 
and further construction was halted until the official permission was 
obtained.90 This was indeed quite out of character for Ansor and Banser, 
which usually turn out to guard churches when they seem under threat from 
Muslim extremists. For Christmas 2005, Banser ordered 3,500 members to 
86 Discussion with Pastor Bambang Mulyatno, Surakarta, 23 March 2007.
87 Imam Subkhan, Hiruk pikuk wacana pluralisme di Yogya, pp. 62–3.
88 JktG online, 8 Dec. 2010.
89 JktP online, 25 Sept. 2011. See further International Crisis Group, Indonesia: From 
vigilantism to terrorism in Cirebon.
90 RK, 7 Aug. 2004, 9 Aug. 2004.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t438   438 6/20/2012   1:22:19 PM
The Protagonists and New Totalitarians 439
guard churches in Central Java and 13,000 to guard them across East Java, 
with a detail of at least 3,000 members in the Kediri area.91
Behind this agitation and violence lies a fear — reminiscent of what we 
have seen in the 1970s and 1980s — that the Islamisation of the Javanese is 
in danger of being reversed by Christian proselytisation. This idea is sustained 
principally by the fact that most conversions are concentrated in towns and 
cities and are thus particularly obvious. But the statistics that are available 
suggest that the great wave of conversions took place in the early years after 
the violence of 1965–6 and that changes since then have been small.
Neither Yogyakarta nor Surakarta has seen increases in the Christian 
population in recent years comparable to what happened in the 1960s 
and 1970s, but there has been growth. We saw in Table 11 above that the 
percentage of Surakarta’s population that was Christian reached 24.5 per 
cent by 1980 and only advanced further to 25 per cent by 1990. In 2006, that 
figure was 26 per cent,92 although that may be an understatement because 
it is based on the religions recorded in residents’ identity cards and local 
officials were sometimes reluctant to change those when a Muslim converted 
to Christianity. In Yogyakarta city the Christian percentage actually fell 
during the 1990s, from 18.1 per cent in 1980 to 16.6 per cent in 1990.93 
Table 25  Christian population in Yogyakarta as percentage of total population, 
 2001–694







91 TempoI, 24 Dec. 2005; MmK, 26 Nov. 2005.
92 Dinas Kependudukan dan Catatan Sipil, Pemerintah Kota Surakarta, ‘Jumlah 
penduduk dan pemeluk agama Kota Surakarta April 2006’, 4 July 2006.
93 Statistical data gathered on my behalf by Arif Maftuhin from Yogyakarta 
statistics.
94 Based on data compiled by Arif Maftuhin from the Yogyakarta dalam angka series 
for 2001–6 and received from him on 13 Oct. 2008.
95 In Surakarta, Christians are split roughly equally between Protestants and 
Catholics, whereas in Yogyakarta Catholics are the larger group, representing around 
60 per cent of the total.
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In 2000, that figure was just 17 per cent, and that actually represented a 
drop in absolute numbers, from 71,323 Christians in 1980 to 67,348 in 
2000. Thereafter, however, numbers and percentages began to grow again, 
reaching and surpassing the 1980 percentage, as shown in Table 25. This 
also represented a growth in absolute numbers of Christians in the city, from 
87,749 in 2001 to 108,650 in 2006.
We may note that this growth took place in Yogyakarta during years 
when the anti-Christian schools campaign was at its height and when there 
was some anti-Christian violence (although much less than in Surakarta). 
This may lead us again to speculate that there is a dialectical relationship 
between Christian conversions and the more extreme forms of Islamic 
activism, each inspiring the other. But another element in religious changes is 
marriage. I am not aware of persuasive data on this, but there are indications 
from some areas and the opinion is held by knowledgeable figures from 
various sides that interreligious marriage is a major cause of conversions.96 
There are two other groups that Sunni extremists love to hate 
throughout the Islamic world: Jews and Shi‘ites. Both, however, are so small 
in Indonesia that they offer limited opportunities to be hated. Nevertheless, 
there has been some violence against them. There is a small Jewish synagogue 
in an old Dutch-era house in Surabaya, with a tiny congregation mostly of 
Baghdadi Jewish background. It is almost impossible to be an orthodox Jew 
in Indonesia, because of both the small size of the community and dietary 
difficulties. Generally the Surabaya Jews have had no trouble.97 In 2009, 
however, a group of Muslim activists organised demonstrations against 
Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip, burned American and Israeli flags and 
forced the synagogue to be sealed, before moving on to Kentucky Fried 
Chicken and McDonalds.98
Shi‘a may have had a presence in Indonesia in the early years of 
Islamisation centuries ago, but was almost entirely unrepresented in more 
modern times until after the Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution in Iran in 1979. 
96 This opinion was expressed by Drs H. Sunardi Sahuri, Yogyakarta, 14 Sept. 2008; 
and by the Catholic priest Father Haryanto in our discussion in Surabaya, 24 Nov. 
2007. Pastor Simon Philantropha also was aware of conversions through marriage 
(discussion in Surabaya, 24 Nov. 2007). Data gathered by Suhadi Cholil on marriages 
in Gunung Kidul in 2005–6 showed that some 17–19 per cent of the 546 marriages 
there involved a change of religion.
97 Discussion with the woman who looks after the synagogue, Surabaya, 24 Oct. 
2008. She asked that her name not be given, which I am respecting.
98 JktP online, 14 Jan. 2009.
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Since that time, Iran has offered scholarships for Indonesians to study there. 
Within Indonesia, Shi‘a has been represented particularly by Dr Jalaluddin 
Rakhmat (b. Bandung, 1949) but also by others. In Javanese-speaking areas, 
its main strength is at Bangil, where there is a Shi‘ite pesantren founded in 
1973 by the Habib Husein al-Habsyi, Jalaluddin’s teacher. There have been 
demonstrations against Shi‘a from time to time and it has been roundly 
denounced by Sunnis of Arab descent, inter alia in the magazine al-Kisah.99 
The Bangil pesantren experienced some conflict in 2007. After the joint 
ministerial decree against Ahmadiyya came out in June 2008, a banner was 
put up in Ampel (an Arab precinct in Surabaya where is found the grave 
of the wali Sunan Ngampel) saying that now it was the turn of Shi‘a to 
be dealt with, but as head of the local inter-religious forum Ky. H. Imam 
Ghazli Said had it taken down.100 In early 2011, the pesantren was attacked 
by about 100 youths on motorbikes who threw stones, injuring two students 
and a guard,101 but there has not yet been a serious arson attack of the kind 
that Christian churches have experienced or murderous violence such as the 
Ahmadis have suffered.
How much impact these smaller Islamist and Dakwahist movements 
have on the general Javanese public is difficult to assess in detail, but 
there is no doubt that they are active, attract attention and are constantly 
pushing Islamist and Dakwahist agendas forward, fighting ‘Christianisation’, 
‘immorality’ and ‘deviance’. A research group from UIN Jakarta studied ‘seeds 
of radical Islam’ in 10 mosques in Surakarta.102 They established that speakers 
such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir or people from organisations such as HTI (which 
they included in their definition of ‘radical’) gave sermons and pengajian 
lessons at some of the mosques. The extremist organisation Hidayatullah 
was represented and the selection of study sites included the Gumuk 
community, the home of FPIS. Among mosque organisers and attendees, 
99 See al-Kisah no. 12/4, 17 June 2007. On this magazine, which was established in 
2003 and appeals particularly to Indonesian Muslims inclined towards Sufism and 
accepting the authority of Habibs, see Ismail Fajrie Alatas, ‘Securing their place: 
The Bā‘alawī, prophetic piety and the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia’ (MA thesis, 
National University of Singapore, 2008), pp. 90–1.
100 Discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, pesantren An-Nur, Wonocolo, 
Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.
101 JktP online, 15 Feb. 2011, 17 Feb. 2011; ‘Pernyataan resmi Ponpes YAPI’ at 
http://www.yapibangil.org.
102 Ridwan al-Makassary and Ahmad Gaus AF (eds), Benih-benih Islam radikal di 
masjid.
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there were people affiliated with HTI, MMI, MTA and other such activist 
movements (as well as the larger Islamic organisations Muhammadiyah and 
NU). There were some who thought Islam to be inconsistent with democracy, 
believed that a caliphate should be established, wanted shari‘a law to be 
implemented, or were sympathetic to extremist actions. But it was more 
difficult to establish how widely held such ideas were or how much impact 
they had on others. Among the interviewees there were also people who 
were tolerant of religious pluralism and rejected Islamist or extremist ideas. 
In the main mosque (Masjid Agung) of Surakarta, teachings about jihad and 
implementing shari‘a evoked ‘very low’ enthusiasm from the congregation. 
When a HTI speaker gave a fiery Friday sermon there about the need for a 
caliphate, most of the congregation ‘was nodding off ’. At another mosque, 
an invited speaker gave a sermon that was very radical, the congregation 
was unhappy about that, and he was never invited again.103 Guinness noted 
similarly in Yogyakarta in 2000 that sermons in the local kampong mosque 
sometimes ‘actually preached violence’ and ‘used the cry of jihad’ but local 
people did not always agree and, when they came out of the mosque, most 
simply ‘went about their daily business’.104 While it cannot be doubted 
that mosques are a major channel for spreading understandings of Islam 
among the community through their pengajian programmes and Friday 
sermons, it remains unclear how many teach concepts associated with the 
smaller Islamist and Dakwahist movements under discussion here or what 
impact they have on their congregations. It needs to be remembered that the 
number of mosques and prayer halls affiliated with NU and Muhammadiyah 
is vastly greater than those linked to these smaller movements. That does 
not, of course, mean that there is a single ‘party line’ taught in NU and 
Muhammadiyah mosques.
It is important to note who constitute the cadres of these movements, 
for they represent an important element within Indonesia’s future leadership. 
Something of a consistent — but not universal — pattern is observable.105 
These people tend to be young, aspiring to upward mobility and engaged in 
tertiary study or already tertiary graduates. Their studies are usually in non-
humanities and non-Islamic disciplines — in science, medicine, veterinary 
103 Ibid., pp. 153, 155, 200.
104 Guinness, Kampung, Islam and state, pp. 184–5.
105 In the absence of widely based surveys of these groups’ followers, what follows is 
necessarily rather impressionistic. The impressions are, at least, shared by others, e.g., 
Hilmy, Islamism and democracy, p. 118.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t442   442 6/20/2012   1:22:19 PM
The Protagonists and New Totalitarians 443
medicine and engineering. The latter are faculties in high demand, attracting 
some of the highest-achieving students. So the stereotypical follower of, say, 
HTI or MMI is smart and well-educated in technical fields, but knows of 
Islam mainly through campus mosques and the leaders of these movements. 
They have mostly studied at major state universities: Gadjah Mada, the 
University of Indonesia, Bandung Institute of Technology and so on. The 
minority who have formally studied Islamic sciences have typically done so 
in Saudi Arabia, where Wahhabi interpretations dominate. It is not unusual 
for the leading figure of a movement to be of Arab ethnic background and 
thus to bear a certain authority within Islamic societies, especially in the case 
of a descendant of the Prophet (Habib). The state Islamic tertiary system of 
STAIN, IAIN and UIN is more rarely represented among these groups. NU’s 
Hasyim Muzadi observed that Liberalism may be more dominant in the state 
Islamic system because the students often come from pesantren backgrounds 
and then study at these Islamic institutions until they ‘are tired of having 
to be pious’.106 The Yogyakarta PKS leader Kholil Mahmud commented 
that IAIN was difficult terrain for the party, which was more successful in 
gaining support in faculties of science.107 As IAINs are converted into UINs, 
however, they add new faculties of the kind that have supported these smaller 
and more extreme activist groups and indeed it is in those new faculties that 
the PKS-associated student movement KAMMI finds support.108 
Noorhaidi Hasan interviewed 125 Laskar Jihad fighters who had been 
involved in the Christian-Muslim bloodshed in Maluku. They were mostly 
between 20 and 35 years of age and students, graduates or drop-outs from 
state universities in Central Java, where most were enrolled in faculties of 
science and engineering. Some were from well-off families and of santri 
background, but many were of rural abangan family background and had 
only learned about Islam when they arrived in a city for their university 
education. There were, however, also people who had only pre-tertiary 
education recruited to Laskar Jihad, often from communities on the edge 
of cities (above all from the environs of Surakarta); again many of those 
were of abangan background and had been converted to a more committed 
understanding of Islam through the work of Revivalist pesantrens and other 
106 Quoted in JktP online, 30 Nov. 2010.
107 Discussion with Kholil Mahmud, Yogyakarta, 22 March 2008.
108 For example, Moh. Irfan Zamzami interview of Jeje Jaelani, a KAMMI leader 
at UIN Yogyakarta, Yogyakarta, 28 Aug. 2008. KAMMI stands for Kesatuan Aksi 
Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Students’ Action Unit.
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forms of proselytisation.109 A study of 80 followers of extremist movements 
in Jakarta done in 2000 — encompassing Laskar Jihad, FPI, MMI’s Laskar 
Mujahidin and a student activist organisation called HAMMAS — found a 
similar pattern. The middle ranks of these organisations consisted mainly of 
people with tertiary education in various sciences. 110
The patterns observable in the followers of these movements are not 
unique to Indonesia. Studies of similar movements in the Middle East 
— for which the term ‘fundamentalist’ is employed — have shown, as Valerie 
Hoffman summarises them, that 
A consistent pattern emerges, across all these different countries, of 
fundamentalists drawing heavily from students and university graduates 
in the physical sciences, usually students of rural or traditionally religious 
backgrounds. These movements seem to attract the beneficiaries of the 
expanded university systems in all of these countries, people who have, 
therefore, likely made recent adjustments to a modern urban intellectual 
and cultural environment after being raised in a fairly traditional milieu 
…. In fact the background of the fundamentalist movements in all 
countries has been largely the intelligentsia of middle- or lower-middle-
class backgrounds.111
There is considerable speculation about why this pattern should emerge 
so strongly, but little consensus in the way of an answer. We may add our own 
speculations here. Young people with such psychological, cultural, social and 
educational profiles as we have seen also in the Indonesian case are among 
109 Hasan, Laskar Jihad, pp. 159–70.
110 Chaider S. Bamualim et al., ‘Laporan penelitian: Radikalisme agama dan 
perubahan sosial di DKI Jakarta’, p. 90. HAMMAS stands for Himpunan Mahasiswa 
Muslim Antar Kampus, Inter-Campus Muslim Students’ Association. The Inter-
national Crisis Group has suggested that by late 2011 there was a generational shift 
under way in the ranks of actual terrorists to people ‘less skilled, less experienced 
and less educated than the Afghan and Mindanao alumni, most … from poor 
backgrounds and relying on petty trade’; International Crisis Group, Indonesia: From 
vigilantism to terrorism in Cirebon, p. 1.
111 Valerie J. Hoffman, ‘Muslim fundamentalists: Psychosocial profiles’, in Martin 
E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds), Fundamentalisms comprehended (The Funda-
mentalism Project, vol. 5; Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1995), p. 206. This covers movements in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Iran and Pakistan. 
Essentially the same observations concerning Soviet Central Asia, North Africa, 
Iran, the Middle East generally and South Asia are made in Roy, Failure of political 
Islam, pp. 3, 49–53. It is striking how often engineers appear as Islamist leaders in 
Kepel, Jihad.
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the brightest of their generation. They face significant personal life transitions 
as well as challenges in breaking through existing social structures to the 
better future they desire, and are attracted to fields of study which — unlike 
the humanities and social sciences — seem to promise straightforward, clear 
and unequivocal answers (so long as they stay away from theoretical physics, 
of course). For those attracted to such kinds of studies, a version of religion 
that also promises straightforward, clear and unequivocal answers may offer 
at once psychological security, a reassuring social identity and network, 
perhaps a ladder to advancement and, crucially, the promise of eternal 
rewards. Small wonder that it attracts.
Thus it is that these smaller Islamist and Dakwahist movements are 
creating cadres of followers who are likely to play crucial leadership roles in 
Indonesia’s future. They are the ones seeking major change, and it is people 
who seek change who by definition hold the initiative. They are the cutting 
edge, the game-changers, the protagonists who push the agenda forward at 
its edges. They can do so because — as we have seen throughout Chapters 
7–12 — they operate in an environment in which Islam permeates Javanese 
life through educational institutions, through efforts to impose conformity 
of Islamic belief and through the activities of large-scale Islamic movements, 
leaving abangan, kebatinan and related ideas and practices on the defensive 
and older arts and performance styles to be Islamised or wither. In the 
discussion of the post-1998 period since Chapter 7, we have recorded a 
profound transition in Javanese society in the decade-and-a-bit since the fall 
of Soeharto, a transition that built upon foundations laid down in previous 
decades. We described other and larger movements with contending views of 
Islam in Chapter 10, but those larger movements seem to be on the defensive 
in the face of these smaller game-changers.
We may ask who now stands against a more thorough-going Islamisa-
tion of Javanese society. Who now are the opponents who figure in the title 
of this book and who played such a strong role until the 1960s? The answer 
is — as we shall see in the next chapter — hardly anyone.
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c h a p te r  13
The remaining opposition: 
Seeking a neutral public space
There is now no significant opposition to the deeper Islamisation of Javanese 
society. There is only difference of opinion about what shape Islamic life 
should take, the extent to which variety and pluralism within Islam are 
acceptable or desirable, how Islamic society should relate to the significant 
non-Muslim minorities in its midst, and what role Islam (or, indeed, religion 
more generally) should play in public life. On none of these issues is there 
a clear consensus. There is hardly anyone — at least hardly anyone who 
is publicly visible — who thinks that the deepening influence of Islam is 
undesirable or should be reversed, except of course for Christian proselytisers 
seeking a harvest of souls for their own version of the supernatural and 
individuals like Soetiyono Tjokroharsoyo in Surakarta. But even the most 
unrealistic Christian can hardly imagine, as some did in the 1970s, that a 
majority of Indonesians might be converted to Christianity; religious people 
may live lives that depend on leaps of faith, but it would take a gigantic leap 
to think that. There is no political force that resists the influence of Islam, as 
there was in the first two decades of independence. History has moved on, 
bringing profound social change with it.
The main form of resistance now concerns how religion should affect 
public life, about the undesirability of that very thing Islamists want: an 
Islamised government and public space. In Chapter 10 we looked at the small 
Liberal Islamic movements, for whom religion is a private matter in which 
the state should not interfere. This view has significant intellectual roots 
within Indonesia, as we have seen above. Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman 
Wahid, Djohan Effendy, Dawam Rahardjo, Said Agil Siradj, Masdar F. 
Mas’udi and others sought a neutral public space for years, during both the 
446
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New Order and the subsequent democratic age.1 In the midst of deeper 
Islamisation across society, from the urban middle classes to country villagers, 
their arguments have remained at an intellectual level rather detached from 
the social and political realities surrounding them. Liberals’ views parallel 
those of the American-based Sudanese authority on Islam and human rights, 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, who argues that one can only live as a true 
Muslim when one does so freely, without government or other compulsion, 
and thus argues for a separation of religion and the state. His views have 
been disseminated in Indonesia and are influential, but have been criticised 
by Islamists.2 Such Liberal ideas do attract wider support, but have limited 
political weight behind them.
It is necessary for those who seek a non-religious public space in 
Indonesia to work within a religious discourse. Their situation is not like that 
of secularists in Europe but does parallel that of similarly minded people 
in the United States. Susan Jacoby observes that in the 1950s American 
Christian liberals became progressively more divided from conservatives, 
so that in effect a Catholic and Protestant conservative alliance against 
Communism and secularism came into being. This meant that, in an age of 
rising religiosity, American secularists (i.e., those who ‘who do not subscribe 
to any faith’, have a predominantly secular worldview and think religion to 
be a private matter) found themselves in alliance with religious liberals in 
opposing church influence in public life. She goes on,
American secularists’ recognition of their common ground with religious 
liberals was (and is) tactically necessary in the pursuit of shared political, 
social and legal aims. But that recognition, since the end of the Second 
World War, has precluded the kind of direct challenges to religion that 
freethinkers mounted in the nineteenth century.3 
In the current political and religious atmosphere of Indonesia, those 
who seek a Liberal separation of religion and the state must couch their 
1 This history is considered further in Assyaukanie, Islam and the secular state, 
Chapter 5.
2 These views are argued particularly in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Islam and the 
secular state: Negotiating the future of Shari‘a (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard 
University press, 2008). The Indonesian translation of this was published in 2007, 
before the English edition, and provoked significant controversy.
3 Susan Jacoby, Freethinkers: A history of American secularism (New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 2005), pp. 311–5; quotation from p. 313. Her definitions of ‘secularist’ 
are on pp. 6–7.
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appeal in more acceptable terms than secularism or Liberalism (both 
declared by MUI, after all, to be haram), so they usually turn to Pancasila 
(which MUI cannot declare haram since it is the foundation of the 
Indonesian state). That concept remains contested, as it has been since 
1945. It was thoroughly corrupted by Soeharto and in the immediate post-
Soeharto years it seemed to disappear from public discourses altogether. 
Yet in political, legal and constitutional terms it remains important, for 
the constitution rests upon Pancasila as its foundation and Pancasila’s first 
principle is Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, ‘belief in the one God’. So the 
Indonesian state — and, in decentralised Indonesia, over 500 local branches 
of that state — are constitutionally entangled in some unclear way in 
religious affairs. That lack of clarity provides room for contention. We noted 
that when the Constitutional Court upheld the blasphemy law in April 
2010, it commented that
The state — consistent with the mandate of the Constitution — also 
has a responsibility to upgrade piety and noble character. The religious 
domain is a consequence of the acceptance of Pancasila ideology. In the 
Pancasila state there may be no activities that cause estrangement from 
religious standards and religiosity.4
It is thus unconstitutional to be an atheist in Indonesia and unconstitutional 
to deny religion a role in public life, but what that role should be remains a 
matter of controversy.
There was a time, in the 1940s to 1960s, when Pancasila was seen as 
the alternative to Islam, as the non-Islamic philosophical option. Given the 
religionising of virtually all discourse in Indonesia, reflected in the words 
of that Constitutional Court argument above, this is no longer so. ‘Belief 
in the one God’ is generally seen as making religion a core function of the 
state, as exemplified in the existence of a Ministry of Religious Affairs. To 
Islamists like Abu Bakar Ba’asyir or Ust. Mudzakkir of Gumuk, Pancasila is 
haram because it underpins the Indonesian state, which is itself unacceptable 
because national identities divide and thus weaken the world-wide Islamic 
ummah. Others who accept the idea of an Indonesian nation, however, can 
interpret Pancasila as facilitating a state role in Islam and vice-versa.
So for those who want a secular or religiously neutral public space, a 
particular interpretation of Pancasila has to prevail. In 2006, a symposium was 
held at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta on the theme ‘The restoration 
4 The Constitutional Court ruling is reported at http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.
go.id/index.php?page=website.BeritaInternalLengkap&id=3941
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of Pancasila: bringing peace to the politics of identity and modernity’. 
This was organised by the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences of the 
University of Indonesia, the Tempo organisation, the Brighten Institute for 
Public Policy and Development Studies and the Democratic Education 
Association (Perhimpunan Pendidikan Demokrasi). This brought together 
many of the nation’s leading intellectuals to consider how Pancasila might 
reclaim a place in national life after its corruption by Soeharto. Some of 
the essays, it must be said, were rather tediously theoretical, but the general 
thrust was to link Pancasila to the values encapsulated in the national motto 
Bhinneka tunggal ika. That is an Old Javanese phrase officially (if rather 
inaccurately) translated as ‘unity in diversity’.5 It was adopted in the early 
days of the Republic as a ‘classical’ Indonesian equivalent to the United 
States’ e pluribus unum.
For the participants in the Jakarta seminar, it was important that 
Pancasila be understood as an expression of the unity of Indonesia within 
the reality of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity, and as something that 
rules out any idea of an Islamic state. Goenawan Mohamad, for instance, 
criticised the idea of an Islamic state for its naivety about the possibility 
of perfecting human society.6 Azyumardi Azra explicitly linked the terms 
‘multiculturalism’ and Bhinneka tunggal ika.7 Dawam Rahardjo labelled 
Pancasila ‘secular’ and said,
Of course Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa [belief in the one God], or 
monotheism, is the foundation of the state. But the state is not founded 
on the teachings of a particular religion, still less on a particular school 
of a religion. In this matter the state is neutral towards the religions that 
are adhered to by its people.8
5 The phrase comes from the 14th-century Old Javanese work Sutasoma and 
expresses the mystical unity of Śiva and the Buddha: ‘They are different, but yet 
they are one (bhinneka tunggal ika), as there is no duality in the Truth of Reality’. 
For a discussion of how this ‘yoga of non-duality’ (as Ensinck called it) survived 
into Islamised Java in the 18th century, see my paper ‘Unity and disunity in Javanese 
political and religious thought of the eighteenth century’, Modern Asian Studies vol. 
26 (1992), no. 4, pp. 663–78.
6 Restorasi Pancasila: Mendamaikan politik identitas dan modernitas; Prosiding sympo-
sium peringatan Hari Lahir Pancasila, Kampus FISIP UI, Depok, 31 Mei 2006 (Bogor: 
FISIP UI, Kelompok Tempo Media, Perhimpunan Pendidikan Demokrasi, and 
Brighten Institute, 2006), pp. 46, 51.
7 Ibid., pp. 151, 154. ‘Multiculturalism’ became a preferred term in the wake of MUI’s 
2005 fatwa declaring ‘pluralism’ to be haram.
8 Ibid., p. 303.
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The seminar culminated in an ‘Indonesianness Declaration’ (Maklumat Ke-
indonesiaan) which declared, inter alia,
Thus, Indonesia does not regard Pancasila as a religion — just as Indo-
nesia has never based and does not wish to base itself on any single 
religion. The great values of religions inspire us, but just because of that, 
we recognise the limitations of humankind. Within those limitations, 
there is no one who can compel, who has the right to monopolise the 
truth, who should dominate discussion. … Therefore on this day we 
call: let us build the spirit of Indonesia, build its body, within difference 
and unity!9 
We need hardly add that this was not a call that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, 
Mudzakkir and his FPIS followers or the cadres of HTI were interested in 
hearing.
Even in this essentially Liberal assembly, however, there were echoes of 
the problems seen on the ground. The Dean of the Faculty observed,
Implementation of the principles of Pancasila can give birth to contra-
dictory attitudes. The principle of tolerance in religious life as hoped-for 
in the first sila can give birth to an intolerant attitude if the Minister of 
Religion permits one religion to invite the followers of another faith to 
its religious ceremonies.10
In other contexts, too, there were efforts to remind the people of 
Pancasila as a set of ideas that could bind Indonesians together regardless of 
their diversity. PDIP of Kabupaten Kediri held such an occasion on the same 
day in 2006 as the Jakarta seminar. It featured Budiman Sudjatmiko, now a 
PDIP member, who ten years before had led the leftist People’s Democratic 
Party (PRD) which the Soeharto regime crushed. There were also ordinary 
farmers and workers there to tell of their problems (which Pancasila would 
help to solve, it was implied).11 Three years later a ‘Pancasila Congress’ was 
held at Gadjah Mada University, where there were calls to get rid of the 
stigmatisation of Pancasila as the ideology of Soeharto’s New Order.12 In 
2010 the head of the State Intelligence Agency As’ad Said Ali expressed 
concern at another Yogyakarta seminar about Pancasila losing credibility with 
the young, for which he blamed the schools.13 
9 Ibid., p. 434.
10 Ibid., p. 21.
11 RK, 27 May 2006.
12 Kmps, 1 June 2009.
13 JktP online, 19 May 2010.
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This was mostly whistling in the dark: Soeharto’s damage to Pancasila 
and its own inherent lack of specificity cause it to remain the weakened 
philosophical foundation of a weakened state. Although all political parties 
engaged in electoral politics would say that they support Pancasila and 
Bhinneka tunggal ika, none would use this as an appeal to stand against the 
tide of Islamisation. That would run the risk of reviving the murderous aliran 
politics of the past and stand in the way of using Islamic appeals to win votes. 
There would be no political advantage in going down that route. So Pancasila 
has become an orphan of the revolutionary past. Liberal intellectuals remain 
willing to support it as a means of reclaiming a secular or religiously neutral 
public space, but in the real world of contemporary Indonesia it can regain 
little or no political or social traction.
NU and Muhammadiyah figures have no difficulty in supporting 
Pancasila. For them it merits support because Pancasila (a) endorses 
Indonesian nationalism while also (b) religionising the public space. We 
may recall Ky. H. Muslim Imampura (Mbah Lim), who named his pesantren 
near Klaten Pondok Pesantren al-Muttaqien Pancasila Sakti, a name which 
combines a place for believers with ‘supernaturally powerful Pancasila’. It 
would be rare for an Islamic leader to depict Pancasila as ‘secular’, as Dawam 
Rahardjo did in the Jakarta seminar. In 2010, Ky. H. Agus Miftach, an NU 
kyai and head of an organisation called the National Unity Front (Front 
Persatuan Nasional),14 spoke of the need to reinforce Pancasila as the 
national ideology so as to bring the nation back to its rightful path, for the 
sacral ideas encapsulated in Pancasila would prevent evil conduct, such as 
corruption. He is quoted as saying, 
A nation having ‘belief in the one God’ has already embedded a religious 
spirit into the implementation of state affairs, so that the doings of the 
state are in the realm of the sacral, and places everything that is profane 
below it. This, then, is the purification of the state with the national 
Pancasila ideology.15 
14 Information on Agus Miftach and FPN found at the organisation’s website, 
http://persatuan.web.id/.
15 Quoted in AntaraNews.com, 7 Apr. 2010. The idea ‘that the doings of the state 
are in the realm of the sacral’ (olah kenegaraan berada di wilayah yang sakral) seems 
treacherously close to Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1988 declaration that his government 
represented a divinely ordained ‘absolute mandate’, making the affairs of state religious 
in character and giving its commandments the status of divine commandments. I 
cannot, however, think that that was what Agus Miftach actually meant. See Said 
Amir Arjomand, ‘Shi‘ite jurisprudence and constitution making in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’, in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds), Fundamentalisms 
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Below the level of intellectuals and people with influence in public 
affairs, Pancasila is often invoked by kebatinan people to justify and protect 
their beliefs. To them, it is attractive because it is of Indonesian origin 
and associated with Sukarno (still a heroic figure to many) and it justifies 
their Weltanschauung, which they think of as also being rooted in Java’s 
indigenous heritage. Thus, to kebatinan adherents, Pancasila is not some 
complex philosophy that intellectuals can have seminars about. Rather, it 
is a protective concept — a sort of jimat perhaps — that is (a) undeniably 
acceptable to most Indonesians and (b) not Islam. We noted in Chapter 11 
that the wong kere claim Pancasila as their spiritual guide. Its importance 
was also underlined by the head of a Kebatinan movement in Yogyakarta.16 
Kebatinan figures in Surabaya say that Pancasila is ‘final, settled’, that it is 
‘our way of life’.17 A 2009 seminar held in the National Library in Jakarta 
was advertised as being about ‘Sabda Palon Nayagenggong from age to age’, 
thereby invoking the anti-Islamic figures of Babad Kedhiri and the other anti-
Islamic books originally written in Kediri in the 1870s, described above. The 
meeting was less an intellectual occasion than one for assertions of Javanese 
cultural superiority, especially over Islam. Most attendees expressed their pro-
kejawen sentiments and distance from or opposition to Islam, at least in its 
hard-line versions. Not surprisingly, several spoke of the necessity to preserve 
and promote Pancasila, one presenter (from Surakarta) even insisting that it 
needed ‘enforcement’.18
What all of this means is that Pancasila has next-to-no chance to be a 
secularist doctrine, for (like the rest of society) it has been religionised. That 
is not to say that it has been made into a religion, but rather that it is widely 
taken as an ideology which (a) actually does not matter much any more 
and (b) insofar as it does matter, encompasses and welcomes all nationally 
recognised forms of belief.
Therefore Liberals of all persuasions, secularists, Christians, Hindus, 
Buddhists and kebatinan adherents cannot hope for a secular public space 
and the state: Remaking politics, economies and militance (The Fundamentalism Project, 
vol. 3; Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 96–7.
16 The group is called ‘Ngudi Utomo’ (with obvious echoes of Budi Utomo); KR, 17 
Dec. 2007.
17 Discussion with Drs KRAT Basuki Prawirodipuro and KRT Giarto Nagoro, 
Surabaya, 25 Nov. 2007.
18 The seminar was held 6–7 Oct. 2009. I was an invited speaker and gave an 
academic paper about the historical origins of the Sabda Palon story which was of 
interest to hardly anyone.
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but must hope for a religiously neutral one, in which all beliefs can take 
part on equal terms. That is, however, a challenge in a nation where the 
overwhelming majority of the populace — according to 2011 estimates, 
some 86 per cent, or over 211 million people19 — are Muslims. Many Liberal 
Muslims and figures from the large-scale organisations Muhammadiyah and 
NU also support such a conception of the public space, and it is only for that 
reason that it is a reasonable aspiration and a significant counter to Islamists’ 
wish to make Islam the determinant of public affairs.
At grass-roots level, we have seen multiple episodes of inter-faith 
conflict in this book, but there are also many examples throughout Javanese 
society of the wish for village-level harmony providing support for positive 
inter-faith relations. Take the village of Sempu in Bantul, south of Yogya-
karta. Here the myths about Sabda Palon are still known. There one can 
see rather grand Chinese graves nicely kept, a Buddhist temple, a mosque, 
a Catholic church and a tree that villagers regard as sacred. In the midst of 
Illustration 43 Villagers at the sacred tree of Sempu, 2007 
(photo by Suhadi Cholil)
19 According to the online CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html.
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this plurality of faiths, the spirit of village tolerance and harmony remains 
strong.20 We noted above that, near Kediri, the village Tanon has a popula-
tion of some 3,000, most of them peasant farmers. They are about 30 per 
cent Hindu, 10 per cent Christian (mostly Catholic), and the remaining 
60 per cent Muslim, with one Buddhist, each faith with its own place of 
worship. This diversity, according to the village head, developed in the years 
after 1965–6. There is harmony, not least because there have been multiple 
inter-religious marriages and many families thus have more than one religion 
within themselves.21
To maintain a harmonious public space in the midst of this Islamising 
but still pluralistic society — with its inherent risks of fanatical conduct and 
inter-religious conflict emerging, as they have from time to time — several 
communities took initiatives to create inter-religious forums. The Yogyakarta 
version was one of the first. In January 1997, at a time when Indonesia was 
experiencing tragic episodes of inter-communal conflict, a meeting of inter-
religious activists was held at the LKiS offices in Yogyakarta and continued 
under the umbrella of an organisation known as DIAN/Interfidei (standing 
for Institut Dialog Antar Iman, Inter-faith Dialogue Institute), then led by 
the Protestant theologian Dr Th. Sumartana (1944–2003, b. Banjarnegara).22 
Another active participant was the prominent Catholic priest, writer, architect 
and general cultural figure Y.B. Mangunwijaya (1929–99, b. Ambarawa). The 
Muslim side was represented particularly by Ky. H. Abdul Muhaimin (b. 
Kota Gede 1953). These discussions led to the formal declaration in February 
1997 of the FPUB (Forum Persaudaraan Umat Beriman, Fraternity Forum 
for Communities of Faith). In the context of the dying stages of the New 
Order, FPUB attracted suspicion from the Soeharto government. Then 
extremist Muslim voices denounced it as a clandestine Christianisation 
project and Abdul Muhaimin was called a kafir, an apostate, or a secret agent 
of Zionism. FPUB ignored all of this. It has equally ignored MUI’s 2005 
fatwas by continuing with joint prayer activities and supporting pluralism, 
which it simply renamed multiculturalism. It has continued to do its work of 
maintaining inter-religious discussions and defusing conflicts in Yogyakarta. 
It has the support of Sultan Hamengkubuwana X and the active involvement 
20 Email from Suhadi Cholil, 18 Aug. 2007.
21 RK, 13 Dec. 2004
22 DIAN/Interfidei was founded in Yogyakarta in 1992. More information found at 
its website, http://www.interfidei.or.id/. On Th. Sumartana, see http://www.tokoh-
indonesia.com/ensiklopedi/s/sumartana-th/sumartana_th2.shtml.
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of supporters of inter-communal harmony.23 Other aspects of Yogyakarta 
are conducive to inter-religious tolerance. There are no religiously defined 
housing enclaves and all faiths mix with each other on a daily basis; even 
graveyards are mixed.24 The press is restrained and does not blow up episodes 
of conflict.25
In Kediri city a similar organisation was established in 1998, at the time 
of conflict in other places. Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar (Gus War), who was then 
leading Ansor in Kediri and was thus involved in guarding churches, played a 
leading role in setting up this Paguyuban Kerukunan Antar Umat Beragama 
(PKAUB, Association for Harmony among Religious Communities). 
Thousands of local people of all faiths met at the local Universitas Islam 
Kediri campus for joint prayers. From this was born PKAUB, which aspired 
to encompass all religious groups in the town. Even the exclusivist LDII 
took part. At some point this paguyuban expanded its membership from 
officially recognised world religions to encompass also kebatinan groups, so 
that it is now known as Paguyuban Kerukunan Antar Umat Beragama dan 
Penghayat Kepercayaan (PKAUB-PK, Association for Harmony among 
Religious Communities and Instillers of Beliefs). Gudang Garam recognises 
its own self-interest in having a peaceful town and has consistently funded 
PKAUB-PK activities. At meetings, matters of belief are not touched upon 
— those are private matters for each person or community — but rather 
common social issues are addressed.26
Managing inter-religious relations in Kediri city is undoubtedly made 
easier by the fact that non-Muslim minorities are small. The Christian 
population has remained at around 9 per cent at least since the 1990s. 
Hindus and Buddhists together amount to less than 1 per cent, kebatinan 
does not register in the statistics at all (although there are certainly some 
followers there) and 90 per cent of the population is recorded as Muslim.27 
23 Imam Subkhan, Hiruk pikuk wacana pluralisme di Yogya, pp. 78–102; discussion 
with Imam Subkhan, Yogyakarta, 13 Sept. 2008.
24 Comments made by Prof. H.M. Amin Abdullah in our conversation in Yogyakarta, 
13 June 2007.
25 An observation by Imam Subkhan, Yogyakarta, 13 Sept. 2008.
26 Discussions with Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar (Gus War), Kediri, 28 Aug. 2003, 26 Oct. 
2008; RK, 21 Sept. 2003, 7 July 2006; MmK, 19 Jan. 2005, 8 Apr. 2006.
27 Based on the series Kota Kediri dalam angka. According to the volume for 2005/6, 
the percentages then were Muslim 90.2, Christian 9.0, Hindu 0.3 and Buddhist 0.4. 
Almost the same figures can be found in the volume for 1998.
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This is quite unlike Surakarta or Yogyakarta, where Christians are a much 
more significant proportion of the population.
The fate of similar organisations elsewhere has been patchy, to say the 
least. Surakarta saw some of the worst rioting anywhere in Indonesia in 1998 
and again in 1999 and an attempt was made there to establish a forum for 
inter-communal harmony. As soon as the rioting died down, however, the 
local business people whose support and funding was crucial lost interest and 
the initiative died. One of the problems there is that many owners of local 
businesses actually live in Jakarta and have been slow to acknowledge that 
they have social responsibilities in Surakarta.28 The new mayor (2005–15) 
Jokowi established a programme of inter-religious meetings, with a group 
of about 40 meeting at his residence once a month. He noted that, at least 
in the early stages, the Islamic leaders were forthright in their views but the 
minority religious representatives still tended to hold back.29 There are other 
small-scale initiatives by various groups, but as we have seen amply displayed 
above, Surakarta remains a place where religious differences are a major 
source of tension and conflict.
In 2006, in the face of multiple conflicts over the building of places 
of worship, the Ministers of Religious Affairs and the Interior ordered 
that organisations should be established in all jurisdictions to resolve 
these matters locally. These were to be called Forums for Harmony among 
Religious Communities (FKUB, Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama). Some 
have evidently worked reasonably well, but there is no suggestion that they 
constitute a significant guarantee of inter-religious harmony.30
In these various efforts to diminish or eliminate conflict, whether 
through some form of Pancasila revival or through inter-religious dialogue, 
the leaders and activists discussed in this chapter are promoting a Liberal 
position. The same is true of the villagers of Sempu, whether at Friday 
28 According to information from Drs Soedarmono on several occasions. A major 
study of the background to social conflict in Surakarta is Mulyadi and Soedarmono, 
Runtuhnya kekuasaan ‘Kraton Alit’.
29 Discussion with Ir Joko Widodo ( Jokowi), Surakarta, 3 Nov. 2006.
30 In Surabaya, the local FKUB seems to function acceptably. It is headed by Ky. H. 
Imam Ghazali Said and has 17 members: 6 from NU, 3 from Muhammadiyah, 2 
from MUI (one each from Muhammadiyah and NU), 1 Catholic, 2 Protestants, 1 
Confucian, 1 Hindu and 1 Buddhist. LDII, Shi‘a or kebatinan are not represented. 
Inter-religious conflict has been limited and no churches have been burned. 
Discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, pesantren An-Nur, Wonocolo, Surabaya, 
23 Oct. 2008.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t456   456 6/20/2012   1:22:21 PM
The Remaining Opposition 457
prayer at the mosque, saying Mass in the church, or paying homage to their 
sacred tree. That is to say, they are defending the rights of individuals and 
their communities to enjoy freedom in their religious and broader life, so 
long as no harm is done to the rights of others. They are opposed to the 
use of violence in any context and seek ways to prevent it. They prioritise 
associated values such as freedom of thought, interfaith harmony and social 
and religious pluralism (or ‘multiculturalism’). They regard these as sources of 
social enrichment rather than as threats or, at the very least, they recognise 
them as realities in Javanese society that must be managed. Among the 
Islamisers whom we have concentrated on in this book, however, are many 
who hold quite different views. In the concluding Part below we will consider 
further the significance of this difference of view, of this contest about how 
to seek a better future.
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PART III
THE SIGNIFICANCE
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c h a p te r  14
The Islamisation of the 
Javanese in three contexts
This book and its two predecessors (Mystic synthesis in Java and Polarising 
Javanese society) have chronicled a story of profound political, social, cultural 
and religious change in Javanese society. Chapter 1 above briefly retold the 
story to 1930, and in subsequent chapters of this volume we have followed it 
to the present. As I pointed out with regard to the period down to c. 1930,1 
so also for the period covered in this book, none of this was a predetermined 
outcome. Instead, we have observed the results of multiple historically 
contingent circumstances.
The process of deeper Islamisation is significant for the Javanese — all 
100 million or so of them — and also for Indonesia as a whole, with its 
population nearing 250 million, the Javanese being the largest ethnic group 
in the nation.2 A stereotype of the Javanese as being ‘really’ abangan has 
been shown to reflect circumstances that developed over barely more than 
a century (c. 1850s–1960s) within the nearly seven-century-long story of 
Javanese Islamisation. We noted in Chapter 4 above Geertz’s observation 
in the 1950s that it was, in his view, ‘very hard, given his tradition and his 
social structure, for a Javanese to be a “real Moslem”’.3 In the following 
decades, Javanese society changed so profoundly that such an observation 
became inconceivable.
461
1 In Mystic synthesis, p. 221.
2 Population data based on 2011 estimates in the CIA World Factbook, at https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html.
3 Geertz, Religion of Java, p. 160.
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This Javanese history is also significant within a world context, as part 
of the universal experience of human societies over recent centuries. This 
concluding chapter will consider the significance of the Javanese tale in three 
particular contexts. The first is the general history of religions, where some 
common themes and differences may be seen. The second is the position of 
Islam in the contemporary world, where again the Javanese case can shed 
light on broader issues. Finally we will turn to the interaction between politics 
and religion, which has been central to this book. We will consider this in the 
context of how humans, as political animals, seek a better life, and argue that 
this represents essentially choosing between freedom and justice as antidotes 
to tyranny — each of which options carries its own risks and promises.
In the history of religion
We will leave aside the question of why most human beings in most parts 
of the world believe in religions at all. Here we simply accept that most do 
believe and look at the social, political, cultural and religious assumptions, 
arrangements and institutions that are involved in their beliefs. The 
Javanese story above has emphasised particularly the interaction between 
the religious and political spheres. This has not been a continuous, logically 
unfolding narrative. Rather, there have been twists and turns and surprises 
in Javanese history (as no doubt there will be in the future). The general 
direction of change, however, is fairly clear. The Javanese progressed from a 
stage of contested faiths and identities in the 14th century to a widespread 
acceptance of what I have dubbed the Mystic Synthesis by the late 18th 
and early 19th centuries. There followed roughly a century of increasingly 
volatile polarisation, culminating in the terrible violence of the 1960s. 
Thereafter, political circumstances facilitated a resumption of the Islamisation 
process interrupted for the previous century. The overall direction has been 
unmistakably towards a society that is more recognisably Islamic — marked 
by greater orthopraxy and orthodoxy.
Part of this Javanese story mirrors a more universal change in what 
religion means in personal and social life. That is, the transition from religion 
as principally a marker of identity, an assertion and enactment of cultural 
and social belonging, to religion as a matter more to do with personal faith 
and internalised piety. This has happened in different times in different 
places. Keith Thomas observes that in medieval England, religion provided 
‘appropriate rites of passage …. Religion was a ritual method of living, 
not a set of dogmas.’4 In Java, there was plenty of dogma and mystical 
4 Thomas, Religion and the decline of magic, p. 88.
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speculation for the minority who were literate, but Thomas’s description 
would probably apply to most Javanese down to, say, c. 1850. This began to 
change in the mid-19th century with the appearance of the first purification 
movements and accelerated in the early 20th century with the arrival of 
Islamic Modernism. These developments brought increased attention to what 
people believed in their heart of hearts and were thus a cause both of deeper 
Islamisation and of the polarisation that marked that period, for a good many 
Javanese decided that they did not in fact believe the sort of ideas then being 
presented by the purifiers as the true Islam. If believing truly in the God of 
Islam necessarily meant not believing in the Goddess of the Southern Ocean 
or the village spirit — whose task it was to regulate the seasons and deliver 
the harvests — then the many who were called abangan just could not (or 
dared not) share that belief. 
The position in Islam and in fact in most faiths (in Java as elsewhere) 
is actually something of a mix of ‘a set of dogmas’ and ‘a ritual method of 
living’. Many would agree that the strength of one’s internalised piety and 
true faith — while ultimately knowable only to God — is reflected in how 
(and how often) one recites the Shahada, performs the five daily prayers, 
pays the zakat alms and fasts in Ramadan, and whether one goes on the hajj 
if able to do so — the five pillars of Islamic orthopraxy. But there is more 
to it than this. Whether you state your intention to pray silently or aloud, 
whether you engage in tahlilan and other such Traditionalist practices or not, 
whether you do dhikr or other Sufi practices, whether you wear trousers that 
show the ankle bone or not or wear a jilbab in a certain way, whether you 
have a bruise on your forehead to indicate the intensity with which you pray, 
whether you call your teacher a kyai or ustadz — all these things and more 
may mark not only your degree of piety, but just what style within the global 
Islamic ummah you adhere to.
Comparing the Javanese experience in the 20th and early 21st centuries 
with 16th- and 17th-century England reveals a significant difference in the 
midst of broad similarity. Both cases concern a process by which all sorts of 
local ideas about supernatural powers gave way before the more organised 
and institutionally solid force of a world religion. A similar development 
may be traced in the Catholicisation of the Philippines5 and in other cases in 
world history, including the long history of the progressive Christianisation 
5 See John Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish aims and Filipino 
responses, 1565–1700 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959); Horacio de 
la Costa, The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581–1768 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1961).
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of Europe. In Catholicism, however, there was a Pope who at least in theory 
commanded a world-wide hierarchy of divines. In England, there was 
similarly a monarch who was head of the Church and styled ‘Defender of 
the Faith’ (a title granted by the Pope to Henry VIII, who not long thereafter 
abandoned the Catholic Church that he no longer defended, but kept the 
title). Javanese kings, in their time, had similar pretensions to religious 
authority and employed titles such as Panatagama (regulator of religion) and 
Kalipatulah (God’s caliph). Such pretensions were often tested by dissent and 
rebellion and frequently had little reality behind them. Whatever the case, 
from the time that the power of Javanese monarchs was eclipsed by Dutch 
imperialism in the 19th century, there was no Javanese political power that 
could in fact wield religious authority, even though the Javanese monarchs 
(like Henry VIII) retained their pretentious religious titles.
From about 1830 to 1966, no political authority exercised control of 
Javanese Islam. During colonial rule, the Dutch were aware that meddling 
with Islam could lead to trouble for their kafir regime and thus sought to 
avoid direct involvement in religious affairs as much as possible. The Japanese 
encouraged religious leaders to support their war effort, but in the midst of 
the chaos of World War II their three-and-one-half-year occupation could 
not entail much political control of a religious agenda. The Revolutionary 
period extended the chaos, with no political authority in very effective control 
of much of anything. The first democratic experiment from 1950 to 1966 
was a time of further chaotic politics — albeit with real progress on many 
fronts for the nascent Indonesian state — in which religion was intimately 
involved, but certainly not controlled by any political power.
It was only with Soeharto’s New Order after 1966 that there was again 
a government that made credible attempts to control religious life. This was 
the first serious totalitarian experiment — an attempt to control both the 
actions and the thoughts of the people — for a very long time, perhaps really 
the first ever in the history of the Javanese. Pancasila was drummed into 
the population, but in such a way that it was part of a larger Islamisation 
agenda within the regime’s social control policies. The regime’s aim was 
effectively to have more social control via more Islam (of a kind congenial 
to the government) and no Communism, and to call it all Pancasila, which 
the regime — which, indeed, Soeharto himself — would personify. In-
efficiency, incompetence and corruption limited the government’s capacity 
to implement its totalitarian aspirations. We have seen how contested its 
religious role was from both Modernist and Traditionalist sides, but also 
how Soeharto achieved much of his agenda and in the later years won many 
Islamic leaders to his side. Considerable integration of state structures and 
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religious organisations was one of the fruits of the Soeharto era. At the end, 
Islamists in particular found the regime quite congenial. This was for the 
obvious reason that a government directing Islam set a promising precedent 
for Islam directing a government. Both Islamists and the regime’s leading 
elements felt threatened by globalisation, liberalisation and democratisation 
and by supposed global plots of capitalists, Christians, Americans and Jews, 
so their interests could be reconciled.
In the post-Soeharto era, Indonesia again embraced democracy. As 
noted throughout Part II of this book, in this era many religious organisa-
tions and movements remained linked to state institutions and had a 
remarkable degree of influence over state actors. We leave aside the question 
whether this was because the latter were pious or just timorous in the face 
of an obvious social trend — probably it was a mix of such motives — or 
in the case of lower-level functionaries whether this was also a matter of 
doing what superiors seemed to want done. Whatever the case, it remains 
remarkable that some fatwas of MUI should be treated by the President of 
the nation and the police as if they had the force of legislation or that police 
should sometimes act as allies of FPI.
In broad terms, the Javanese story reflects global patterns. In the 19th 
and 20th centuries, Javanese life was influenced by the Dutch colonial 
presence. This did not, however, prevent waves of religious reform originating 
in the Islamic Middle East bringing change to Javanese Islam, a process 
which continued into the 20th century and down to today. These waves of 
reform paralleled the so-called ‘Great Awakenings’ in the history of American 
Protestantism in about the same periods from the mid-18th to mid-20th 
centuries. Christian sensibilities were also strengthening in 19th-century 
Europe, which represented part of the background to the Christianising 
mission work that began to produce Javanese converts from the middle years 
of that century, thus breaking the nearly universal identification of being 
Javanese with being Muslim.6
In the years since the mid-20th century, Islam in Indonesia has 
paralleled a rising tide of religiosity seen in most faiths around the world, 
which confounded many observers. This was especially true of those who 
thought that they could predict how the ‘third world’ would evolve, who were 
confident that modernisation and secularisation were automatic bedfellows. 
These ideas were projected onto the ‘developing world’ as a matter of 
6 At this time there still remained some pockets of pre-Islamic religious belief among 
Javanese in more remote locations.
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certainty. One of the most-used textbooks of the time — authored by the 
major figures of ‘third world’ political science — asserted that ‘wherever the 
modernization process has had an impact, it has contributed to secularization, 
both social and political’.7 For the Americans among such analysts, even as 
they held firm to their ideas about the ‘third world’, their own society was 
proving them wrong by becoming itself more religious in many ways.8
In the Indonesian case, there were specific political circumstances 
that facilitated this deepening Islamisation, yet its coincidence with a 
global revival of Islam helped the process along. The devout who believe 
that God directs things on earth may think it more than a coincidence 
that the Soeharto government’s initiatives in this area coincided with the 
phenomenal rise of oil prices and consequent explosion of Arab petro-dollars 
throughout the Islamic world. As Mohammad Roem said in 1977, ‘We have 
no idea how rich they are’.9 The Ayatollah’s Iranian revolution of 1979 was 
important, too, for it had a widespread psychological impact in the Islamic 
world. This growing religiosity was not, however, just something of the 
Islamic world, a matter of Arab money, Iranian inspiration or Indonesian 
regime dirigisme. In the United States — so like Indonesia in these ways, 
and both of them so unlike later 20th-century Europe — fundamentalist 
Protestant movements developed from the 1960s, spawning their own 
schools and right-wing social and political activism and eventually becoming 
powerful within the Republican Party. Presidents (not only Republicans) 
from the ‘born-again’ Democrat Jimmy Carter (1977–81) onwards, and other 
politicians, have had to make much of their Christian piety. The reasons for 
this remain unclear in the American case. Jacoby wonders how it can be 
that ‘intolerant fundamentalism’ has led to circumstances in which ‘so many 
Americans today are attracted to forms of religion that educated men and 
women were beginning to reject a century ago’.10 Yet it is so, and because it 
is so in places as far apart historically, culturally, socially and religiously, as 
well as geographically, as the United States and Indonesia, we must accept 
that we are dealing with a global phenomenon for which we have yet no 
satisfactory explanation.
7 Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds) et al., The politics of the developing 
areas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 537. In addition to Almond 
and Coleman, the authors were Lucian W. Pye, Myron Wiener, Dankwart A. Rustow 
and George I. Blanksten.
8 Cf. Micklethwait and Wooldridge, God is back, p. 17.
9 Discussion with Dr Mohammad Roem, Jakarta, 3 Aug. 1977.
10 Jacoby, Age of American unreason, p. 204.
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Nor is this just a matter of the United States and Indonesia, or of 
Protestant Christianity and Islam. In other faiths, too, similar phenomena are 
apparent. Half a century ago, it would have been hard for scholars of Indian 
Hinduism to imagine the politicisation and extremism associated with its 
version of fundamentalism today. The growth of this general phenomenon 
across several religious traditions inspired the five-volume Fundamentalism 
project led by Marty and Appelby, several of the contributions to which 
are cited in this book. The parallels among these movements are striking. 
Generally speaking, they conform to Grayling’s description of them as 
‘opposed to democracy, liberal pluralism, multiculturalism, religious toleration, 
secularism, free speech and equal rights for women. They … assert the literal 
and unrevisable truth of their ancient holy writings.’ All, he believes, ‘are 
determined to take control of the states in which they exist, and to impose 
their view of the world upon them’.11
Within this global phenomenon, there are of course Javanese (and 
Indonesian) as well as Islamic specificities. The former have been the main 
topic of this entire book. It is time now to look a little more closely than we 
have so far at the latter.
In the contemporary Islamic world
Olivier Roy’s book The failure of political Islam — first published in French 
in 1992 and in English translation in 1994 — still stands up well as an 
account to that time of Islamist political movements in the areas he covered. 
His fieldwork was in Afghanistan and then-Soviet Central Asia, but his 
book also discusses the Middle East, North Africa, Iran and South (but 
not Southeast) Asia. It constitutes a long interpretive and imaginative essay 
which has been highly influential. For Roy, the failure of political Islam was 
less its failure to gain and hold political power (although it is partly and 
importantly that) than its failure to change societies. ‘Islamism is a failure 
historically’, he says. This failure does not mean that Islamist parties cannot 
achieve power, but rather ‘that those parties will not invent a new society’. 
For the rich, the model is ‘Saudi Arabia (revenue plus sharia)’ while for the 
poor it is countries like Pakistan and Sudan (‘unemployment plus sharia’).12 
He writes that Islamism
marks the streets and customs but has no power relationship in the 
Middle East. It does not influence either state borders or interests. It 
11 A.C. Grayling, What is good? The search for the best way to live (London: Phoenix, 
2004), pp. 92–3.
12 Ibid., p. x.
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has not created a ‘third force’ in the world. It has not even been able 
to offer the Muslim masses a concrete political expression for their 
anticolonialism. Can it offer an economic alternative or deeply transform 
a society? The answer seems to be no.13 
Roy’s subsequent book Globalized Islam (2004) could take advantage 
of events since the 1990s, including the al-Qaeda attacks in the United 
States in September 2001, terrorist atrocities elsewhere and the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Here he develops further the concept (used but not 
clearly defined in his earlier book) of ‘neo-fundamentalism’. This is the 
Weltanschauung of those who ‘reject the idea that there can be different 
schools of thought and consider themselves the only true Muslims’. This 
‘neo-fundamentalism’ is new, says Roy, because it is global in its imagination 
and rejects the idea of Islam being embedded in particular cultural 
environments — ‘the end of Dar-ul-Islam [dar al-Islam] as a geographical 
entity’. It deals instead ‘with a religion that is no longer embedded in a 
given society and thus is open to reformation’. A characteristic of such 
‘radical neo-fundamentalists’ is their ‘bypassing racial and ethnic divides’.14 
These are, in essence, the people whose epistemology is Revivalist in the 
terms used in this book. Roy records how such movements are hostile to 
local cultures and to Islamic Traditionalist scholarship, subject to ‘de facto 
political marginalisation’ and anti-intellectual.15 We have seen parallels in 
our account of such people among Revivalists, Dakwahists and Islamists 
operating in Javanese society.
Another powerful paradigm is conveyed by Gilles Kepel’s Jihad: The 
trail of political Islam (French original 2000, English translation 2002), 
which also deals with the Middle East and South Asia. This argues that 
terrorism was the outgrowth of political failure and its attendant frustrations, 
but that embracing terrorism only hastened the decline of ‘political Islam’, 
essentially by alienating the pious middle classes who are crucial to the 
success of any political movement. Kepel argues that ‘the waning of the 
[Islamist] movement’s capacity for political mobilisation explains why such 
spectacular and devastating new forms of terrorism have now been visited 
on the American homeland. … September 11 was an attempt to reverse a 
process in decline, with a paroxysm of destructive violence.’16 The Afghan 
13 Ibid., p. 131.
14 Roy, Globalized Islam, pp. 232–4, 311.
15 Ibid., pp. 4, 35, 155, 259.
16 Kepel, Jihad, pp. 4–5.
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jihad was a central episode, producing veterans who scattered globally as ‘the 
free electrons of jihad ’,17 several of whom we have encountered amongst the 
Javanese in this book.
Our study of the history of Islamisation among the Javanese has some 
obvious parallels with these studies (and, of course, with others) but there 
are important departures that have implications for our understanding 
of the global influence of Islam in today’s world. Contrary to the views 
of these scholars, it is hard for us to speak of a failure of Islam (political 
or otherwise) amongst the Javanese except in two rather narrow respects. 
The first is the failure of explicitly Islamist political parties to gain power. 
Masyumi was a major political player during the first democratic experiment 
of the 1950s but circumstances precluded any real Islamising agenda, as we 
saw in Chapter 4. Masyumi was banned by Sukarno and remained banned 
under Soeharto. Thereafter, Islamists failed to gain power either by cuddling 
up to the disintegrating Soeharto regime or through the ballot box in the 
post-Soeharto era. The second failure is that of violent organisations such 
as Darul Islam or JI to take power (a highly unlikely outcome anyway) or 
to destabilise the country or society. But it does not seem to me possible 
to speak of the failure of Islam when multiple Islamising agendas, resting 
on varying epistemologies and socio-political agendas, have dramatically 
increased the influence of Islamically derived ideas and standards on Javanese 
society, culture and religion. And on its politics.
The relationship between the political realm on the one hand and 
the religious, social and cultural realms on the other has been central 
throughout this book and I hope that readers have agreed with me about 
its centrality. In this relationship lie general issues about how power works 
that are not specific to Java, Indonesia or Islam. An excursus on this matter 
may be appropriate, for there is a commonly held myth which seems to 
me unhelpful. That is, the idea that a separation of the religious and the 
political is a specifically modern and Western idea, one that is contrary to 
the traditions of Islam, or of the non-Western world more generally. That 
idea suits Islamists just as well as it suits Western commentators who wish 
to depict Islam (or the non-West generally) as fundamentally, culturally and 
in other ways, so unlike the West that a ‘clash of civilisations’ (to borrow 
Huntington’s dubious term) is likely, even inevitable. But it is not so. It is true 
that ‘church’ and ‘state’ came to be regarded as separate sources of authority 
17 Ibid., p. 219.
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in Europe.18 But in fact the idea of two distinguishable forms of elites and 
their authority can also be found in non-Western traditions.19
Political and religious authority and elites are conceptually and socio-
logically differentiated in non-Western as in Western political philosophies 
and practices.20 To avoid confusion, we need to be clear whom we are 
talking about. By ‘political elite’ or ‘state-controlling elite’, I mean those who 
control the state, its apparatus, institutions and symbols, or those who are 
in competition with other similar figures to do so. Examples are the kings 
and emperors of previous days and their colleagues, and the politicians of 
our day — including politicians in parties that declare themselves to be 
religious, whether PPP and PKS in Indonesia or the Christian Democrats 
in Europe. By ‘religious elite’, I mean leaders who are defined, legitimated 
and/or inspired by their religious standing. Examples are priests in religions 
that have priests, ordained theologians in others, or — particularly in Islam 
— the learned scholars of the faith, the respected interpreters of scriptures 
who are recognised as such by their community. There are no formal 
processes by which one achieves such recognition in Islam, no doctorates 
in theology or priestly investitures. We noted earlier Ali Maschan Moesa’s 
account of the four criteria to be recognised as a kyai: ability to read the 
classic works of Traditionalist Islam known as the kitab kuning, popularity 
as a pengajian leader, ability to lead ritual prayer, and capacity to nyuwuk (a 
magical blowing of the breath to cure the sick).21 One he did not mention is 
descent from or authorisation by someone who is already regarded as a kyai. 
For non-Traditionalist leaders, to be recognised as an ustadz can be even less 
formally describable and more open to disputation.
18 Bertrand Badie analysed how this distinction evolved in European history; see 
his Les deux États: Pouvoir et société en Occident et en terre d’Islam ([Paris:] Fayard, 
1997).
19 While Badie argues (ibid., p. 192) that in the Islamic Middle East a different 
concept of sovereignty evolved, he also recognises the existence there in modern times 
of two kinds of authority represented by the ulama and the modern state — what he 
calls ‘deux rationalités contradictoires’. Salim considers the question ‘Is there unity of 
Islam and the state?’ in Challenging the secular state, pp. 16–23, and answers that the 
idea of such unity ‘actually existed only in the period of the Prophet Muhammad at 
Medina, for about ten years’. See also An-Na‘im, Islam and the secular state, p. 51, on 
‘the fundamental difference’ between ‘political and religious leadership’.
20 The arguments that follow are set out at greater length in my paper ‘Religious 
elites and the state’.
21 RK, 27 Feb. 2004.
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Islamic, Hindu and Buddhist classical traditions (all of them of 
relevance in the history of Southeast Asia) all distinguished between religious 
and political elites. The religious elites who were frequently the authors 
of the treatises may have flattered themselves that they were the superior 
of the two groups and devised ritual matters so as to make themselves 
indispensable, but there was no serious doubt about who was actually in 
charge. In Islamic thought we find a difference between the ‘alim (pl. ‘ulama’: 
the scholars, the doctors of religious sciences) and the za‘im (pl. zu‘ama’: the 
chiefs, leaders, military commanders and politicians) or the amir (pl. umara’: 
the commanders, governors and princes). Hinduism also observed such a 
differentiation. Ignoring multiple complexities, we may observe that (at 
least in theory) the caste system distinguished the Brahmins — the religious 
elite, priests — from the Kṣatriyas — the warrior elite, i.e., the politicians. 
In principle, kingship in ancient India was consecrated by the priesthood. 
But the religious elite was distinct from the ruling elite; the Brahmins 
were distinct from the Kṣatriyas, rather as the ‘ulama’ were different from 
the zu‘ama’ or umara’ in Islam. It was clear that, even though the Kṣatriyas 
should have ritual validation by Brahmins to be regarded as legitimate and 
supernaturally endorsed monarchs, it was the Kṣatriyas who in the end were 
in control.
The distinction between elites and their authority was even clearer 
in Buddhism. Here the central religious institution was (and remains) 
the monastic order (sangha) which, in principle, should be entirely non-
political.22 In principle, Buddhism was meant to be so devoid of a political 
role that it was difficult to offer legitimating rituals to kings. Hence, state 
rituals tended to remain largely Brahminical in South and Southeast Asia, 
Confucian in China and Korea and Shinto in Japan, regardless of how 
Buddhist the state and society were in other respects. Buddhist monarchs 
sought to demonstrate their piety and to gather merit, but it was clear that 
it was the state-controlling elite that set the tone of the relationship between 
sangha and power-holders.
This distinction between different kinds of elites and different kinds 
of authority has been clear to many Muslim leaders in Indonesia. We noted 
earlier in this book Wahid Hasyim’s 1951 distinction between the ‘clever’, 
Western-educated Modernists on one hand and the religious experts ‘who 
22 See the analysis in Heinz Bechert, Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft in den 
Ländern des Theravāda-Buddhismus, vol. I: Grundlagen; Ceylon (Frankfurt am Main 
and Berlin: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1966), esp. p. 22.
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really master Islamic religious knowledge’ on the other.23 He was drawing a 
distinction between the zuama who led the Masyumi party and the ulama 
(kyais) of NU. Nowadays this distinction is reflected in the tensions and 
animosities sometimes seen between NU’s kyais and the politicians of PKS 
or other parties that declare themselves to be Islamic in inspiration. It has 
also been evident within NU between the kyais in the countryside and 
the Jakarta-based politicians leading NU when it was a political party or 
within PKB more recently. Within NU, which is no longer a political party 
in its own right, similar tensions can still arise between the advisory board 
(Syuriyah) and the executive board (Tanfidziyah).
Historically there are multiple examples of religious elites — and not 
just Islamic ones — attempting but failing to take power in a state. The most 
prominent example of a successful takeover is Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1979 
Islamic revolution in Iran. We need to remember, however, that a decisive 
event was the decision by the army — a key state institution — to go over 
to Khomeini’s side, thus making the Ayatollah’s victory possible. Moreover, it 
has been argued that what then transpired in fact constituted a state takeover 
of the revolution. Khomeini’s personal dictatorship displaced anything more 
conventionally Islamic and the authority of the jurists was set aside. In 1988 
it was even declared that Khomeini’s commandments were comparable to 
God’s commandments and that obeying the government was thus a religious 
obligation. Thus, argues Said Amir Arjomand, the consequence was ‘the 
strengthening of the actual authority of the bureaucratic state rather than the 
hypothetical authority of the jurist’.24 This view can be disputed, however, for 
the state and Islam (as Khomeini interpreted it) — that is to say, the political 
elite and the religious elite — subsequently became so entwined in Iran’s 
power structures that the distinction itself became difficult to defend.25 
Accepting the analytical complexity posed by the Iranian case, it 
remains generally true that it is the power-holders, the political elite, who set 
the tone of the relationship with religious elites and who decide how far the 
influence of those religious elites extends in political affairs. This is not some 
departure from Islamic (or other) traditions but a continuation of them as 
well as a recognition that this is how power actually works. As Peter Beyer 
23 Quoted in Choiratun Chisaan, Lesbumi, p. 99.
24 See Arjomand, ‘Shi‘ite jurisprudence and constitution making in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’; quote from p. 105.
25 See also Arskal Salim’s distinction between Saudi Arabia, where the umara’ (the 
ruling dynasty) has ‘effective authority’, and Iran, where the Ayatollah gained the 
‘right to rule on behalf of God’; Salim, Challenging the secular state, pp. 27–30.
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notes, ‘religious authorities do not have at their disposal effective religious 
mechanisms to enforce their orthodoxies / orthopraxies. Instead, they tend 
to rely on the capacities of other systems, notably but not exclusively the 
political, legal or educational where such resort proves possible; and on the 
family socialisation of the young.’26
We have seen how power-holders set the tone for this relationship in 
Indonesia. In Chapters 5–6 of this book we observed Soeharto seeking to 
create a totalitarian state in part by facilitating deeper religious influence in 
society. The Javanese were a particular target of this enterprise, being seen 
as the abangan foundations of PKI power. So wiping out PKI influence 
meant more thoroughly Islamising the abangan, a task in which success 
was achieved to a considerable degree. By the end of the Soeharto regime, 
the state’s earlier competition with older religious organisations was largely 
replaced by cooperation. There was even something of a honeymoon 
created between an increasingly ‘green’ New Order elite and Revivalist and 
Islamist groups — two forms of aspirant totalitarianism recognising their 
shared interests in opposing (as we noted above) the common threats of 
globalisation, liberalisation and democratisation along with those widely 
believed plots of capitalists, Christians, Americans and Jews.
This honeymoon continued under Habibie’s brief presidency (1998–9). 
Since 1990 Habibie had been the most prominent figure in ICMI and was 
thus one of the architects of the alliance of the pious middle class, prominent 
military figures and the regime. By the time he became President, it already 
seemed natural for the state and religious interests to coincide. The alliance 
could make little headway, however, in those tumultuous first months of 
post-Soeharto Indonesia. As President, Habibie did more to liberalise and 
democratise Indonesia than had been expected. Yet his term ended in the 
midst of financial scandal and denunciations for various of his policies, 
notably the excision of East Timor via a UN referendum and the subsequent 
scorched-earth revenge there by the military.
Abdurrahman Wahid brought to the Presidency (1999–2001) a Liberal 
commitment to secular politics, openness, pluralism and nationalism, which 
severed the connection between Islamists and the Presidency, but this was 
only a brief interlude in the story of that alliance. That is, however, an 
important interlude for our analysis, for it is consistent with the argument 
that it is the state-controlling elite who set the tone of the relationship. 
26 Peter Beyer, Religions in global society (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 
p. 95.
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Abdurrahman was President less because he was a senior kyai than because 
he was a successful politician. But he was also very ill, inexperienced, 
incautious and over-confident of his own knowledge and abilities. He was 
toppled by the parliament from power and replaced by his Vice-President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–4). She achieved little in any direction, but 
presided over a time when (as we noted in Chapter 7) there were dramatic 
developments that led to some quite extreme religious movements rising to 
public prominence. Her Vice-President Hamzah Haz of the Islamist PPP 
took opportunities to show his respect for figures such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 
and Ja‘far Umar Thalib, thus suggesting that a restoration of the regime-
Islamist alliance was possible.
During Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s two terms as President (2004–
14), the national state effectively opened its doors to conservative and even 
violent forms of Islam. While the government acted strongly and effectively 
against terrorist groups such as JI, it said to MUI — as the President himself 
put it in 2005 — ‘We open our hearts and minds to receiving the thoughts, 
recommendations and fatwas from the MUI and ulamas at any time … so 
that it becomes clear what [are] the areas where the government or state 
should heed the fatwas from the MUI and ulamas’. This was so that the state 
could carry out ‘the task entrusted by the ulamas to the government … to 
wipe out evil [and] to fight all forms of evil and immorality’.27 Thus some 
MUI fatwas have been treated as if they have the force of legislation.
Whether in Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s case this arises out of 
political calculation or personal piety is uncertain, but it is possible that the 
latter explains his conduct as President. His biography published in March 
2004, just days before the parliamentary elections and undoubtedly with 
the upcoming presidential election in mind, emphasises his commitment 
to Islam. There are three poems by him at the front, one entitled ‘Light of 
Islam’, which opens, ‘I bring news to you, O all humankind / of Islam, the 
spreader of mercy to all the world’. The book emphasises that he leads a 
devout Islamic life and is inspired by the Qur’anic injunction to command 
the right and forbid the wrong (amar ma‘ruf nahi mungkar). ‘To SBY, all is 
very clear within the boundaries of religious doctrine concerning amar ma‘ruf 
nahi mungkar’, wrote the authors. ‘All that is good (makruf) must be upheld, 
and that which is mungkar (which destroys) must be crushed.’ After going 
on the hajj in 2000, says the book, the future President invited a kyai to his 
own home to give pengajian. ‘SBY’s intensity in delving into Islam made 
27 http://www.presidenri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2005/07/26/370.html.
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Illustration 44 A volume produced for the 2004 election campaign 
emphasising the Islamic piety of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
entitled The Islamic-Nationalist face of SBY
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his discourse concerning Islam ever broader, until he himself gave speeches 
to santris [here in the sense of religious students] and ulama ’. He was so 
proficient in quoting the Qur’an, claims the work, that it was as if he were a 
pesantren graduate himself ’28 (which he is not). Whatever the truth of this 
matter — for we would be naïve to take politicians’ campaign biographies at 
face value — we may safely assume that the many thousands of politicians 
and bureaucrats across Java understand such messages. They therefore need 
find no conflict between acting in ways which they regard as pious and doing 
what they believe their superiors will approve of.
These are favourable circumstances for Islamic interests to advance their 
influence in politics as in social and cultural affairs, but it must be emphasised 
that this does not mean the advance of a single, coherent ideology called 
‘Islam’. For, as we have often noted, the meaning and content of the faith are 
contested today, as they have been for the last 1,400 years (and as they have 
been since ancient times in other religions). How one knows what the Islamic 
revelation actually means is contested amongst Traditionalist, Historicalist, 
Modernist and Revivalist epistemologies. What social and political agendas 
that understanding leads to has produced contending Dakwahist, Islamist 
and Liberal projects. Traditionalist Sufis and ‘modern’ Sufis and opponents 
of mysticism find it hard to share common ground. Such contestations have 
significant social, political and cultural consequences today, as they have in 
the past. Roy observes how deeper Islamisation ‘is accompanied everywhere 
by an increase in sectarian and religious feuds within the Muslim community. 
Competition for religious legitimacy means also competition for the right to 
say who is a good Muslim and conversely who is not.’29 Cultural attitudes 
are caught up in this, as we have often seen. Roy again:
US evangelical Protestantism and Islamic fundamentalism share, mutatis 
mutandis, many common patterns. Faith is the fault-line between the 
good people and the wicked. … Culture (novels, films, music) may bring 
about dereliction of mores. Religious norms and creeds can apply to 
anybody anywhere: hence there is no need for ‘cultural sensitivity’. The 
divide is between believers and non-believers within so-called cultures 
and not between different cultures.30
28 Usama Hisyam et al., SBY: Sang Demokrat ( Jakarta: Dharmapena Publishing, 
2004), pp. [viii], 812–3, 860–2. The original of the quotation from the poem Cahaya 
Islam reads Ku khabarkan kepadamu wahai semua insan / Islam, penabur rahmat bagi 
semesta alam.
29 Roy, Globalized Islam, p. 161.
30 Ibid., p. 329.
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James Piscatori regards fragmentation and contestation about who 
holds religious authority and, in effect, can thereby claim to be successor to 
the Prophet, as ‘the most notable aspect of modern political Islam’.31 Daniel 
Brown adds that ‘even secularists implicitly recognise Prophetic authority 
when they appeal to the Prophetic example to justify their secularism’.32 This 
is no less true in Indonesia, as we have repeatedly seen. The distinguished 
Islamic scholar and leader Prof. Azyumardi Azra argues that extremist 
forms of Islam cannot come to dominate Indonesia precisely because of 
this plurality of authority in Islam.33 Unlike the Catholic Church, but like 
ever-schismatic Protestantism, there is just too much room for differences 
of opinion in Sunni Islam.
In this competition for religious authority and in the search for 
followers, however, today’s Revivalists hold advantages over other epistemolo-
gies: the advantages of simplicity and certainty. Traditionalist epistemology 
rests upon the scholarly traditions of the four Sunni schools of law with 
their complex legal arguments and disputes, plus the insights and practices 
(themselves full of variety) of Sufism — no simple matters. Historicalism 
is a highly intellectual approach to the faith, a fashion that arose in the 
political context of the New Order and whose day may be over. Modernism 
is rooted in modern rational approaches along with a return to the Qur’an 
and Hadith as guides to understanding God’s revelation, and also makes 
serious intellectual demands. You are unlikely to become a leader in 
Modernist circles nowadays if you lack a PhD. Implicit in these approaches 
is a recognition that understandings of Islam have changed over time and 
may change in the future. This can be a ‘hard sell’ amongst the pious masses. 
The Revivalists need none of this.
We need only turn to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir to illustrate Revivalist views. 
To understand Islam, he believes, it is necessary to return to the learned 
guides of the time of the Prophet, who were ‘more expert than we’ (lebih 
pintar dari kita). He believes that human thought cannot reform Islam, for 
the faith rests upon the perfect word of God. How does he know that his 
interpretation is correct, given 1,400 years of contestation? He knows because 
31 James Piscatori, ‘Accounting for Islamic fundamentalism’, in Martin E. Marty 
and R. Scott Appleby (eds), Accounting for fundamentalisms: The dynamic character of 
movements (The Fundamentalism Project, vol. 4; Chicago and London: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 368.
32 Daniel Brown, Rethinking tradition in modern Islamic thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 80; see also pp. 59, 75, 79.
33 Conversation with Prof. Azyumardi Azra, Jakarta, 22 Oct. 2010.
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God directs him, he says. Those who rely on the intellect such as JIL are 
enemies because they ‘deify reasoning’ (mempertuhankan akal) and think that 
they are smarter than God, whereas the human mind is only for technology, 
Ba’asyir believes.34 When he gives such messages, many listeners find their 
simplicity and certainty attractive. We observed above that when he appeared 
at a small mosque near Kediri in 2006 and 2007, thousands reportedly 
came to hear him. A young Muhamadiyah leader who was inspired by him 
described his ideas as ‘simple, timely, practical and functional’.35 His ideas are 
none of these things except for being simple. By ejecting intellectualism and 
rationality from religious discourse, Ba’asyir and other Revivalists can appeal 
through their simplicity and certainty to the almost-universally literate but 
certainly not well-educated general populace of Indonesia, as well as to what 
Olivier Roy calls the ‘lumpenintelligentsia’, those who have ‘spent enough 
time in school to consider themselves “educated” … but … haven’t pursued 
higher education’.36 We already noted Micklethwait and Wooldridge’s 
comment that ‘certainty has proved much easier to market’.37 ‘In a time of 
constant transformation,’ Salman Rushdie writes, ‘beatitude is the joy that 
comes with belief, with certainty’.38
So it is that the more categorical forms of religious belief and practice, 
the ones that offer certainty and simplicity, may have an advantage over 
more subtle and complex forms of faith. If so, this is an important element 
that is undervalued in the ‘failure-of-political-Islam’ literature. We noted at 
the start of Chapter 10 Masdar Hilmy’s comment that Islamist ideas can be 
‘contiguous with “moderate” ones’ and that they can ‘gain broad resonance’ 
in organisations like NU and Muhammadiyah which are normally labeled 
‘moderate’.39 Once one accepts the basic premises of any religion (since such 
premises rest upon supernatural explanations and are thus beyond intellectual 
34 Discussions with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Ngruki, 26 March 2007 and 13 Sept. 2008.
35 Discussion with Ashari, Ngadiluwih, 28 Nov. 2007; Ba’asyir’s speech at Ngadiluwih 
is also reported in MmK, 7 Nov. 2007.
36 Roy, Failure of political Islam, p. 51.
37 Micklethwait and Wooldridge, God is back, p. 17. Jacoby, Age of American unreason, 
p. 201, similarly notes in the context of American religiosity that ‘Unlike religious 
moderates who, like most human beings, want to have things both ways — God 
and science, belief in eternal life and the medical pursuit of every means to prolong 
earthly life — fundamentalists have no doubts.’
38 Salman Rushdie, The ground beneath her feet: A novel (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1999), p. 353.
39 Hilmy, Islamism and democracy, p. 101.
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testing or measurement), there need be no logical break between ‘moderate’ 
and ‘extreme’ versions.
Atheist writers have made the same point as a part of their critique of 
all faiths.40 Without needing to accept such an atheist analysis, we must agree 
that religion is a potent force in many societies, including the Javanese, that it 
is crucial to most humans’ search for a better life and that its manifestations 
are not always or necessarily of a moderate kind. There may be only two 
circumstances in which ‘moderation’ is a natural position for believers to 
adopt. The first is when doubt arises — doubt about some aspect of the faith, 
about one’s own understanding of it, about its contemporary manifestations 
or about the best strategy for implementing its imperatives in this world. 
The second is when one’s social and political agenda is Liberalism, with its 
search for greater individual freedom in religious and other matters, for this 
leads inevitably to the view that religious belief is a private, individual matter 
— that individuals have a right to freedom of thought.
As the story has unfolded, in the end there is little that we can regard 
as a ‘failure’ of Islam in this Javanese history (except, as noted above, in the 
two narrow respects of [a] the failure of explicitly Islamist political parties 
to win power through elections and [b] the inability of religiously inspired 
terrorist organisations to destabilise the country or society or to take over 
the state). There is much evidence that confirms its growing potency. We 
should accept that believers believe what they say they believe. Of course 
there are frauds, self-promoting careerists and fools in religion, as in any 
walk of life, but for the purposes of our analysis we must accept that people’s 
commitments to their faiths are genuine. Certainly in my experience there 
have been only very few whom I suspect to be hypocrites. So let us take the 
faith of our subjects as genuine and their search for a better, more perfect 
life as real. In the next section, I will suggest that this search for a better 
life fundamentally revolves around a choice between two differing antidotes 
to the threat of tyranny: freedom or justice, each of which brings its own 
promises and carries its own risks.
In the search for the better life: Freedom vs justice
Here we approach contending philosophies and ideologies which transcend 
Islamic, Javanese, Indonesian, or East-West particularities, and which may 
40 Richard Dawkins, The God delusion (London, etc.: Bantam Press, 2006), p. 306; 
Grayling, What is good? p. 234.
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help us (even in the brief discussion here) to understand issues arising in this 
book. Socio-political thought in all places and traditions has been remarkably 
consistent in identifying tyranny as the principal barrier to a better life — an 
identification that can be richly supported from history. Given that there is 
no shortage of tyranny in any age, there has been no end to the search for 
ways to restrain it.
Before we begin our own study of freedom and justice, we must address 
a monument in the English-language literature that gets in our way and is 
of only little help. I refer to John Rawls’ A theory of justice,41 to which many 
writers refer (and defer). This is written within Western parameters. Its 
argument only suits an idealised Western-style parliamentary democracy 
and may be said even to fit the real world of parliamentary democracy 
poorly. Justice is defined as ‘fairness’, something which itself is defined by a 
contract arrived at among the governed in a hypothetical ‘original position’. 
So Rawls’ ‘justice’ is not something that can be externally validated or that 
corresponds to some abstract or absolute standards: it is the outcome of a 
contract. Neither ‘justice’ nor ‘fairness’ has any definition beyond what people 
in their ‘original position’ agree them to be. In the end, Rawls’ principles of 
justice turn out to be something to do with individual rights, freedoms and 
liberties,42 that is to say, less about justice as we will discuss it here and more 
about freedom instead. Rawls’ work does help us in one important respect: 
it is consistent with the belief there is no abstract standard of justice which 
people of all societies and all times might recognise, hence his ‘justice’ must 
be negotiated by people who can agree on it in their hypothetical ‘original 
position’. This helps us to understand why, down through the ages, people 
have thought that only some deity can define true justice. This is not the 
idea of justice found in phrases such as ‘bring X to justice’ or ‘make X face 
justice’, where ‘justice’ equals ‘judgment’, ‘punishment’ or ‘retribution’. Rather, 
this is above all justice as something that inheres in a righteous, morally 
perfect utopia.
Let us turn to the conceptualisation of justice that is relevant to our 
enquiries, which in due course will be seen to have roots in Platonic, Islamic 
41 John Rawls, A theory of justice (rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1999).
42 See ibid., pp. 266–7. We may add that Rawls’ argument is not just Western but 
distinctively Protestant: ‘Each person must insist upon an equal right to decide what 
his religious obligations are. He cannot give up this right to another person or insti-
tutional authority’ (p. 191). There is no room for Catholicism or shari‘a law here.
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and Javanese traditions. This is justice as something absolute that arises 
from divine imperatives. This idea rests, in principle, upon a pessimistic 
view of human society. It understands that human ‘justice’ is not true justice; 
that what might seem just to you would seem unjust to someone else. This 
also reflects a pessimistic view of individuals, seeing human beings as more 
given to evil than to good. Freedom is therefore to be distrusted: if humans 
were entirely free, society would become a chaos of licentiousness, violence, 
anarchy and — of course — injustice. This conceptualisation, however, 
takes an optimistic view of the possibilities of government, believing that 
government can be just, that a just ruler can be found. Below we will see 
Plato’s importance in the evolution of this school of thought (and remember 
that Plato’s writings greatly influenced Islamic philosophy), so we may note 
here the comment by H.D.P. Lee, Plato’s translator, that ‘The argument 
against Plato’s system, in fact, is not that it trusts the common man too little 
but that it trusts his rulers too much.’43
Proponents of justice as the answer to the human predicament must 
hold a utopian view that perfect justice is possible, even if it has only been 
known at some golden age in the past and might only be found again in an 
afterlife. Here on earth it may be necessary to restrain government which is 
in the hands of imperfect human beings, but that is done in the interest of 
allowing maximum justice to reign, without abandoning the hope that a just 
ruler can be found. This implies that perfect justice is knowable, even if it is 
not discoverable by humankind unaided. So it must be what God says it is, 
as God has revealed it to humans. There is a corollary to this: if there is such 
a thing as perfect justice, known to God and revealed to humans, then while 
our experience of it may be imperfect, there can be no question of deciding 
to limit justice. We must always strive instead to remove limitations upon it. 
You can’t have too much justice.
When we turn to the concept of freedom as the antidote to tyranny, 
we find something that does not have strong roots in Islamic or Javanese 
traditions, but rather is more associated with modern Western thought. 
There is a related concept in Javanese and Indonesian, captured in the 
term bebas, meaning free of restraints, unimpeded. Thus, one can be made 
bebas from imprisonment, for example, or bebas from an obligation. This 
has never become a major political concept. Another local term that did 
acquire political relevance is Javanese mardika, which derives ultimately from 
43 H.D.P. Lee introduction in Plato, The republic (transl. and intro. H.D.P. Lee; 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1955), p. 45.
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the Old Javanese word (itself from Sanskrit) maharddhika, found in pre-
Islamic literature. This conveys meanings of exceptional qualities, eminence, 
perfection and of the wise sage or holy man.44 This sense can still be found 
in the Modern Javanese usage sang mardika for a sage. Presumably because 
sages should be free of the impositions of rulers, the more common Modern 
Javanese usage of mardika has come to mean freedom from the authority 
of an overlord and thus free of taxes or other demands from a superior. In 
the Indonesian language this appears as merdeka, which means freedom 
from control and particularly political independence, in which sense it was 
a rallying cry for Indonesian nationalists. None of this actually leads to the 
concept of individual freedoms that Liberals seek.
Generally speaking, Liberals’ concept of freedom as the defence against 
tyranny rests upon an optimistic view of human society. It recognises that 
individual humans are imperfect but believes that they can work together 
in their own self-interest to create a better society. It accepts that there 
can be no perfection in human societies, but believes that improvement 
is possible through human action. It has a generally optimistic view of 
individual humans, thinking them more inclined to do good than to do 
harm; if individuals are allowed personal freedoms, then they will accept 
personal responsibility for their actions and show respect for others. Given 
human imperfection, however, and given the real possibility that one person’s 
freedoms might have the effect of inhibiting the freedoms of another, there 
must be restraints upon freedom (to which we will return shortly).
Advocates of freedom in principle have a pessimistic view of govern-
ment. They think a ‘just ruler’ to be a chimera, since unrestrained governments 
will always incline to tyranny. They agree with Lord Acton’s famous dictum 
that ‘Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely’. 
Government must therefore be restrained through constitutionally mandated 
and actually practiced limitations on its power. For advocates of freedom, 
democracy with all its imperfections is still the best form of government.
This school of thought rejects utopian ideas of perfection. Society 
must seek a balance of freedoms, for any sort of absolute freedom would be 
unsustainable and a source of conflicting claims. Hence freedoms must in 
practice be limited. The classic example is the oft-quoted case where freedom 
of speech cannot include a right to shout ‘fire!’ in a crowded cinema. Freedom 
44 For authoritative definitions and source citations, see P.J. Zoetmulder with the 
collaboration of S.O. Robson, Old Javanese-English dictionary (2 vols; ’s-Gravenhage: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), vol. 1, p. 1086.
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can only function as an antidote to tyranny if the freedom of each individual 
is limited and balanced against the freedoms of others. Note the important 
difference here with the idea of justice. Freedom, in its essence, must include 
the concept of limitations upon freedom. Justice admits of no limitation. It 
is not possible to have too much justice, but it is possible to have too much 
freedom. Indeed, that is just what advocates of justice fear will happen: too 
much freedom. But advocates of freedom must equally recognise this risk, so 
that limitations on freedom are an essential part of the case.
Isaiah Berlin sets the political implications of these contending views 
of humanity in a broader context in Western philosophy:
Philosophers with an optimistic view of human nature and a belief 
in the possibility of harmonising human interests, such as Locke or 
Adam Smith or, in some moods, Mill, believed that social harmony 
and progress were compatible with reserving a large area for private life 
over which neither the State nor any other authority must be allowed to 
trespass. Hobbes, and those who agreed with him, especially conservative 
or reactionary thinkers, argued that if men were to be prevented from 
destroying one another and making social life a jungle or a wilderness, 
greater safeguards must be instituted to keep them in their places; he 
wished correspondingly to increase the area of centralised control and 
decrease that of the individual.45
Freedom as a political principle is not essentially religious in origin, 
although it is sometimes depicted in that way and may be justified on 
religious grounds. It is frequently and often emotionally invoked in American 
politics where, given the rise of religious influence in American life in recent 
decades, freedom may be described by religious believers as something that 
is ‘God-given’.
We must address the question of the role played by the idea of justice 
in totalitarian ideologies. Plato’s Republic is a foundational text. This proposes 
an ideal state to be governed by ‘the superior minority’ in which ‘justice is the 
principle we laid down at the beginning and have consistently followed in 
founding our state’. In this state, the various classes would know their places 
and keep to them, for interference in each other’s roles would do ‘the greatest 
harm to our state’ which ‘gives us a definition of injustice’. Plato’s Republic 
rested also on a fear of too much freedom: ‘an excessive desire for liberty’ 
which would ‘lead to the demand for tyranny’, since ‘a democratic society 
in its thirst for liberty may fall under the influence of bad leaders’ and lead 
45 Berlin, Proper study of mankind, p. 198.
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people to ‘disregard all laws’.46 Karl Popper’s monumental Open society and 
its enemies, first published in 1945, begins with ‘the spell of Plato’ (the title 
of the first volume) and proceeds to Hegel and Marx in the second volume, 
Popper’s purpose being to show how Platonic ideas can be traced in the great 
European tyrannies of the mid-20th century.
A few quotations from Popper will suffice to show how, in his view, a 
Platonic concept of justice can be used to support tyranny and how this idea 
of justice is the enemy of freedom: 
It will be seen that Plato’s concept of justice is fundamentally different 
from our ordinary view …. Plato considers justice not as a relationship 
between individuals, but as a property of the whole state, based upon a 
relationship between its classes.47 …
 The humanitarian theory of justice makes three main demands or 
proposals, namely (a) the equalitarian principle proper, i.e., the proposal 
to eliminate ‘natural’ privileges, (b) the general principle of individualism, 
and (c) the principle that it should be the task and the purpose of the 
state to protect the freedom of its citizens. To each of these political 
demands or proposals there corresponds a directly opposite principle of 
Platonism, namely (a’ ) the principle of natural privilege, (b’ ) the general 
principle of holism or collectivism, and (c’ ) the principle that it should be 
the task and the purpose of the individual to maintain, and to strengthen, 
the stability of the state.48 …
 Plato recognises only one ultimate standard, the interest of the state. 
Everything that furthers it is good and virtuous and just; everything that 
threatens it is bad and wicked and unjust. … This is the collectivist, the 
tribal, the totalitarian theory of morality: ‘Good is what is in the interest 
of my group; or my tribe; or my state’.49
Thus Popper’s assault on Plato. It would take only a few changes 
to attach similar charges to Islamist political thought, to which we will 
return below, for it, too, rests upon the principle that the foremost objective 
of political action is justice. Hannah Arendt makes similar judgments. 
46 Quotations from Plato, The republic (transl. H.D.P. Lee), pp. 179, 181, 183, 
335–7.
47 Karl Popper, The open society and its enemies (2 vols; London and New York: 
Routledge Classics, 2003 [originally published 1945]), vol. I, p. 96.
48 Ibid., vol. I, p. 100. We may note that Popper’s ‘humanitarian theory of justice’ 
involves the ‘freedom of … citizens’, thus bringing together (as does Rawls) two ideas 
that I am distinguishing from one another in this discussion.
49 Ibid., vol. I, p. 113.
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t484   484 6/20/2012   1:22:24 PM
Islamisation of the Javanese in Three Contexts 485
In her writing about Soviet and Nazi totalitarianism, she comments on 
totalitarianism’s typical defiance of positive laws: ‘Totalitarian lawfulness 
pretends to have found a way to establish the rule of justice on earth — 
something which the legality of positive law admittedly could never attain. 
The discrepancy between legality and justice could never be bridged.’50
Others have made recent contributions to the issues we are considering 
here. In the course of a powerful critique of ‘Rational Choice Theory’ (the 
idea that maximising one’s narrowly defined self-interest constitutes the 
most rational thing to do), Amartya Sen benefits from his knowledge of 
non-Western (principally Indian) philosophy and history. He does not 
refer to Popper’s Open society and its enemies, although his views are similar. 
Sen’s book is to a considerable degree a more recent version of Popper’s 
arguments in favour of the application of reason, individual freedom and 
piecemeal improvements rather than sweeping utopian solutions such as 
the search for an abstract reign of justice. As for Berlin and others, for Sen 
the essence of freedom is the freedom to make choices, which ‘gives us the 
opportunity to pursue our objectives — those things that we value’.51 He 
emphasises the importance of an open public realm as a site of discussion, 
debate and compromise among contending views that can make it possible 
for democracy to function. He does not (I think) give sufficient weight to 
the risk that the public space can be monopolised by a dominant ideology 
to such an extent that it can inhibit discussion, debate and questioning 
— that this realm can become, not a space for reason, but one for dogma 
and repression.52
Grayling argues from a humanist (non-believer) position, denying the 
truth claimed by religions. This leads him to support the concept of freedom 
as the key to a better life. Grayling writes, 
In everything that has been said in this book about the humanist 
conception of the good life, the concepts of freedom and autonomy 
have been central. From classical antiquity to modern philosophy the 
fundamental idea has been that people possess reason, and that by using 
50 Arendt, Origins of totalitarianism, p. 462.
51 Amartya Sen, The idea of justice (London, etc.: Penguin Books, 2009), p. 228.
52 Late in the book, however, he contemplates the possibility that ‘a ruthless majority 
that has no compunction in eliminating minority rights would tend to make the 
society face a hard choice between honouring majority rule and guaranteeing 
minority rights. The formation of tolerant values is thus quite central to the smooth 
functioning of a democratic system’ (ibid., p. 352).
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it they can choose lives worth living for themselves and respectful of 
their fellows. … Given that the metaphysics of religion is man-made, 
and that human psychology is the source of belief in the power of 
transcendent authority to reward obedience or punish its opposite … it 
follows that the chief motivation for religious ethics is the need felt by 
potentates of many kinds to exert control over individuals, to limit their 
freedom, to make them conform, obey, submit, follow where led, accept 
what is meted out to them, and resign themselves to their lot.53
Even if we do not accept the ‘given’ in that last sentence, the description that 
follows it is clearly consistent with multiple historical examples.
From this discussion of justice and freedom,54 we may come to the view 
that neither of these concepts as ultimate political objectives is free of risks. 
Each has defensible criticisms of the other. But only one of them — that is, 
the search for justice — is prone to support totalitarianism, to facilitate the 
very tyranny which, in principle, it seeks to resist.
We must turn from these more general considerations to the specific 
traditions of Islam, in which justice has been a central aim since the earliest 
times. World history offers no examples of an ideal system of justice in 
operation, but Revivalists believe it to have existed in the seventh century, 
in the time of the Prophet and the four ‘rightly guided caliphs’ (three of 
whom, we may note, were assassinated in that most perfect of times).55 The 
Arabic term for justice is ‘adl, which we find in Javanese and Indonesian as 
adil and various derived forms. As one of the fundamental dogmas of Islam, 
this refers to the perfect justice of God.56 The term for freedom is huriyya, 
which originates as a ‘legal term denoting the opposite of “unfree, slave”’; for 
53 Grayling, What is good? pp. 247–8.
54 We might have discussed a full trinity (a hat-trick?) of Harvard writers by adding 
Michael Sandel to Sen and Rawls. But Sandel’s Justice: What’s the right thing to do? 
(London, etc.: Penguin Books, 2009) is less helpful to our discussion, although 
readers may find it of interest. Sandel struggles with the issues until arriving at 
what seems to me a position akin to what Amartya Sen calls the ‘transcendental 
institutionalism’ mode of thought (that is, seeking some universally applicable way 
of finding justice through ideal institutions), rather than Sen’s ‘realisation-focused’ 
approach, which (like Popper’s) consists of seeking incremental means of ridding the 
world of its worst injustices without imagining that perfection is achievable.
55 Abu Bakr died in his mid-60s in 634, ‘Umar was assassinated in 644, ‘Uthman was 
assassinated in 656 and ‘Ali was assassinated in 661.
56 See E. Tyan, ‘‘Adl’, in P. Bearman et al. (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed.), vol. 
1, p. 209.
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the latter there is the term ‘abd, which appears in Indonesian languages as 
abdi. Huriyya did not make it into Javanese, but its meaning is conveyed in 
the word bebas, discussed earlier. Rosenthal comments that huriyya, ‘although 
much discussed, did not achieve the status of a fundamental political 
concept that could have served as a rallying cry for great causes’. Rather, 
‘The individual Muslim was expected to consider subordination of his own 
freedom to the beliefs, morality and customs of the group as the only proper 
course of behaviour. … Politically, the individual was not expected to exercise 
any free choice as to how he wished to be governed.’57 The reign of justice 
that has been lost since the time of the Prophet and the four rightly guided 
caliphs will be restored by the future Mahdi, who will reign before the end 
of the world and again be a ‘rightly guided one’ whose task will be to fill the 
world with justice. This messianic idea gained greater strength among Shi‘ites 
than among Sunnis, but it played some role in Sufism, which has been so 
important among the Javanese.58 We will discuss the analogous Javanese ‘just 
king’ (Ratu Adil ) below.
These ideas were elaborated and debated as Islamic philosophy 
developed, with the writings of Plato being an important part of the Islamic 
intellectual tradition. Scholars argued what the qualities of the ideal ruler 
must be, how that person could rule with virtue and impose justice with 
divine guidance. Muslim philosophers (particularly luminaries of the ninth 
to twelfth centuries such as Al-Farabi, Abu Bakr al-Razi, Abu Hatim al-
Razi, Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd) considered how there might be constructed 
a regime that could rely on the moral superiority of the ruler to administer 
God’s laws, which constitute what justice is. The core question was how to 
restore the just governance of the time of the Prophet and the first four 
caliphs, not how to achieve freedom for individuals.59
The search for justice (not freedom) as the principal cure for this 
world’s ills was also central to Javanese thought. Various texts call for a 
57 See F. Rosenthal and B. Lewis, ‘Ḥuriyya’, in P. Bearman et al. (eds), Encyclopaedia 
of Islam (2nd ed.), vol. 3, p. 589. Rosenthal refers readers further to his own work The 
Muslim concept of freedom prior to the nineteenth century (Leiden: Brill, 1960).
58 See W. Madelung, ‘al-Mahdī’, in P. Bearman et al. (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam 
(2nd ed.), vol. 5, p. 1230.
59 There is a vast literature on this subject. For an overview, see Hans Daiber, ‘Political 
philosophy’, in Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (eds), History of Islamic 
Philosophy (Routledge History of World Philosophies, vol. 1; 2 vols; London and 
New York: Routledge, 1996), vol. 2, pp. 841–85.
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purifying time of destruction, after which justice will reign. The leader of this 
time of justice is usually called the Ratu Adil, the ‘just king’. Adil of course 
comes from the Arabic ‘adl, but it is reasonable to presume that Javanese 
messianic ideas had older, pre-Islamic roots. Such ideas are found in the so-
called ‘prophecies of Jayabaya’, which are ascribed (very possibly apocryphally) 
to king Jayabhaya of 12th-century Kediri. The Ratu Adil was usually said to 
take Erucakra as one of his titles — a term of uncertain origin, but suggested 
by Pigeaud to derive from the name of the Vairocana Buddha and thus, if so, 
of pre-Islamic derivation.60 Whatever the case, the hope for the Ratu Adil 
was deeply rooted in Javanese tradition and was consistent with the Islamic 
search for justice.
People claiming to be the Ratu Adil, bearing the title Erucakra, arose 
from time to time and rallied the support of both ordinary and elite Javanese. 
In 1718 a son of the reigning king called Png. Dipanagara rebelled and took 
the Erucakra title. He surrendered in 1723 and spent his remaining days 
in exile in Sri Lanka. In 1825, the most famous of the princes to carry the 
name Dipanagara rebelled and took the name Erucakra along with others of 
religious and messianic import such as Lord of the Faith (Sayidin), Regula-
tor of Religion (Panatagama), Caliph of the Messenger of God (Kalifat 
Rasulullah), First among Believers (Kabirulmukminina) and Commander 
in Holy War (Senapati Ingalaga Sabilullah). We noted in Chapter 1 what a 
pivotal figure Dipanagara was in Javanese history. He initiated the disastrous 
Java War of 1825–30 and his defeat ushered in the truly colonial period of 
Javanese history. Other aspiring Ratu Adil figures arose after him in Central 
Java. A rather weak-minded Yogyakarta prince named Suryengalaga, while 
still a child, was nominated by some conspirators in 1864 as the future Ratu 
Adil and his mother plotted a rebellion in his name in 1883. The Dutch 
colonial regime was well established by then and this Ratu Adil ’s reign lasted 
less than a week. In 1890 another aspiring rebel who claimed supernatural 
powers prophesied the coming of the Ratu Adil, but he was quickly exiled 
60 Th. G. Th Pigeaud, ‘Erucakra-Vairocana’, in India antiqua: A volume of oriental 
studies, presented by his friends and pupils to Jean Philippe Vogel on the occasion of the 
50th anniversary of his doctorate (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1947), pp. 270–3. For a fuller 
discussion of these messianic traditions, see J.A.B. Wiselius, ‘Djåjå Båjå, zijn, zijn 
Leven en Profitieën’, BKI, 3rd series, vol. 7 (1872), pp. 172–217. A briefer discussion 
with reference to several further sources is in M.C. Ricklefs, ‘Dipanagara’s early 
inspirational experience’, BKI vol. 130 (1974), nos. 2–3, pp. 244–7.
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before any justice could appear. In 1918 another Ratu Adil came to grief. As 
late as 1967 there was an Erucakra who claimed to be a reincarnation of Png. 
Suryengalaga.61 It has been reported that the spirit of the aspiring Ratu Adil 
Suryengalaga even appeared twice to the present Sultan Hamengkubuwana 
X of Yogyakarta while he was still crown prince and demanded for himself 
the right to succeed as the next Sultan.62 Early in the 20th century, the 
charismatic leader of the ostensibly modern organisation Sarekat Islam was 
Tjokroaminoto (the scholarly spelling of whose name would be Cakra-
aminata), who was taken by some to be a fulfillment of the prophesies of 
the Ratu Adil, not least because of the appearance of cakra both in his name 
and in Erucakra. In the account of the 1930s in this book, we have seen both 
Png. Surjodiningrat and the Surakarta politician Singgih regarded by their 
followers as the Ratu Adil. Embah Wali proclaimed Yogyakarta’s Sultan 
Hamengkubuwana IX to be the Ratu Adil, and said that there was no longer 
such a Just King after the latter died in 1988.
The search for justice remains a strong theme in recent and contem-
porary Islamic discourse in Indonesia. We noted above how the Traditionalist 
activists who set up LKiS in 1992 described their mission as being to ‘bring 
into being a transformative form of Islam on the side of justice and plurality 
with an Indonesian foundation’.63 The prominent NU figure Ky. H. Masdar 
F. Mas’udi said in 2008 that ‘Clearly, in Islam there is a primary mandate 
of “justice” to which the state must be fully dedicated’. Further, ‘Because 
religion, being the soul of the state, gives justice to all. … it is our job to 
discover how to infuse the secular institutions of the state (its political, 
legal and legislative systems) with the spirit of justice and mercy as their 
sacral and transcendental duty.’64 It is no surprise that the 1990s campus 
61 These post-Java War cases are described in A.L. Kumar, ‘The Suryengalagan affair 
of 1883 and its successors: Born leaders in changed times’, BKI vol. 138 (1982), nos. 
2–3, pp. 251–84.
62 From an anonymous, but I believe absolutely reliable, source. Readers may notice 
that the present Sultan’s position seems consistent with what I have called the Mystic 
Synthesis style of Javanese Islam.
63 http://www.lkis.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=89&Ite
mid=88.
64 Masdar F. Ma’sudi, ‘Islam and the state: The social justice perspective’, in Ota 
Atsushi, Okamoto Masaaki and Ahmad Suaedy (eds), Islam in contention: Rethinking 
Islam and state in Indonesia ( Jakarta: The Wahid Institute; Kyoto: Center for 
Southeast Asian Studies Kyoto University; Taipei: Center for Asia-Pacific Area 
Studies RCHSS Academia Sinica, 2010), pp. 17, 25.
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cadre-formation movement modeled on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
should have given rise to a political party that called itself the Justice Party 
(Partai Keadilan), now transformed into PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), 
the Prosperous Justice Party.
Bernhard Platzdasch explored the Partai Keadilan (PK, later PKS) 
understanding of justice and shows its roots in the medieval Islamic thought 
we have discussed here. His analysis is based in particular on interviews with 
Hidayat Nur Wahid and Irwan Prayitno in 2001–2:
To understand PK’s interplay of rhetoric and political action it is 
crucial to point out that, in the classical Islamic perception, justice only 
exists where shari‘a rule has been established and religious obedience 
accomplished. Because understanding of the term ‘justice’ was embedded 
in the Qur’an, by definition, justice only existed in the Islamic context. 
The Qur’anic imperative (verse 5:8), PK President Dr Hidayat Nur 
Wahid explained, was to ‘act justly because this is what is closest to 
piety’.65 … Mankind, the party declared, had to be liberated from all 
forms of tyranny. Yet to understand the true meaning of ‘justice’, Hidayat 
Nur Wahid emphasised, it was necessary to understand the Qur’anic use 
of the term. ‘Actual justice’, he argued, ‘was of divine origin [ilahiah], 
[something] that is religious, evolving from religious and moral values’. 
It had to do with ‘fundamental principles’, which will prevent ‘anything 
that is tyrannic’, as Islam prohibited any activity that ‘kills the soul’. … 
As such, PK epitomised the archetypal Islamist credo that the only way 
to bring about justice ultimately was through shari‘a rule and complete 
submission to Islam. Irwan Prayitno argued: ‘As for the concepts, they 
are already standard, for example “justice”. What remains is the medium. 
Stealing — hand will be cut off. Whoever kills — is killed. If in ancient 
times with a sword, today there is the electric chair. These things can still 
be discussed but the concept is justice.’ … Such statements illustrated that 
the party’s conception of shari‘a went beyond that of ‘universal values’. In 
particular, it highlighted the inseparability between PK’s understanding 
of ‘justice’ and explicit Islamic hudud rulings. It also showed that, despite 
the frequent advocacies of independent reasoning, PK leaders preserved 
various medieval traditions in the elucidation of Islam.66 
65 In Abdel Haleem’s translation: ‘You who believe, be steadfast in your devotion to 
God and bear witness impartially: do not let hatred of others lead you away from 
justice, but adhere to justice, for that is closer to awareness of God. Be mindful of 
God: God is well aware of all that you do.’ Qur’an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem, 
pp. 68–9.
66 Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia, pp. 232–3. Hudud punishments are those that 
are regarded in Islamic law as crimes against religion and for which there are fixed 
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In the minds of many Islamic thinkers of all inclinations, the search 
for justice is paired with opposition to, even fear of, the idea of freedom. The 
HTI figure Farid Wadjdi expressed this as follows:
Liberalism is … dangerous. On behalf of free thinking, for instance, they 
feel free to question the authenticity of soundly indicated religious texts, 
such as the Qur’an as Allah’s revelation. On behalf of freedom of speech, 
no kind of thinking can be prohibited even if it is in contradiction to 
Islamic belief and shari‘a. Then on behalf of freedom of expression, 
adultery, homosexuality, and lesbianism must be tolerated; prostitution is 
supported and considered as a profession; pornography and pornographic 
actions are accordingly defended. This is really dangerous because it can 
lead humankind to destruction, putting humans at the level of animals, 
even lower than that.67
The concept of individual freedoms is defended in today’s Indonesia 
by the Liberals whom we have discussed earlier in this book. Current 
circumstances, however, limit the possibility of mounting a robust case for 
individual freedoms (rather than justice) as a paramount political objective. 
In particular, the prevailing religiosity of public discourse makes it difficult 
to question whether religion should dominate both private and public affairs 
at all. Furthermore, given that in Islamic, Javanese and wider Indonesian 
thought, justice is so strongly embedded as the principle solution to life’s 
woes, the prospects of winning a public debate for the cause of greater 
individual freedoms are reduced.
Can the search for greater freedom and the search for greater justice 
not be reconciled? An elegant Liberal case for a way to do this in Muslim 
societies is made in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im’s Islam and the secular state, 
the Indonesian-language version of which was published in 2007 by the 
Islamic publishing house Mizan68 (the year before the English-language 
version from Harvard). An-Na‘im distinguishes between the state as an 
institutional structure and politics as day-to-day social reality, and seeks to 
mediate the distinction between the separation of the state from religion 
(for which he argues) and a legitimate involvement of religion in politics 
and harsh punishments such as death by stoning, amputation of limbs and flogging. 
These offences include unlawful sexual intercourse, false accusations of such sexual 
activity, drinking alcohol, highway robbery and theft.
67 In a 2005 article in al-Wa’ie, quoted in Hilmy, Islamism and democracy, p. 166. 
68 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Islam dan negara secular: Menegosiasikan masa depan 
syariah (Bandung: Mizan, 1428/2007.
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through what he calls ‘civic reason’.69 This consists of the reasonable exercise 
of freedom (such as ‘freedoms of opinion, belief and association’) with 
respect for others by participants in the public realm, so that the meaning 
and application of shari‘a can be freely discussed. This rests on the view 
that ‘rights are ultimately the tools for realizing the objectives of social 
justice, political stability, and economic development…’.70 In this way, the 
exercise of freedom is the necessary means to a collective effort to engage 
the diversity of human understandings of God’s perfect justice through free 
discussion, consistent with the Qur’anic principle (2:256) that ‘there is no 
compulsion in religion’.
The problem in practice is not the Liberal view of how things should 
be, but the Revivalist and Islamist view of how things must be. Revivalists 
will reject the epistemology upon which this Liberal agenda rests: that is, 
that the understanding of sacred texts inevitably involves the application of 
reason, of ‘human interpretation’.71 They would see this as — to quote Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir’s rejection of JIL — a case of mempertuhankan akal (deifying 
human reasoning) by people who think that they are smarter than God, 
whereas the human mind is only for technology.72 Revivalists and Islamists 
are likely to be unreasonable in two senses of the word: they cannot be 
reasoned with and they are likely not to behave fairly in the circumstances of 
a free public space.73 They believe that there is a clear divinely defined thing 
called justice that is encapsulated in shari‘a (which is to say, of course, their 
69 An-Na‘im, Islam and the secular state, esp. pp. 92–101, 274–5. This concept is close, 
but not identical, to Rawls’ ‘public reason’.
70 Ibid., p. 103.
71 Ibid., p. 30.
72 Discussion with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Ngruki, 26 March 2007.
73 Yet again, this is not an issue unique to Islamic societies. Cf. Popper, Open society, 
vol. 2, pp. 267–8, arguing that debate between the rational and the irrational (our 
Revivalists) is unlikely to lead to agreement: ‘since it is impossible to discuss such 
profundities with a rationalist, the most likely reaction will be a high-handed 
withdrawal, combined with the assertion that there is no language common to 
those whose souls have not yet “regained their mystical faculties”, and those whose 
souls possess such faculties’. This may involve ‘the Hegelianising intellectualist who 
persuades himself and his followers that their thoughts are endowed, because of 
special grace, with “mystical and religious faculties” not possessed by others, and 
who thus claim that they “think by God’s grace”’. And how times have changed: 
Popper believed (in 1945) that ‘this division is present in every religion, but it is 
comparatively harmless in Mohammedanism, Christianity, or the rationalist faith’.
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understanding of it) and the Islamist project requires this to be enforced by 
the state in the name of amar ma‘ruf nahi mungkar (commanding the right 
and forbidding the wrong). There is no room for free citizens to debate what 
this shari‘a is — although there are, in practice, plenty of arguments about it 
among Revivalists and Islamists themselves. Thus, unlike the Liberal political 
agenda supported by the intellectual substantiality of An-Na‘im’s arguments, 
the Revivalist and Islamist position seeks not to open but to close the public 
space, to reject intellectuality and to call that justice. A reconciliation of the 
competing priorities of freedom and justice thus faces a formidable obstacle 
from those who reject Liberalism.
It is the Islamic, Javanese and Indonesian traditions that most concern 
us, but the issues here are not unique to these traditions. As the references 
to European and American writers and to the history of other parts of the 
world have shown, the search for a better life through either greater freedom 
or greater justice is not unique to Islam, Java or Indonesia. Both of these 
ideas in principle carry risks. Freedom carries the risk of anarchy. Justice 
carries the risk of totalitarianism. The latter, as Popper has shown, can be 
traced back to Plato. Because advocates of greater freedom recognise the 
need for it to be limited in the interest of the community as a whole, it is 
hard to find a case where a commitment to freedom as the main objective 
has actually led to anarchy, although we can certainly think of examples 
where it has led to confused and inefficient government (the United States 
in the early 21st century offers an example). As the global financial and 
economic crisis developed from 2008, Islamists in Indonesia (and not only 
they) were inclined to say that this demonstrated the anarchy arising from 
excessive freedom within the realms of finance and business, and hoped that 
this presaged the very collapse of global capitalism. Because it is not possible 
to conceive of limiting justice, however, there is less difficulty in finding 
cases where the idea has been used to support totalitarian states. We need 
only think of the horrific European totalitarianisms of the 20th century or 
of Khomeini’s Iran.
In principle, Islamism seeks to restrain the potential tyranny of a state 
or ruler by requiring it or him to heed the advice of the ulama, who are 
qualified — unlike everyone else — to interpret God’s revelation in such 
a way that it becomes divine law imposed on earth. Thus, Islamism is (like 
Plato’s ideal state) a class-based government — the ulama class being the 
law-givers on behalf of God. While the goal is an ideal, pious ruler in the 
form of a caliph, even a caliph must listen to the ulama. The egalitarianism of 
Islam in principle thus becomes in practice an inegalitarian political system 
led by the ulama, whose political purposes are two: to restrain the potential 
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tyranny of the ruler and to restrain the freedom of individuals, for free 
individuals are likely to disobey God’s commandments unless restrained by 
law and the punishments attached to it. Both Plato and Islamism thus can 
give rise to totalitarianism, which in both cases claims to represent justice. 
Class roles and privileges, proper modes of thought, limitations on individual 
rights are all to be imposed by the state and it is the duty of individuals to 
adhere to these rules.
We may say also that both Plato and Islamist ideas rest upon what 
Popper calls an ‘irrational attitude which springs from an intoxication with 
dreams of a beautiful world. … [which] seek[s] its heavenly city in the past 
… [and whose] appeal is always to our emotions rather than to reason’.74 
Popper denounces such thought in unequivocal terms. ‘The more we try to 
return to the heroic age of tribalism,’ he says — or of the Prophet, we might 
add — ‘the more surely do we arrive at the Inquisition, at the Secret Police, 
and at a romanticised gangsterism.’75 
But the appeal of these ideas is a powerful one. Like the secular creeds 
of fascism and Communism that Popper analyses, the Islamist ‘modern 
totalitarianism is only an episode within the perennial revolt against 
freedom and reason. From older episodes it is distinguished not so much by 
its ideology, as by the fact that its leaders succeeded in realising one of the 
boldest dreams of their predecessors; they made the revolt against freedom 
a popular movement.’76 
Thus, it seems appropriate to consider recent and contemporary 
Islamist ideas and organisations in Indonesia (and elsewhere, of course) 
as being linked to the very long history of totalitarianism, at least as much 
as — and arguably more than — an aspect of comparative religion. Like 
other totalitarian ideas, they have spun off terrorism, although that remains 
a marginal phenomenon within the wider range of Islamist groups and 
movements. This means that comparisons of Jemaah Islamiyah or al-Qaeda 
with European anarchists of a century ago, the Baader-Meinhof group, the 
Japanese Red Army Faction, the Red Army Brigades in Italy and Action 
Directe are appropriate — probably more appropriate than, say, comparing 
then with the Branch Davidians, Jonestown or Aum Shinrikyo, which one 
might do if they were to be thought of as primarily some perverted or 
extreme version of religion. These are terrorists like those predecessors, but 
74 Popper, Open society, vol. 1, pp. 177–8.
75 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 214. 
76 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 65.
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their ideology is Islamist rather than Marxist or anarchist.77 In both cases, 
significant general sympathy was initially won by the terrorists, but they lost 
much support when their violence became a clear threat to the interests of 
the middle class.
We leave this section thus with a comparative context for the issues 
facing a more deeply Islamised Javanese society, and Indonesia as a whole. 
This comparative context confirms that this is not an exotic, parochial history 
that we are considering, but something which goes to the heart of the way 
in which many contemporary societies are evolving.
Concluding observations
We have seen Javanese society travel a long way in this book. Under colonial 
rule in the 1930s it was polarised along lines of identity between santri 
and abangan, a polarisation that had become politicised and was about to 
become more so. The abangan majority were not irreligious, for they had a 
rich spiritual life, but it was only partly touched by what reformers regarded 
as the true Islam. Abangan art forms encapsulated understandings of the 
supernatural that permeated Javanese life in the countryside and were in 
some cases linked to those of the royal and princely courts — themselves 
tamed clients of the colonial state. Islamic Modernism and Traditionalism 
were active, the former in particular pioneering a modernisation of 
educational and welfare activities that strengthened the santri side of Javanese 
society, while the colonial state sought to stay out of religious affairs as much 
as possible.78 Modernists played roles in nationalist political movements, 
but none of the latter could make much headway under a repressive colonial 
regime and during the hard years of the Great Depression. Traditionalist 
kyais, conveying sanctity and possessed of superhuman capacities, were often 
held in high regard by rural society, even by many abangan it seems, but they 
had no effective political presence.
77 A comparison of al-Qaeda with anarchist terrorists in Europe and the USA in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries is in Mat Carr, ‘Cloaks, daggers and dynamite’, 
History Today vol. 57, no. 2 (Dec. 2007), pp. 29–31. Carr makes the point that 
the most powerful parallel between the two lies ‘in their strategic conception of 
violence’.
78 The strengthening of Muslim civil society under colonial rule is explored in the 
specific context of Islamic philanthropy in Fauzia’s important work ‘Faith and the 
state’.
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The Japanese occupation and subsequent Indonesian Revolution of 
1945–9 saw the first opportunities for Traditionalist leaders to join their 
Modernist fellows in active political involvement and leadership. As they 
did so, however, the combination of their religiosity with politics led to 
questioning of their sanctity. During this time, santri-abangan polarisation 
and politicisation generated the first serious episodes of violence, particularly 
in connection with the Madiun uprising of 1948 which left thousands 
dead. With this spilling of blood the santri-abangan chasm deepened and 
reinforced the bitter political contest between PKI and its abangan followers 
on one side and santri on the other, represented above all by NU (at that 
time still within Masyumi). PNI had a more priyayi leadership but also 
recruited followers of abangan religio-cultural identity.
During Indonesia’s first attempt to create a democracy in the years 
after the Revolution, santri-abangan conflict deepened still further. The 
politics of this period followed the aliran style, that is to say, polarisation 
followed socio-religious-cultural identities more than lines of class. In this 
context, it was the PKI and PNI that represented the principal barriers to 
deeper Islamisation among the Javanese. Was this independent Indonesia’s 
one and only ‘secular moment’? Probably not. PNI was a rather elitist, 
priyayi-led party without any real secularist agenda, just seeking power and 
hoping for no social revolution. PKI’s version of Communism was adapted 
to aliran realities. The Party had literacy and educational campaigns to raise 
the level of understanding of its cadres and followers, but I am not aware of 
a Party policy to get rid of the superstitions that underlay much of abangan 
life. The Party used kethoprak, ludruk, reyog, jaranan, tayuban and so on for 
propaganda without, so far as I am aware, trying to persuade audiences that 
the supernatural ideas encapsulated in many such performances had to be 
abandoned. Many kebatinan followers felt close to PKI (principally because it 
was the main opposition to the dominance of Islam, no doubt) but the party 
did not try to undercut kebatinan spiritualism. At national level, a debate 
dragged on about whether Pancasila or Islam should be the foundational 
philosophy of the state, coming to no conclusion down to the time when the 
Constituent Assembly that was supposed to resolve this was log-jammed and 
then dissolved by Sukarno in 1959. By the mid-1960s aliran-defined political 
violence reached serious levels, culminating in the slaughter of hundreds of 
thousands — perhaps millions — in 1965–6.
Soeharto’s years from 1966 to 1998 constituted the first period after 
independence when there was a political power in charge with genuinely 
totalitarian aspirations and prospects of achieving them. These decades were 
truly transformative in many ways. The regime was determined to control 
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everything possible, to wipe out all traces of Communism, to shape both what 
people thought and how they acted. Its aspirant totalitarianism was limited 
by the scale of the society it was dealing with and its own administrative 
shortcomings, incompetence and corruption. It was not, however, short of 
brutality, so the threat of the government no doubt often achieved more than 
its capacities could otherwise have delivered. The Soeharto regime established 
(or, perhaps we should say, reestablished) a tradition of the integration of 
the state with religion. The experience of Islamic organisations and leaders 
was mixed — some found cooperation with the state easy, many found it 
problematic but unavoidable, others were discomfited by being sidelined as 
competitors to the state at grass-roots level, and yet others objected loudly 
about the regime to little effect. Some went about their business of deepening 
the Islamisation of Javanese society as best they could in the circumstances. 
Islamic organisations often found in the end that the state’s anti-Communist 
and Islamisation agendas in pursuit of social control suited their own agendas 
well enough. Institutions — above all the political parties — that were 
previously supported by abangan, and in turn supported abangan identities, 
were destroyed. Abangan arts declined, as did kebatinan, both of them being 
under pressure for links with Communism and for being not properly 
Islamic. Towards the end of the New Order, old-fashioned Javanese forms of 
entertainment (and their spiritual suppositions) were also under threat from 
modern entertainments and globalisation. Education and literacy advanced 
dramatically, and with them regime-approved and more orthodox forms of 
religious instruction. 
The santri side lost its political parties under Soeharto, too, but still 
had a vast range of other institutional structures available, including MUI, 
NU, Muhammadiyah, mosques, pesantrens, madrasahs, Muhammadiyah’s 
educational and social welfare activities and much more. The government 
funded the IAIN and STAIN network, producing a new Islamic intelligentsia 
mostly inclined towards Liberal interpretations. While facilitating grass-roots 
Islamisation as a way of imposing a conservative discipline on society, the 
government also enabled DDII to function and, because of DDII’s intimate 
connections with Saudi Arabia, a flow of petrodollars followed. Saudi-funded 
LIPIA was important, too, in promoting the spread of a more Wahhabi-style 
interpretation of Islam.
By the early 1990s, the production of an Islamist intelligentsia began 
to produce real impacts at grass-roots level. DDII and LIPIA-sponsored 
Revivalists, including Afghan jihad veterans, and others were beginning to 
influence the abangan masses through Salafi educational institutions, which 
mushroomed. Indonesia was influenced — like just about everywhere else 
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except Western Europe — by the rising global tide of religiosity which 
involved most world religions. Religion seemed more and more to be a part 
of modernity to many Javanese. The military elite saw a potential ally — and 
encouraged — Revivalist and other generally conservative views of Islam as 
a way of countering globalisation with its human rights and democratisa-
tion agendas.
By the end of the Soeharto years, there was a growing alliance among 
‘green’ military leaders, other leaders of the regime and emerging Islamist 
movements. At grass-roots level, Javanese society was visibly more Islamic 
in its beliefs, rituals, entertainments, social life, discourse, presumptions and 
expectations. Christianity also became a more prominent part of Javanese life 
in the Soeharto period. Although it remained a small minority overall, its 
presence in urban areas grew significantly and helped to fuel what seems to 
have been a dialectical relationship between conversions to Christianity and 
more extreme forms of Islam. This continues in some places to the present, 
notably in Surakarta.79
The New Order collapsed in 1998, allowing another period of 
democracy to blossom. This also enabled a still-small Islamist movement 
to flourish, supported also by external developments, notably the growing 
strength of international extremist networks and the American-led ‘global 
war on terror’, which was interpreted in many parts of the Islamic world 
as a Western Christian crusade against Islam. Prior Islamisation meant 
that the social and political polarisation that now emerged was no longer 
between abangan and santri,80 for there was no longer any serious opposition 
to deeper Islamisation. Rather, one can observe a profound competition 
about how to know what the Islamic revelation means and who can claim 
authority to interpret that revelation. So we see an ongoing contest among 
differing epistemologies — mainly Traditionalist, Modernist (which two 
look increasingly like each other) and Revivalist — and competing social, 
cultural and political agendas. The national governments of post-Soeharto 
Indonesia have taken sometimes differing approaches to religious affairs, 
79 This also seems true in West Java; see the forthcoming work by Chaider Bamualim 
provisionally entitled Islamisation and resistance in West Java: A study of religion, politics 
and social change since c. 1965.
80 Even the meaning of those terms was changing, as we noted in Chapter 7. 
Abangan are now more likely to describe themselves as kejawen ( Javanese, or Javanist, 
implying a truly authentic Javanese identity), while the term santri seems now to be 
used more commonly in its original meaning of a student at an Islamic school (a 
pesantren, the place of the santri).
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and since the introduction of regional autonomy beginning in 2001 so have 
local governments. But generally speaking, governments at all levels have 
accepted the tradition bequeathed by the Soeharto years and thus regard 
the integration of the state and religion as normal, but unlike Soeharto they 
have been willing to concede initiative over many matters to religious institu-
tions. The arts remain a field of contestation, particularly for Modernism, 
Revivalism and Dakwahism. Traditional and folk arts are targeted because 
they convey contending world views and dissenting spiritualities: the process 
of their Islamisation is well advanced. Modern arts are often suspect because 
they challenge conservative norms.
Thus, the history of the Islamisation of the Javanese and opposition 
to it may have approached a decisive stage, in the sense that it is difficult 
to imagine that the deepening influence of Islam among Javanese can 
be stopped or reversed by any remaining opponent. No historian should 
of course dare to suggest what the future may hold. No one in 1830 in 
Java is likely to have predicted the reform movements, social changes 
and polarisation that were soon to follow. No one in 1930 or 1950 would 
have predicted such a great decline of the abangan and predominance of 
Islam in Javanese life. No one in 1965 expected that Wahhabi-style Islam 
could become important in Javanese society. But these and other surprises 
happened and no doubt there will be more to come. As far as we can see 
at the present, however, the history of the Islamisation of the Javanese has 
reached a significant stage.
If we are right to think that the deepening Islamisation of the Javanese 
is incapable of being reversed and that conflict over who holds authority to 
interpret Islam’s message will be incapable of final resolution, then the central 
contemporary dynamics and most salient analytical issues may be two:
• the extent to which political elites (at all levels of government) 
allow religious elites, organisations and issues to dominate the 
public realm, policy making and state conduct; and
• which political philosophy — the search for justice or the search 
for freedom — has greater influence within a more deeply 
Islamised society and state.
Terrorism is a significant but peripheral issue in this context. The main 
Islamist agenda now is about influencing, infiltrating and taking over 
state, semi-state and civil society organisations, in which they are having 
considerable success. Meanwhile, Dakwahism continues powerfully at grass-
roots level, supporting deeper Islamisation in all its forms.
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Research methodology and case studies
In my previous studies of Islamisation in Java before c. 1930, I had to take 
what information was available, concerning whatever part of Javanese society, 
and try to make as much sense as I could of this history. For the period 
down to c. 1830, covered in my book Mystic synthesis in Java, much of this 
concerned kraton circles. There was some information available about other 
levels and locations in Javanese society, but it was limited. For the period c. 
1830–1930 (covered in my Polarising Javanese society), the range of sources 
opened out and, for all their inadequacies about just the things I sometimes 
wanted to know, these records made possible a broader depiction of the 
experiences of the Javanese people.
For this volume covering the period since 1930, however, I faced the 
usual problem of the modern historian: far too much material, particularly 
for the most recent years. There is a good deal of published literature that 
touches on the subject matter of this book — some very good, some less 
so — and an immense amount of primary material, making selectivity 
essential. There are some very valuable historical studies. There are also a 
significant number of publications of two other types: detailed case studies 
(mostly by anthropologists) and sometimes rather sweeping national-level 
generalisations (mostly by political scientists). We also have, alas, some junk 
literature: there are a couple of dreadfully ignorant anthropological studies 
(which I have not mentioned, even to criticise them, in this book and have 
not listed in the bibliography, lest anyone should thereby be led to them 
hoping to learn something) and some poor studies of terrorism. It was clear 
from this antecedent literature, as well as from my own experience of over 40 
years’ involvement with the Javanese, that there was an important story here 
about the ongoing transformation of a large-scale society. The Javanese now 
number around 100 million people, which makes them one of the world’s 
largest majority-Muslim ethnic groups after the Arabs. But telling that story 
was clearly going to be challenging.
500
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My answer to this challenge was to combine a general analysis of 
sources about any part of the Javanese population (which for more recent 
decades necessarily also involved wider Indonesian issues) with closer study 
of several case-studies to try to give the analysis some local depth and grass-
roots reality. Initially, in 2003, I chose two locations for such case-studies: 
Surakarta and Kediri. These were not random choices, for these two towns 
(and their broader environs) had both similarities and differences which I 
expected to provide valuable analytical insights. Three aspects were relevant: 
they were both fairly well known historically; their social and economic 
makeup was roughly comparable; and their histories had important parallels 
until the early Soeharto period, after which they diverged significantly: a 
matter begging for explanation.
With regard to their historical background, Surakarta has received a 
good deal of attention from scholars, including many works of high value 
covering the mid-18th century (when the kraton was founded) to the present. 
Kediri has been less well covered in published literature, but I was quite 
familiar with the sources for its 19th-century history through the work on 
my book Polarising Javanese society. Among the most valuable sources were 
the reports of the missionary-scholar Carel Poensen who lived in Kediri 
from 1862 to 1891. These were particularly useful for insights into Javanese 
life at village level. It was good fortune also that Pare, within Kabupaten 
Kediri, was where Clifford Geertz and his colleagues did their research in 
the early 1950s, which produced important works by him, Hildred Geertz, 
Robert Jay and others. So religious aspects of life in Kediri were reasonably 
well documented for certain significant periods.
Surakarta in Central Java (also frequently known by its pre-kraton 
name of Solo, properly spelled Sala) is an old court city with a long tradi-
tion of radical politics, of social division along lines of divergent forms of 
Islam and of anti-Chinese violence. It was a major centre of PKI strength 
and thus the site of some of the worst slaughters in 1965–6. There was also 
serious socio-political violence in 1998, 1999 and 2000. Since the fall of the 
Soeharto government, Surakarta has been home to some of the most extreme 
of Islamic groups. It also has a significant Christian population (now around 
26 per cent of the city’s population). Its total population in the middle of 
the night, when factories are shut, is around 560,000, but that reaches about 
2,200,000 in mid-day when all the factories are working, as workers flood in 
from the surrounding countryside.1 Tourism and trade in such items as gems 
1 Population figures from Mayor Ir Joko Widodo ( Jokowi), Surakarta, 3 Nov. 2006.
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and handicrafts (notably batik) are important. Modern industries cover such 
fields as textiles, furniture and plastics. The largest local employers are the 
textile firms Sari Warna Asli and Sritex, the latter having 13,500 employees.2 
Surakarta’s economic activities are classified as approximately 30 per cent 
industrial, 25 per cent hospitality, 12 per cent services, 10 per cent transport 
and communications, 10 per cent construction, 10 per cent financial services 
and less than 2 per cent agricultural.3 The large-scale human flux created by 
workers moving in and out of the city encourages a wide range of social prob-
lems, so that Surakarta is noted for its widespread poverty, illegal gambling, 
prostitution, heavy drinking, drug problems, street crime and general violence. 
Whereas Yogyakarta (described below) is often dubbed kota pelajar (student 
city), Surakarta is sometimes called kota buangan (trash city).4 
Kediri in East Java is also an industrial town, dominated almost 
entirely by the giant Gudang Garam cigarette factory, employing some 
33,000 (predominantly young and female) workers. This is a city with a 
politico-social history like Surakarta’s until the 1970s, including a strong PKI 
presence and terrible killings in 1965–6, but it has been quiescent thereafter. 
The extinction of PKI unions made it possible for Gudang Garam to enter a 
period of great growth. There was also a history of Javanese-Chinese conflict 
but that, too, ended early in the New Order. In the post-Soeharto era, Kediri 
town has been without extremist groups of any significant size. It is, however, 
the headquarters of one of the most exclusive and fundamentalist Islamic 
organisations, LDII, and of other idiosyncratic Majlis Dhikr groups, as we 
noted in Chapter 9. The town’s population is around 270,000. Its economic 
sectors reflect the dominance of Gudang Garam, being classified as follows: 
79 per cent industrial (of which 68 per cent is Gudang Garam) and 18 per 
cent trade and hospitality, with all other sectors insignificant.5 The wider 
Kabupaten Kediri was also of interest — a predominantly rural area where 
agriculture is the largest single form of economic activity.6
2 According to http://www.sritexindonesia.com/v2/ina/behind/index.php.
3 See [Tim Litbang Kompas], Profil daerah, kabupaten dan kota (5 vols; Jakarta: 
Kompas, 2001–5), vol. 2, pp. 320–6.
4 The term was used by, among others, the Catholic priest Mardiwidayat SJ 
(discussion in Surakarta, 4 Nov. 2006) in explaining why there is so much criminality 
in Surakarta: Solo is kota buangan, he said, a pertumpahannya sampah: a refuse-city, 
where rubbish is dumped. Thus thieves from elsewhere can send their stolen goods 
to be easily fenced in Solo. If you want a Mercedes, you can order it and they’ll steal 
one for you, he said.
5 [Tim Litbang Kompas], Profil daerah, kabupaten dan kota, vol. 1, pp. 275–81.
6 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 443–9.
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Australian Research Council funding enabled me to engage colleagues 
in Indonesia to gather information from these case-study sites, arrange 
meetings and interviews and alert me to developing issues, beginning in 2003. 
I was fortunate in those who were willing to collaborate in this research. In 
Surakarta, Soedarmono was prepared to work with me — a senior historian 
at Universitas Sebelas Maret, an important cultural figure and, as far as 
I could see, the teacher at some time or other of just about anyone who 
mattered in Surakarta, as well a lead author of an important social history of 
Surakarta.7 He gathered others around as sources of information and could 
open any door. In Kediri, the younger but very able Suhadi Cholil and Imam 
Subawi of the newspaper Radar Kediri proved enthusiastic collaborators, from 
whom I received any form of assistance required, including regular bundles 
of bound volumes of newspaper clippings. Thanks to these colleagues, it was 
as if I had a permanent, if indirect, presence in these two research sites for 
seven years from 2003 to 2010. 
Based on this work and many hours of discussion, my provisional 
answer to the question about why Kediri and Surakarta had such similar 
histories before the 1960s and such divergent experiences afterwards 
rests upon the differing nature of authority in those two places. We may 
distinguish three forms of authority:
• ‘traditional’ authority, grounded in social memory and history from 
the more distant past,
• ‘modern’ authority, embodied in political parties, elected represen-
tatives and city or kabupaten government, and
• commercial leadership.
In Kediri, traditional authority is represented by the Traditionalist kyais 
of NU, modern authority is embodied in the local parliament, mayor and 
other city officials, and commercial leadership lies above all in the hands of 
Gudang Garam. These three forms of authority have been generally well-
regarded (remembering that we are not talking about perfect states here) and 
collaborate closely with each other.8 Gudang Garam’s senior people live in 
Kediri, recognise their social responsibilities and provide funding for good 
7 Mulyadi and Soedarmono et al., Runtuhnya kekuasaan ‘Kraton Alit’.
8 Ky. H. Imam Yahya Mahrus (Ky. Imam) made the point that Kediri was stable 
because of the combination of what he styled as economics, politics and social leaders 
(= Gudang Garam, Mayor Maschut and the kyais) (discussion at Lirboyo, Kediri, 29 
Nov. 2007).
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causes. They generally look after their employees responsibly. The mayor and 
other political leaders have been effective and often popular. There have been 
no really big corruption scandals, although there have certainly been reports 
of some dubious arrangements. Most prosecutions for official corruption 
have collapsed in court, which makes activists suspicious of the courts but 
encourages others to think that Kediri is relatively free of corruption. Actual 
convictions have been few.
In Surakarta, traditional authority is represented by the royal house of 
the Susuhunan and the subsidiary Mangkunagaran princes, none of whom 
is held in high regard. Susuhunan Pakubuwana XII and Mangkunagara VIII 
were removed from any authority outside their palaces by popular action 
during the Revolution and never regained their wider authority. When 
Pakubuwana XII died in 2004, two sons each claimed to be the successor, 
producing an ongoing royal comedy of errors. The leaders of these royal and 
princely lines are more likely to be seen in Jakarta than in Surakarta. The 
mayoral office was, until 2007, occupied by persons who carried little or no 
popular respect. PDIP’s Slamet Suryanto came to the office in 2000 without 
some people, at least, being quite sure what his background was; one well-
connected friend said that she thought that he might have been some sort of 
middleman.9 In 2007 he was convicted of corruption, but further proceedings 
in 2010 were delayed because of his illnesses, including a curious psychiatric 
condition which I believe to be found mainly among Indonesian corruptors, 
called ‘post-power syndrome’.10 Members of the local parliament have also 
been convicted of corruption, as were members of the police. The owners of 
major commercial enterprises tend to live in Jakarta rather than Surakarta 
and have shown little sense of social responsibility, although some people in 
Surakarta sense improvement in this area in recent years. Because all these 
forms of leadership are pretty dysfunctional, there has been effectively no 
social leadership, which has allowed just about any form of social malaise, 
activism or violence to bubble up from below. 
This hypothesis about the key explanation being the nature of these 
forms of leadership is being tested as this book is being written. In Surakarta, 
the new mayor Jokowi (2005–10, then reelected with 90 per cent of the 
vote in 2010) is a breath of fresh air: competent, unpretentious, free of 
any charges of corruption, concerned about the disadvantaged, open to all 
9 Discussion with K.R. Ay. Hilmiah Darmawan Pontjowolo, Surakarta, 9 June 
2003.
10 TempoI, 14 March 2007; Jakartapress.com, 20 March 2010.
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groups and consequently popular. More honest and able police commanders 
have also been brought in. This change in modern-style leadership already 
seems to be making a difference in Surakarta — although it may be naïve to 
speak of a fundamental transformation. It has also been suggested that an 
increasing number of indigenous business-owners in Surakarta are becom-
ing more willing to support constructive activities by Islamic organisations 
in the city.11 Serious problems of course persist, including very high 
levels of criminality,12 but changes in modern political leadership and in 
commercial leadership may have a significant impact. Meanwhile in Kediri, 
the Traditionalist kyais are declining in influence (a point repeatedly made 
above) and — at least coincidentally and perhaps even as a consequence 
— Revivalist thought and Islamist groups that previously had no significant 
presence there are growing.
In 2004 Kudus was selected as another case study, with the local 
collaboration of Iskandar Wibawa. The information gathered there was of 
considerable interest, but Kudus (another tobacco town) turned out to be so 
much like Kediri that it did not seem worth pursuing further.
In 2006 I accepted an invitation to join the National University of 
Singapore History Department. Thereafter, with funding from NUS and 
subsequently from the Singapore Ministry of Education, it was possible to 
add two more case study sites. 
One of the new sites was Yogyakarta (Central Java), since the mid-
18th century the competitor kraton to Surakarta (in the wake of a civil war) 
and a place that I know well from my own research, the work of others, and 
personal experience of having lived there. We studied both the city itself 
and its wider Special District. The contrast with Surakarta proved to be 
useful. In Yogyakarta, traditional authority in the form of the Sultan is still 
influential. Whereas both NU and Muhammadiyah are weak in Surakarta, 
the latter was founded in Yogyakarta; it remains headquartered and very 
influential there. With a total population of some 390,000, Yogyakarta is a 
major tourist centre, second only to Bali. It does not have the great economic 
enterprises found in Kediri and Surakarta, rather is dominated by small 
11 According to Drs Ahmad Syamsuri of pesantren Assalaam (discussion in Sura-
karta, 20 March 2008). Sritex has a section on its website briefly mentioning social 
responsibility activities: http://www.sritexindonesia.com/v2/ina/behind/index.
php?act=detail&p_id=3.
12 TempoI, 28 March 2008 reported that criminality in Surakarta was second only to 
Semarang within Central Java.
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and medium enterprises. The city’s economic activity is classified as 25 per 
cent trade and hospitality, 22 per cent services, 16 per cent transport and 
communications, 16 per cent financial, only 12 per cent industrial and 7 per 
cent construction.13 From 2007 to 2010 I had outstanding collaboration in 
Yogyakarta from Noorhaidi Hasan and Arif Maftuhin — and, from time to 
time, from Suhadi Cholil as well, since he was working there. In particular, 
Arif Maftuhin compiled a comprehensive and invaluable library of clippings 
across the range of interests seen in this book, conducted multiple interviews 
himself and involved others in doing so as well.
The other site chosen was Surabaya, one of the great cities of Indonesia. 
Surabaya has long been the second city of the country (after Jakarta), a 
major seaport and the home to major Java- and national-level movements 
and organisations. It has a population of around 2,900,000 and an economy 
that is heavily industrial. Its economic activity is classified as 34 per cent 
industrial, 32 per cent trade and hospitality, 10 per cent construction, 10 
per cent transport and communications, 6 per cent financial and 5 per cent 
services.14 Here Masdar Hilmy was an invaluable collaborator, bringing 
his own outstanding research instincts to bear on our shared interests and 
engaging the assistance of others.
Thus it was that for periods of from three to seven years, I was, in 
effect, indirectly present in these four research sites on a daily basis. During 
a stint as a visitor at NUS’s Asia Research Institute in 2003–4 and then after 
taking up the position in the History department in 2006, I was able to travel 
frequently to Java for interviews and meetings. 
Finally, a word on the interview techniques employed. Readers will see 
over a hundred interviews and discussions by me listed in the bibliography, 
with more done by my colleagues. You will also notice that these meetings 
are labeled ‘discussions’ in the footnotes in most cases. This is because I 
avoided the formal style of interview, with a structured list of questions and 
issues to be pursued, in almost all cases. Rather, we (I was in almost all cases 
accompanied by one of my collaborators and often by others as well) usually 
commenced with an account of the topic of our research, and often engaged 
in some preliminary chat — done in considerable measure to establish that I 
was better informed than the average visiting journalist. We then sometimes 
asked what the person we were talking to thought the major issues were, 
and in general allowed that person to shape the discussion, to take it where 
13 [Tim Litbang Kompas], Profil daerah, kabupaten dan kota, vol. 1, pp. 261–7.
14 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 289–95.
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she or he thought it would be most interesting and informative, guided by a 
nudging question or comment from our side. We were thus often taken down 
unexpected byways, many (but certainly not all) of which proved valuable to 
understanding the central topics of this book. Interviews that are listed as 
having been done by my collaborators in Indonesia were more formally 
structured. All interviews were conducted in Indonesian or a combination 
of Indonesian and Javanese. Readers will notice also several interviews done 
in 1977. Those were collaborative in content. They had to be done in English 
for broadcast on BBC radio, so there was an initial meeting conducted in 
Indonesian during which we agreed what topics to discuss, followed by the 
interview which was recorded in English.
This case-study and interview/discussion material was integrated with 
all the other material gathered from primary sources, various publications 
and discussions about other areas of the Javanese-speaking heartland, and 
of course about national-level matters. Jamhari Makruf of UIN Jakarta 
organised for specific questions that I wanted asked to be inserted into 
annual social surveys done by that university. Amelia Fauzia and her 
colleagues at the same university conducted separately funded research 
projects that were valuable in their own right and published separately, but 
were also done with my project in mind and lent it direct support.
I remain pleased with the results of this approach. I feel that I gained 
greater depth of knowledge than I could have achieved in any other way. A 
great deal of material was collected that was not employed in this book, of 
course, but all of that helped me to make judgments about what was most 
relevant, about what — in the blizzard of information in which we all live 
— was most worth discussing. I had extraordinary good fortune in being able 
to work with such outstanding colleagues in Indonesia.
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abangan nominal or non-practising Muslims; literally 
‘the red (or brown) ones’
aksi sepihak PKI ‘unilateral action’ campaign of 1964–5 
to carry out land reform laws
Allahu akbar ‘God is great’, a conventional Islamic 
expression used in prayer and on many other 
occasions, including as a sort of battle cry
amar ma‘ruf nahi mungkar  commanding the right and forbidding the 
wrong, an obligation upon all Muslims based 
on Qur’anic injunctions, e.g., Qur’an 3:104: 
‘You are the best community singled out for 
people: you order what is right, forbid what 
is wrong, and believe in God.’
ande-ande lumut popular folk theatre set in the pre-Islamic 
age of Raden Panji
asas tunggal the ‘single foundation’ required from 1982 
for all organisations in Indonesia, that being 
Pancasila
batik ( Javanese bathik) wax-resist dyed cloth
bedhaya sacred kraton dance performed by women, 
invoking the presence of the Goddess of the 
Southern Ocean (Ratu Kidul)
bid‘a unlawful innovations in Islam
Bismillah  ‘In the name of God’: short form of the 
Arabic invocation of God’s blessing that 
should precede any important act and which 
opens all but one of the suras of the Qur’an: 
bismillah al-rahman al-rahim, ‘in the name of 
God the lord of mercy, the giver of mercy’
508
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Bupati head of a regency (kabupaten)
dakwah Islamic mission, preaching, proselytism; 
invitation to accept God’s ways (Arabic 
da‘wa)
dalang ( Javanese dhalang) puppeteer in the Javanese wayang theatre
dangdut a form of popular sung music, the name 
reflecting the sound of the driving drum beat 
that defines it
Densus 88  police anti-terrorism task force, from De-
tasemen Khusus 88, Special Detachment 88
dhikr recitation of pious formulae as a mystical 
exercise
dukun ( Javanese dhukun) shaman, medicine-man, spiritual healer
empu spiritual master of Javanese traditions, kris-
maker
Fatihah the first brief verse of the Qur’an, part of the 
obligatory daily prayers, praising God and 
asking for his blessing and guidance
fatwa  an opinion on a matter of Islamic law, given 
by a legal interpreter (a mufti)
gamelan Javanese orchestra, consisting mainly of 
percussion instruments
Habib ‘beloved’, a term used for descendants of the 
Prophet Muhammad
Hadith Prophetic traditions
haji a person who has completed the hajj 
(pilgrimage) to Mecca
hajj the pilgrimage to Mecca; one of the ‘five 
pillars’ of Islamic orthopraxy
Hadith traditions of the sayings and actions of the 
Prophet Muhammad 
halal allowed in Islamic law
haram  forbidden in Islamic law
ilmu mystical sciences (also ngelmu in Javanese)
jaranan a dance performance involving woven 
bamboo model horses and spirit possession
jihad struggle; the term may be used for various 
forms of striving for religious objectives, 
including armed conflict (Holy War) in 
certain circumstances
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jilbab female headscarf that covers the hair and fits 
tightly around the face 
jimat magical amulet for warding off evil or 
misfortune
ka‘ba the rectangular building at the centre of 
the Great Mosque of Mecca, housing the 
holy black stone; the focus of prayer and 
pilgrimage for Muslims
kabupaten administrative unit, in Dutch times called a 
regency
kafir unbeliever, non-Muslim
kampung hamlet or neighbourhood, particularly in a 
town or city
Kauman the area of a Javanese town occupied mainly 
by pious santri Muslims
kebatinan  Javanese spiritualism, usually seen as being 
opposed to orthodox Islamic ideas and 
practices; literally ‘inwardness’
kejawen Javanese, Javaneseness; a term used 
particularly for nominal or non-practising 
Muslims or kebatinan adherents, especially 
by themselves, implying truly authentic 
Javanese identity
kethoprak a form of Javanese popular theatre
kraton court of a Sultan or Susuhunan
kris Javanese dagger, often believed to be ‘alive’ 
with supernatural powers
kyai term of veneration for male Islamic teachers, 
particularly Traditionalists, and for revered 
objects such as royal pusaka
laskar militia, paramilitaries, usually claiming an 
Islamic motivation and identity
ludruk a form of Javanese popular theatre
madrasah Islamic schools of a modern type, with 
graded classes, desks and ‘secular’ as well as 
religious subjects
mujahadah ‘striving’, a Sufi practice of spiritual exercises 
and struggle including dhikr and similar 
activities intended to advance one’s moral 
and spiritual state
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mujahidin holy warriors, fighters in the path of God
murshid (mursyid) spiritual guide, leader of a Sufi tarekat, a 
shaykh 
nasyid  devotional songs, usually sung by males with 
minimal musical accompaniment
ngelmu mystical sciences (also ilmu)
nyai term of veneration for female Islamic 
teachers, particularly Traditionalists 
Pancasila the ‘five principles’ which constitute 
the philosophical basis of the Republic 
of Indonesia as declared in the 1945 
constitution. Their formulation has not 
always been consistent, but in general (as 
formulated in the Soeharto period) they 
consist of belief in the one God, just and 
civilised humanitarianism, the unity of 
Indonesia, democracy guided by consensus, 
and social justice for all Indonesians.
Pangeran  prince
pangulu chief religious officer, head of a mosque
pasar  market
pasisir north coast of Java
pengajian Qur’anic lectures and study 
pesantren Islamic boarding school
priyayi  members of the Javanese administrative-
aristocratic elite
pundhen sacred site for kejawen/abangan; often a 
sacred tree, a grave, etc.
pusaka  supernaturally powerful heirlooms, mainly 
weapons
Qur’an the holy scripture of Islam, containing the 
divine revelations recited by the Prophet 
Muhammad
Ratu Adil Just King, the messianic figure promised by 
Javanese eschatologies
reyog a masked dance performance featuring very 
large costumes, in which performers enter 
trances
ruwatan exorcism, required in various social and 
personal circumstances, usually involving 
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the performance of a particular shadow 
play (wayang) story to protect endangered 
persons from the god Batara Kala
Salafi Muslims who seek to follow the example 
of the righteous ancestors of early Islam, 
the Salaf al-Salih; a position commonly 
associated with adherents of Wahhabism
salat ritual prayer; one of the ‘five pillars’ of 
Islamic orthopraxy
santri in the modern era — and in this book 
— a term used for devout Muslims among 
Javanese; literally, a student of religion
Shahada The confession of faith, that there is no God 
but God and Muhammad is the messenger 
of God; one of the ‘five pillars’ of Islamic 
orthopraxy
shari‘a Islamic religious law
shaykh spiritual guide, leader of a Sufi tarekat, a 
murshid
shirk associating anyone or anything with God, 
polytheism, the most heinous form of 
disbelief in Islam
slametan ritual communal meal to observe major 
occasions such as birth, death, marriage,    
etc.
slawatan  narratives of the life of the Prophet sung 
by men in either Arabic or Javanese to the 
accompaniment of terbangs (tambourines), in 
Javanese musical style
Sufi, Sufism Islamic mystic, mysticism
tahlilan a Traditionalist devotional practice consisting 
of group repetitive chanting of the first part 
of the confession of faith, that there is no 
God but God (La ilaha illa ‘llah)
tarekat Sufi mystical order
tayuban performance by Javanese dancing-girls, often 
associated with prostitution
ulama Islamic religious leaders, learned scholars; 
unlike in Arabic, in Indonesian languages 
ulama can be used as a singular noun. In 
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Javanese society, these scholars are commonly 
called kyai 
ummah the community of believers, the Muslims; 
the term is sometimes also used for other 
religious communities
ustadz master, teacher; used especially for Revivalist 
religious scholars
Vorstenlanden Central Javanese principalities of the 
Susuhunan and Mangkunagara in Surakarta 
and the Sultan and Pakualam in Yogyakarta
Wahhabi the teachings, or an adherent, of the 
ideas of the eighteenth-century Arabian 
figure Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab, a 
doctrinaire, puritanical interpretation of 
Islam which rejects any form of innovation 
(bid‘a) and is now dominant in Saudi Arabia
wali semi-legendary apostle of Islam in Java, of 
whom there are usually said to have been 
nine (the wali sanga)
warung small shop or trading-stall
wayang Javanese shadow play using flat parchment 
puppets; also used for other forms of 
theatrical performance such as wayang wong 
(dance drama) and wayang topeng (masked 
dance performance)
yasinan  a Traditionalist devotional practice consisting 
of group repetitive chanting of Qur’an sura 
36
zakat charitable giving for the benefit of the needy; 
one of the ‘five pillars’ of Islamic orthopraxy
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Key analytical terms1
Basic epistemological distinctions
Traditionalism Acceptance of the four Sunni Schools of Law as valid 
guides to knowing Islam. 
  Traditionalism usually recognises that these legal tradi-
tions are subject to change and redefinition. It commonly 
involves tolerance towards locally derived cultural expres-
sions, acceptance of mysticism, and a gradualist approach 
towards greater Islamisation.
Traditionalist One who, or that which, adheres to Traditionalism 
Historicalism An approach to knowing Islam which denies that the four 
Sunni Schools of Law are the sole authoritative guides 
and believes that Revelation can be clarified by observing 
how it has been understood in changing socio-historical 
contexts. 
  Because it accepts that understandings have evolved 
historically, Historicalism also commonly implies an 
acceptance that understandings may evolve in the present 
and future. It is often open both to mysticism and to local 
cultural expressions. Historicalism is a significant approach 
among intellectuals but lacks broad social networks.
Historicalist One who, or that which, embraces Historicalism
Modernism An approach to knowing Islam which denies that the four 
Sunni Schools of Law are authoritative guides and which 
514
1 These analytical terms and their definitions grew from discussions over several 
months with my colleagues in a research project at the National University of 
Singapore focussed mainly on the post-Soeharto period, Chaider S. Bamualim and R. 
Michael Feener. Several colleagues at NUS and overseas also gave valuable comments 
and suggestions.
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relies fundamentally upon human reason in understanding 
Revelation. 
  This commonly involves a disregard for socio-historical 
contexts but openness to modern learning as a way of 
enhancing the power of reason. It is principally opposed to 
what it sees as the medieval obscurantism of Traditionalism, 
may reject local cultural expressions and is at least 
suspicious of mysticism.
Modernist One who, or that which, embraces Modernism
Revivalism An approach to knowing Islam which denies that the four 
Sunni Schools of Law are authoritative guides and which 
aspires to revive a pristine universal Islam as in the time of 
the Prophet and his Companions. Its epistemology rests on 
cognition of Revelation as found in the Qur’an and Hadith 
through divine guidance. 
  Revivalism normally distrusts the application of human 
reason and denies that understandings of Revelation may 
legitimately change over time or that Islam may evolve in 
changing socio-historical contexts. It commonly rejects 
local cultural expressions and regards mysticism as a source 
of heresy. 
Revivalist One who, or that which, adheres to Revivalism
Social and political projects
Islamism A project whose principal locus of activity is the state. It 
seeks a more perfect political order by establishing state 
institutions and/or controlling existing ones so as to impose 
deeper Islamisation, achieve greater justice, and safeguard 
the integrity of the Muslim community.
  Islamism is most commonly associated with Modernist 
and Revivalist thought and sometimes (but not necessarily) 
validates the use of force to achieve its objectives. It 
usually seeks social conformity and, where it is tolerant of 
other faiths, normally expects them to accept a position 
subordinate to Islamic dominance.
Islamist One who, or that which, embraces the Islamism
Dakwahism A project whose principal locus of activity is at the level of 
the society. It seeks a more perfect social order by actively 
propagating what it regards as a correct understanding of 
the faith, its moral standards and its ritual obligations.
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  Dakwahism is found mainly among Traditionalists, 
Modernists and Revivalists. Traditionalist Dakwahism 
is normally consistent with tolerance towards locally 
derived cultural expressions, acceptance of mysticism and 
a gradualist approach towards greater Islamisation, and is 
usually said to rest upon the example of the wali sanga. 
Modernist and Revivalist styles are normally characterised 
by rejection of local practices and superstitions and 
insistence on the superiority of Islam over other religions. 
All styles may prioritise associated values such as the soli-
darity of the Islamic ummah and strict female modesty.
Dakwahist One who, or that which, embraces Dakwahism
Liberalism A project whose principal locus of activity is the indivi-
dual. It seeks greater individual freedom in religious and 
other matters, so long as no harm is done to the rights of 
others.
  Liberalism is found amongst Traditionalists, Historicalists 
and Modernists, but is rare among Revivalists. It is 
generally suspicious of the role of government in religious 
affairs and opposed to the use of force in any context. It 
commonly prioritises associated values such as social and 
gender equality, freedom of thought, interfaith harmony, 
social pluralism and economic progress.
Liberal One who, or that which, embraces Liberalism
Socio-religious process
Islamisation A process of deepening commitment to standards of 
normative Islamic belief, practice and religious identity. 
Those standards are subject to contestation among groups 
and individuals.
  Islamisation as an objective is associated with all of the 
epistemological approaches described above.
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Ageng, Ratu, 11
Agung, Sultan, 5–6, 41, 197, 294–5
Agus Miftach, 451
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t552   552 6/20/2012   1:22:34 PM
Index 553
Agus Mustofa, 306–7
ahlu sunnah wal-jamaah, 96
Ahmad Dahlan, 45, 361–2, 363
Ahmad Dahlan University, 312
Ahmad Khudlori, 434
Ahmad Rifa‘i (Rifangi), 15
Ahmad Salehudin, 338
Ahmad Siddiq, 227, 329
Ahmad Soemargono, 252
Ahmad Sukina, 426–7
Ahmad Syafii Maarif, see Syafii Maarif, 
A.
Ahmad Syafi’i Mufid, 169
Ahmad Syamsuri, 178–9
Ahmadiyya, Ahmadis, 48–9, 56, 332; 
denunciations of and attacks upon, 
318–22, 325, 331n52, 339, 346, 359, 
421, 441
Aidit, D.N., 73, 102, 106
Airlangga University, 307
‘Aisyiyah, 191–2, 233, 289, 294n72, 295
‘Aisyiyah Health Sciences College, 312
Aku dan Tuhanku, 297
Al Falah, 329
Alamsyah Ratu Prawiranegara, 223
Alatas, Hamid, 252
alcohol, drunkenness, 126, 173n169, 
195, 213, 233, 234, 240, 282–3, 352, 
377, 423–5, 491n66
Alers, H., 73
Algeria, Algerians, 50, 444n111
‘alim, ‘ulama’, passim; distinguished 
from za‘im, zu‘ama, 471–2
Ali Maschan Moesa, 336, 343, 355, 
470
aliran sesat, see deviant sects
aliran, passim; description of, 80–1; 
decline of, 162–4; not revived post-
1998, 277
Al-Irsyad, 44, 46, 182, 248, 421
All-Indonesia Kebatinan Congress 
Body, 133
Almond, G., 466n7
alms (zakat), 5, 7, 9, 73n29, 81–3, 84, 
299–300, 337, 463
amar ma‘ruf nahi mungkar 
(commanding the right and 
forbidding the wrong), 173n168, 
174, 225, 474, 493
Amien Rais, M. 196, 249, 250, 253, 
262, 263, 310, 361, 388
Amin Abdullah, 249, 361, 363
Amin Azis, 296–7
Amir Hamza, 396
Amir Sjarifuddin, 69, 72, 73
Amir, Ky., 294
amir, umara’: distinguished from ‘alim, 
‘ulama’, 471
Ampel, 441
amputation of criminals’ limbs, 6, 183, 
491n66
amulets (jimat), 93,108, 113, 123, 
222n57, 308, 309n123, 371, 375, 
426–7, 452
Anand Krishna, 337n78
Anas, Ky., 50, 65
ande-ande lumut, 127, 392
Andung, Mt, 396
angklung, 103
Anis Matta, 29n58, 433
Anjir, Ky., 194
An-Na‘im, A. A., 447, 491, 493
Ansor, 88, 102, 106–9, 111–12, 
115n105, 145, 169, 189, 199, 228, 
248, 165, 369, 396–7, 422, 424, 433, 
438, 455
Anti-Communist Front, 301
Anwar Harjono, 242, 262
Anwar Iskandar (Gus War), 152, 455
Appelby, R.S., 467
Arabia, Arabs, 12, 14, 30, 44, 49, 50–1, 
160, 176, 180, 182, 189, 241, 252, 
272, 300, 353, 357, 359, 399, 400, 
401, 414, 419, 422, 426, 441, 443, 
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235n98, 303, 304, 337
Confrontation, 109, 117
Confucianism, 133–4, 456n30, 471
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Jawa Hokokai, 65, 68
Jawa Pos, 266, 301, 306, 349, 355, 357
Jay, R., 90–1, 97, 501
Jayabaya, Jayabhaya, 121, 236, 488
Jefri Al Bukhori, 300
Jehovah’s Witnesses, 144
Jekulo, 271, 352
Jemaah Islamiyah, see JI
Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, see 
Ahmadiyya
Jember, 23, 141, 298, 329, 349n18
Jenengan, 77
Jepara, 135, 145, 168, 436
Jews, Judaism, 133n49, 147n90, 172, 
184, 242, 262, 275, 289, 310, 
359n48, 421n32, 440, 465, 473
JI, 176, 184, 268, 281, 409–11, 417, 
418, 434n77, 469, 474; see also 
Ba’asyir, bombs
jihad, 184; in Indonesia, 77, 252, 433–4, 
442; Abu Bakar Ba’asyir on, 411–2; 
see also Afghanistan
Jihad: The trail of political Islam, 468
JIL, 336, 355–9, 363, 364, 478, 492





Jogokariyan mosque, 296, 434, 436
Johor, 249
joint prayer, 455; NU fatwa against, 
360; MUI fatwa against, 359, 454
Joko Sarsetyoto, 307
Joko Sembung, 336
Joko Su’ud Sukahar, 304
Jokowi ( Joko Widodo), 406, 424, 425, 
456
Jombang, 24, 62, 63, 77, 86, 109n86, 
110n88, 151, 165, 180, 186, 188, 
215–16, 232, 292, 346n15
Jones, S., 180n185, 409
Jonestown, 494
Jong, S. de, 133
Jordan, University of, 357n40
JSIT, 310
Jusuf Hasjim, 106




kafir, 6, 15, 45, 61, 90, 97, 112, 181, 
183, 184, 215, 325, 390, 454, 464











Kalono, M., 324, 380
KAMMI, 443
Kantor Urusan Agama, 62
Kaplongan, 67







kasidah, 213, 220–1, 392–3, 399
Kats, J., 34
Kauman, 75, 403, 438
kawi, 120
Kawruh Urip Sejati, 387
kawula-gusti, manunggaling, 389
Kayuwangi, Rakai, 378n21
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Kebatinan, 38, 94, 114, 119, 122, 124, 
132–8, 139, 155, 162, 164, 169, 
170, 175, 193n216, 194, 195, 210, 
260n1, 332, 343n4, 379, 380, 383, 
384–8, 391, 392, 409, 445, 452, 
455, 456n30, 496, 497; changing 
meaning and declining use of term, 
269, 270n20, 383n40
Kedhiri, Babad, 18, 302–4, 384, 452






kejawen, 135, 237, 270, 271–2, 387, 
417, 452; as preferred term, 269, 
383n40, 498n80




Kentucky Fried Chicken, 440
Kepel, G., 410, 468




kethoprak, 36, 93, 104, 105, 125, 126, 






Kholil (Cholil) Ridwan, 252, 314n141, 
340
Kholil Mahmud, 368n77, 401, 443
Khomeini, Ayatollah, 196, 241, 440, 
451n15, 472, 493
Kiai Kanjeng, 232, 298, 355n34, 389
kiblat (qibla), 318
Kidung lalembut, 371
Kidung rumeksa ing wengi, 236–7,    
371
Kim Hyung-Jun, 97n52, 147n88, 211, 
236
King Saud University, 420
Kirlian camera, 371
Kisah, al-, 441
KISDI, 248, 252, 320n12
Kitab al-Tawhid, 283, 310
kitab kuning, 150, 239, 343, 470
Klaten, 105, 139, 168, 189, 190, 333, 
346, 386, 424n43, 430n65, 438, 451
Koiso Kuniaki, 64





Kosim Nurseha (Qosim Nursekha), 197
Kostrad, 110
kota buangan, 502
Kota Gede, 22, 25, 29, 40, 44, 136, 166, 





Krapyak, pesantren, 77, 372
Krapyak, Seda ing, 40
Krendawahana, 42
kris, 4, 113, 184, 190, 330, 380, 396–7, 
401, 426
Krishna (Kresna), 9, 38
Kristen Jawa, Kristen Londo, 13
kroncong, 393
Kṣatriyas, 47
Kudus, 75, 76, 89, 105, 271, 276, 278, 
285, 320, 342n3, 352; as case study, 
505
Kulonprogo, 337, 338, 391
kungkum, 387, 389
Kunst, J., 34
Kuntara Wiryamartana, I., 405n126
Kurasawa, A., 60, 64, 65, 66
Kurawa, 402
Kursi, Ayat al-, 349–50
Kusumayuda, 39
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kyais, passim; supernatural powers of, 
65, 67, 108, 113, 122–3, 156, 226, 
329, 343, 346–7, 349–50, 470, 495; 
complication of political activism 
for, 65–6, 106n77, 227, 351–2, 353, 
355
labuhan offerings, 41, 373, 378
Lakpesdam, 229, 355
Laksmi Pamuntjak, 302
Laku Dumadi Anggayuh Titi Tentrem, 
334
Lamongan, 24, 194, 349n19, 362





Laskar Jihad, 313, 410, 419–20, 423, 
443–4; (possible second group with 
the same name), 401–2
Latif, Gus, see Abdul Latif Madjid, 
Lawang, 44
Laweyan, 29
Lawu, Mt, 7, 42, 135, 140, 189, 320, 
372, 373, 380, 387, 417
Lawu, Sunan, 7, 114, 180, 189, 329, 
372, 383, 387
LDII, 194, 237–9, 276, 322–6, 328, 
366, 380, 417, 455, 456n30, 502
leather workers, 40
Lee, H.D.P., 481
Lekra, 103, 104, 125, 127, 136, 245, 
247
Lelyveld, Th. B. van, 34
Lemah Abang, Seh, 16n14
LEMKARI, 237n106; see also LDII




Liberal Islamic Network, see JIL
Liberalism, MUI fatwa against, 359
Libforall Foundation, 344n10
Liddle, R.W., 277–8n9
lightning as movement of angels, 309
Lim, Mbah (Ky. H. Muslim 
Imampura), xviii, 189, 348–9, 451
LIPIA, 240–1, 313, 358n43, 419, 420, 
497
Lirboyo, 77, 114–15, 168–9, 243, 319, 
324, 328, 346, 353, 359, 384n46, 
399n102
literacy, 77, 24–5, 37, 42, 55, 57, 90, 92, 
143n79, 154, 207–8
Lith, F. van, 405





ludruk, 34, 36, 93, 104, 125, 126, 212, 
232, 397, 398, 496, 
LUIS, 389n61, 438






Madiun, 23, 98; PKI uprising at, 72–9, 
90, 91, 111, 127, 164, 301, 496
Madrais (Muhammad Rais), 50
Madras, 22
Madukoro, 75–6, 212–15, 240
Madura, Madurese, 5, 6, 13–26 passim, 
47, 83, 85, 99, 155n118, 187n197, 
227, 251, 264, 320, 359, 369
Maftuh Basyuni, 289–90, 437
Magelang, 99, 235, 335, 387, 419; 
Military Academy at, 261
Magetan, 75, 212, 232
magic, xviii, 5, 6, 13, 40, 75, 94, 97, 104, 
108, 113, 134, 135, 184, 197, 205, 
222n57, 305, 308, 309n123, 343, 
349–50, 351, 372, 397, 470; see also 
amulets, exorcism, kyais, healing, 
ruqya
Ricklefs_Islamisation combined t564   564 6/20/2012   1:22:36 PM
Index 565
Magsaysay Foundation, Ramon, 245–6
Mahathir Mohamad, 221
Mahdi, 123, 487
Mahkamah Konstitusi, see 
Constitutional Court
Mahrus Ali (Revivalist), 399–400






Majapahit, 3, 5, 18, 102, 114, 184, 
193n216, 234, 302, 380, 384–5, 387, 
388n58
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, see MMI
Majelis Tafsir al-Qur’an, see MTA
Majlis Dakwah Islamiyah, 156
Makasar, Makasarese, 5
makrifat, 135, 328
maksiat, tempat, see immorality, attacks 
on places of, 
Maksum Djauhari (Gus Maksum), 
345–6
Malang, 23, 24, 98, 193, 253, 306, 335, 
336, 342n3, 349n19, 388n59, 419
Malari riots, 158
Malaysia, 109, 117, 184, 209, 221, 237, 
249, 340n87, 357n40, 411, 420, 
434n77
Malik Fadjar, Abdul, 253
Malik Madany, 339, 352n26
ma-lima, 173, 235, 240, 282
Maluku, inter-religious violence in, 
268, 419, 420, 443




Mangkubumi, see Hamengkubuwana I
Mangkunagara I, 7, 121
Mangkunagara IV, 14, 121, 389
Mangkunagara VII, 37, 38, 504














marriage, inter-religious, 140, 291, 440, 
454; MUI fatwa against, 359
Marriott hotel bombing, 410
martial arts, 67, 102, 113, 197, 345, 
362, 398, 429; see also Pagar Nusa 
and various entries beginning with 
ilmu 
Marty, M.E., 467
Marx, K., Marxism, 20, 91, 93, 96, 226, 
247, 249, 484, 495; see also PKI
Maschut, A., 378, 503n8
Masdar F. Mas’udi, 229, 339, 358, 446, 
489
Masdar Hilmy, 275, 284, 307, 341, 409, 
428, 433, 478, 506
Masih Al-Maw’ud, Al-,332
masked dances, topeng, 32, 35–6, 127, 
232; see also reyog
maslahat, 198
Masrur Ahmad, 383
Masykur, Ky. H., 77
Masyumi, 62, 68–101 passim, 109, 111, 
117, 128, 137, 158, 161n135, 166, 
198, 264, 301n97, 337, 469, 472, 
496
Maulani, Z.A., 261–2
Maulid Nabi, Mauludan, 35, 127, 396
Mawardi, al-, 53




McVey, R.T., 78, 80, 124
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Mecca, passim; errors in mosque 
orientation towards, 318n1
Media Dakwah, 241–2
Megawati Sukarnoputri, 246, 248, 







Merapi, Mt, 42, 127, 135, 372, 373, 
375–6, 395–6
Merbabu, Mt, 93, 212, 396
Mertju Suar, 147
Micklethwait, J., and A. Wooldridge, 
220, 271, 478
middle class, 12, 14, 30, 36, 206, 242, 
310, 409–10, 428, 447, 468, 473, 
495
Miftahul Huda, 335
Mik, Gus, see Hamim Jazuli
Milir, 140
Military Academy, 261
Military Law Academy, 189
Mill, J.S., 483
Minangkabau, 12, 44, 52–3, 69, 225
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, 48, 319, 332
Misbach, 247
Missi Islam, 102
MMI, 187n197, 195n219, 287, 294, 
300, 320, 333, 366, 369, 380, 
415–44 passim; founding of, 411–12
Mochtar Lubis, 246
moderate, limited usefulness of term, 
341–2
Modernism, Islamic, passim; origins of 
in Indonesia, 19






Mortimer, R., 106, 108
mosques, passim; density of, 152–3; 
become centres of student activism, 
159, 232
Mranggen, 188
MTA, 176–8, 366, 384, 422, 426–8, 
442
Mu‘tazilite reationality, 357
Mudjahirin Thohir, 135, 145, 168, 363, 
364n65




Muhammad, the Prophet, passim; 
depicted with crown of Majapahit, 5
Muhammadiyah, passim; founded, 19; 
threatened by infiltration, 366–8, 
433
Muhammadiyah Hospital, Surabaya, 
307
Muhammadiyah Polytechnic, 312
Muhammadiyah Universities, 235, 253, 
266, 293, 294, 312, 331, 342–3n3, 
364–5, 404, 430n65
Muhammadiyah Youth Generation 
Preparedness Command, 363–4 
MUI, 48, 159, 192, 209, 239, 247, 248, 
252, 262, 275–7, 284–8, 289, 295, 
298, 301, 315–46 passim, 359, 364, 
415–16, 421, 437, 448, 454, 456n30, 
465, 474, 497
mujahadah, 299, 328, 329, 344, 391
Mukti Ali, 151, 157
Mulder, N., 134, 136, 139
multiculturalism, 449, 454, 457, 467
Munasir, M., 106
Munawir Syadzali, 74, 157n127
Munir Mulkhan, Abdul, 249, 361, 363
Mus, Gus, see Mustofa Bisri
Mush’ab Abdul Ghaffar, 434–5
Mushaddeq, Ahmad, 332, 334
Muslim Brotherhood, 44, 159, 161, 
171, 182, 186, 196, 241, 310, 367, 
430, 490
Muslim Imampura, see Lim, Mbah
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Muslim World League, see Rabitat al-
‘Alam al-Islami,
Muslimat, 88, 102, 108n84, 192
Muslimun, al-, 312
Musso, 71, 72
Musta’in Romly, 188, 215
Mustofa Bisra, 344–5, 357
Mutamakin, Ahmad, 170n159
Mu‘tazilite theology, 357
Muttaqien Pancasila Sakti, Pondok 
Pesantren al-, 451
Mystic Synthesis, 3–12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 
41, 49, 121, 123, 164, 197, 211, 217, 
235, 371, 373, 462, 489n62
Nadwi, Abu Hasan an-, 160
naga, supernatural, 253
Nahdlatul Ulama, see NU
Nakamura, M., 136, 166–7
names, Javanese vs. Arabic, 255
Naqshabandiyya, 15, 50, 51, 53, 170, 
178, 188, 213, 306, 346; see also 
Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya
Nasakom, 104
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 44
Nasution, A.H., 73
nasyid, 185, 300, 398, 399
National Unity Front, 451
Natsir, M., 69, 117, 147–8, 160–1, 165, 
166, 176, 198, 211, 224, 242, 262
Naumann Stiftung, Friedrich, 196
Navy Technical College, 307






Nganjuk, 24, 336, 397, 415n16
Ngawi, 74, 75, 127, 387, 419
ngelmu,135–6, 380, 387; see also ilmu
Ngoro, 239
Ngruki, Al Mukmin school at, 182–3, 
184–5, 389, 401, 412, 416, 417, 
418n27, 422, 424, 434n77
Ngudi Utomo, 452n16
nguras enceh, 373
night journey, Prophet’s, 332, 355n34
Night of Power, 393
ninja, 346, 349, 351
Nitisastra, 121
Noer, D., 225
NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), passim; 
foundation of, 19; threatened by 
infiltration, 368–9, 429
Nugroho Notosusanto, 201
Nurcholish Madjid, 163, 165–6, 170, 
196, 253, 284, 362, 446






Old Javanese, 5, 11, 120n11, 140, 217, 
221, 223, 389, 405n126, 449, 482
Open society and its enemies, 484, 485
Opick, 399
opium, 6, 17, 36, 173n169, 240, 282
Osing, 47, 217, 402
P3M, 229, 355
P4, 222–5
Pacitan, 75, 176, 178
Padris, Padri War, 12
Pagar Nusa, 345, 351n24
Pagentongan, 188
PAKEM, 137, 332n58
Pakempalan Kawula Mangkunagaran, 
38
Pakempalan Kawula Ngayogyakarta, 
36–7
Pakempalan Kawula Surakarta, 38
Pakistan, Pakistanis, 160, 165, 176, 
205, 419, 444n111, 467; see also 
Mawdudi, Abu ’l-a‘la 
Pakualam I, 7
Pakualaman principality, 7, 24, 373n7
Pakubuwana II, 6–7





Pakubuwana X, 37, 39, 47
Pakubuwana XI, 39
Pakubuwana XII, 389n61, 504
Pakubuwana, Ratu, 6, 197
Palestine, Palestinians, 370, 428, 434




Pancasila, 172 et seqq passim; imposition 
of as sole foundation (asas tunggal), 
224–5, 227; Hari Lahir vs. Hari 
Kesaktian Pancasila, 222; turned to 
by Liberals, 448–50; turned to by 
kebatinan, 452
Pandawa, 402
Panembahan Senopati Division, 73
Pangestu, 132, 133, 135, 384, 386
pangulu, 15, 41, 45, 63, 64, 86, 218
Panji Masyarakat, 149, 174n173, 225
Panji, 35–6, 127
Papua, 251n142
Parabu, Pangudi Rahayuning Budi, 387
Parangkusumo, 373, 380
Parangtritis, 338–9, 380
Pare, 71, 76, 85, 90, 91, 399, 501
Parindra, Partai Indonesia Raya, 39
Parisada Hindu Dharma, 139, 140
Parkindo, 150
Parmusi, 117–8, 163
Partai Demokrat, see Democrat Party
Partai Keadilan ( Justice Party), 358, 
366, 430, 490; see further PKS
Partai Sosialis, 69
Pasuruan, 125, 193, 262, 298, 329
Pati, 75, 357, 394n84
Patine Gusti Allah, 105
Patrialis Akbar, 321–2, 435n77
PBI, 38, 39
PDI, 163, 203, 214, 246, 248, 249
PDIP, 262–4, 276–7, 279, 282, 283, 
352n27, 384, 419, 424, 433, 450





Pemalang, 25, 97, 112
Pemuda Muhammadiyah, 248
Pemuda Rakyat, 102, 107, 109




Pentecost World Conference, 437
People’s Credit Banks, 230
People’s University, 102
perda, peraturan daerah, 282
perdukunan, 346
Permai, 91–2
Persatuan Islam (Persis), 49n74, 52, 
309n123, 311–12
Persatuan Perusahaan Batik Bumiputra 
Surakarta, 30
Persis, see Persatuan Islam
Pertanu, Pertanian Nahdlatul Ulama, 
88, 102
pesantren, passim; see also names of 
individual schools
Pesindo, 69, 73–4, 76
Peta, 67
Peterongan, 77, 186, 188
Petition of 50, 205
Philippines, 298n84, 463
photographs: declared haram, 45; of 
auras, 307
Pigeaud, G.Th.G., 32, 34–5, 232, 488
Pijper, G.F., 43, 46–7
pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj), passim; 
numbers undertaking, 14, 19, 85, 
167–8, 272–3; quota restrictions 
on, 272




Pithaloka, Ratu Diah, 386




PKB, 262–4, 276, 277–9, 338, 351–2, 
397, 432, 472,
PKI, 31, 71–152 passim, 162–203 
passim, 211, 212, 228, 245, 247–9, 
254, 301, 398, 415n16, 473, 496, 




PKS, 195n219, 277n9, 283, 292, 299, 
310, 315, 320n12, 323n22, 358, 
366–8, 369, 379, 380, 401, 409, 
415, 428, 430–6, 437, 443, 470, 
472, 490
Plato, 480, 481, 483–4, 487, 493–4
Platzdasch, B., 278n9, 490
Playboy, 300
Ploso, 173n171, 329, 353
pluralism, MUI fatwa against, 359, 
449n7, 454
PMII, 102
PNI, 20, 69–132 passim, 150–1, 162–4, 
203, 211, 254, 496
Poensen, C., 16
Pol Pot, 115
police, Indonesian, 75, 76, 103n64, 108, 
127, 169, 236, 239, 281–2, 286, 
300, 301, 313–339 passim, 345, 346, 
358, 373, 376, 384, 390, 400, 409, 
414–26 passim, 434, 437, 438, 465; 
see also Densus 88 
political 115, 117, 146–7, 243, 246,  
261
polygamy (polygyny), 23, 191, 288, 289, 
291–2
polytheism (shirk, syirik), polytheists, 
178, 184, 186, 187, 238, 309n123, 
338, 339, 377, 379, 389, 390, 397, 
428, 435
Ponari, Ki Bagus, 384
Ponorogo, 33, 75, 76, 104, 125, 170, 
405
Popongan, 346–7
Popper, K., 200–1, 484–5, 486n54, 
492n73, 493, 494
population, Javanese, xix, 13, 22, 83, 
461; rate of growth of, 12–3, 23, 59, 
142n74
pornography, ‘porno-action’, 172, 173, 





Power of Al Fatihah, 297
PPP, 158, 189, 202, 205, 213–231 
passim, 263–4, 276n5, 277–8, 279, 
320n12, 321, 344, 410n5, 414n10, 
416, 435n78, 474; founded, 163
Prabowo Subianto, 248n135, 251–2
Prambanan, 311, 338
Pramoedya Ananta Tur, 103, 245, 
246–7, 301
prayers, five daily (salat, sembayang), 7, 
9, 34, 139, 142, 187, 270, 271, 277, 
280, 281, 297n80, 309, 318, 334, 
335, 336, 337, 343, 355, 463, 470; 
see also joint prayers





Princess Juliana School, 30
Prisma, 195–6
priyayi, 12, 15, 17–8, 19, 20, 34, 47, 56, 
60, 62, 70, 80, 97, 98, 108n84, 151, 
162, 164, 314, 388, 496
Probolinggo, 18, 23, 99, 298, 336, 
349n19
prophesies, MUI fatwa against, 346
prostitution, 35, 36, 94, 126, 136, 233, 
234, 282, 283, 352, 420, 423, 425, 
426, 491, 502
Protestantism, see Christianity
Protocols of the Elders of Zion, 262, 
289
Proyek Pembinaan Mental Agama, 156












Qadiriyya wa Naqshabandiyya, 15, 50, 
170, 188, 215
Qadiriyya, 50, 51, 344
Qaeda, al-, 267, 275, 313, 401n112, 
468, 494
qasidah, see kasidah
qital, fiqh al-, 412
Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah, Al-, 332–4
Qur’an kindergartens, 316–17, 326















 33:59, 293; 
 36, 169n158
 52, 306n111
 55:33, 190–1; 
 56:27–56, 70; 
 57:25, 306n111; 
 59:2, 250; 
 109, 148 
Qutb, Sayyid, 44, 161, 171, 182, 186, 
241
rabita, 53
Rabitat al-‘Alam al-Islami, 160, 287
Radar Kediri, 271n23, 503
Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Solo, 182
Raffles, T.S., 9
Raharjo Suwandi, 129, 130, 132
Rahima, 290
Rahmat Subagya ( Jan Bakker), 132
Raliby, Osman, 165, 190, 191, 305
Rama, 35
Rama Diyat, Empu (Soediyat 
Prawirokoesomo), 118–19
rasa, 328
Rashid Rida, M., 166, 176
Rasjidi, M., 44–5, 148, 149, 166, 187
Rasul, Haji (Abdul Karim Amrullah), 
53, 64
Rational Choice Theory, 485
Ratu Adil, 11, 37, 38, 123, 129, 131, 
372, 487, 488–9
Ratu Kidul, see Goddess of the 
Southern Ocean
Rawls, J., 480, 484n48, 492n69
Razi, Abu Bakr al-, 487
Razi, Abu Hatim al-, 487
rebana, 103, 213, 398
Red Army Brigrades, 410, 494
regional autonomy, decentralisation, 
234, 260, 261, 266–7, 392, 448, 499
Rejoso, 186, 188
Religion, Religious Affairs, Ministry/
Department of, 82, 87, 137, 153, 
155, 167, 193, 202, 272, 290, 318n1, 
325, 333, 352n28, 381, 448
Rembang, 290n49, 344–5




Revolusi Agustus, 77, 301,
Revolution, Indonesian, 39, 45, 62, 
68–79, 87, 111, 112, 129, 200, 218, 
350, 372, 464, 496, 504
reyog, 103–4, 125, 212, 232, 233, 235, 
405, 496
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Rhoma Irama, 219–20, 298
Rifa‘iyah, 15
Rina Iriani Sri Ratnaningsih, 380
Risalah Mujahidin, 266
Rizieq Shihab, M., 420, 421n32




Roy, O., 467–8, 476, 478
rubber, 25
Rumi, Jalal al-Din, 297
ruqya, 308; Persis fatwa against, 
309n123




Saban, observances during, 46–7, 216
Sabda Palon, Sabda Palon Naya-
genggong, 302, 384–5, 452, 453
Sabili, 266, 275–6, 302, 325, 437
Sabilil Muttaqin, 213–14
Sabilillah (militias), 74, 76, 88
Sabilillah, Sabilullah (Holy War), 275, 
412, 488
Sadrach, 13,
Sahal Mahfudh, 352n26, 360, 422
Said Agil Siradj, 336, 349–50, 355, 360, 
446
Saifuddin Zuhri, 42–3, 70, 75, 77
Saiful Mujani, 277n9
Salafi, 170, 241, 313, 401, 422, 433, 497
Salahuddin mosque, 159, 233
Salamullah, 322n20
Salatiga, 76, 111, 145




Samboyo Putro, Pak Samboyo, 236–7






Sanskrit, 217, 221, 222, 223, 482
santri, passim; proportion of in 
population, 81–5, 268–71; changing 
usage of term, 269, 498n80
santrinisasi, 212, 255n149
Sanusi, M., 187n197
Sapta Darma, 132, 133, 384–5, 386, 
390–1




Sarekat Islam, 19, 489
Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia, 73
Sartre, J-P., 172
Sat Guru Sabdo Langit IV, 388
Satan, 182, 236, 337, 404
satriya, 36; see also Kṣatriyas
Saudi Arabia, 51, 160, 189, 241, 272, 
287, 300, 313, 359, 399, 400–1, 419, 
443, 467, 472n25, 497
Sayidin, 488
sayur lodeh, 375
science and medicine, Islamised 
versions of, 305–9
Sebelas Maret, Universitas, 184, 307, 
503
Secularism: in Indonesian politics, 57, 
60, 65, 69, 124, 195, 215, 263, 264, 
276–9, 282, 292, 447–9, 451, 452, 
473, 489, 496; denunciations of in 
Indonesia, 171–2, 184, 242, 249, 
250, 262, 289, 314, 359, 365, 412, 
434; in USA, 447
Sejarah nasional Indonesia, 201
Sekolah Islam Terpadu, see Integrated 
Islamic Schools
Selok, Mt, 119
Semar, 127, 184, 264n10, 302, 390
Semarang, passim
Sempu, 453, 456
Sen, A., 485, 486n54
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Sen, K., 201, 219
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The Javanese — one of the largest ethnic groups in the Islamic world — were once 
mostly ‘nominal Muslims’, with a minority of pious believers and the majority 
seemingly resistant to Islam’s call for greater piety. Over the tumultuous period 
analyzed here — from colonial rule through Japanese occupation and Revolution 
to the chaotic democracy of the Sukarno period, the Soeharto regime’s aspirant 
totalitarianism and the democratic period since — that society has changed 
profoundly to become an extraordinary example of the rising religiosity that marks 
the modern age.
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Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java 
draws on a formidable body of sources, 
including interviews, archival documents 
and a vast range of published material, to 
situate the Javanese religious experience 
from the 1930s to the present day in its 
local political, social, cultural and religious 
settings. The concluding part of the 
author’s monumental three-volume series 
assessing more than six centuries of the 
ongoing Islamisation of the Javanese, the 
study has considerable relevance for much 
wider contexts. Beliefs, or disbeliefs, about 
the supernatural are important in all societies; and the nal section of the book, 
which considers the signicance of Java’s religious history in global contexts, 
shows how this history exemplies a profound contest of values in the universal 
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